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ABSTRACT
It has been identified that Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities have
severe impacts on, and continue to be a prominent problem to, marine ecosystems. In a 2012
report, FAO disclosed that 87.3% of fish stocks were fully exploited or overexploited. In
accordance with the recent report, it is estimated that the economic losses from the practice
are approximately between $10 billion and $23.5 billion per year, which is equal to between
11 and 26 million tons of fish catch. The FAO report revealed that fish stocks decreased from
90 per cent in 1974 to 71.2 per cent in 2013 while 68.8 per cent of were considered
overfished.
Indonesia has a significant IUU fishing problem. According to the data provided by the
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia (MMAF), Indonesia suffers around Rp.
101 trillion (US$ 8.8 million) annually due to IUU fishing activities alone. The economic
losses Indonesia has suffered from those illicit activities are from the practices of tax evasion,
illegal fuel and this has affected local fishermen’s income. In response to this matter,
Indonesian authorities have committed to eradicating the activities by imposing stringent
measures.
When probing IUU fishing, related transnational crimes activities have also been discovered
including human trafficking and slavery as well as drugs and weapons smuggling. As such,
Indonesia has developed several legal and policy measures to overcome IUU fishing and
transnationally organized fisheries crimes. Nonetheless, there persist some challenges. This
paper examines Indonesia’s policy and legal practices in combating IUU fishing and
transnationally organized fisheries crimes from the views of domestic and relevant
international law and practices by observing the advantages and disadvantages of such policy
and making analysis through the lens of environmental law. At the end, it attempts to analyse
if fisheries crime offers a better approach to combat IUU fishing.
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ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING AND TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED FISHERIES CRIME:
PERSPECTIVES OF LEGAL AND POLICY MEASURES OF INDONESIA
PART I
INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction.
It is conceived that fisheries constitute an essential sector for human life as fish is a part of
the diet of millions of people and contributes significantly as an income source.1 The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) disclosed that 56.6 million people around the globe
were involved in the leading sector of capture fisheries and aquaculture in 2014. However,
compared to the previous years of 2012 and 2013, the number of people working in the said
sector showed a decline in 2014. Further, in the same year, there was an approximate
reduction of 1.5 million fishermen which gave rise to the total decrease of those employed in
capture fisheries from 83 per cent in 1990 to 67 per cent in 2014. This was a different case to
the overall engagement in aquaculture which was considered more stable and even showed an
increase from 17 to 33 per cent in the same period. In 2014, Asia assumed the most
substantial proportion of people engaged in fisheries and aquaculture being 84 per cent,
followed by Africa with nearly 10 per cent and Latin America and the Caribbean (about 4 per
cent).2
In the broader sphere of ocean resources, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) estimated in 2010 the overall contribution of oceans to the world
value-added economy to reach US$1.5 trillion per annum.3 This considerable contribution to
global revenue should be secured from destructive practices and nature’s phenomena such as
illegal fishing and climate change, respectively. This challenge has existed for a long time,
and international society has taken measures to address critical ocean problems for more than
half a century. Historically, the awareness to preserve ocean resources emerged after the
Second World War. The concern that ocean resources, despite their renewability in many
cases, are not unlimited and, for that reason, they have to be adequately managed if their roles
1

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2010 (Rome, 2010)
6.
2
FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014 (Rome, 2014) 32.
3
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Ocean Economy in 2030: Workshop
on
Maritime
Clusters
and
Global
Challenges
(1
December
2016)
<https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/Session%201_b%20-%20Claire%20Jolly%20-%20Web.pdf>.

1

are to be sustained in providing contributions to food, employment, and social aspects in
increasing global population growth.4
In addition, the resources have a large-scale advantage for human health and nutrition. As the
primary source of animal protein, fish delivers the protein for one billion of the globe’s
poorest people. 5 The provisioning service of food from capture fisheries and culturing
activities are regarded as one of the ultimate services granted by the oceans to human
communities. The ocean creatures categorized as ocean-based sources of food include marine
mammals, plants, invertebrates, and fish. 6 Considering the crucial concerns, it is worth
mentioning that fish stocks play a key role in ensuring the contributions of ocean resources be
provided without any hindrance.
Unfortunately, fisheries resources have shown a general trend of decline from 90 per cent in
1974 to 71.2 per cent in 2011 based on the reports composed by FAO, amongst others, in
2011, 2012 and 2014.7 This deterioration, as part of ocean problems, is not only related to
environmental concerns, but it also extends to criminal activities. Within a study of
transnational environmental crimes, it is not too challenging to find academic literature to
review the interplay between illegal fishing and transnationally organized crimes, because
this subject has received close attention from the international community and scholars in
recent years.8 In a book titled ‘Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime,’ Eve de
Coning offers a thoughtful discussion on fisheries crimes. At the very outset of the article,
she presents several cases of illegal fishing conducted by fishing vessels such as the Songhua,
4

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm>. The discussion of historical perspective can be found
in the preface of the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) as background to depict how
essential it is to adopt CCRF.
5
Ed Pilkington, ‘Saving Global Fish Stocks Would Cost 20 Million Jobs, Says UN’ The Guardian (Sydney), 18
May 2010 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/may/17/saving-fish-stocks-cost-jobs>.
6
The United Nations, The First Global Integrated Marine Assessment (World Ocean Assessment I): Chapter 10
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) (‘World Ocean Assessment I’) 2.
7
FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2014, above n 2, 37.
8
Seokwoo Lee, Anastasia Telesetsky, and Clive Schofield, ‘Slipping the Net: Why Is It So Difficult to Crack
Down on IUU Fishing’ in Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore, Robert C. Beckman and Ronan Long (eds),
Freedom of Navigation and Globalization (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff Publishing, 2015), 88, 111. The connection
between IUU fishing and TOC has been firstly raised in the ninth meeting of the United Nations Open-ended
Informal Consultative Process on Ocean, and the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS) held in 2008. Delegates
required deeper and further research on the interplay between IUU fishing and TOC. Three years later after the
UNICPOLOS meeting (in 2011), UNODC organized an expert group meeting to discuss the presence of TOC in
the fishing industry. UNODC has been productive in taking the initiative to hold meetings and initiating some
publications on the subjects such as Organized Crime Involvement in Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of
Migrants, Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry and Estimating Illicit Financial Flows
Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crimes: Research Report.

2

the Kunlun and the Yongding that are allegedly part of criminal organizations utilizing the
weak enforcement of fisheries law in the Southern Ocean. 9 These illegal fishing vessels
having committed crimes repeatedly are known as ‘repeat offenders’ employing ‘flag
hopping, fish laundering, ports and flags of convenience’ and involving Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated (IUU) fishing.10
Within the internal arena, Indonesia also faces illegal fishing and other transnationally
organized crimes related to this activity. The report of the International Organization
Migration (IOM) depicts the detrimental effect of illegal fishing on various aspects including
Indonesia’s economy, environment, and small-scale fishers. 11 When she joined the World
Bank, Sri Mulyani gave an overview of Indonesia's coral reefs which were regarded as
threatened at 65 per cent as a result of overfishing practices. Illegal and unreported fishing
makes Indonesia’s loss of revenue some US$ 20 billion. The poverty rate in coastal areas also
remains high.12 Illegal fishing impinges heavily upon those small-scale fishermen living in
coastal areas due to the decline in fish stocks. As a consequence of overfishing, Indonesia’s
people have become less interested in opting to be fishers as an occupation, in particular,
traditional fishers. It is evident that based on the data from the Central Bureau of Statistics of
Indonesia, the number of traditional fishers experienced a decrease from 1.6 million to 864
000 households between 2003 and 2013.13
In general, as revealed by Telesetsky, countries have regarded IUU fishing as a management
problem of fishery resources rather than as an egregious crime.14 More complexity in the

9

Murray McCully (2015a), ‘Illegal vessels fail to comply with attempts to board,’ press release, 14 January
2012, cited in Eve de Coning, ‘Fisheries Crimes’ in Gregory Rose (ed), Handbook of Transnational
Environmental Crime (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 146.
10
INTERPOL (2015a, 2015b, 2015c), ‘INTERPOL Purple Notice: Modus Operandi,’ cited in Eve de Coning,
‘Fisheries Crimes’ in Gregory Rose (ed), Handbook of Transnational Environmental Crime (Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2016) 146, 146.
11
MMAF, International Organization for Migration and Coventry University, ‘Human Trafficking, Forced
Labour
and
Fisheries
Crime
in
the
Indonesia
Fishing
Industry’
(Report,
2016)
<https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/country/docs/indonesia/Human-Trafficking-Forced-Labour-andFisheries-Crime-in-the-Indonesian-Fishing-Industry-IOM.pdf> 11.
12
Sri
Mulyani,
‘the
Case
for
Inclusive
Green
Growth’
(9
June
2015)
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/06/09/the-case-for-inclusive-green-growth>. Sri Mulyani
holds the position as Minister of Finance of Indonesia prior to and post joining the World Bank. This statement
was delivered in the Indonesia Green Infrastructure Summit in Jakarta.
13
MMAF, International Organization for Migration and Coventry University, above n 11.
14
Anastasia Telesetsky, ‘Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
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fisheries sector, drawn from some cases of organized crimes, demonstrates that illegal fishing
does not bring fisheries management problems per se. Transnational crimes such as human
trafficking and drugs smuggling do occur in the fishing activities of Indonesia. In early 2018,
the Indonesian navy seized ‘FV Sunrise Glory’, a fishing vessel attempting to smuggle one
tonne of crystal methamphetamine, concealed in 41 sacks of rice, just off the Batam Island
waters. When boarded and inspected, the vessel was flying a Singaporean flag. However,
after further investigation, this vessel had changed the flag or been ‘reflagged’ because the
navy also discovered a Taiwanese flag on board.15
Another case of human trafficking has been practiced within a fishing company located in
Benjina and Ambon, Eastern Indonesia in 2015. This case drew the attention of the
international community as a very large number of 1300 of fishers were working in inhuman
conditions. Some media called this practice human slavery because human rights were
violated including excessive work hours, abuse of physical and mental conditions and even
homicide. The rescued fishermen originated from Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos.
The foreign fishing vessels employed them when poaching fish in Indonesia waters by
reflagging. In this case, IOM played a crucial role in undertaking the investigation of the
victims.16 In perceiving and addressing IUU fishing and fisheries related crimes in Indonesia,
the analysis on the subject matter should be tagged on the general framework of maritime
policy under Jokowi’s administration. This overview would deliver a more comprehensive
understanding of the policies taken by Susi Pudjiastuti, Minister of Marine Affairs and
Fisheries, on her priority to launch a war against IUU fishing and its related transnational
organized crimes (TOC).
A total area of 5 193 250 square kilometres of marine waters17 covers approximately 78 per
cent of the whole of Indonesia’s territory.18 The country offers abundant marine and fisheries
resources including capture fisheries that are explorable to the advantage of the Indonesian
people. In that sense, in spite of it being obviously an illegal act, it is not much of a surprise
15
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that once foreign fishing vessels poach fish in Indonesia waters and violate domestic and
international relevant laws in the form of IUU fishing, it contributes to fisheries-related
crimes taking place. This marine and biodiversity richness has led the top policymakers of the
country to take strategic steps and to be creative in securing the resources from the poachers
and other violations by way of ocean governance.
With such a vast area of marine waters and their complexity, Indonesia has complicated
ocean governance.19 The complication extends to IUU fishing and fisheries crimes for the
reason that the ocean governance holds a pivotal role in addressing both fisheries problems
and in setting a mechanism for prevention of those activities experiencing further expansion.
The intricate issues may come from the inadequacy of the elements of ocean governance such
as legal and policy frameworks in closing the gaps that persist between the two levels,
national and international.
In the domestic sense, when Minister Susi Pudjiastuti takes a hard stance against illegal
fishing perpetrators through, among others, sinking and/or burning illegal domestic and
foreign fishing vessels, the question of the legality of such robust measure prevails.20 The
legal view shall be taken into account in this respect since, as a member of the international
community and party to ocean-related international conventions, Indonesia shall conform
with relevant domestic and international laws. For instance, fishing vessels flying foreign
flags carry national jurisdiction of a state over the boat, in accordance with Article 94(1) of
the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC).21 It may raise a legal question when such vessels
suffer a severe penalty from Indonesia authorities. Such legal inquiry also applies when
finding the link between IUU fishing and TOC.
In developing an in-depth analysis of the nexus between IUU fishing and TOC, two
dimensions of national and international dimensions need to be examined as those two are
intertwined. The interconnectedness can be explained through the interdisciplinary
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knowledge of international law and international relations. The collaborations between the
two schools of thought have been a long-standing subject of academic discussion by scholars
after the end of World War II.22 In this sense, international relations practitioners need to
understand the concept of international legal argument in international treaties being binding,
amongst states. Likewise, in establishing good relations with other parties, international
lawyers should comprehend the ideal notion of diplomacy as the core of international
relations.
Within the realm of the subject matter of this thesis, the discussion falls under related
international legal instruments such as LOSC, Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea of 10 December 1982
Relating to The Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (the 1995 United Nations Fish Stock Agreement), 23 Port State
Measure Agreement (PSMA) 24 and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (UNTOC), 25 the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the 1993
FAO Compliance Agreement), the Cape Town Agreement on the Safety of Fishing Vessels
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(the 2012 Cape Town Agreement) and other relevant legally binding mechanisms in the form
of “hard law” as well as international legal cases.
The other international frameworks include voluntary mechanisms, or “soft law”, containing
moral and political commitments that are non-legally binding in character such as IPOAIUUF (International Plan of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing), joint
declarations, action plans, and memoranda of understanding. Meanwhile, international
relations play a strategic role in endorsing Indonesia’s interest before international forums or
in international organizations such as FAO, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crimes
(UNODC), and ASEAN through the formulation of appropriate domestic policy measures
and legal instruments.
Under the Regime of President Joko Widodo (preferably known as Jokowi), ocean affairs
receive more attention from policymakers and have become a top national agenda after the
doctrine of Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) was declared. This policy makes Minister Susi,
whose institution assumes the primary responsibility of sustainably securing marine
resources, pledge to fight at all costs any illicit activities such as illegal fishing and
transnationally organized crimes relevant to it. In this sense, the adequacy of legal and policy
domains turns out to be significant factors in making the said objective be pursued. Those
two dimensions would become more relevant in conjunction with international legal
instruments and practices. This thesis attempts to examine the existing legal and policy
frameworks of Indonesia to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and its connection with
Transnational Organized Fisheries Crime (TOFC) within the context of relevant practices of
international laws and policies and to provide a critical discussion of the inclusion of any
pertinent measures of a broader scope, or the interplay between IUU fishing and fisheries
crimes.
This thesis comprises eight different parts. Part one is the introduction consisting of the
discussion on domestic and global problems of IUU fishing and TOFC. Part two provides the
general overview of the search for archipelagic status by Indonesia. This part is imperative in
terms of the history of Indonesia as an archipelagic state and its struggle to obtain
archipelagic status. From the past, some lessons can be drawn to inspire the current efforts of
Indonesia to promote the issue of transnational organized fisheries crimes at the global level.
This part also provides the maritime journey of Indonesia. Part three presents the examination
7

of GMF to revisit Indonesia as a maritime nation. Part four examines policy perspectives on
IUU fishing and TOFC ultimately. This part is divided into two sections applying
backgrounds (international and domestic) and proposed policy measures as a response to the
loopholes identified. Part five encompasses international and domestic legal frameworks on
IUU fishing and TOFC followed by identifying the loopholes and proposing legal measures
to fill these gaps. Part six examines IUU fishing and fisheries crimes through the lens of
environmental law. Part seven offers the discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of
combatting illegal fishing from the perspective of TOC. Part eight presents the conclusions.
1.1 The Deteriorating Global Level of Fish Stocks.
The global community faces a major challenge in fostering the benefits that the ocean can
offer without compromising the capability of the ocean to deliver continuously its advantages
for future generations, in particular sustainably managing ocean exploration and exploitation.
The decline in fish stocks status has been a major concern of many countries particularly the
concern for food security and sustainable development.26 As revealed by the report of FAO in
2012, the proportion of fish stock overexploitation has surged, particularly in the late 1970s
and 1980s, which accounted for 10 per cent of the world’s marine catch in 1974 to 26 per
cent in 1989. Since 1990, the amount of overexploited fish stocks had continued to increase
but at a slower pace.27 Although this matter is subject to international attention, the level of
marine fish stock globally demonstrates a general decline and therefore it needs
improvement. This inference can be drawn from the other comparisons presented by FAO in
2014 relating to the state of the global marine fish stock from 1974 to 2011, as illustrated in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The State of the Global Marine Fish Stocks 1974-2011 (FAO) 28
Notes: Dark shading =within biologically sustainable levels; light shading = at biologically unsustainable levels. The light line divides
the stocks within biologically sustainable levels into two subcategories: fully shed (above the line) and under shed (below the line)

The FAO further reported in 2014 that prior to experiencing a general decline, the global
marine fisheries reached a production peak of 86.4 million tonnes in 1996. In 2011, global
production was 82.6 million tonnes while in 2012 the production was 79.7 million tonnes. It
was recorded in 2011 that the region with the highest output of 21.4 million tonnes or 26 per
cent of the world’s marine catch was the Northwest Pacific. The second highest was the
Southeast Pacific region with 12.3 million tonnes or 15 per cent, followed by the Western
Pacific and the Northeast Pacific with 11.5 million tonnes or 14 per cent and 8.0 million
tonnes or 9 per cent, respectively.29
The portion of biologically sustainable levels of fish stock demonstrated a decrease from 90
per cent in 1974 to 71.2 per cent in 2011 while 28.8 per cent of stocks were considered to be
overfished. In the same year, 2011, the fish stocks that were fully fished and underfished
accounted for 61.3 per cent and 9.9 per cent respectively.30 Furthermore, the stock of fish
continued to decline to a level of 68.8 per cent in 2013, leaving approximately 31.4 per cent
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overfished or biologically fished at the unsustainable level.31 It can be inferred from this data
that fish stocks, in general, decreased during that period. If this problem is not taken
seriously, it could result in there being no fish remaining in the ocean, and it may be a threat
to the life of mankind. The primary issue affecting the declining level of fish stock has been
identified as the practices of IUU fishing. This activity leads to severe destructive impacts
and continues to be a prominent problem for marine ecosystems. 32 From an economic
viewpoint, based on the assessment by the United Nations in 2010, it was estimated that the
worldwide losses from the practice of IUU fishing were approximately between US$10
billion and US$23.5 billion per year, which was equal to between 11 and 26 million tonnes of
fish catch.33
1.2 Transnational Organized Crimes in the Fisheries Sector.
It is evident that developing countries are those most affected by IUU fishing practices. This
destructive activity particularly impinges upon several poor countries where the income of
the people is highly dependent on fisheries for foods and exports. 34 Developing states in
Africa and the Asia Pacific constitute the main instances of the countries facing the grave
impacts of IUU fishing. One recent example of economic losses in the waters of Sub-Sahara
Africa accounted for almost US$1b in one year, equal to nearly 25 per cent of the total
amount of fisheries annual exports.35 Meanwhile, in the Asia Pacific alone, the cost as a result
of IUU fishing practices, is approximately US$4.5 billion to US$5.8 billion a year.36
As a form of transnational and organized activity, IUU fishing is intertwined with other
crimes. In many cases, transnational organized crimes such as people smuggling, human
trafficking, forced labour, and drug trafficking can be found when IUU fishing takes place.
One example is an abalone fishery case in South Africa. As assessed by UNODC, this case
had a link with an international criminal organization. The connection was shown when
31

Ibid.
Ibid 9.
33
United Nations, Resumed Review Conference on the Agreement Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: General Facts regarding World
Fisheries
(United
Nations
Department
of
Public
Information,
24-28
May
2010)
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/reviewconf/FishStocks_EN_A.pdf> 3.
34
Frank Meere, ‘The Challenge of Combatting Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: Fishing for
Development’ (Background Paper for participants to a joint meeting of the OECD, FAO and the World Bank on
Fishing for Development, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, March 2014) 9.
35
David J. Agnew et al., ‘West Africa Regional Fisheries Project. Estimation of the Cost of Illegal Fishing in
West Africa. Final Report’ (the Marine Resource Assessment Group, 2010) 8.
36
Robin Lungren et al., Status and Potential Fisheries and Aquaculture in Asia and the Pacific 2006 (FAO
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, RAP Publication 2006/22) 46.
32

10

abalone from South Africa was exported to other countries, and in return, drugs were
imported to South Africa. Ostensibly, the investigation disclosed that abalone plundering is
part of the criminal chain related to theft and illegal drugs in the country.37
Another area of enquiry making a clear nexus between IUU fishing and organized crime is
when organized criminal groups such as Russian criminal syndicates, Chinese Triads, and
other Asia gangs commonly engage in practicing IUU fishing. Russian syndicates illegally
ship around two million metric tonnes of seafood to Europe and other countries such as the
United States and Japan, earning up to US$4 billion annually in the 1990s. It was conceivable
that the criminal groups were also associated with the illegal harvesting of abalone which
generated up to US$80 million a year in revenue.38 In pursuing their objectives, the criminal
syndicates employed illegitimate methods. For instance, when poaching razor clams in
Scotland, the organized gangs violated laws by using unlicensed vessels and electro-fishing, a
stunning method by operating electrical shock, to collect shellfish.39
An expert group meeting, organized by UNODC on 8-9 March 2011, 40 gave rise to the
publication of Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry focusing on three main
topics of trafficking in persons, migrant smuggling and trafficking of drugs. This research
attempts to address two main concerns, firstly, whether TOC and other crimes do occur in the
fishing industry, and secondly, what the vulnerabilities of the fishing sector are to TOC or
other criminal activities.41 The research on both fundamental questions is highly relevant for
convincing the countries involved, pertaining to the presence of TOC in the fisheries sector as
well as to examine the interplay between TOC and IUU fishing.
From the above-mentioned publication, the study held a view that TOC such as trafficking in
persons, migrant smuggling, illegal drugs trafficking and psychotropic substances in all its
37
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forms involved most of the fishing-industrial sector.42 Based on the findings, other related
types of criminal activity such as corruption, piracy, poaching of marine living resources and
other security related crimes have been considered as having links with the fishing industry.
Meanwhile, for the second question, the study disclosed that the fishing industry poses
various vulnerabilities related to:43
1. Opportunities;
2. Governance and Rule of Law;
3. Sea Surveillance and Transhipment;
4. Lack of Transparency;
5. Jurisdiction of Criminal Law Enforcement;
6. Shortage of Safety Regulation and On-board Fishing Vessels’ Working Conditions;
7. Circumstances of Socio-Economics; and
8. Acceptance of Social Norms.
These vulnerabilities provide a comprehensive and general overview of the potential
problems in the fisheries sector. Should the problem occur in the fishing industry concerning
TOC, one or more above-mentioned vulnerabilities can be referred to as the main background
for a more in-depth analysis.
1.3 The Measures of Indonesia to Cope with IUU Fishing and TOC.
Indonesia encounters the same challenges as the other countries pertaining to IUU fishing
practices. According to the accessible data presented by MMAF (Ministry of Marine Affairs
and Fisheries) of the Republic of Indonesia, each year Indonesia suffers many losses
amounting to approximately Rp. 101 trillion (US$8.8 million) as a result of these activities
with the highest losses resulting from tax revenue, fuel subsidy and local fishermen’s
income. 44 The illegal fishermen also produce and hold counterfeit licenses to avoid tax
payment. These unlawful fishermen fill their boats with fuel supposed to be allocated to
traditional fisherman and subsidized by Indonesia Government leading to the loss of state
revenue. In practice, they employ destructive fishing gear reducing the local fishermen’s
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catch as well. The flag states most identified in conducting IUU fishing activities in Indonesia
are of various nationalities such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and China.45
Indonesia has shown a prompt response in addressing this fish poaching through the
imposition of stringent measures, such as, among other methods, burning and/or sinking
illegal fishing vessels and establishing particular-designated tasks forces. From January to
April 2014, the Indonesian maritime police seized 16 (sixteen) ships committing illegal
fishing in Indonesian waters, eight of them were Vietnam-flagged vessels. The Directorate
General of Marine and Fisheries Resources Surveillance of Indonesia’s MMAF confiscated
130 fishing vessels between 2007 and April 2014.46
The burning and/or sinking of illegal fishing vessels continued to occur from 2015 onwards.
As pointed out by Nilanto Prabowo, former Director General for Product Competitiveness of
the MMAF, from 2015 to 2017 the number of fishing vessels found committing illegal
fishing and which were sunk was 363. Nevertheless, this robust measure did not prevent the
poachers completely breaching related national and international laws and regulations. 47
Policy and institutional regulators have also been fortified when MMAF established a Task
Force to Prevent and Eliminate IUU Fishing through the stipulation of Ministerial Decree
Number 26A/KEPMEN-KP/2015. 48 This ministerial decree employs the objective of
addressing the problem through more coordinated and integrated efforts amongst departments
within the ambit of MMAF.
Another initiative also taken by the Indonesian Government is to form a special task force at
national level through a cross-sectoral approach by involving other agencies such as the
Navy, National Police, Maritime Security Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut), Attorney
General’s Office, PT Pertamina (a State-owned Oil Enterprise) and other relevant institutions
through the enactment of Presidential Regulation Number 115/2015 concerning the Task
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Force to Combat Illegal Fishing.49 This team has the abbreviated name of Satuan Tugas 115
(Task Force 115). The number 115 is derived from a set of regulations founding this task
force within the legal framework. The primary duties of this task force are not only to combat
illegal fishing but also to develop fisheries governance through a strategic roadmap,50 and
presumably in that sense, this team falls under the coordination of the Minister of Marine
Affairs and Fisheries. The involvement of different agencies carries the mission to make the
efforts more integrated and coordinated in combating IUU fishing and fisheries crime.
The measures employed by MMAF to foster fisheries resources in Indonesia’s waters finds
full support by President Joko Widodo who pays a lot of attention to maritime issues and
reinforced Indonesia as a maritime nation by declaring Indonesia as the GMF in the early
stage of his presidency in June, 201451 and invoking the slogan Jalesveva Jayamahe (In Our
Seas We Are Triumphant). 52 This vision has been translated further through Presidential
Regulation 16/2017 concerning Indonesia’s Ocean Policy. President Jokowi also introduced
this doctrine at the 9th East Asia Summit in Myanmar resting on five main pillars.53 The
endeavour of MMAF in combatting IUU fishing and fisheries crimes falls under the Second
pillar.
The ministry’s sound policy to fight against illegal fishing by sinking or/and blowing up
fishing vessel receives ample support from the international community. At the global level,
outstanding acknowledgments of Minister Susi’s commitment have been presented by several
organizations. In September 2016, the World Wild Fund (WWF) conferred Leaders for a
Living Planet Award to Minister Susi. This award shows recognition for remarkable personal
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contributions to nature conservation and sustainable development.54 In 2017, as a sign of
maritime contribution, Minister Susi received an Annual Peter Benchley Ocean Award being
recognized for 2017 Excellence in National Stewardship. She was recognized by the
committee for her encouragement in aggressively protecting the economy and environment of
Indonesia from the operations of pirate fishing by foreign fleets through among other things,
blowing up illegal fishing boats seized for poaching, freeing labourers working like slaves on
those foreign fishing boats and leading to the release of illegally trapped whale sharks.55
In 2016, foremost legal structures to safeguard Indonesia’s marine resources and to eliminate
IUU fishing have been constructed by the Indonesian Government through the ratification of
the Agreement on Port State Measuress to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing (PSMA) by enacting Presidential Regulation 43/2016. 56 This
ratification implies state’s consent to be bound by the Agreement in having effective law
enforcement against poachers for fishing vessels when intending to offload the catch in the
nearest port through port state jurisdiction. As pointed out by Emma Witbooi, the PSMA is
considered as a significant leap to uphold current efforts in combatting IUU fishing. 57
Indonesia’s ratification to PSMA is complemented by its endorsement, along with the
Norwegian Government to apply the 2014 FAO Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State as a
“soft law” instrument aiming to improve the implementation of Flag State responsibilities.58
Nevertheless, the realization of the guidelines by both countries remains to be seen in the near
future.
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1.4 Indonesia’s Persistent Diplomacy in Bilateral and Multilateral Forums.
TOFC or fisheries crimes is a progressively major issue not only in terms of maritime
security but also in its relationship to ‘the sustainability of marine living resources’.59 As part
of IUU fishing, to some extent, TOFC can be deemed as a core business of IUU fishing. It
can be argued that in achieving their illegal objectives, IUU fishing perpetrators commonly
cross borders and poach fisheries resources illegally by using organized networks. Therefore,
it is necessary to act hand-in-hand with the other countries and the international community
to address this problem. The Indonesian Government has a deep awareness of organized
criminal groups conducting IUU fishing by raising this matter in international forums.
The role of diplomacy is prevalent in shaping international norms and garnering the
commitment of countries to converse and agree on common concerns. In bilateral and
multilateral agendas, determined position has been shown by Indonesia on the issues of IUU
fishing and its connection with transnational organized crimes. When negotiating texts in the
bilateral meeting with Australia during the 9th Ministerial Forum, both the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia
agreed to raise this issue and came to the conclusion to combat IUU fishing and
acknowledged the connection between illegal fishing and TOC groups. They also committed
to implement active efforts in eradicating this practice, among others, from the perspective of
UNTOC. The ministers reiterated further their assurance to prevent and fight IUU fishing as
referred to in the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the
Framework for Security Cooperation (Lombok Treaty).60
On a multilateral level, the mandate and function of the Commission on Crime Prevention
and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), is amongst other things to combat national and transnational
59
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crime,61 and can be deemed to be one of the appropriate formal forums under the UN system
to invite attention from the countries to discuss this matter further. Although the resolutions
and decisions of this Commission are non-legally binding in character and hold no authority
to compel governments to take particular actions they undoubtedly, to a large extent, carry
political and moral weights. In the 2013 sessions of CCPCJ and on International Drug
Control held in the United Nations, Andi Rachmianto echoed Indonesia's commitment to
have a closer collaboration and impose more robust efforts with the international society in
fighting ‘arising crimes’ such as cybercrime, illegal transfer of traditional properties, illegal
transfer of forest goods and IUU fishing activities.62
A similar concern on IUU fishing was again raised in the same forum by Indonesia’s
representative. During the 25th session of CCPCJ which took place in Vienna in May 2016,
the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti reaffirmed Indonesia’s view
that ‘fisheries crimes and other fisheries-related crimes’ are related to IUU fishing. The
terminology ‘crime’ is here attributed as depicting delinquency committed in the fisheries
activities including organized crimes such as forced labour, human trafficking and weapons
smuggling. Based on its investigation, Indonesia found several fishing vessels that engaged in
‘transnational organized criminal groups’ also were involved in those illicit activities. She
reiterated further that fisheries crimes and fisheries-related crimes should be treated equal to
the other transnational organized crimes. She was of the view that effective measures through
international cooperation can be garnered if this approach was employed.63 In this important
forum, when conveying Indonesia’s concerns, Minister Susi emphasized the transnational
aspect of IUU fishing in its relationship to criminal organization networks. She was on the
right path in making this statement which was observed by the other delegates since
Indonesia saw this problem from the domestic point of view.
At the United Nations Ocean Conference held in the UN Headquarters on 5-9 June 2017, the
Indonesian delegation, led by Luhut Panjaitan, Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs of
Indonesia, raised, before the delegates of member countries, the notion of the inclusion of
61
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IUU fishing as an organized crime activity. At this prestigious worldwide conference,
Minister Susi also strongly recommended declaring IUU fishing as a crime transnationally
organized. Peter Thomson, President of the United Nations General Assembly, rendered
support for this proposal and called upon all parties, governments, Non-Governmental
Organizations and scientist to take a role in this campaign.64 Until the end of the conference,
the proposal remained undecided by countries. Despite the fact that the President of the
General Assembly has verbally lent his support, no General Assembly resolution was adopted
to confirm this inclusion as his statement was made in his personal capacity, without
representing the UN as an institution.
The responses of countries in perceiving this environmental and security connection are
diverse. Although IUU fishing and the other related crimes have a global dimension and
countries should bear the responsibilities in cracking down on the problems, it should pass
through several processes to make those subjects accepted as international norms. This issue
should also conform to some facets such as the global legal system to make countries
convinced of their common interest. State representatives examined the early effort to link
those IUU fishing and transnational organized crimes including environmental crime in the
9th meeting of the United Nations Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Ocean and
the Law of the Sea (UNICPOLOS) held in 2008.65 In this forum, some delegates challenged
the notion to include IUU fishing as a threat to maritime security,66 yet the general perception
was expressed that illegal fishing threatens the economy, livelihood and marine environment
leading to the deterioration of sustainable development. 67
In the 9th UNICPOLOS meeting, some countries were of the view that illegal fishing should
be part of transnational crime but on the other hand, other delegations observed that the
connection between illegal fishing and several other crimes conducted at sea was inadequate
to designate illegal fishing as TOC. Those opposing delegates maintained that flag states have
exclusive jurisdiction when operating on the high seas, including IUU fishing. The flag state
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exclusivity can be waived when maritime security threats take place. Unfortunately, in
international law, there is no such recognition of IUU fishing being a maritime security,68 so
that flag state responsibility plays a key role in combatting this activity when committed at
sea. Different approach and view were taken by the UN Secretary General concerning IUU
fishing and maritime security. In his report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea in 2008, the
UN Secretary General classified seven particular threats to maritime security including IUU
fishing which has been conceived as a major challenge to peace and security in light of food
insecurity.69 The lack of consensus amongst the delegates in the 9th UNICPOLOS forum to
have common ground that there exists the connection between fishing illegally and
transnational activity indicates that states have different perceptions and practices in
perceiving the proposal.
Three years later following the UNICPOLOS meeting and the UN Secretary General report,
the subject received more attention from countries and international organizations when the
position of transnational organized crimes in the fishing industry was discussed at the Expert
Group Meeting organized by UNODC. 70 This meeting was intended to be a small and
focused group of discussion attended by government and international organization
representatives, practitioners and/or experts having expertise on the topic. This setting carries
more weight in terms of identifying the true challenges in the field and proposing
recommendations to overcome the identified problems. The initiative taken by UNODC is
timely based on several findings pointing out that it is a common practice for transhipment as
a method of transporting or transferring illicit drugs to West Africa.71
1.5 Policy and Legal Discussions.
The observance of related policy and legal frameworks is required to further examine the
nexus between IUU fishing and transnationally organized crimes. When analysing the
interplay between both subjects, the discussion on fisheries activities and TOC is also
highlighted. The frameworks should be deepened further by making an analysis from the
perspectives of domestic and international domains. Each dimension may influence one
another as they are not stand-alone subjects.
68
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Domestically, the adoption of Presidential Regulation Number 115/2015 marks a different
approach taken by Indonesia in perceiving and overcoming illegal fishing and TOC. This task
force involves other concerned agencies. The measure should be praised as this problem is
not merely an issue of one sector of marine and fisheries but rather a cross-sectoral problem
that necessitates the engagement of other institutions following the various crimes that take
place in the field. In the case of Indonesia, when other crimes such as human trafficking and
people smuggling become more involved in the fisheries sector72 the single-door system is no
longer relevant and is less effective in solving this criminal interconnectivity. As opposed to
the single-door policy, the concept of multi-door needs to be introduced in this respect. This
approach has come about through the formation of Satgas 115. To establish this concept and
to prevent avoidable confusion in its execution, more details and further arrangement of the
work and further procedure needs formulating and adopting.
When Indonesia attempts to justify and reconcile IUU fishing to be included as TOC, it is
worth noting that related international law should be referred to as the principal instrument
allowing action in conformity with international legal dimension. The reference also raises
the objective of garnering support from the international community. In the realm of
transnational crimes, the international convention which should be the main reference is
UNTOC. Indonesia became a signatory to this Convention on 15 December 200073 and has
expressed its consent to be bound by this Organized Crime or Palermo Convention through
the stipulation of Law Number 5/2009 concerning the Ratification of United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.74
It can be conceived further that without referring to an international convention such as
UNTOC, IUU fishing operations demonstrate transnational character in the field. It can be
argued that in carrying out this activity, the overseas fishing vessels would cross the border to
72

Ioannis Chapsos and Steve Hamilton, ‘Illegal Fishing and Fisheries Crimes as Transnational Organized Crime
in Indonesia’ (2018) Trends in Organized Crime 15 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-018-9329-8>.
73
Fat, ‘Pemerintah dan DPR Bahas Ratifikasi Konvensi Kejahatan Transnasional (Government and House
Representative Discuss Ratification to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime),'
Hukum Online (online), 16 December 2008 <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol20723/pemerintahdan-dpr-bahas-ratifikasi-konvensi-kejahatan-transnasional>.
74
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 2009 tentang Pengesahan United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (Konvensi Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa Menentang Tindak Pidana
Transnasional yang Terorganisir) [Law Number 5/2009 on the Ratification of the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crimes] [Ministry for Legal and Human Rights (Indonesia) trans] (‘UNTOC
Ratification Law of Indonesia’).

20

poach fish in the waters of other countries. The exploitation of foreign fishing vessels from
China, Russia and Japan in the territorial waters of Angola demonstrates the real challenge of
the transnational issue. 75 Nonetheless, classifying IUU fishing as transnational organized
crimes would pose a severe challenge because it comprises three different aspects of illegal,
unreported and unregulated. Illegal constitutes a crime, unlike unreported and unregulated.
The last two terms would be complicated to be part of crimes in a case where the obligation
to report and regulate in place does not exist. Within legal overview, the primary challenge
for Indonesia’s proposal derives from the provisions of UNTOC requiring some
classifications for any crimes to be TOC. In this Convention, some standards need to be
confirmed when crimes are regarded as transnationally organized crimes.
Although IUU fishing becomes a nationwide agenda in Indonesia, only limited current
research has been conducted to employ a more effective way to address IUU fishing
problems. In 2007, an Indonesian scholar, Dikdik submitted his thesis regarding IUU fishing
from the perspective of legal and institutional frameworks. His focus was primarily the
examination of Indonesia’s legislation and international law nexus. He identified some
inadequacies such as Indonesia’s decision not to join as a full member of RFMOs and the
activities of illegal Indonesia-flagged vessels fishing in the high seas under the authority of
existing RFMOs. He concluded that domestic legal and institutional structures should be
developed further to fight against IUU fishing and should not be inconsistent with
international instruments.76

While it is true that Dikdik provides a significant contribution to Indonesia to possess a better
legal and institution foundation to address IUU fishing, his thesis however no longer follows
the current development of the issue and should be updated with existing measures. For
instance, his legal reference was still Law Number 31/2004 concerning Fisheries as a basis
for his analysis of legal and institution issues. When writing his thesis, this Law was newly
adopted by Indonesia. 77 In 2009, however, this Law has been amended by Law Number
45/2009 since there were some significant developments to overcome fisheries issues such as
imposing firmer law enforcement on illegal fishing and paying more attention to traditional
75
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fishers.78 It is also important to note that Dikdik’s thesis did not touch upon the issue of
transnational organized crime in relation to IUU fishing activities. Nonetheless, his overview
of domestic and international legal and institution frameworks provides a worthy
understanding of the issue and can be utilized as an essential foundation for further research
on IUU fishing.
In dealing with IUU fishing and transnational organized crime, there are some relevant laws
and regulations enacted within the framework of Indonesia’s legislation. These include Law
number 45/2009, as the amendment to Law number 31/2004 concerning Fisheries and Law
Number 32/2014 concerning Ocean Affairs which forbids the practices of IUU fishing.
Although fisheries crimes are regulated in fisheries law, the connection between IUU fishing
activities and transnational organized crime is not provisioned. Meanwhile, Law number
8/2010 concerning Countermeasure and Eradication of Money Laundering links money
laundering and crimes in marine and fishery. 79 Criminal acts listed in Article 2 of Law
Number 8/2009 are intended to conform with Article 6 paragraph 2(b) of the Palermo
Convention. 80 In terms of serious crime, Article 2 of Law number 8/2010 includes any
criminals on the list who are imprisoned for 4 years or longer.81
Apparently, the term ‘serious crime’ is justified in the domestic legal sense. Nevertheless, it
is also important to take a look at the fisheries-related laws. In Law Number 45/2009, as the
amendment of Law Number 31/2004 concerning Fisheries, and Law Number 32/2014
concerning Ocean Affairs, IUU fishing is not clearly defined or explained, particularly in
Article 1 of said laws.82 The only reference to IUU fishing can be found in the National Plan
of Action on IUU Fishing adopted by Ministerial Decree Number KEP.50/MEN/2012 on the
National Plan of Action (NPOA) to Prevent and Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
78
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Fishing of 2012-2016.83 Unfortunately, this NPOA-IUU Fishing Plan no longer exists since it
has expired in 2016.
Within the ambit of international legal instruments, as described previously in this Part, there
are some international instruments that will be examined to enrich the discussion. Moreover,
this thesis identifies some significant “toolkits” to overcome IUU fishing and fisheries crimes
in which Indonesia is not state party: the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, the 2012 Cape
Town Agreement and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention (C188). The Compliance
Agreement has the objective to enforce ‘the effectiveness of international fisheries
conservation and management measures’ which is specifically to fill a legal gap in fisheries
arrangement of re-flagging,84 the Cape Town Agreement emphasizes the protection of the
laborers operating on fishing vessels, 85 and the Work in Fishing Convention sets the
minimum standard for fishers to working in fishing vessels such as accommodations,
minimum age, medical examination, work agreement, payment, recruitment and placement,
medical care and other issues.86
Furthermore, the decline of fish stocks and the different modus operandi of fish poaching
means countries need to be more advanced than they are in initiating breakthroughs on the
legal aspect. Prosecuting the perpetrators of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes requires more
robust policy to prevent our marine living resources from total depletion. Learning from the
U.S v. Bengis, et al case, 87 exterritorial jurisdiction principle can be applied to the U.S
nationals who commit a crime or breach regulations of other country. This principle of
jurisdiction needs to be reviewed by the Indonesia Government for possible adoption in its
domestic legal system.
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2. Thesis Statement.
Indonesia’s existing legal and policy frameworks are inadequate to combat IUU fishing and
TOFC despite some improvements. From the perspective of policy, it is important to prepare
and conclude the NPOA on IUU Fishing 2017-2021, apply a multi-door policy and formulate
its detailed arrangements, amend the duties of Task Force 115, secure the cooperation to
combat IUU fishing and fisheries crimes with the other countries and make practical
guidelines as the follow up to Presidential Regulation Number 115/2015.
In virtue of a legal overview, it is suggested that Indonesia amends the existing laws and
regulations particularly Fisheries Law No 45/2009 as the amendment of Law No 31/2004, or
make a law regarding the prevention, deterrence, and elimination of IUU fishing and provide
its consent to be bound by the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, the 2012 Cape Town
Agreement and the Work in Fishing Convention Number 188. Another proposed measure is
to consider enacting a regulation similar to, or incorporating, the elements of the Lacey Act.
3. Purposes, Scope and Limitation.
The purposes of this thesis are to provide analysis of domestic legal status and policy
overview within the context of relevant international legal and policy instruments and
practices in combatting IUU fishing and TOFC.
Towards this end, this thesis will address the following objectives:
1) To identify and explore national and international legal and policy frameworks regarding
IUU fishing and TOFC;
2) To identify possible legal and policy challenges in the years to come if Indonesia endorses
IUU fishing and TOFC;
3) To analyse and to address gaps in the context of mainly domestic legal and policy
frameworks and mechanisms of the topics concerned.
This research will involve a comprehensive analysis of the following:
1) The analysis of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes under the Jokowi’s Doctrine of GMF;
2) The extent of Indonesia’s set of legislation and policies pertaining to the prevention,
deterrence, and elimination of IUU Fishing and its connection with TOFC;
3) Laws and policies of the United States and South Africa on fisheries relating to IUU
Fishing and TOFC compared to those of Indonesia;
4) International legally and non-legally binding frameworks relevant to marine and fisheries
resources sustainability and transnational organized crime;
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5) The connection between IUU fishing and fisheries crimes that are organized
transnationally.
6) The advantages and disadvantages of combating IUU fishing through the method of
fisheries crimes;
This thesis primarily focuses on legal and policy analysis of the issues involved and other
matters insofar as they are relevant and necessary. This thesis will not discuss the extensive
application of other transnational organized crimes except for those pertaining to fisheries.
4. Significance of the Research.
This research is of national and international significance. From a domestic perspective, the
results of my research will make a significant contribution to the development of relevant
laws and regulations such as Law Number 31/2004, as amended by Number 45/2009
regarding Fisheries and Law Number 8/2010 on Countermeasure and Eradication of Money
Laundering. Additionally, it will contribute to other relevant national regulations and policies
regarding IUU Fishing and fisheries transnationally organized crime. The topic of this thesis
is of utmost importance for ocean affairs’ development, specifically on the issues of IUU
fishing and fisheries crimes in Indonesia as these have been listed currently, and in the past,
as the main focus of the policy of MMAF.
IUU fishing and fisheries crimes are not merely a domestic problem but also an international
responsibility as the perpetrators may come from different countries. In that sense,
international collaboration is needed to overcome transnational dimension of the issues.
Academics have conducted some research connecting IUU fishing and fisheries
transnationally organized crime, and this research will further analyse the relationship
between these matters within the domain of legal and domestic policy frameworks of
Indonesia. In international sphere, this thesis may contribute to the discussion of fisheries
crimes as it offers the examination of advantages and disadvantages of using the method of
TOFC in addressing IUU fishing.
5. Research Questions.
This thesis will address the following principal research questions:
1) What is the position of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes under Jokowi’s Doctrine of
GMF including the Ocean Policy?
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2) What are the legal and policy frameworks of Indonesia in addressing IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes?
3) What are the gaps that exist in Indonesia’s legislation and policy regarding IUU fishing
and its connection with fisheries’ transnationally organized crime?
4) What are the lessons learned that could be drawn from legal and policy measures of the
United States and South Africa concerning the matter?
5) What measures are necessary to combat IUU fishing and fisheries’ transnationally
organized crimes within the scope of domestic legal and policy frameworks?
6) What are the advantages and disadvantages of combatting IUU fishing through the
method of fisheries crimes?
7) What is the connection between IUU fishing and fisheries crimes that are organized
transnationally?
8) Do fisheries crimes constitute a better approach to combatting IUU fishing?
9) What are the recommended measures to be taken to promote fisheries crimes?
6. Conclusion.
It is evident that the world is highly dependent on the ocean. As one part of the ocean’s
contribution, fisheries provide food, health, employment and social aspects to the global
community. Unfortunately, fisheries resources face severe problems such as the general
decline in the level of fish stock based on the reports composed in 2011, 2012 and 2014. The
practice of IUU fishing makes the level of fish stocks deteriorate. Another issue that the
fisheries sector is facing relates to criminal activities. Academic debates concerning the
connection between the fisheries sector and crimes have been shared amongst scholars. Some
fishing vessels such as the Songhua, the Kunlun and the Yongding present clear examples of
illegal fishing and the involvement of transnationally organized crimes. Qualifying as repeat
offenders, they commonly engage in flag hopping, fish laundering, ports and flags of
convenience and IUU fishing. Criminal syndicates, such as those from Russia and China, are
involved in the practice of IUU fishing. From the research of UNODC, it is evident that TOC
in virtually every form is involved in the industrial fishing sector.
In a domestic sense, Indonesia experiences the problem of illegal fishing and transnational
organized crimes. Illegal and unreported fishing costs Indonesia some US$ 20 billion per
annum. This practice also severely affects small-scale fishers due to the decline in fish stock
numbers. The number of fishers is also suffering a decrease because of this activity. In the
26

field, some cases have proved that the fisheries management problem is not the only problem
arising from illegal fishing. One recent example of drug smuggling in the fishing activities
was the seizure of ‘FV Sunrise Glory’ by the Indonesian Navy in 2018. This vessel was
carrying one tonne of crystal methamphetamine when boarded and inspected.
Under the administration of Jokowi, ocean affairs including illegal fishing and its related
crimes are receiving greater attention. The Doctrine of GMF, declared by President Jokowi in
the early stages of his presidency to strengthen Indonesia as a maritime nation, paves the way
for illegal fishing and TOC to be the primary focus of the MMAF. A prompt response to cope
with the problem has been shown by the ministry through, among responses, burning and/or
sinking illegal fishing vessels and establishing task forces. The Task Force 115 has the main
duties of combatting illegal fishing and fisheries crimes as well as developing fisheries
governance through a strategic map. This task force involves other ministries or agencies in
achieving its objectives.
Although Indonesia imposes severe measures in addressing IUU fishing, it does not prevent
illegal fishers poaching in Indonesian waters. An approach to link illegal fishing and
transnational crimes has been introduced and endorsed by Indonesia on many occasions.
Along with this effort, Indonesia has also become an active supporter of the concept of
fisheries crimes. In international forum, Minister Susi has held the view that fisheries crimes
and other fisheries-related crimes relate to IUU fishing. As such, fisheries crimes and other
fisheries-related crimes should be treated as equal to the other transnational organized crimes.
The response of countries in perceiving this proposal is varied. The divergent views amongst
delegates divided them into two schools of thought. One side was of the opinion that illegal
fishing should be part of transnational crimes, the other side refused the inclusion of illegal
fishing as TOC.
This thesis focuses on domestic legal and policy aspects to overview the nexus between IUU
fishing and transnational organized crimes. The problems may come from the inadequacy of
those two elements in addressing the loopholes that exist at national level by taking into
consideration international legal and policy instruments. In the domestic sense, the
examination goes to legal and policy instruments. Domestic legal framework provides
various related regulations such as Fisheries Law, Ocean Affairs Law and Money Laundering
Law. Moreover, the policies to address IUU fishing and its related crimes are also subjected
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to be reviewed in this thesis. In addition, legal instruments such as LOSC, UNFSA, PSMA,
UNTOC, the Compliance Agreement, the Cape Town Agreement and ILO Convention on
Work in Fishing Number 188 have become highly relevant in approaching this problem.
This thesis holds a view that the existing domestic legal and policy frameworks need to be
reviewed and improved. With regard to the policy measures, some recommendations can be
taken into consideration such as the conclusion of NPOA on IUU Fishing 2017-2021, the
formulation of detail arrangements on a multi-door approach, the amendment and duties of
Task Force 115, the cooperation with other countries on IUU fishing and fisheries crimes and
the composition of practical guidelines of Presidential Regulation of 115/2015. Further, in
terms of the legal aspect, the amendment of Fisheries Law would be a positive step. Within
the context of international law, Indonesia needs to provide its consent to be bound by FAO
Compliance Agreement of 1993, Cape Town Agreement of 2012, Work in Fishing
Convention and consider adopting the elements of the Lacey Act.
Towards this end, this thesis sets three main objectives. In fulfilling the objectives, deeper
research on the matters of the GMF, relevant sets of legislation, other states practice such as
the U.S and South Africa, the benefits and drawbacks, the interplay between IUU fishing and
TOC and the assessment on IUU fishing as TOC from the international relations perspective.
This thesis may signify the development of related laws and regulations. In regard to the
research questions, nine research questions need to be addressed. Chiefly, the questions
reflect the scope of the research with an extended set of questions.
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PART II
THE SEARCH FOR ARCHIPELAGIC STATUS: THE CASE OF INDONESIA
1. Introduction.
As explained in the previous part, Indonesia and the rest of the globe face a severe problem of
fish stock and transnational crimes committed in the fisheries sector. The initiatives taken by
Minister Susi to combat these intricate issues are in conjunction with Jokowi’s vision of
GMF. It highlights the pivotal role of the ocean as the main drive of the nation’s
development. Several research questions are established as guidelines to the structure of the
thesis. In observing the comprehensive overview of Minister Susi’s policies and Jokowi’s
GMF as well as the research questions, the history of Indonesia in the maritime sphere needs
to be discussed in this part before going further into a deeper elaboration.
This part provides an overview of the trail of Indonesia when struggling to assert archipelagic
status. It will introduce the fundamental pretexts to assume the status by presenting some
background such as the geography and strategic locations of Indonesia. Moreover, it is also
important to include the maritime spirit that has influenced the history of the country. This
section examines the spirit of a sailor nation, the existence of old kingdoms to shape the ‘old
Indonesia’ and the key role of the Bajau People in the region during olden days. After taking
into consideration the historical maritime glory, this part discusses the conceptual discussion
of Indonesia as a maritime nation. The Juanda Declaration that changed the rules stated in
TZMKO (Territoriale Zee En Marietieme Kringen Ordonnantie) laid a fundamental argument
in promoting Indonesia’s proposal as an archipelagic state. This declaration also enabled
Indonesia to be covered under one blanket which was in contrast with the rules stipulated in
the TZMKO. This regulation enacted by the colonial regime allowed foreign vessels to
exercise the rights of freedom of navigation when passing through the high seas located
between the Islands of Indonesia. Undoubtedly, this rule posed a potential threat to domestic
defence and security.
This part also examines the international legal case of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries for the
reason that it supports Indonesia in obtaining archipelagic status from the perspective of the
international legal framework. History tells us that Indonesia should pass several stages in a
painstakingly long process before becoming an archipelagic country. In this sense, this part
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presents the challenges faced by Indonesia and like-minded states in UNCLOS I, UNCLOS II
and UNCLOS III.
2. Geographical Context.
The geographical location of a country greatly influences its policy makers to determine the
course of the country in seizing the opportunities and coping with the challenges so that
potential threats can be anticipated and curtailed. Additionally, its advantages can be
augmented and presented for the greatest benefit of the people. In assessing the GMF,
geographical context would be useful in delivering a background overview of how the top
leaders of Indonesia frame Indonesia’s policy based on their perception of the country’s
physical realty. The geographical features, such as mountains, oceans, valleys and deserts to
name a few, form a complete characteristic of a country. In addition, the geographical
location also serves as input for a state to perceive itself in a region.
The strategic central location of Indonesia, between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and
between the Asian and Australian Continents, functions as the background in making an
assessment on the geopolitical architecture of Indonesia.88 This comprehension also comes
from the comparison between the land and marine waters that form the country. From the
following map of Indonesia updated in 2017 (Map 1), located between the geographic
coordinates of 6.1750°E latitude and 106.8283°E longitude in Asia and geographical
alignment of latitude 5° 00’N and longitude of 120° 00’ E,89 it appears roughly that the land
dominates marine waters. Nonetheless, it can be drawn from the data disclosed by Badan
Informasi Geospasial Indonesia (Indonesia Geospatial Information Agency/BIG) in 2013 that
as the biggest archipelagic country in the world, Indonesia covers 1,922,570 square
kilometres of land and 3,257,483 square kilometres of marine waters.90 This means that with
a total area of 5,250,053 square kilometres, the majority (62.05%) of Indonesia’s area is
covered by marine waters.
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Map 1: The Map of Indonesia as updated by the Indonesian Government on 14 July 201791
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In some literatures, the total area of Indonesia seemingly presents a different number. For
instance, the data published by the Report on Human Trafficking, Forced Labour and
Fisheries Crime in the Indonesia Fishing Industry92 is not the same as the report issued by
BIG. This may occur as the extent of the total area of a country is dynamic due to natural
phenomena such as climate change and erosion or agreement with other countries on
maritime boundary delimitation.
The total area of Indonesia demonstrates a broader cover after the Coordinating Ministry of
Maritime Affairs of Indonesia released an updated Indonesian map on 14 July 2017. As Arif
Havas Oegroseno states, there are some concerns that lead the government to take this policy.
First of all, Indonesia has concluded two agreements on the maritime boundary delimitations
with Singapore in both the western and eastern sides and the Philippines in the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ). Both agreements have been ratified by the parties concerned.
Secondly, this measure follows the arbitration award of the South China Sea case
adjudicating that small rocks in the middle of the sea, that are unable to sustain human life,
cannot legally secure sovereign rights of 200 m nor the continental shelf. As such, it affirms
that small islands of the neighbouring countries can only extend 12 m from baseline. Thirdly,
the water column north of Natuna needs updating for the reason that the continental shelf
around the area has been named as North Natuna Block, South Natuna Block, East Natuna
Block and Southeast Natuna Block since the 1970s. Fourthly, Indonesia reconfirmed its claim
in the Malacca Strait by simplifying the border line making law enforcement more
seamless.93
The conclusion of bilateral agreements on maritime boundaries between Indonesia and
Singapore, as well as Indonesia and the Philippines, also leads to the total area of marine
waters being larger than as announced by BIG in 2013. In 2017, the Governor of Aceh,
Irwandi Yusuf revealed that Indonesia had potential to extend its territories after an island
was discovered to the west of Sabang (tip of Sumatra Island). Locals are familiar with the
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island and call it Karang Melati.94 It falls under the duty of BIG to keep the map updated
regularly and precisely calculate the total area of Indonesia.
The policy to revise the map sparked controversy from China. Spokesperson of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of China argued that the naming of North Natuna Sea “makes no sense at
all and is not conducive to the effort of the international standards of the name of places”.95
The response from China was not surprising, since the updated map brings a direct message
of China’s claim of its nine-dash line in the most part of the South China Sea. The Deputy of
Maritime Sovereignty of the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Arif Havas was of
the view that the naming of North Natuna Sea was in accordance with common practice.96
So, it is a matter of consistency with the name that has applied for decades. Legally speaking,
China does not have the right to refuse Indonesia’s naming. It comes from an arbitration
ruling that China’s claim in the South China Sea is baseless for the reason that a rock cannot
be used to draw a boundary of 200 m from its baseline. As such, Indonesia has the right to
name the waters above Natuna Island (as is seen from the map), the North Natuna Sea.
It can be observed further from the map that Indonesia comprises 5 (five) main islands;
Kalimantan, Papua, Sumatera, Sulawesi and Java with a total population of 237,642,326
based on data published by Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS/Central Bureau of Statistics) in
2010.97 Despite the fact that the largest single island, not shared with any other country, is
Sumatera with 425,000 square kilometres98 covering 25.2 per cent of the overall territory of
Indonesia, this island is only occupied by 21.3 per cent of the total population. In contrast, the
most populated island belongs to the smallest island of the five, Java. The inhabitants of the
island occupy 57.5 per cent of the total population although it only covers 6.8 per cent of the
total area. 99 This reliable data illustrates that the population of Indonesia is unevenly
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distributed and most of Indonesia’s people are mainly concentrated on the island of Java.
During Suharto’s administration, known as Orde Baru (New Order), attempts to overcome
the population distribution were made by migrating people from Java to other islands such as
Kalimantan, Sulawesi or Sumatera through the Transmigrasi (Transmigration) program. 100
They were provided with land and a house for living. However, once the reformation era
commenced post the collapse of the Suharto regime, this program no longer served as a
priority for the government.
3. Maritime Spirit in Indonesia’s History.
3.1 Indonesia as Bangsa Pelaut (a Sailor Nation).
Presenting the history of Indonesia in the maritime domain builds a deep and analytical
background which enriches the current discussion on Jokowi’s doctrine of GMF. When
revoking the old slogan Jalesveva Jayamahe (In Our Seas We Are Triumphant) in his
inaugural speech as Indonesia’s President, 101 Jokowi was attempting to make his people
rekindle Indonesia’s ancestry when sailing and conquering ocean waves in pursuit of victory.
The spirit of Indonesia as bangsa pelaut (a sailor nation) was embedded in the history of
Indonesia long before Jokowi took the post as head of state and declared it a maritime nation.
For children living during the 80s and 90s, the lyrics of the folk song Nenek Moyangku
Seorang Pelaut (My Ancestors are Sailors) became famous and awakened the nationalism
and pride of our ancestors. The complete lyrics are as follows:
Nenek Moyangku Orang Pelaut (My Ancestors are Sailors)
Gemar Mengarung Luas Samudra (Love to Cruise the Ocean)
Menerjang Ombak Tiada Takut (Navigating the Waves without Fear)
Menempuh Badai Sudah Biasa (Accustomed to Confronting the Thunderstorm)
Angin Bertiup, Layar Terkembang (Wind Blows, Sail Spreads)
Ombak Berdebur di Tepi Pantai (Waves Roar at the Beach)
Pemuda Berani, Bangkit Sekarang (Valiant Youngsters, Emerge Now)
Ke Laut Kita, Beramai-Ramai (To the Oceans, We Go Together).102
The song illustrates Indonesia’s maritime culture, rooted in the past. In the prehistoric caves
of the Islands of Muna, Seram and Arguni, pictures of traditional sailing boats were found as
evidence that Indonesia’s ancestors were sailors. Rudi Wahyono, the Director of Energy,
Environment and Maritime Centre, highlights that the discovery of prehistoric sites on
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several islands and the history of kingdoms on some islands suggests the supremacy of
Indonesia in the maritime sphere.103
3.2 The Influence of Old Kingdoms in Shaping Nusantara.
Before further analysing the historical context of Indonesia maritime past, it is worth giving a
brief account of the term Nusantara. Although this term is widely used in different countries
including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore,104 it does not come with an agreed universal
definition. From an etymological approach, Nusantara derives from two Sanskrit words,
Nusa and Antara. The former means ‘island’ while the latter implies ‘in between’ or
‘including’.105 The combination of those two terms presents divergent interpretations among
scholars. The translation can refer to ‘between the islands of nations’ or ‘the islands lying in
between’,106 but Hans-Dieter Evers opted to draw the meaning as ‘other islands’ taken from
an old Javanese-English dictionary.107
This concept takes a more domestic-oriented sense in Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia
(Indonesia Formal Dictionary/KBBI) which is defined as ‘a reference to the whole territory
of Indonesia.’ 108 Considering the geography of old kingdoms, where the concept of
Nusantara was initially introduced, the interpretation can be extended to ‘islands and
maritime areas around them’ as it has a close meaning to Nusa and Antara. Translation
adopted in KBBI would limit the scope of Nusantara while in fact old literature, such as
Nāgarakrĕtāgama and Pararotan, suggests broader land and maritime areas. As a nonIndonesian academic, Anwar enriched the scholarship discussion by extending Nusantara to:
...unified geographical region of indigenous communities that covers the entire part of
Southeast region of Asia. In fact, its geopolitical coverage is almost identical to Southeast Asia.
Even though in the 13th and 14th centuries (during the time of the Kertanegara and Majapahit
kingdoms) it centered on Java, in our contemporary times, the term ‘Nusantara’ has become
shared among the indigenous communities in the region.109
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From Anwar’s perspective, Nusantara was enlightened by two kingdoms which originated
from the island of Java (Indonesia), Kertanegara and Majapahit. However, this concept
experiences a wider scope of the meaning by covering the Southeast Asian region following
the expansion of the kingdom’s territory.
The awareness of Majapahit’s reign should be appreciated when initiating a literature
tradition through historical transcripts. Nāgarakrĕtāgama is a poem created in the 14th
century during the Majapahit Reign and Pararotan is a chronicle written in the 14th century
in the Majapahit Kingdom.110 According to the Memory of the World Register submitted by
Indonesia to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), Nāgarakrĕtāgama (1350-1389 AD) also known as Desyawarnana conveys the
testimony of a king who ruled the kingdom in the 14th century in Indonesia. This literature
suggests that Majapahit highly respected the modern notions of freedom of religion, social
justice, safety of individual and with the well-being of people to be held in high regard. As
part of world heritage, it also affirms the principles of democracy and transparency practiced
in the period when the kingship was held as the main political and government system. This
valuable literature records that the wide territory of Majapahit expanded to Sumatera, the
Malay Peninsula, Kalimantan and eastern Indonesia.111 It has been further confirmed in the
Nusantara, from the translation of the original Sanskrit language at Pupuh (Chapter) XII-XIII
that:
The detail of each island of the states subordinated under Nusantara are, firstly Melayu: Jambi,
Palembang, Toba and Darmasraya, Kandis, Kahwas, Minangkabau, Siak, Rokan, Kampar dan
Pane Kampe, Haru serta Mandailing, Tamihang, negara Perlak dan Padang…Dwipatara.112

As conceived by Slamet Mulyana, Dwipatara, or archipelago partners, refers to nations that
are adjacent to Majapahit territory. 113 Pupuh XIII(1) further clarifies that the Dwipatara
include Siam (Thailand) together with Ayudyapura, Darmanagari, Marutma, Rajapura,
Singanagari, Campa, Cambodia and Yawana. Majapahit commenced to campaign on
overseas expansion around in 1347. It is commonly known that the role of Gajah Mada as
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prime minister, in order to assume a pivotal role in taking charge of this operation, vowed to
abstain from Palapa, which can be interpreted as fruit, religious ritual or even sexual
intercourse, until he had conquered Nusantara under Majapahit’s rule.114

Map 2: Nusantara Territory as depicted in Nāgarakrĕtāgama115
Furthermore, some subjects and information depicted in Nāgarakrĕtāgama were also
illustrated in Pararaton and the character was almost identical. Pararaton describes
Nusantara as follows:
He, Gajah Mada Patih Amangkubhumi does not want to enjoy a palapa (breaking the fast). He,
Gajah Mada said, if you have beaten Nusantara, I (will) give up the fast. If you have beaten
Gurun, Seram, Tanjungpura, Haru, Pahang, Dompo, Bali, Sunda, Palembang, Tumasik, so I
(will) enjoy a palapa (breaking fast).116

It can be seen that Pararaton delivers the narrative about Nusantara. The central figure
depicted in Pararaton, Gajah Mada Patih Amangkubhumi, is said to be the same person in
Nāgarakrĕtāgama. However, when it comes to describing Nusantara, Nāgarakrĕtāgama
clarifies more detail than Pararaton. While Nāgarakrĕtāgama presents areas that are similar
to Southeast Asia, Pararaton extends Nusantara to a group of states within the region
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including Tumasik, Palembang, Sunda, Bali, Dompo, Pahang, Haru, Tanjungpura, Seram and
Guru.117
During the period of old kingdoms such as Srivijaya, Majapahit and Demak, Indonesia
received high respect in Asia from neighbouring countries. Srivijaya based its political vision
on the shipping lanes and seaborne trade by conquering strategic locations and then
establishing maritime power bases. In the 13th century, Srivijaya, under the rule of King
Kertanegara, deployed a maritime expedition to the Kingdoms of Malay and Champa to
connect the friendship and to restrain the expansion of the Mongol Empire to Southeast Asia.
As Wolters pointed out, Srivijaya Kingdom played a prominent role in bridging sea trade
lanes between east and west when dominating this strategic maritime spot.118
The history of the Kingdom of Demak supplemented and enriched the maritime identity of
Indonesia. As the greatest Islamic Kingdom of Java in the 16th century, Demak played a
major role as a centre of development in political, religious and economic terms. Based on
research by Keat Gin Ooi, religious drive and economic affairs made Demak expand its
territory and became a respected Islamic kingdom not only in Java but also within the entire
Southeast Asia region. Rulers of Demak frequently launched attacks on Melaka in attempts to
defeat the Portuguese. When Adipati Unus (Duke Unus) took charge, he launched a naval
assault on Melaka in 1513 with the assistance of a kingdom in Palembang. Unfortunately, the
Portuguese defeated the armada and killed Adipati Unus.119
3.3 The Role of Bajau People in the Maritime Journey of Indonesia
It is also evident that Orang Bajau (Bajau People) performed a prominent role in shaping the
identity of Indonesia’s vision as a maritime nation. Their practice as Suku Laut (Ocean Tribe)
has contributed various aspects, such as maritime culture and seaborne trade, to the forming
of Indonesia as a maritime nation. When depicting Indonesia’s historical outlook, only a few
select articles can be discovered concerning maritime culture or other ocean affairs which
have been attributed to Suku Bajo in shaping Indonesia’s identity. To the best of the writer’s
knowledge, when making any assessment on Indonesia as a maritime nation research into the
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Bajau people receives less attention than research into the maritime power during Majapahit
and Srivijaya reigns. One recent publication in 2017 that comprehensively assesses how the
concept of archipelagic state came into effect 120 and the journey of Indonesia as an
archipelagic state does not even touch upon the history of Orang Bajau. Presenting Bajau
People as background in the book would bring about more seriousness to the appreciation
that Indonesia has a long and deeply-rooted tradition in the maritime culture.
Adrian Lepian delivers a good understanding of the Bajau people regarding their maritime
crusade across the region. He praises Bajau people living throughout Southeast Asia as the
most traditional maritime peoples of all the others121 such as the Madurese, Balinese, Malay
and Buginese.122 Bajau People have various names including Bajo, Bajjo, Bajjau or Orang
Sama. The latest refers to their own preference by which they call themselves. In a book
chapter titled ‘Legal and Illegal Indonesian Fishing in Australian Waters’, James Fox points
out the first time an officer of the Dutch East Indian Company witnessed Bajau People with
some 40 small boats gathered Trepang on the south coast of Rote Island was in 1728.123 The
record shows that they had an advanced economic system as they traded their catch such as
pearls and teripang with other parts of the region.124
The dispersion and settlement of Orang Bajau cover a wide area ranging from the southern
Philippines region, eastern Sabah, Sulu, Macassar, eastern Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku,
East Timor and Nusa Tenggara. From the following Map 3, it can be elicited that they are
concentrated and live in the whole island of Sulawesi, unlike some other islands such as
Kalimantan or Borneo Malaysia. Therefore, they influence the maritime culture of Sulawesi
Island society through their skill in navigating the ocean. Bajo people contributed to the
establishment of Macassar (State of Gowa) as a political and economic powerhouse in eastern
Indonesia during the 16th and the beginning of the 17th centuries. Gowa then became the
influential kingdom of Bugis people, the Bone. The Bajo people engaged in many tasks such
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as explorers, messengers and in naval exploits. They linked different trade partners and
bridged economic relations in sea trade with the other countries.125
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Map 3: Area of Sama-Bajau People in Some Parts of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Timor Leste126
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The findings of Natasha Stacey about the dispersion of the Bajau People, as illustrated in
Map 4, can be true since most of them originated from, and occupied, those areas. In Chapter
2 of her thesis concerning the history of Bajo settlement, she presents the origin and
dispersion of the Sama-Bajau. It can be learned further that there exist three different ethnolinguistic groups of Bajau People: the Moken, the Orang Laut and the Sama-Bajau. It is
interesting to assume that each group has distinct geography, language and culture and has
adapted to the ecosystems and the environment of both the maritime and islands of Southeast
Asia.127
However, alternative evidence suggests that the Bajau People roamed over other parts of the
region, not only the area depicted in Map 4. Further information from the following map
illustrates the dispersion of the sea nomads (Bajau People) throughout Southeast Asia.
Unfortunately, the original source lacks information about the period in time that the journey
took place. It can be seen from the map that sea nomads headed to the north, south and west
part of Sulawesi. They continued to traverse the waters of not only Sulawesi and its vicinity
but also to the Malaysian Peninsula, Singapore and the western part of Borneo.

Map 4: The Dispersion of Sea Nomads Across the Region128
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Mohammed Nassir Ismail, a Singaporean university lecturer, testifies that he is a descendant
of Orang Selat (People of Straits), one of the clans of Orang Laut (Bajau people) known in
Singapore’s history. His ancestor is believed to have come to the waters of Singapore in the
16th century. By the 19th century, roughly more than 1000 Orang Laut resided in Singapore.
Nassir recites the spirit of the gotong-royong upheld by the villagers of Kampung Kucai
where he lived until he was 18 years old. This spirit means ‘if someone faces a problem, all
the villagers will be ready to render assistance.’129 Within the Indonesia community, this
spirit has been acknowledged for centuries as a cultural identity. The spirit still exists today
as a means of making strong ties amongst the people living in the villages. Nonetheless, this
principle is not popular in the city because individualism comes to the fore. In comparison,
gotong-royong, predominantly becomes the principle of city dwellers. Their continued
dispersion throughout the region bears testament to the movement of indigenous people along
the maritime route. The boat journey taken from their original residence to different countries
in Southeast Asia along with traditional navigation proves that they were tough sailors.
It can be observed from the above discussions that the concept of Nusantara receives wide
acknowledgment in the region. It is important to maintain that the maritime identity of
Indonesia has been deeply rooted for centuries, pioneered by the existence of old kingdoms
such as Majapahit and Srivijaya. The discovery of Nāgarakrĕtāgama sheds some light on the
concept of Nusantara and the political system of Majapahit, including its international
relations with adjacent kingdoms. Majapahit built fleets to regularly visit many parts of
Nusantara to acquire formal submissions or to receive tributes.130 Further, it is also evident
that Bajau People contribute to the shaping of a maritime culture and identity for Indonesia as
Bangsa Pelaut through their courage to navigate the waves across the ocean far away from
the place where they came from.
4. The Conceptual Design of Indonesia as an Archipelagic State.
After examining the historical setting of the maritime sphere of Indonesia, the following
section seeks to uncover the conceptual discussion of Indonesia as an archipelagic state. This
becomes imperative in order to deliver a deeper understanding and larger picture about the
circumstance of the vision for Indonesia as a GMF. This section focuses on the concept of the
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archipelagic state and how the delegations from Indonesia struggled to get its status as
archipelagic country. Having said that, this section also elaborates on some historical events
such as the Juanda Declaration.
4.1 Juanda Declaration.
Deklarasi Juanda (the Juanda Declaration) possibly constitutes the foremost concept in
promoting the ambitious doctrine of GMF. It can be understood that this declaration does not
only lay down a foundation for Indonesia as an archipelagic state, but, as Nugroho
Wisnumurti points out, it also carries a very significant breakthrough in promoting the
domestic interests of Indonesia within the scopes of law, politics, economy, culture as well as
the protection of the unity and integrity of Indonesia.131

Map 5: Indonesia Map After Juanda Declaration of 1957 (13 December – 17
February 1969) enacted in Law Number 4/prp. 1960.132
The history of Indonesia’s maritime integrity commenced when the cabinet Prime Minister
Djuanda Kartawidjaja133 made a declaration on 13 December 1957. It revealed that:
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…all waters, surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state,
regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state
and therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty
of the Indonesian state. Innocent passage of foreign ships in these internal waters is granted as
long as it is not prejudicial to or violates the sovereignty and security of Indonesia. The
delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12-miles) is measures from baselines
connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia.134

This declaration was made by the Indonesian Government after the country proclaimed and
gained independence in 1945. It was a response to the divided areas of the country as
inherited by the Netherlands Indies politically and legally when they adopted the 1939
Ordinance on Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts (Territoriale Zee En Marietieme Kringen
Ordonnantie/TZMKO) (Staatsblad 1939 No.442). 135 The Juanda Declaration extended
territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles and highlighted that ‘for the purpose of territorial
unity, and in order to protect the resources of Indonesia, all islands and the seas in between
must be regarded as one total unit.’136
With the separate areas inherited by the colonial regime, it was challenging to protect marine
resources from violation and to enforce the law if crime was committed on the different
islands divided by the ‘kantung’ (pocket) of the high seas. As seen in Map 6, the pockets
existed prior to the Juanda Declaration as Indonesia was not just under one blanket. This
condition also created vulnerability in national security when foreign fishing vessels sailed in
between Indonesian islands without strict regulations.
The Juanda Declaration was subsequently legalized by Law No. 4/prp 1960 concerning
Indonesian Waters. This law permits foreign fishing vessels to exercise innocent passage
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through internal waters.137 Article 4(2) regulates that this Law supersedes Article 1(1) (1)-(4)
of the 1939 TZMKO138 since it does not serve the interests and rights of Indonesia to protect
its safety and security.139

Map 6: Indonesia Map Before Juanda Declaration of 1957 (17 August 1945-13
December 1957) enacted in Dutch Law (Royal Territorial Sea Ordinance of 1939).140
It may be of value to briefly examine this ordinance as a background to discussing the
development of the concept of the archipelagic state in Indonesia. In the Ordonnantie, there
exist some important arrangements as follows:141
1. De Nederlandsch-Indische Territoriale Zee (Netherland Indies Territorial Sea). This
territorial sea comprises two major regulations.
(I) Marine waters area that extends to 3 nautical miles measured from the low water mark
of the islands, or part of islands, under the territory of the Netherland Indies except
otherwise stated by other provisions.
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(II) The sea area located to seaward of the area as defined in Paragraph I but lying within
the anchorage limits depending on each specification.
2. Het Nederlandsch-Indische Zeegebied (Territorial Waters). This area covers territorial sea
of the Netherlands Indies including coastal waters and the water areas of bays, straits and
mouths of rivers and canals which are directed to landward of the territorial sea.
3. De Nederlandsch-Indische Wateren (Netherlands Indies Waters). This covers all waters
located to landward of territorial sea of the Netherland Indies and, in addition, to those
parts of all rivers, canals, lakes and pools in the Netherlands Indies.
4. De Nederlandsch-Indische Marietieme Districten (Maritime Districts). The scope of this
area includes the territorial sea of the Netherlands Indies and its internal waters.
Article 1 of the Ordonnantie also regulated further detail of other legal matters of the sea
such as bays, islands, straits and fishing rights. In the case of a bay, it depends on the width of
the bay. If it is not more than ten nautical miles wide, the measurement of territorial waters is
drawn from a straight line across the opening of the bay. If the opening is more than ten
miles, then the same straight line shall be drawn as close as possible to the entrance at the
first point where it is not more than ten nautical miles. With regard to islands of a group of
two or more islands, the maximum 3-mile rule from a straight line applies ‘connecting the
outermost points of the low water marks of the islands on the outer edge of the group, at the
point where distance between these points is not more than six miles.’142
For straits connecting two high seas, if it is not more than six nautical miles and the
Netherlands is not the only coastal state, a middle line between the territorial waters of the
states should be drawn. 143 Meanwhile, fishing rights will be granted only to indigenous
people in the maritime districts and the holder of a licence to be approved by naval
commander.144 It is worthwhile to also highlight that the TZMKO introduced the right of visit
and the right of hot pursuit.145
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The questions regarding the measurement of 3 nautical miles applied by the Netherlands
Indies may arise in this regard. There exist some reasons following behind the policy of 3
nautical miles:
1) The motherland needed Indonesia to be divided. As Denny Indrayana puts it, the
Netherland Indies employed the tactic of divide et impera (divide and conquer) as an
attempt to fragment Indonesia.146 This strategy would make Indonesia easier to conquer
and rule than the amalgamated land and waters as one national structure. If Indonesia was
united, it would threaten the supremacy of colonial rule over the whole occupied territory
of Indonesia.
2) At the time of application of law of the sea, the Netherlands Indies applied the same rule
as its Dutch motherland, to Indonesia as the colony.
As confirmed by J.J.G Syatauw, prior to World War II, Indonesia applied the same laws
and regulations of the Dutch as laid down in the TZMKO. This Ordonnantie represented
principles of the law of the sea ratified by the Netherlands and adopted definitions of some
provisions generally contained in the law of the sea.147 It is obvious that J.J.G Syatauw’s
reference to the law of the sea was not directed to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention
because his book was published in 1961. Furthermore, the breadth of territorial sea was
not agreed to by the state parties to the convention until it was provisioned in the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
The UN convened the first Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva on 24 February
1958 – 27 April 1958 and successfully adopted four conventions including the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and one optional protocol on
the settlement of dispute.148 Although this first conference was praised for concluding four
conventions, the issue on the breadth of territorial waters remained unresolved. Provisions
concerning territorial sea encompass Articles 1-13, but no specific article defines the
actual extent of territorial sea. 149 This Convention referred to territorial sea as ‘the
sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of
sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea’.150 Therefore, it depends on the
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state parties of this Territorial Sea Convention to extend its territorial waters breadth from
the baseline. The Dutch rule to apply the 3-nautical mile limit as territorial waters can be
derived from the popular notion of the so-called ‘cannon-shot rule’. In brief, the territorial
sea width was calculated from the coast seaward up to a distance where a shot from a
cannon could reach. This 3-nm range became customary international law as the width of
territorial sea until the new regime of 12-nm was adopted in the LOSC.151
3) The third reason is that colonials had less sense of belonging to tanah air (motherland).
The proclamation of independence by Soekarno-Hatta on 17 August 1945 marked a new
page in Indonesia’s history. As a newly independent state at the time, Indonesia brought a
strong and visionary perspective on national unity and integrity. Nationalism and
territorial sovereignty came to the fore after having been colonized by the Dutch for
hundreds of years.152 Facing the reality of the rule of 3-nm from baseline as territorial
waters, with divided islands as the heritage of the Netherlands Indies, Indonesia had
interest to protect and prevent the entire region from the possible intrusion of foreign
countries when sailing through the high seas in between the islands.
It was a different story for the Netherlands Indies. As a former colony to Indonesia, it has
a lower sense of belonging and pride to tanah air (homeland) of Indonesia. The formation
of Vereenighde Oost-Indische Compagnie (East India Company/VOC) in 1602153 can be
seen as the colonial’s measure to conquer Indonesia with an economic-motivated agenda.
In history, this company, as their initial motive, intended to be a competitor of the
Portuguese in establishing a direct line for exotic spices to Europe. This company made
the Dutch more progressive and the colonialization became more commercial through
direct contact with the locals and indigenous people. The exploitation was not limited to
spices, but also to other inhuman practices such as slavery which was a common trade.154
In that sense, instead of having responsibility to develop and protect Indonesia, the main
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objective of the Netherland Indies was rather to exploit its natural resources to their own
economic advantage.
4.2 The Concept of Archipelagic State and Territoriale Zee En Marietieme Kringen
Ordonnantie/TZMKO.
It is appropriate to commence the discussion in this section by referring to Article 25A of
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 1945 (Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia of
1945) which reads: ‘the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is an archipelagic state
with Nusantara trait, the boundaries and rights of whose territory shall be established by
law.’155 The legal position of constitution as the supreme law within the hierarchical system
of Indonesia’s laws and regulations156 gives a strong message that Indonesia is committed to
positioning the maritime domain as its main priority. It can be conceived that Article 25A
delivers three major concepts: being unitary state, archipelagic state and Nusantara. By
assigning those three concepts in one provision, it demonstrates that there is one integral
system that forms Indonesia. Those concepts cannot be separated since each influences the
others. Within the adoption of those elements lies the essential foundation that is based on
geographical features, Indonesia’s marine waters dominate its land. The affirmation that
Indonesia is an archipelagic state has been established also in the Article 2, Law Number
6/1996 on Indonesia Waters. It can be conceived that Article 25A of 1945 Constitution
strengthens archipelagic state of Indonesia as stated in the Law Number 6/1996 and upgrades
into a higher level of “law” into “constitution”.
The admittance of the archipelagic state and Nusantara as essential elements should be more
than sufficient to declare Indonesia as a maritime nation. Nonetheless, it was not until
Jokowi’s presidency in 2014, that the maritime domain received more attention than under
the previous administrations. Considering the painstaking and long process that has been
experienced by the Indonesian delegates when proposing the archipelagic concept as the
accepted principle in LOSC,157 the principle should become a main reference as a vision that
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determined the course of the nation in the future long before the inauguration of Jokowi as
the seventh president. Nevertheless, the previous regimes also paid attention to maritime
affairs. One instance was the adoption of Hari Nusantara (Nusantara Day) on 13 December
by President Megawati to rekindle the Juanda Declaration.158
4.2.1. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and the Archipelagic Doctrine.
As an influential concept for the development of Indonesia, the archipelagic state has a long
history, in fact before the LOSC came into effect in 1982. Historical writings show that
territorial waters and archipelagos proved to have a strong connection. The year 1888 saw the
initial development of the link between the two when Aubert, a Norwegian jurist, brought this
the question of the territorial waters of archipelagos to the attention of the Insititute de Droit
International (the Institute of International Law).159 Nonetheless, it was not until the 1920s
that the territorial waters were adopted as a subject of discussion at formal forums such as the
International Law Association 160 American Institute of International Law in 1925 and the
Stockholm session of the International Law Association in 1927.161
This regime of archipelagic state entered into a legal process in the case of the AngloNorwegian Fisheries Case adjudicated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Primarily,
ICJ made a decision, delivered on December 18, 1951, that straight baselines are admissible
to be applied when configuring a particular area of waters connecting the outermost points
and include the waters between its islands in the internal waters of Norway.162 In summaries
of judgements, advisory opinions and orders of ICJ, it was further clarified that the case
brought before the court by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
against Norway, questioned the legality of the Norwegian Government in accordance with
international law to delimit the zone where the fisheries were reserved to its own nationals.
The judgment found that ‘neither the method employed for the delimitation by the Decree,
nor the lines themselves fixed by the said Decree, are contrary to international law; the first
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finding is adopted by ten votes to two, and the second by eight votes to four.’163 Norway
drew the line on the basis of the 1935 Decree. The decision, taken by ICJ in this case, gave
rise to the International Law Commission to allow a state with a fringe of islands in the
immediate surroundings of its coast to apply straight baselines.164 The approach of straight
baseline laid a stronger foundation for the concept of an archipelagic regime to be a subject of
international consideration and inspired Indonesia to claim archipelagic waters by drawing
straight baselines.
5. The Struggle of Indonesia to Obtain Archipelagic Status.
After the periods of the old kingdoms and the Netherland Indies, the declaration of
Indonesian Independence on August 17, 1945 highlighted the subsequent phase of
Indonesia’s maritime journey. At the time of declaration, the territories of the former colony
had been inherited by Indonesia in accordance with the international legal principle of uti
possidetis juris (as you possess in law). The inheritance also includes the three miles of
territorial waters surrounding islands regulated under TZMKO leaving Indonesia incapable of
claiming waters in between its islands. 165 This circumstance made Indonesia divided by
ocean, whereas it should function as a means to unite.
As conceived by Etty Agoes, Indonesia which had very much concern over the situation was
prompted to issue the Juanda Declaration on the basis of the following rationale:166
1. As an archipelagic state comprising thousands of islands, geographically Indonesia
required its own specific arrangement based on its traits and features;
2. The archipelago and its interconnecting waters should be regarded as a unifier for the
territorial integrity of Indonesia;
3. Article 1, paragraph 1 of the 1939 TZMKO, regulating the limit of territorial sea, should
be considered as no longer valid with the interest of Indonesia concerning safety and
security matters;
4. It is the right of each state to take the necessary efforts to preserve the unity and safety of
its territory.
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Juanda Declaration also contains a political dimension to overcome a critical condition of
disintegration. The declaration was part of a strategy to address the issue, by introducing a
concept that would represent a symbol of unity.167 At the time of the declaration, political
disintegration erupted when the government announced an emergency situation on 14 March
1957. This later turned into a war declaration on 17 December 1957.168 This declaration was
imperative to solidify the nation building that at the time was vulnerable, and the Nusantara
concept or archipelagic regime embodied in the Juanda Declaration provided a clear response
to this challenge.
In early days of the declaration, this concept evoked protest from major countries such as the
United States, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan and New
Zealand. 169 On January 13, 1958, the Government of Japan, through the Japanese Vice
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Katsum Ohno, protested the declaration to the Indonesian
mission in Tokyo, that the claim of Indonesia could not be admitted under international law
and as such, it was not legally binding upon Japanese nationals, vessels or airplanes.170 The
United States and the United Kingdom countered Indonesia’s proposal expeditiously and
resolutely. Those two countries accused Indonesia of breaching the sacrosanct maxim of
freedom of navigation and free transit as no single power could possess the ocean, as
reflected in Grotian tradition.171 Both countries filed the protests almost concurrently. Britain
made a statement on 3 January 1958, three days after the U.S rejection. Indonesia’s
declaration was perceived by the U.K as illegitimate and as such, invalid to its vessels,
individuals and airplanes.172 Likewise, on 3 January 1958, the Australian Embassy expressed
its concern through a diplomatic note to the Government of Indonesia stating that Indonesia
had intention to assert the sovereignty over the high seas. In that respect, as maintained in the
note, Australia was of the view that the claim constituted a breach of international law and
167
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the Australia Government did not bind itself to such action. 173 Indonesia persistently
defended its stance in international forums, most importantly during the negotiations to
formulate the provisions of the law of the sea.
5.1. UNCLOS I.
The first UN Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in Geneva on 24 February – 27
April 1958. As considered by Tullio Treves, this conference considered its duty to examine
the law of the sea from the legal, technical, biological, economic and political aspects and to
frame the result of its work in international conventions or other instruments.174 In the final
result, the conference drew up four conventions signed on April 29, 1958 on the general
regimes on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, on the High Seas, on the High Seas
Fishing and Fishery Conservation and the Continental Shelf.175
In this initial and influential conference to determine the future of the ocean, it was generally
believed that Indonesia was the first state to raise the archipelago issue before the delegates
of UNCLOS I.176 The Indonesian delegation of Indonesia made a statement concerning its
country’s unilateral legal decision on the archipelagic regime, as follows:
Indonesia consists of some 13,000 islands scattered over a vast area. To treat them as separate
entities each with its own territorial waters, would create many serious problems. Apart from
the fact that the exercise of state jurisdiction in such an area was a matter of great difficulty,
there was the question of the maintenance of communication between the islands.
If each of Indonesia’s component islands were to have its own territorial sea, the exercise of
more effective control would be made extremely difficult. Furthermore, in the event of an
outbreak of hostilities, the use of the modern means of destruction in the interjacent waters
would have disastrous effect on the population of the islands and on the living resources of the
maritime areas concerned. That is why the Indonesian Government believes that the seas
between and around the islands should be considered as forming a whole with the land territory,
and, the country’s territorial seas should be measured from baselines drawn between the
outermost points of the outermost islands.177

Indonesia was clear in making its statement heard by the other delegations when delivering
the possible condition of the country along with the disadvantages that Indonesia would face
if its territorial sea was not drawn from baselines in between the islands’ outermost points.
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As a response to this, the head of the U.S delegation, Arthur Dean retained that country’s
position by making a reference to the universal doctrine of freedom of navigation in which
any state could unilaterally appropriate no part of it. He had reason to believe that the
restriction to the free use of the high seas through a 12-mile blanket around the archipelago
should not be deemed as advanced measures. The argument delivered by Arthur Dean is as
follows:
The committee should bear in mind that whatever was added to an individual state’s territorial
waters must inevitably be subtracted from the high seas, the common property of all nations.
For example, if islands were treated as an archipelago and a twelve-mile belt was drawn round
the entire archipelago according to the formerly used by ships of all countries would be
unilaterally claimed as territorial waters, or possibly even internal water. It would be a
misnomer to describe such restrictions on the free use of the high seas as “progressive”
measures. This delegation was ready to listen with understanding to the views of others, but
hope that the views of the maritime powers would likewise receive full and fair
consideration.178

The U.S directed the objection against the general application of the archipelagic regime and
not the proposal of Indonesia per se. The conversion of high seas into territorial sea brought
the potential denial of free access navigation to maritime countries and applied to some areas
such as Dover Strait, Malacca Strait, Hormuz Strait, Bering Straits and all passages within the
Indonesian Archipelago.179 Some countries claimed their territories portions as archipelagos
such as Yugoslavia, Denmark, Finland, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iceland. The Faroes and
Svalbard groups, as outlying island groups, also wanted to be treated as an archipelago.180
The lack of legal aspects concerning archipelagic doctrine prompted countries to make a
unilateral declaration at the time. The potential enlargement of the proportion of their
territories drew their interest to make such a claim.
Until the end of the first Conference on the Law of the Sea, the delegates failed to reach an
agreement on the archipelagic concept. This failure can be explained by two rationales. First,
there was a lack of support from western maritime powers such as the U.S, Britain, France
and the Netherlands. On the other hand, there were only two major powers who supported the
archipelagic concept, Russia and China.181 Therefore, more support by major powers was
crucial and could put gravitas to the adoption of this doctrine at the conference. Secondly, the
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cold war setting, to some degree, possibly influenced the reluctance of the western bloc to
lend support to the archipelagic doctrine as it had received endorsement from the eastern
bloc. It was argued that Russia and China were supposed to have the same concerns as the
western bloc regarding the potential restriction on their fleet of vessels when passing through
the passage of the archipelagic states. However, the two countries held a different position.
Thirdly, China and the Soviet Union supported Indonesia’s claim to maintain their good
relationship with Indonesia and both had limited interests at the time.182
In his written article, available from the UN library, Judge of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Tullio Treves testified that the Conference failed to reach
consensus on several proposals including ‘ranging from 3 to 200 miles maximum limits, a
proposal for a 6 miles breadth of the territorial sea plus a 6 miles fishery zone immediately
adjoining it which was accepted by the Committee on the whole but which did not obtain the
necessary two-thirds majority in plenary’. The UN General Assembly had concerns over this
unresolved question, including the fishing limits, and saw this worthy of a further measure to
reach an agreement and made them the main agenda item of the Second UN Conference on
the Law of the Sea.183
5.2. UNCLOS II
The subsequent conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva from 17 March to 26
April 1960 with eighty-seven countries participating. As the continuation of the previous
conference, this conference tabled the unsettled items for further discussion, pursuant to
Resolution 1307 (XIII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations Convening the
Conference (Convening of a Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea).184
The primary debates among the delegates in this conference were still on the issues of:185
a) The breadth of the territorial sea bordering each coastal state;
b) The establishment of the fishing zone by coastal states in the high seas, contiguous to, but
beyond the outer limit of the territorial seas of the coastal states.
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As stated previously, the archipelagic concept still faced a tough challenge from some
countries. Indonesia together with the Philippines maintained their claim for this doctrine.186
Nevertheless, UNCLOS II repeated the same story as UNCLOS I in that it failed to reach an
agreement concerning the proposal of both countries, 187 even when the delegation of the
Philippines attempted to propose a breakthrough to solve the problem.188 Indonesia and the
Philippines turned to their domestic regulation as an effort to strengthen their position before
the international community. Nonetheless, those two proponents of the archipelagic doctrine
approach differed concerning the time for the enactment of the said regulations.
Indonesia made the archipelagic state doctrine codified as Indonesia law through the
enactment of Law Number 4/prp 1960 concerning Indonesia Waters. This law entered into
force on 18 February 1960, or one month prior to the first Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The adoption of this law illustrated the persistence of Indonesia in realizing its vision to cover
the country under one blanket. It also delivered the messages not only of domestic but also
external disagreements. Internally, some domestic elites were in doubt of endorsing this
vision further after the refusal and failure of UNCLOS I. The Chief of the Indonesian Navy,
Admiral Subijakto was of the view that the doctrine was impractically motivated by
exaggerated political sentiments. He was not convinced that the Indonesian Navy was able to
safeguard the newly declared maritime boundary because of its limited capability. 189
Externally, the enactment of the law can be viewed as a strategy to strengthen Indonesia’s
position in making negotiations with the other delegations.
Similarly, the Philippines enacted the Republic Act No. 3046 of 17 June 1961: An Act to
Define the Baseline of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines after its delegation faced a tough
challenge from some major countries at UNCLOS I. In this act, the Philippines held the
position that:
Whereas all the waters within the limits set forth in the Treaty of Paris and other relevant
treaties have always been regarded as part of the territory of the Philippine Islands; Whereas all
the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippine archipelago,
irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary
appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the
Philippines; Whereas all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within
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the limits of the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea
of the Philippines; Whereas the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is
determined consist of straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the
archipelago; therefore, All waters within the baselines provided for in section one hereof are
considered inland or internal waters of the Philippines.190

This Republic Act was amended later by Republic Act No.5446 of 18 September 1968: An
Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act 3046. 191 The regulations govern a strict
arrangement for navigation, passage and marine resources access in the waters because
internal waters have the same legal regime as the regime of land territory.192 Major maritime
powers such as the U.S, the U.K and Australia then expressed their dissatisfaction with the
right of passage through the archipelagic waters of the Philippines particularly for their
warships.193 The U.S acted as a vocal dissenter of the archipelagic doctrine and argued that
the concept would allow belligerent countries to close off the straits giving rise to ‘United
States warships steaming to quell trouble in a localized flare up…[and be] subjected to
additional travel time – as much as 2-3 days – to avoid penetrating the waters of a nonbelligerent state'.194
The Philippines continued to affirm their stance through legal framework by ratifying a new
Constitution encompassing this claim to the Treaty Limits which reads:
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters
embraced therein, and all the other territories belonging to the Philippines by historical or legal
title, including the territorial sea, the airspace, the subsoil, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and
the submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters
around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, irrespective of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.195

This Constitution came into effect on 17 January 1973 or 11 months before the relevant
countries consented to convene UNCLOS III as the subsequent conference of UNCLOS II.
The adoption of this Constitution came at the right time to convey the message that the
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Philippines persistently would pursue its vision as an archipelagic state despite protests from
the opposing countries.
5.3. UNCLOS III
5.3.1. First Session.
This third conference of UNCLOS received more enthusiasm from states compared to the
previous conferences of UNCLOS I and II. In this last conference of UNCLOS, the
delegations and specialized agencies participating consisted of 160 participants and eight
organizations, respectively which meant the total number was three times larger than
UNCLOS I and II.196 On 17 December 1970, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution
2750C (XXV) that decided to convene the third conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973
aiming to encompass a comprehensive Law of the Sea Convention. The first session from a
total of eleven sessions held from 1973-1982 of UNCLOS III took place in New York on 315 December 1973.
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This UN General Assembly Resolution 2750C (XXV) also

strengthened the existence of the Committee of the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (UN Seabed Committee).
In the sessions of the UN Seabed Committee, the Indonesian delegation paid close attention
to the maxim of “Common Heritage of Mankind” and the challenging issues of maritime
zones and straits. There were two main rationales for having the matters as top priority. First
of all, the issues were primary concerns of the developing states. Secondly, Indonesia had a
profound interest in the maritime zones and strait passage since archipelagos came under the
agenda of maritime zone198 and the strait passage arrangement had a direct impact on the
Malacca Strait passage lane.
The work of the third conference on the law of the sea chiefly comprised three committees.
The first committee had the task of discussing the issue of the legal regime for the deep
seabed beyond the limit of national jurisdiction, the second committee dealt with the topics of
‘territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, the
high seas, land-locked countries, shelf-locked States and States with narrow shelves or short
coastlines and the transmission from the high seas’. The last committee was charged with the
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topic of the preservation of the marine environment.

199

As testified by Mochtar

Kusumaatmaja, the most challenging task in this New York session was that the delegations
to the conference should commence the discussion right from the beginning because the
agenda item had to be further discussed due to the emergence of newly independent states
that were entitled to have representatives as the member of delegates in the forum.200
In this forum, there were four countries that consistently advocated the archipelagic state
regime, namely, Indonesia, the Philippines, Fiji and Mauritius.201 Hasjim Djalal maintained
Indonesia’s assertion to obtain the legal status of an archipelagic state in order to foster the
country's territorial integrity, unity, political stability as well as cultural, social and economic
cohesiveness as it is conceived that land, waters and people were of one unified element.202
Amongst the scholars, Daniel Patrick O’Connell, was known as an influential academic and
main supporter of the archipelagic concept. He had paid close attention to this issue since
1969.203 As pointed out by O’Connell:
So long as the territorial sea was restricted to three, or even six, miles, the area of waters to be
enclosed within a group of islands was relatively restricted, but when a closing line for bays of
twenty- four miles has become the rule, and when a twelve-mile territorial sea is becoming a
conservative standard, arithmetic has ceased to have relevance to the question. Archipelago
claims can no longer be regarded as legal aberrations, since they are likely to be made by
almost all the newly independent nations which consist of island groups.204

O’Connell attempted to comprehend the archipelago concept from the background of the
newly independent state and their geographical features. This perspective was correct in the
sense the rules that the colonial regimes and the newly independent states had followed
should be distinguished. The colonial governments, such as the Netherlands Indies, applied
the same principles as its motherland because Indonesia functioned as a ‘long-arm’
administration of the central government in Amsterdam. At the same time, the geographical
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features of the Netherlands were vastly different from that of Indonesia. As a country with a
group of islands, the top leaders of the country should find a way of protecting the country
through archipelagic doctrine.
5.3.2. Second Session.
The second session of the UNCLOS III was convened in Caracas, Venezuela from 20 June –
29 August 1974.205 Before going into further negotiations, the meeting adopted the course of
the meeting by mirroring the structure of the Sea-Bed Commission. The First Committee had
the task of discussing the regime and mechanism for the regulation of the use of the seabeds
beyond national jurisdiction. The Second Committee was in charge of the traditional matters
of the law of the sea such as the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone, the continental
shelf, the high seas, the straits, the archipelagos and fishing. The Third Committee had the
duty to address the issues of sea pollution, transfer of technology, scientific research and
conservation. The delegations to this session focused on the declaration presentation rather
than negotiations of the texts.206
Nevertheless, in accordance with a report composed by Elisabeth Mann Borgese in 1974, as
archived in the University of Dalhousie, when delivering the general statements, the real
issues that emerged were between on the one hand, a few countries that were persistent in
holding the basic notion of freedoms of navigation and the fragmented and limited national
and international regimes, and on the other hand, most of the countries that supported ‘a
strong and rational regime for the ocean, the management of which would be shared by
coastal nations, regional organizations and the International Authority.’ At least 24
developing countries challenged the freedom of navigation if the freedom only served the
interests of major powers in navigation and fisheries. The developing countries further
requested that the management of living resources and all other activities on the high seas
should fall under effective international arrangement.207
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Meanwhile, the Second Committee paid attention mostly to the exclusive economic zone.
Aguilar made a summary on the work of the Committee stating that:
The proposal for a territorial sea belt of twelve miles and an economic zone of up to two
hundred miles had received support from the majority of delegations, even though final
agreement depended on the resolution of a number of concurrent problems such as passage
through straits, the outer limits of the continental shelf, the regime of islands and archipelagic
states, and the rights of landlocked nations. Whereas there was near-unanimity among the
majority of nations with regard to international ocean space, no such agreement existed in the
Second Committee concerning national ocean space.208

In regard to the archipelagic concept, Indonesia, along with other like-minded states that
supported the doctrine, formally submitted draft articles concerning the archipelagic states.
The basis of the proposal referred to the previous submissions by four states in the
preparatory meetings convened in Geneva and New York. The Head of the Indonesian
delegation delivered a speech in the general debate session that highlighted several concerns
including the main rationale of Indonesia's stance and the grounds and objectives of draft
articles that had been submitted. The speech also pointed out the main legal basis of
archipelagic states which was primarily illustrated in the Juanda Declaration and Law
Number 4/Prp. of 1960 concerning Indonesian Waters and which took into considerations the
interests of the other supporting countries.209
The other interesting development that occurred at this conference was India’s proposal on
‘archipelago of state’. This notion at a glance seemed to be the same idea as the archipelagic
state, but it offered a different approach. On the one hand, the archipelagic state concept
suggested the legal framework of the whole territory as an archipelago without admitting the
existence of islands outside the territory. On the other hand, the archipelago of state concept
proposed the application of the principles of archipelagic state to the archipelago of a state in
which most of the territory is a continent. The developing countries from the African
Continent made an objection to this notion. Problematic circumstances occurred when coastal
states, as a prominent group with a significant number of members, consented to make a
proposal encompassing draft articles on several issues such as an economic zone of 200
nautical miles and continental shelf. It was quite complex as Indonesia would have to decide
either as the co-sponsor of the proposal or as a state with a different position.210 Opposing or
supporting the proposal offered by coastal states brought the same risk for Indonesia when
208
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attempting to garner the support of as many countries as possible in this regard. Finally,
however, Indonesia decided to join the coastal states.
Finally, although this session discussed several important matters, it did come to agreement
on the anticipated articles. 211 All proposals submitted by the delegations have been compiled
and considered by the head of the conference as the Main Trends of the Law of the Sea.212
The persistence of Indonesia and the other proponents to endorse the concept of archipelagic
state gave rise to the adoption of the archipelagic state concept in the minutes of the meeting,
encompassing the Main Trends of the conference.213
5.3.3. Third – Eleventh Sessions.
The third conference on the Law of the Sea opened its third session on 17 March to 9 May
1975 in Geneva with the undertaking to, amongst other things, ‘achieve tangible and lasting
results which would lead to a Convention on the Law of the Sea’. The Main Trends served as
guidance for negotiations. This document also made the link between the Carcass session and
the subsequent sessions including this Geneva conference.214 The following sessions of the
fourth to the eleventh were convened on 15 March 1976 and concluded on 10 December
1982. There were five sessions during UNCLOS III that were resumed; seventh, eighth,
ninth, tenth and eleventh sessions.215
As a Singapore ambassador to the U.N and the President of the third U.N Conference on the
Law of the Sea from 1981-1984, Tommy T.B. Koh generally asserted that UNCLOS III
attempted to address the issues that remained unresolved by the Hague Codification
Conference of 1939 and UNCLOS I and II such as the territorial sea limits and the right of
exclusive fishing. The delegations of the third conference also negotiated the continental
shelf, contiguous zone, straits for international navigation, archipelagos, high seas, the
protection and preservation of the marine environment from pollution, marine scientific
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research and seabed and ocean floor. The appeal by Arvid Pardo concerning the link between
ocean space and ecological unity was also examined.216
At the end of the Geneva session, President Amerasinghe made an announcement regarding
the dissemination of the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) with a note from the
President that the text would serve as the procedural reference and a basis for negotiation.217
The conclusion of ISNT proved a step forward as an achievement from the previous Caracas
Conference in the sense that the Geneva Conference produced a single text while the Caracas
drafts provided alternative provisions. The Geneva Conference also reached agreement to
confirm universal support of the 12 nautical miles for the territorial sea regime and 200
nautical miles for the economic zone. 218 With regard to archipelagic concept, Mochtar
Kusumaatmaja disclosed that there was no resistance from countries, including the U.S,
against this concept, which demonstrated the general acceptance by countries in this Geneva
Conference. Compared to the struggle to secure a 200 nautical mile economic zone, the
archipelagic concept faced its challenges in the sense that fewer countries paid interest or
attention to it and were interested only in the economic zone that involved a large number of
coastal states.219
Although the delegations admitted the archipelagic concept in ISNT, it did not mean that the
other representatives gave their approval. In this respect, mapping of the countries both in
favour and against the concept was necessary to plan and execute a precise strategy. Based on
the assessment made by the Indonesian delegation, countries involved in the negotiation
process were clustered into four groups:220
1. Neighbouring countries in the region including ASEAN members and Australia.
2. Countries with interest in fisheries such as Japan, and in underwater cable for
communication. Japan as a far-distant fishing nation had long been recognized as having
exploited Indonesian waters before Indonesia became an archipelagic state without any
benefit to Indonesia.

216

Tommy T.B Koh, ‘The Origins of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1987)29 Malaya Review 17.
Hamilton S. Amerasinghe, President, Progress of Work, UN Doc A/CONF.62/SR.54 (18 April 1975) 3.
218
Milenko Milic, ‘Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’ (1976)8 Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law 168-169.
219
Kusumaatmadja, The Concept of Archipelagic State in the 3rd Conference of the Law of the Sea, above n 198,
104.
220
Ibid 105.
217

64

3. Maritime countries. Their interest was to ensure that their maritime navigation did not face
any obstruction. Most of them were in western countries.
4. Maritime major powers with military strategy interest. The U.S and Soviet Union were
part of this group.
Indonesia set the highest priority to obtain the support of ASEAN member countries for the
reason that their endorsement, as their closest neighbours, was necessary to convince the
other clusters.
During the last nine sessions of the third conference on the Law of the Sea, Indonesia and the
other archipelagic countries intensified efforts to approach and pursue countries and relevant
institutions around the globe with the main objective of securing their support. As a
prominent diplomat that actively represented Indonesia in the negotiation forum to promote
the archipelagic concept, Prof. Hasjim Djalal documented some notable achievements.
Amongst others are the following:221
1. The declaration to support the archipelagic concept by the participants attending the
meetings of the Developing Countries on the Law of the Sea held in Nairobi, Kenya in
1974;
2. The statement of the Organization of African Union to support the archipelagic principles
during its meetings held in Addis Ababa (1974) and Mogadishu (1975);
3. Indonesia established a sort of ‘alliance’ with the African countries in which most of them
sought the recognition of 200 miles EEZ around their coastline (the so-called economist
countries or group);
4. Indonesia reached several informal understandings with some American countries which
had interest in receiving acknowledgment of the 200 miles Territorial Sea concept
(territorialist countries or group);
5. Indonesia to cooperate with the so-called strait countries or group, in particular, Malaysia,
Oman, Egypt, Greece, Tanzania and Spain to make the maritime regime of navigation
accepted through straits used for international navigation. In addition, Indonesia and some
countries such as Malaysia and Singapore had reached an understanding on the
management of the safety of navigation and the protection of the environment of the
Straits of Malacca and Singapore in 1971;
221
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6. Indonesia cooperated with the marginist countries or group that sought to obtain the
extension of the continental shelf beyond the depth of 200 metres of water as stipulated in
the Geneva Convention in Continental Shelf of 1958. This would extend to 100 miles
beyond a depth of 2,500 metres of water and beyond 200 miles throughout the natural
prolongation of the land territory of the states along the way to the outer edge of the
continental margin. This marginist group includes Australia, New Zealand, India, Norway,
Canada, the U.S, the Soviet Union and others;
7. Indonesia maintained good, non-confrontational relations in regard to the Land-Locked
and Geographically Disadvantaged States which originally opposed both EEZ and
Continental Margin claims. This approach was taken to make those states’ opposition to
the archipelagic doctrine as low as possible;
8. Fostering intensive communication with maritime powers such as the U.S, the Soviet
Union, the U.K, Japan, China, India, Canada, Latin America and Caribbean countries so
that the maritime powers gradually understood and supported the concept in the sense that
the definition of archipelagic state and legal regime of archipelagic waters could be
addressed. The navigation of transit through the archipelagic waters and other problems
could be settled.
All the strategies in advancing the concept of Archipelagic States bore fruit. The UNCLOS
was finally adopted in Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 1982. Indonesia received
recognition as an archipelagic state and founded its legal basis to proclaim sovereignty over
the archipelagic waters. LOSC for the first time recognized the concept of archipelagic states
through the definition of an archipelagic state in Article 46 which reads ‘a State constituted
wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands’.222 Article 47 articulates
that ‘the states comprising one or more mid-ocean archipelagos may, under certain
conditions, draw straight baselines joining the outermost islands and drying reefs of the
archipelago.223 The archipelagic baselines are used to measure the breadth of the territorial
sea contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf (Article 48).
Furthermore, archipelagic waters are waters enclosed within archipelagic baselines. The
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archipelagic state has the right to exercise sovereignty over such waters, its seabed, subsoil
and the airspace above.224
As provisioned in this Constitution of Ocean, Indonesia can claim:
1. Sovereignty over 12 nautical miles territorial sea surrounding the archipelagic waters
(Articles 1(3) and 3);
2. Up to 24 nautical miles from archipelagic baselines as contiguous zones (Article 33(2));
3. The sovereign rights and other jurisdiction over 200 nautical miles from its archipelagic
baselines (Article 57);
4. The sovereign rights over the continental shelf to the outer edge of its continental margin
(Article 76);
5. The delimitation of internal waters within its archipelagic waters by drawing closing lines
(Article 50).
Law of the Sea Convention also employs certain rights of other countries in certain parts of
its archipelagic waters such as traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the
immediately adjacent neighbouring countries in specific areas falling within archipelagic
waters. Nonetheless, bilateral agreements should be concluded to regulate terms and
conditions to exercise such rights and activities. 225 In connection to this, Indonesia and
Malaysia have consented to be bound by the Treaty between Malaysia and the Republic of
Indonesia relating to the Legal Regime of Archipelagic State and the Rights of Malaysia in
the Territorial Sea and Archipelagic Waters as well as in the Airspace above the Territorial
Sea, Archipelagic Waters and the Territory of the Republic of Indonesia Lying Between East
and West Malaysia (the Treaty) concluded in 25 February 1982.226
It can be learnt that the Treaty was a result of ‘give and take’ negotiation between the two
states. In the Treaty, both parties consider the support of Malaysia to the legal regime of the
archipelagic state of Indonesia and the policy of Indonesia to recognize and respect the
existing rights and other legitimate interests traditionally practiced by Malaysia in some areas
of Indonesia agreed upon by the two countries.227 Meanwhile, with regard to passage and
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transit through archipelagic waters, the Convention governs the regimes of innocent
passage228 and the archipelagic sea lanes passage through archipelagic sea lanes229 and air
route there above.230
6. Conclusion.
The importance of archipelagic status in shaping Indonesia as a maritime nation cannot be
underestimated. Before obtaining acknowledgment as an archipelagic country, various
elements supported the notion that its maritime realm has reinforced Indonesia as a maritime
nation. The geographical location suggests that Indonesia is located strategically at the
juncture of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and between the Asian and Australian Continents.
The total area of Indonesia is covered mainly by marine water of approximately 62.05%. This
area potentially increased after the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs updated the
map following the bilateral maritime boundary conclusion with Singapore and the Philippines
and as a response to regional dynamics.
Moreover, maritime culture and spirit are deeply rooted in Indonesian history. The old mantra
of Jalesveva Jayamahe and a famous song titled ‘Indonesia as a Sailor Nation’ present clear
examples that the ocean flows in the blood of Indonesian people. Old kingdoms based
originally in Java, such as Majapahit, Srivijaya and Demak, played a prominent role in
expanding their territory and forming trade relations with other countries through sea routes.
Old examples of literature such as Nāgarakrĕtāgama and Pararaton testified that the
Majapahit Kingdom under Patih Gajah Mada (Prime Minister Gajah Mada) ruled the region
known as Nusantara covering Sumatera, Malay Peninsula, Kalimantan and eastern Indonesia
in the fourteenth century. This maritime tradition experienced a decline after the colonials
such as the Portuguese and the Dutch arrived and occupied the strategic ports in the region.
Since then, maritime culture turned into land-based agricultural culture. Aside from the role
of ‘old states’, Suku Laut (Ocean Tribe) also contributed to maritime culture and seaborne
trade. Based initially in Sulawesi, they roamed across the region including to the territories
known today as Malaysia and Singapore.
‘CONSIDERING the policy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to recognize and respect the
existing rights and other legitimate interests traditionally exercised by Malaysia in the territorial sea and
archipelagic waters as well as in the airspace above the territorial sea, archipelagic waters and the territory of the
Republic of Indonesia lying between East and West Malaysia’.
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After an examination of the historical context, this part discusses the conceptual design of the
archipelagic state. In 1957, Prime Minister Juanda made a declaration that territorial seas
should be measured 12 nautical miles from baselines connecting the outermost points of
Indonesia’s islands and all waters, surrounding, between and connecting the islands should
become part of the Indonesian state. This Declaration has three strategic plans; firstly,
foundation of an archipelagic state, secondly, a breakthrough to achieve national interest and
thirdly, protection of Indonesia's integrity and unity.
A fact of interest is that in 1951, ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case a decision was
made that the internal waters of Norway could be measured from the straight baselines when
configuring a particular area of water connecting its outermost points. This decision inspired
Indonesia to claim archipelagic waters by drawing straight baselines. By the time of the
Juanda Declaration, major countries expressed their concern and sent their protests to
Indonesia.
Indonesia continued to hold this position in international negotiations including in the Law of
the Sea Conferences. In the LOSC I and II, delegations failed to reach agreement on an
archipelagic state. Indonesia and the other like-minded states such as the Philippines, Fiji and
Mauritius maintained the claim for an archipelagic state. Finally, the delegations in UNCLOS
III successfully adopted provisions on an archipelagic state. In the domestic legal framework,
Indonesia as an archipelagic state has been basically adopted in Article 25A of the Indonesia
Constitution of 1945. This provision strengthens archipelagic state of Indonesia as stated in
the Law Number 6/1996 and upgrades it from “law” into “constitution”.
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PART III
MARITIME CONCEPT REVISITED: INDONESIA AS GLOBAL MARITIME
FULCRUM
1. Introduction.
As described in the previous part, Indonesia has a long history in maritime journeys. The
geographical condition of Indonesia comprising thousands of islands covered mostly by
waters and the victory of old kingdoms having their capitals in Indonesia influenced
Indonesia’s persistent struggle to be an archipelagic state before countries’ delegates in
LOSC conferences. After gaining this status, the maritime vision was not getting the
government’s first priority, not until Jokowi took charge and made a declaration of GMF.
What follows is an account of an overview of the doctrine of GMF introduced in 2014. In
making a comprehensive assessment of this Jokowi’s doctrine, it is imperative to touch upon
an aspect of the history. A brief history in this part functions as a bridge to the subsequent
section on the decline of maritime tradition that Indonesia has experienced. As the historical
context is not a sole contributor to the journey of Indonesia’s maritime history, this section
also examines the succinct perspective on the archipelagic state and maritime power since
those concepts solidify national identity as a maritime nation. The following section presents
the emergence and affirmation of Indonesia as a maritime nation. Before arriving at the
conclusion that Indonesia is qualified as a maritime nation, it discusses the original concept
of maritime nation by prior examination of the concepts of sea power and maritime power.
The next section delivers the analysis on GMF and how this doctrine covers the issue of
marine resources preservation. It is worth noting that when examining Jokowi’s doctrine, this
part provides analysis of the newly adopted document of Ocean Policy. This document
delivers further detailed programs to make Jokowi's vision materialize including how to
preserve marine and fisheries resources in Indonesia. Having said that, this section also offers
a critical review of Government policy to combat IUU fishing under the Ocean Policy.
2. Maritime Concept Revisited.
The discussion concerning the intersection between archipelagic state and maritime nation
highlights an interesting overview of Indonesia’s vision as it involves the conceptual design
of Indonesia based on three considerations:
70

a) how the country was shaped in the past based on historical experiences;
b) how Indonesia faces the current challenges in domestic and international domains; and
c) how does the country best prepare to cope with issues or problems that may arise in the
future?
For Indonesia, the maritime identity lies as an ultimate foundation in supporting the nation to
have self-confidence to be a country with an ocean-oriented future by looking at all the
elements that the ocean can serve and by promoting all potentials that contribute to the
prosperity of the people.
2.1 Maritime Trails of Indonesia: Historical Outlook.
The historical trails of Indonesia suggest that the country’s maritime concept and practice
existed long before the introduction and adoption of archipelagic principles. From the
fifteenth until the seventeenth century, cities with essential ports in Nusantara developed and
reached a golden age as they engaged in maritime global trade networks.231 The emergence of
old kingdoms such as Majapahit, Srivijaya and Demak, as previously discussed in this
section, illustrated in the past that the maritime vision was projected by the kings that ruled
the dominant kingdoms in Indonesia.232
2.2 The Decline of Maritime Culture.
The history of the maritime supremacy of old kingdoms and their prominent roles in
establishing maritime culture declined severely in the sixteenth century. Nusantara as the
centre of maritime power in the region reached a drastic turning point after the arrival of
Europeans. In the early period, the Portuguese and Spanish as pioneers came to Indonesia
with the subsequent wave from the Netherlands and England. Gradually they seized and even
destroyed the leading political and economic institutions and instruments in Nusantara and
took power over maritime purview in the region.233 The occupation of Malacca under the
Portuguese rule in 1511, Manila under the Spanish regime in 1571 and Batavia under the rule
of the Netherlands in 1691 also severely affected some centres of economy, political power
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and prominent cultural creativity in the Asia Region such as Phnom Penh, Hoi An, Malacca,
Patani, Brunei, Banten, Jepara, Gresik, Pegu, Ayutthaya and Macassar.234 The occupation
also gave rise the decline of the power and influence of the Majapahit Kingdom in the region.
Pramoedya Ananta Toer depicted the collapse of Majapahit, as the leading maritime
powerhouse in Nusantara and as a major maritime kingdom in the North, had contributed to
the cessation of ‘the dialogue of civilization between North and South’. As a consequence,
the next phase of history suggested that not only has Nusantara lost its national identity that
was capable of restraining the influence from the South but also it became the occupied
territory of maritime nations coming from the South such as the Portuguese, English and the
Dutch. In the journey, this circumstance forced the people of Nusantara to ignore the ocean
and to pay more attention to the inland-agricultural civilization.235
The interaction of the Nusantara region was highly dependent on the sea lane. Before the
colonists sailed to Nusantara and occupied some strategic ports in the region, maritime
connectivity dominated the community interrelationship in the region. The main trade routes
from the East to the West encompass:
1. Land Route: Silk road from China, Turkistan (Central Asia), India en route to the
Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Peninsula; and
2. Sea Route: South China Sea, Malacca Strait, Calcutta, Persia Gulf, the Mediterranean Sea
en route to Egypt and Europe.
It brought about a different approach and practices that were frequently taken by sailors or
traders in the Nusantara region in which the sea lanes were the only route connecting the
region due to the fact that the land route caused higher risks than that of the sea route at that
time. Reid asserted that the land route in Southeast Asia was difficult to pass through because
of the natural conditions such as heavy dense forests and frequent rainfall.236 Hence, it can be
conceived that two main factors serve as the primary reasons for maritime culture and trade
in Nusantara experiencing severe degradation in the 16th century, as follows:
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1.

The wave of fleets from European countries to occupy strategic territories including ports
in the region. Reid asserted there exist two main factors contributing to their arrival:237
a. Externally, the economic crisis in Europe. They attempted to discover new and
promising lands to be exploited.
b. Internally, problems within their governments or kingdoms and conflict between the
power of the king and the middle class due to economic issues.

2.

The decline of old kingdoms as a consequence of the colonialization in Nusantara by
European countries;

3.

High dependency on the sea as the main route connecting networks in Nusantara placed
the maritime culture and trade in trouble. This circumstance led to the development of
land-based agricultural orientation as the sea no longer served as the main route for sea
trade.

2.3

The Rise of Indonesia as a Maritime Nation.

2.3.1. Sea Power or Maritime Power?
The doctrine of Indonesia as a maritime state did not find its formal admittance in the
domestic domain, until the declaration made by Jokowi in 2014. This concept is not ‘an old
wine in a new bottle’ but it is rather a strategic policy to rekindle the maritime spirit that had
fallen by the time the colonials came to seize the freedom of inhabitants in the region. The
vision appears to be a reference to the heroic speech of Soekarno, a founding father and first
President of Indonesia, in 1953 in the inaugural ceremony of the Naval Institute of Indonesia,
later known as Akademi Angkatan Laut (Naval Academy of Indonesia). As a true orator, he
encouraged Indonesians to become a respected sailor nation by stating:
Try your best to reshape Indonesia as a sailor nation. A sailor nation in the widest extent
meaning. Not only as laborers on the vessels, but also a sailor nation that possesses merchant
ships, a sailor nation that has warships, a sailor nation that is as busy as the waves in the
ocean.238

The atmosphere created by this speech coincided with the notion of making Indonesia unified
through the Declaration of Juanda in 1957.
From the conceptual discussion, some interesting questions with regard to maritime debates
prevail such as the grounds for a nation to be entitled to a status of a maritime nation and the
237

Ibid 310.
Bernard Kent Sondakh and Team, Pemikiran, Tindakan dan Harapan Bernard Kent Sondakh (the Idea,
Action and Hope of Bernard Kent Sondakh) (Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2014) 47.
238

73

elements that make a nation deserve to be a maritime nation. Although possibly this
fundamental issue does not often come to the practitioners or policy makers attention, this
basic concept matters to scholars in the sense that this discussion can lay a strong foundation
to keeping the direction on the right path along with achieving an excellent strategy.
In some works of literature, the elements that contribute to the concept of a maritime state
have been translated into numerous thoughts. One of the most theoretical perspectives was
introduced by Alfred Thayer Mahan in his famous book, ‘The Influence of Sea Power upon
History: 1660-1783’. This classic book was written in 1890. Even though his brilliant concept
in this literature was very old it was and will be relevant for national power in the late 20th
century, the 21st century and the future to come.239 Prominent scholars draw on Mahan’s
theoretical framework to analyse the phenomena of each national maritime power and how
the major maritime countries play their roles and grow their influence regionally and
globally. 240 As a naval officer and strategist, 241 Admiral Mahan held a comprehensive
overview in his seminal work outlining six key elements concerning the sea power of nations.
It covers:
1. Geographical location;
2. Physical conformation including natural resources and climate;
3. The extent of territory;
4. Population numbers;
5. People’s character; and
6. The character of government including national institutions.242
As conceived by James R. Holmes, Mahan’s writings were more appropriate to analyse great
maritime powers such as Great Britain or the United States. Hence, it has less relevance for
fledgling powers in the region such as Japan.243 If it is deemed not to be adequately applied to
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a country such as Imperial Japan, the appropriate application to other countries with moderate
or less maritime power such as Indonesia should also be questioned.
A different angle was introduced by Geoffrey Till perceiving sea power as not simply the
possession of military capabilities in the maritime realm. The power extends to the
interrelation of the inputs and the outputs. As he puts it:
The inputs are navies, coast guards, the marine or civil-maritime industries as more than
military maritime capabilities. Sea power is not simply about what it takes to use the sea. It is
also the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or
from the sea. This approach defines sea power in terms of its consequences, its outputs not the
inputs, the ends and not the means.244

In Till’s perspective, the output should be given more priority than the input. The means will
be meaningless if not taking into account the final results. This concept of sea power extends
to soft power such as the ability to influence the attitude of others and not the hard power per
se.
The sea power concept evolves along with the time and the development of knowledge and
global grouping, in particular with the rise of the other major powers such as China. An
Indonesia Navy officer, Lieutenant Colonel Salim took the view that naval historians have
presented a list including the strength of the economy, the prowess of technology, the culture
of socio-politics, the geographic location, the dependence on maritime trade and sea
resources and lastly, the policy and perception of government. 245 China can be a clear
example of how its sea power has developed to strengthen its regional and global vision. This
country, to some degree, has all the qualifications that are on the list. From the economic
side, as revealed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China is rated as the number one
economic superpower in the world. Compared to the U.S, China’s GDP (Gross Domestic
Product) of 17% outnumbered the U.S GDP of 16% in 2014.246 Its maritime technology was
certainly quite advanced according to some research. China has practiced a cultural change
through sea routes from as early as the fifth century to the places known today as India,
Cambodia, Java, Sumatera, Malaysia, Japan, Sri Lanka and Mecca. Meanwhile, the
government-sponsored emigration and privately organized emigration of China’s population
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to other countries throughout history 247 illustrates that China has the vision to expand its
influence on different parts of the world.
In the modern school of thought, sea power employs a combination of the capability of a
country for international commerce and the exploration of marine resources. This military
power at sea holds a key responsibility to render control over trade and possible disputes and
to influence events on land from the sea. This concept obviously occupies a broader scope
than that of sea power as a mere military perception.248 It appears that this concept highlights
the crucial roles of trade and natural resources. However, the commerce and exploration
activities need security protection that military institutions such as the navy are able to offer.
This concept also enables military power at sea to have the capability not only to perform its
duties at sea but also to have direct and indirect engagement with occurrences on land. An
aircraft carrier, for instance, can put pressure on other countries that pose a threat to the
region, or flag state of the carrier since the standard technology of the ship enables missiles to
be launched and fighters to take off from its deck.
Nonetheless, sea power is not always identical to maritime power. Maritime power embraces
a broader ambit than sea power. Salim holds the view that sea power extends to the total
ability of a state to employ the sea, including all its resources, to pursue and accomplish
national interests. In this sense, sea power supports maritime power. Therefore, it is proper to
suggest that sea power is not an independent form of military power and it has the same
capacity as air and land powers to determine the military strategy.249 This notion has been
upheld by Deborah Sanders when taking the position that maritime power is a multifaceted
concept that goes far beyond the rigid military characteristics.250
2.3.2. What Makes Indonesia Qualify as a Maritime Nation?
Taking into consideration the interplay between modern sea power and maritime power
debates, Indonesia needs to take the elements and look at how those factors can contribute to
setting Indonesia up as a maritime nation. The concept of sea power and maritime power also
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sheds some light on the belief that Indonesia deserves to be a maritime nation based on
several reasons:
1. The history.
The previous section tells the maritime history that shapes today’s Indonesia. The prominent
role of old kingdoms based in Indonesia such as Majapahit in the 14th century, Srivijaya in
the 13th century and Demak in 16th century demonstrates that maritime culture is deeply
rooted in the history of Indonesia. In the Southeast Asia Region, the term Nusantara receives
wide acceptance in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Ancient literature written during
Majapahit Reign, Nāgarakrĕtāgama supports this acknowledgment. This book suggests that
Majapahit territory had already reached Sumatera, Malay Peninsula, Kalimantan and eastern
Indonesia. When Jokowi invoked the old mantra Jalesveva Jayamahe by the time of the
affirmation of Indonesia as a maritime nation and the declaration of Indonesia as GMF in
2014, he asked the nation to bear in mind that Indonesia’s victory lies on the sea by recalling
the achievement of “old Indonesia” in the region.
2. Archipelagic state.
The status of Indonesia as an archipelagic state significantly influences the self-confidence of
Indonesia as a maritime state. Prior to the Juanda Declaration, the ocean functioned as a
barrier to integration from one island to the others due to the existence of high seas in
between. Foreign vessels could access the waters and exploit the resources without providing
benefits for Indonesia. This geographical setting also made Indonesia vulnerable to internal
and external threat.
Internally, separatism would find a perfect setting to initiate this mission. Each large island
such as Kalimantan, Sumatera, Sulawesi, Papua and Java had more opportunity to declare
their independence because they had less sense of belonging to the central government. As
regarded by Indonesia scholars, the original character of Indonesia with a high level of
diversity of ethnics, economies and religions would obviously contribute to spark the idea of
an independent state.251 The government also would find it difficult to assume full control
over the islands that were separated by high seas. Externally, foreign vessels would freely
pass through the high seas to exercise the old maxim of freedom of navigation without taking
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into consideration the interest of surrounding states. If this arrangement applied to Indonesia
at that time, Indonesia would be more exposed and tenuous to potential threats from other
states.
After the Juanda Declaration, Indonesia turned into a solid maritime nation with a vast
archipelago. The enactment of Law No. 4/Prp of 1960 enforced the declaration to obtain
domestic and international recognition. This law comprises four rudimentary paragraphs:
1. The straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands to measure
a territorial sea;
2. Waters located within those baselines, including the sea-bed, its subsoil and the airspace
above them shall be under the sovereignty of Indonesia;
3. Territorial sea shall be 12 nautical miles from baselines; and
4. Innocent passage through internal waters is legal insofar as not being prejudicial to the
interest of the state and does not bother its security and good order.252
The method to draw a straight baseline from outermost points enables Indonesia to claim a
land and sea area of about 5 193 250 square kilometres from the previous land area of about 2
207 087 square kilometres. Meanwhile, the territorial waters have increased by about 3 166
163 square kilometres.253 The straight baselines cover Indonesia solidly under one blanket.
The territorial expansion also leads to the increased leverage of Indonesia in front of the
international community. After the adoption of LOSC 1982, particularly with regard to the
application of Part IV of the Convention, Law No. 4/Prp of 1960 has been amended by Law
No. 6/1996 concerning Indonesian Waters. The amendment came from the considerations of
security and defence, unity, economy and the protection of the environment from pollution
and sustainability and management in Indonesia waters.254
3. The concept of maritime power.
It is evident that a maritime nation needs maritime power to achieve its vision. Following the
notion of Deborah Sanders, maritime power extends to a general term of maritime duties that
a state should perform. In her book titled ‘Maritime Power in the Black Sea’, Sanders
highlights the capability to use the maritime domain to attain a political effect. Domestic
political issues such as the development of the economy, the defence industry investment and
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political stability influence and shape the maritime power as such. Having said that, maritime
power encompasses political, economic and social dimensions.255
As a maritime nation, Indonesia should focus on those three major interrelated components in
order to envisage the maritime vision in the larger picture. Bruce and Scott hold a view that in
the 21st century, maritime power does not cover fighting wars or the deployment of force at,
or from, the sea per se, but it encompasses the capacity and ability to undergo various
maritime tasks such as maritime resources preservation, maritime traffic safety and control,
maritime border protection, maritime sovereignty protection, search and rescue duty and
prevention of misuse of the ocean.256 As the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia
bears a great responsibility to ensure that all those tasks can be accomplished seamlessly. If
Jokowi envisages Indonesia as a GMF, Indonesia should ensure that the components of
maritime power, including marine resources preservation, be set as the highest national
priority.
3.

Global Maritime Fulcrum and Preservation of Marine Resources.

3.1. Global Maritime Fulcrum.
Indonesia entered the new phase in its history when making the commitment as a GMF. The
terrestrial concept that was previously adopted by Indonesia was deemed and proven to be
less relevant to building Indonesia when perceiving the geographical footprint of the country.
President Jokowi and his vice president, Jusuf Kalla introduced this long-awaited concept to
push forward ocean affairs on their inauguration to assume the post as Indonesia’s top leaders
which took place before the People's Consultative Assembly members at the compound of the
Assembly and House of Representatives on October 20, 2014. In his inauguration remarks,
President Jokowi reinvigorated the maritime domain by proclaiming Indonesia as a maritime
nation. He was of the view that ‘ocean, seas, straits and bays are the future of Indonesia’. He
mentioned that those elements of oceans had been neglected for too long.257
The East Asia Summit convened in Myanmar on 13 November 2014 was observed by Jokowi
as a fitting forum to launch the doctrine before international community representatives
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attending the summit. The rationale comes from Jokowi’s acknowledgment that the strategic
role of this summit was to foster three critical aspects of security, stability and economic
prosperity in the region.258 Chiefly, this doctrine rests on five areas, namely;
1. Rebuild Indonesia’s maritime culture. As a country consisting of 17,000 islands, Indonesia
should be aware of, and see the oceans as, part of the nation's identity, its prosperity and its
future are determined by how we manage the oceans.
2. Maintain and manage marine resources, with a focus on building marine food sovereignty
through the development of the fishing industry.
3. Provide priority to the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity by
constructing sea highways along the shore of Java, establish deep seaports and logistical
networks as well as developing the shipping industry and maritime tourism.
4. Through maritime diplomacy, Indonesia invites other nations to cooperate in the marine
field and eliminate the source of conflicts at sea, such as illegal fishing, violations of
sovereignty, territorial disputes, piracy and marine pollution.
5. Indonesia has an obligation to develop its maritime defence forces. This is necessary not
only to maintain maritime sovereignty and wealth but also as a form of our responsibility to
maintain the safety of shipping and maritime security.259

Those five pillars encompass different characteristics, but each aspect forms one notion of
establishing a maritime nation and strengthening each other. The political manifesto and
optimism of Jokowi to bring Indonesia to a maritime nation through the doctrine of GMF
during his campaign and after being elected as the 7th President of Indonesia 260 find its
justification in two rationales, firstly the vast archipelago of Indonesia. As the largest
archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia comprises five main islands and approximately 35
groups of smaller islands and islets. The total number of islands of Indonesia, that have been
acknowledged in many works of literature, including in a book titled ‘Indonesia’s Delimited
Maritime Boundaries’ approximate 19 000.

261

Based on the record of Indonesia’s

Government, there exist 17 504 islands under Indonesia’s territory. However, this number has
been updated by the 30th UN Group of Expert on Geographical Names (UNGEGN) lodged by
the Indonesia delegation during the 11th UN Conference on Standardization of Geographical
Names (UNCSGN) from 7-18 August 2017 in New York. As of July 2017, 16 056 islands
have been verified by the UN. This total number includes 2590 islands that were registered in
the 30th UNGEGN.262 Arif Havas Oegroseno, Deputy Minister of the Coordinating Ministry
for Maritime Affairs Office disclosed that there remain 1 448 islands that need to be validated
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and verified. Following this process, those islands would be named and registered in the UN
in the future. This naming procedure prevents an island from duplication.263
Secondly, Indonesia also lies in the strategic juncture of the often so-called posisi silang
(known as crossroad) of two important continents, Asia and Australia, and in the global
intersection of two influential oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. 264 Some
opportunities would prevail because of this characteristic such as rich biodiversity and major
seaborne trade. Thirdly, other advantages of Indonesia in terms of its geographical nature
come from the length of its coastline and its vast marine area. It has been claimed that
Indonesia has 54 716 kilometres of seaside. 265 Most of Indonesia’s entire area is covered
approximately by 78% of marine waters266 constituting 5 193 250 square kilometres.267 These
three factors determine the key role of Jokowi’s regime to manage the ocean and its resources
through the lens of environmental concerns.
3.2. The Preservation of Marine Resources.
3.2.1 Ocean Policy.
On 20 February 2017, President Jokowi issued Presidential Regulation 16/2017 concerning
the Ocean Policy of Indonesia. For the purposes of the Presidential Regulation, Article 1(1)
reads:
Indonesian Ocean Policy is the general guidelines on ocean policy and its implementation
through programs and activities of ministries or non-ministerial government institutions in the
area of ocean affairs that is adopted to accelerate the implementation of Global Maritime
Fulcrum.268
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This Ocean Policy comprises two documents of the National Document on Indonesia Ocean
Policy and the Plan of Action of the Indonesian Ocean Policy. 269 In the nature of a
government document, this policy serves as the common guidelines for government
institutions at any level concerning maritime-related programs and policies as well as a
reference for the public sector.
Most importantly, the long-awaited definition of GMF is provided in this Ocean Policy. It
took three years to make this doctrine defined in a legal instrument. Prior to the adoption, this
vision of Jokowi had been translated in different perspectives and there was a lack of detailed
guidelines. The term “global” in this doctrine encompasses the ambitious projection of
Indonesia’s maritime future. While Indonesia is struggling to assume a strategic and central
position as a maritime nation in the region, it is questionable whether Jokowi’s vision can be
achieved at the regional level considering the presence of maritime powers such as China and
Japan. Indonesia needs to secure the recognition in the region beforehand to make the global
vision materialize. With the enactment of Presidential Regulation 16/2017, Article 1 of the
regulation defines GMF as Indonesia’s vision to become a maritime country that is sovereign,
advanced, independent, robust and capable of contributing positively towards the peace and
security of the region and the world as referred to as in its national interest.270 From the
definition, it can be observed that two dimensions are involved, being internal and external. It
demonstrates the internal dimension when projecting a vision of standing on its own feet and
being a robust maritime nation without depending on other countries. In the meantime, aside
from a domestic overview, Indonesia commits itself to mediate peace and security in the
region and the world by looking at its national interest as a reflection of an external
dimension.
In this comprehensive national document of Ocean Policy, GMF has been extended from an
initial five main areas to seven pillars encompassing:
1. Marine and Human Resources Development;
2. Maritime Security, Law Enforcement and Safety at Sea;
3. Ocean Governance and Institutions;
4. Maritime Economy Development;
5. Sea Space Management and Marine Protection;
269
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6. Maritime Culture;
7. Maritime Diplomacy.271
The document also sets out further details of the program activities to implement Jokowi’s
vision through a short-term five-year Plan of Action 2016-2019 covering 76 strategic policies
and 425 activities designed to attain 330 targets. The following Figure 2 illustrates that three
main elements of National Medium-Term Development Plan, Law No. 32/2014 on Ocean
and Nawa Cita contribute to the formation of Ocean Policy. Two factors that influence
Indonesian Ocean Policy are seven Policy Pillars of GMF as stated above and six Principles
comprising Wawasan Nusantara, Sustainable Development, Blue Economy, Integrated and
Transparent Management, Participation and Equality and Equitability.

Figure 2: Road Map of Indonesia Ocean Policy Towards Global Maritime Fulcrum272
271
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Some debates remain concerning the proper translation of ‘Kelautan’ into the English
language. The national document refers to ‘ocean' as providing a general overview of
‘kebijakan kelautan’ in national policy. It is argued that the word ‘ocean’ has a more accurate
meaning than ‘maritime’ or ‘sea’. The rationale continues in internationally recognized legal
or non-legal documents such as LOSC as a global constitution of ocean covering all aspects
of ocean affairs.273 Nevertheless, Evan Laksamana introduces the alternative to the term by
proposing ‘sea’ as a more appropriate term to translate ‘kelautan’. He invokes LOSC as the
main reference since the term ‘sea’ is rooted in the Convention.274 It is very interesting to
note that both meanings take different perspectives from the same source. The former
highlights ‘ocean’ as a reference to the Constitution of Ocean, whereas the latter emphasizes
‘sea’ as stated in the LOSC. The two meanings can find their justification. However, the
technical term of ocean may shed some light concerning the correct term to use. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the U.S Department of Commerce
distinguishes Seas and Oceans. Seas are regarded as smaller than oceans in terms of their
scope. Seas are also located where the land and oceans meet and are so typical to partially be
enclosed by land. 275 Therefore, the term ‘ocean’ would be more appropriate than ‘sea’
because it covers a wider meaning than ‘sea’ and carries a more general and comprehensive
concept of ocean policy.
Apart from the technical term, ocean policy receives substantive feedbacks from scholars. In
general, they praise the conclusion of ocean policy as a significant and comprehensive
document to make GMF more executable in the field by government apparatus. As
Laksamana puts it, the ocean policy acts as an effective ‘bureaucratic umbrella’ streamlining
the existing programs and policies. This policy has more inward dimension than outward
looking projections. Furthermore, the document describes that the role Indonesia would play
in the region continues to be ‘the missing middle’ rather than a ‘force’ between Indian and
Pacific Oceans. 276 The perception of the major powers interaction in the region, to some
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degree, influences the formulation of this policy. Arif Havas Oegroseno conceived that the
document projects the interest of Indonesia and its adaptive strategy to counteract strategies
of key powers in the region.277 Some conceptual strategies such as One Belt and One Road
(OBOR) Initiative introduced by China, Open and Free Indo Pacific and the U.S role in the
region present a clear narrative concerning the policies of major powers in pursuing their
national interests to the greatest possible extent.
3.2.2

IUU Fishing under Ocean Policy: A Critical Review.

This ocean policy, in which the implementation is under the supervision of the Coordinating
Ministry of Maritime Affairs, highlights five main clusters comprising: 278
1. Maritime Boundary, Ocean Space and Maritime Diplomacy;
2. Maritime Industry and Sea Connectivity;
3. Services and Industry of Marine Natural Resources and Marine Environment
Management;
4. Maritime Defence and Security; and
5. Maritime Culture.
Shafiah Muhibat suggests that these five clusters can be grouped into internal and external
dimensions. The group that has external elements is classified into the first cluster of
Maritime Boundary, Ocean Space and Maritime Diplomacy as well as the fourth cluster of
Maritime Defence and Security. 279 On the other hand, the three remaining clusters are
inclined to cover internal dimensions. The first cluster sets four priorities in the negotiation
and agreement of the maritime boundary, the reinforcement of maritime diplomacy, the
conclusion of toponyms and the management of maritime space. The fourth cluster comprises
three main programs: marine defence, maritime security and IUU fishing as depicted in
Figure 3. It is worth noting that IUU fishing, as the last element of this cluster, has the most
detailed programs with 13 activities.
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Figure 3: The Fourth Priority Program of Maritime Defence and Security280
Each program in this fourth cluster is broken down into activities, target, output, range of
time, focal point, relevant institution and financial resource. The total seven priority programs
of this fourth cluster comprise: 281
1. The development of robust maritime defence and security;
2. The development of oceanic national character to support national defence;
3. The enhancement of integrated capability and performance of the whole area of national
jurisdiction and beyond national jurisdiction in accordance with international law;
4. The enhancement of Indonesia’s active role in the cooperation of maritime defence and
security at regional and international levels;
5. The enforcement of sovereignty and law in Indonesian waters and jurisdiction;
6. The optimization of the system of command, control, communication, digitalization,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and
7. The elimination of fisheries crimes.
In the matrix as described in the annex to the Presidential Regulation 16/2017, MMAF has a
role as a focal point for the last program of fisheries crimes elimination. Meanwhile, MMAF
is involved in some activities of the third, fifth, sixth and seventh programs.
It is very interesting to perceive that IUU fishing falls under the fourth cluster of maritime
defence and security. It may suggest that the government takes this view based on the
following three rationales:
280
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1. IUU fishing has the same aspect as maritime defence and security.
2. IUU fishing should be addressed from the perspective of maritime defence and security.
As such, it is more a security problem than a fisheries management issue.
3. The measures to address maritime defence and security need to be integrated with the
policy to combat and eliminate IUU fishing.
All these three reasons shape the Government’s perspective to take robust measures to
eliminate IUU Fishing.
The approach taken by the Government gives rise to three following challenges:
1. The policy to observe IUU fishing from the defence and security points of view leads to
the conceptual debate of the whole term of IUU fishing and appropriate measures to
respond. While illegal fishing has a different meaning and context from unreported and
unregulated fishing, it appears to make inappropriate generalizations when imposing a
defence and security approach to combat unreported and unregulated fishing.
2. It would be understood if the defence and security approach is taken to combat illegal
fishing and transnational organized crimes involvement such as drug trafficking, people
smuggling, money laundering, terrorism and other crimes transnationally organized in the
fisheries sector. However, not reported or misreported and unregulated fishing should be
perceived within a different context because they do not pose a threat to national security.
3. This ocean policy document also renders MMAF responsible for combatting fisheries
crimes. In this ocean policy, the lack of narrative on the interplay between IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes gives rise to the perception that IUU fishing and fisheries crimes have the
same context. In reality, from a conceptual perspective, those two practices are not always
identical.
Taking into consideration the three challenges, it would be more proper if illegal fishing,
involving transnational crimes, falls under this fourth cluster, yet the elements of unreported
and unregulated fishing should be under the third category, Services and Industry of Marine
Natural Resources and Marine Environment Management. The comprehensive discussion
concerning IUU fishing and fisheries crimes from the legal and policy frameworks
perspective will be presented in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
4. Conclusion.
This part continues to comprehend the national vision to project Indonesia as a maritime
nation and to encourage the country to play a greater role in the maritime domain of the
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world. In Indonesia’s national history, maritime journey has experienced a fluctuation. The
story of old kingdoms in the past illustrates that ancestors of Indonesia had a deeply-rooted
maritime culture and occupied a vast area in the region, widely known as Nusantara.
However, after the wave of arrivals from western countries such as the Portuguese, Spanish,
Dutch and English to colonize the influential ports and cities in the region, the maritime
tradition and culture started to decline. Not only did the colonials destroy the maritime
connectivity but also the centres of economy and political governance in Southeast Asia. The
colonialization profoundly affected the sea trade in the region for the reason that the only
route to connect the major cities at the time was through the sea lanes. The traders found it
challenging to access the land route due to extremely dense forests and frequent rainfall.
Indonesia started to revitalise the maritime spirit and reaffirm the nation as a maritime nation
when Joko Widodo assumed power as the seventh president of Indonesia. However, this part
offers a critical review of the concept of maritime nation and whether or not Indonesia
previously qualified as a maritime nation. In the course of conceptual discussion on the
maritime issue, there exist the concepts of sea power and maritime power. The former was
introduced by A.T Mahan in 1890 focusing on six essential elements to establish a dominant
sea power of a nation. It appears that Mahan's overview was directed at large maritime
powers such as the U.S and Great Britain with the main objective to establish a great naval
power. Sea power has evolved and expanded into a broader scope encompassing non-hard
power elements such as influence. In the modern school of thought, sea power combines
international trade and marine resources exploration. Sea power has the same level as air and
land power in lending support to military power. When focussing on the qualifications as a
maritime nation, this part presents the argument that Indonesia deserves to be a maritime
nation for three reasons: the history, archipelagic state status and its meeting the requirements
of a maritime nation as set by scholars.
This political commitment as a maritime nation has been translated further by projecting
Indonesia as a GMF. The doctrine of GMF previously rested on five pillars but has expanded
into seven major elements. A number of factors can be drawn to examine the rationales
behind this vision. Firstly, Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country in the world.
Secondly, Indonesia’s holds a strategic position in the region. Thirdly, Indonesia has the
second longest coastline in the world with its vast marine area. The adoption of Ocean Policy
has translated the doctrine into more detailed programs. This policy serves as the main
88

reference to the Government institutions and public sector. Most importantly, the definition
of a GMF is provided by embracing two different dimensions, internal and external.
Internally, Indonesia should stand on its ‘own feet’, and externally Indonesia has a
commitment to contribute to regional and global peace and security.
In order to make the implementation of ocean policy integrated, seven priorities have been
grouped into five clusters. It is worth noting that IUU fishing holds a distinct position in this
document since this activity falls under the fourth group of maritime defence and security.
Therefore, it can be observed that IUU fishing has defence and security dimensions. The
measures needed to overcome IUU fishing include harmonization and integration with
defence and security policies and IUU fishing should be eliminated by using the perspective
of defence and security. In short, security and defence approaches come to the fore and play a
more prominent role than fisheries management to combat IUU fishing. The inclusion of IUU
fishing in this fourth cluster poses three challenges. Firstly, illegal fishing has a different
context to unreported and unregulated fishing. Secondly, the defence and security approach
should be imposed to address illegal fishing involved with transnational organized crimes.
Thirdly, IUU fishing and fisheries crimes are not always identical. Therefore, it is
recommended that the fourth cluster covers only illegal fishing with transnational crimes
dimension and the elements of unreported and unregulated fishing should fall under the third
category.
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PART IV
POLICY PERSPECTIVES OF IUU FISHING AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED
FISHERIES CRIMES
1. Introduction.
In the commencement, Part III delivers the discussion on the maritime history of Indonesia.
The same subject is also elaborated in Part II. Nevertheless, each encompasses a different
focus. For Part II, it offers a more comprehensive overview on Indonesia’s struggle to be
admitted as an archipelagic state. In this context, the maritime history lays a backdrop that
maritime culture and journey are deeply rooted in the nation’s history that supports the
proposal to assume the archipelagic status. Meanwhile, for Part III, historical overview
signifies the notion that maritime trail of Indonesia had ascended and descended before
Jokowi’s doctrine of GMF was introduced. Part III goes further by examining marine
resources preservation including the IUU fishing issue under GMF and ocean policy. At the
end, a critical review of IUU fishing in ocean policy provides a comprehensive discussion of
how the Government of Indonesia perceives IUU fishing in its policy structure.
This part mainly analyses the policy frameworks of Indonesia to address the problems of IUU
fishing and Transnational Organized Fisheries Crimes (TOFC). 282 Firstly, it outlines the
international and national backgrounds of the subject matter. The backgrounds present a more
precise and more comprehensive understanding of how decision makers should interpret the
policies. At international level, it delivers the conceptual developments by discussing IPOAIUU fishing, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, Agenda 21, the Johannesburg
Declaration and its plan of implementation, the Rio Declaration, Goal 14 and the Reykjavik
Declaration.
This part discusses the state practices of two countries, the United States and South Africa in
their determination to sustain the marine ecosystem through policy efforts. State practices can
be beneficial in eliciting lessons learned from both positive and negative points of view alike.
In general, according to Anastasia Telesetsky, countries ‘have not remained indifferent’ in
addressing IUU fishing and have embraced ‘a polycentric governance’ method, by using
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management practices that have arisen and intersected in some distinct stages.283 The main
reason to involve the two countries is chiefly because their policies contribute to some
positive outcomes.
In the domestic light, this part presents measures and challenges. Indonesia has developed a
number of policies such as a moratorium and transhipment prohibition. Nevertheless, some
challenges including resistance from fishers and the NPOA on IUU Fishing, which has
expired, still remain. The policy issues are then examined, focussing on inter-agency
cooperation and inter-country collaboration. The subsequent section proposes some measures
to cope with the problems.
2. International and Domestic Backgrounds.
From the perspective of policy, international and domestic backgrounds are imperative to
provide comprehensive understanding on IUUF and TOFC. In determining appropriate
policies, policymakers should observe and consider relevant domestic and international
instruments so that the policies taken will be adequately coherent with the developments at
national and international levels. This general overview also applies to the discussions on
protection of a sustainable marine ecosystem. Particular attention is paid to IUU fishing as a
major global problem threatening ocean ecosystems and sustainable fisheries as well as
undermining conservation and management measures at both domestic and international
levels.284
2.1. International and Comparative Settings.
2.1.1. The Conceptual Developments.
In discussing policy perspective from an international background, it is important to firstly
touch upon the description of IUU fishing and give a brief history of the activity in respect of
this thesis objective as an illustration of how the current situation has developed. The
following is the explanation of IUU fishing:
Illegal Fishing refers to activities conducted:
(a) by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the
permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations;
(b) by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries
management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and
283
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management measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are bound, or
relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or
(c) in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by
cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization.

Unreported Fishing refers to fishing activities which:
(a) have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in
contravention of national laws and regulations; or
(b) undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management
organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of
the reporting procedures of that organization.

Unregulated Fishing comprises fishing activities:
in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are
conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to
that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or
contravenes the conservation and management measures of that organization; or
(b) in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or
management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner
inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources
under international law.285
(a)

Even though the terms ‘Illegal’, ‘Unreported’, and ‘Unregulated’ were formally adopted in
IPOA-IUU in 2001,286 concerns and notions about IUU fishing activity commenced in the
early 1990s. After the adoption of LOSC, 287 negotiations were established through the
development of legally binding and non-legally binding instruments to fight against
unsustainable fishing activities and to encourage the preservation of fisheries resources.288
The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA)289 and the 2009 Agreement on
Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing (PSMA)290 are examples of hard mechanisms while IPOA-IUU291 and the 1995 FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (‘Code of Conduct’)292 are prominent instances of
‘soft law’ as they are non-legally binding instruments. Those hard and soft instruments play
significant roles as a policy and legal reference in combatting IUU fishing in domestic and
international levels. Albeit non-legally binding, it does not mean that the instruments are less
important than those with legal binding character. Non-legally binding instrument may offer
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a better and elastic approach for countries to accept and follow the provisions set by countries
on common ground issues particularly when certain states have some concerns and are
reluctant if the articles prompts legal ramifications toward them. Those voluntary
mechanisms can be a reference for countries in their national document. One instance is
Malaysia’s NPOA on IUU fishing. This instrument states that “the IPOA-IUU defines IUU
fishing according to the definitions below. Malaysia also uses these definitions in her NPOAIUU”.293 While it is the authority of Malaysia to establish the explanation of IUU fishing in
IPOA-IUU fishing as a definition in its NPOA-IUU fishing, however it should be properly
understood that the narrative “the IPOA-IUU defines IUU fishing” is incorrect since IPOAIUU fishing generates non-legally binding provisions and there is no a definition as such.
At the international level, marine ecosystems have been a global problem and a concern of
world leaders. They agreed to call immediate action to address IUU fishing through United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution number A/RES/66/68 adopted on December
6, 2011. This resolution accentuates the grave concern over IUU fishing and acknowledges it
as one of the continuing most significant challenges to marine sustainability. It is necessary
for countries to have the effective control over their fishing vessels in order to prevent and
deter them from conducting IUU fishing.294
UNGA also adopted two resolutions recognizing the possible link between illegal fishing and
transnational organized crimes through UNGA Resolution 67/79295 and UNGA Resolution
68/71. 296 In addition to these resolutions, countries set several mechanisms as a solid
commitment to sustaining marine ecosystems and combatting IUU fishing such as Agenda
21, the Future We Want, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, IPOA-IUU fishing and
the other relevant non-legally binding instruments.
The first formal meeting to identify the elements of IUU fishing took place at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. The delegates at
the conference reached some agreements including what is known as Agenda 21. Chapter 17
293

Department of Fisheries of Malaysia, Malaysia’s National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Malaysia’s NPOA-IUU) (Department of Fisheries, Ministry of
Agriculture and Agro-based Industry of Malaysia, 2013) 3.
294
United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/68 adopted on 6 December 2012, paragraphs 43 and
44.
295
United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/67/79 adopted on 11 December 2012, paragraph 68.
296
United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/68/71 adopted on 9 December 2013, paragraph 72.

93

of Agenda 21 encompasses some aspects identified as main hurdles to the sustainable
management of fisheries in areas under national jurisdiction, and water columns beyond
national jurisdiction. For the high seas fisheries, the identified problems, among others, are
‘unregulated fishing, overcapitalization, excessive fleet size, vessel reflagging to escape
controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and the lack of sufficient
cooperation between States’.297
Countries whose vessels fly their flags fishing in high seas are encouraged to strengthen
cooperation bilaterally, sub-regionally and globally to manage especially highly migratory
species and straddling stocks. The cooperation should also settle problems in fishing
activities including in biological information, fisheries statistics and upgrading data
management. 298 Meanwhile for areas under national jurisdiction, major issues affecting
fisheries are ‘local overfishing, unauthorized incursions by foreign fleets, ecosystem
degradation, overcapitalization and excessive fleet sizes, under evaluation of catch,
insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases, and increasing competition between
artisanal and large-scale fishing, and between fishing and other types of activities’.299 In this
area, three measures recommended to be focussed on encompass management-related
activities, data and information as well as international and regional cooperation and
coordination.300
In 2002, world leaders attended the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg, South Africa. In this forum, they agreed to adopt the Johannesburg
Declaration and its Plan of Implementation.301 In this political document the depletion of fish
stocks and the loss of biodiversity was recognized. 302 The leaders acknowledged the
importance of Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in
playing a pivotal role in setting up a new scheme for sustainable development. Under the
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auspices of the United Nations, between the Rio and Johannesburg conferences, countries
held several meetings to define ‘a comprehensive vision’ of humanity.303
In the Plan of Implementation of the Johannesburg Declaration, it was necessary to ensure the
sustainable development of the oceans by conducting, coordinating and cooperating
effectively at regional and global levels amongst related institutions. This was to be done
amongst other things, by calling countries to ratify and accede to LOSC, promoting the
implementation of Chapter 17 of Agenda 21, establishing proper coordination mechanisms on
oceans and coastal matters in the United Nations systems, encouraging the implementation of
the ecosystem approach as referred to in the Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries
in the Marine Ecosystem304 and the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity.305 This would thus enhance regional coordination and cooperation amongst related
regional bodies including Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) and take
into account the open-ended informal consultative process initiated by the United Nations
General Assembly through Resolution 54/33.306
This plan of implementation further requires countries, inter alia, to foster or restore stocks to
the maximum sustainable yield as a matter of urgency, and not later than 2015 to their best
extent, ratify or comply with the United Nations and related fisheries agreement or
arrangement notably United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and the 1993 Food and
Agriculture Organization Compliance Agreement. Additionally, countries are encouraged to
apply the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Implement International Plan of
Actions under the Food and Agriculture Organization including IPOA-IUU fishing and
eliminate subsidy practices contributing to IUU fishing and over-capacity.307
The United Nations continues to maintain and secure sustainable development globally
through the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/1 of 25 September 2015
concerning the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.308 The Agenda is determined to
be ‘a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity’. There are 17 goals and 169 targets for
sustainable development in this document demonstrating the determination of a new
303
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universal agenda. Those goals and targets came into effect on 1 January 2016 and are
proposed to be applied until 2030 in this area of urgent attention needed for humankind and
the world.309
The agenda most related to ocean affairs lies in Goal 14, that is, Conserve and Sustainably
Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable Development. In this goal, there
are 7 (seven) targets to achieve on the issues of marine pollution, marine and coastal
ecosystem, ocean acidification, fishing activities, conservation of coastal and marine areas,
fisheries subsidies and economic benefits to small island developing states and least
developed states.310 Particular attention concerning IUU fishing is given to Agenda 14.4 on
fishing activities. By 2020, member countries of the United Nations should: a) apply
management measures when harvesting fish; b) eliminate overfishing, IUU fishing and
destructive fishing activities; and c) apply management plans based on science aiming to
revive fish stocks, at least to the maximum sustainable yield level.311
IUU fishing and transnational organized fisheries crimes have been an emerging issue in
UNODC. As guardian of the UNTOC and its supplementary protocols, UNODC issued a
publication on the connection between illegal fishing and TOC. In this report, a different
outlook is taken by referring to only illegal fishing, without unreported and regulated fishing,
as it is deemed as having the equivalent perspective as fisheries crime but with a broader
depth.312 This report presented many cases depicting the close relationship between ‘fishing
industry and other transnational criminal activities’. It also discovered human trafficking
activities in the fishing industry in addition to crimes such as the trafficking of cocaine and
other illicit drugs found to be transported by fishing vessels.313
UNODC and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) co-organized an Expert Group Meeting on
Fisheries Crime on 24 to 26 February 2016 in Vienna. There were three primary objectives of
this meeting. First was to identify the most effective means to address ‘transnational
organized fisheries crimes’ through law enforcement and criminal justice including
309
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developing new approaches, secondly was to discuss tools to promote international
collaboration and inter-institution cooperation in ‘investigating and prosecuting fisheries
crimes’, and thirdly was to elaborate the ways for international society to receive support
from UNODC for ‘capacity building and opportunities to improve knowledge and skills to
better address fisheries crime along the entire value chain’.314
In this forum, fisheries crime was explained as ‘serious offences within the fisheries resource
sector that take place along the entire food products supply chains and associated value
chains, extending into the trade, ownership structures and financial services sectors. The
‘serious’ term was not associated with the definition found in the UNTOC315 but instead it
was meant to impact on the community extensively. Fisheries crime was also regarded as
having connection with other criminal offences and generally be ‘transnational, largely
organized, and can have severe adverse social, economic and environmental impacts both
domestically and internationally’.316
The measures to eliminate IUU fishing have been systemically undertaken through UN
conferences and other international forums. The two distinctive organizations, UNODC and
FAO, assume leading roles in advocating member states to develop their domestic policy
reforms. Nevertheless, as conveyed by Gunnar Stølsvik, Chairperson of the INTERPOL
Fisheries Crime Working Group, in ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on IUU Fishing, it
was necessary to differentiate the roles of FAO (IUU fishing) and UNODC (fisheries
crimes).317 This distinction is imperative to allow each organization to be more focussed in
addressing the problem on the basis of each organization’s mandate. Nonetheless,
collaboration and coordination between the two organizations should regularly be managed.
In the international stage, the conceptual development of IUU fishing has evolved from a
mere fisheries management issue under the auspices of FAO through IPOA-IUU fishing to
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the activities related to crimes. The international community puts a lot of efforts to address
IUU fishing by setting it as international agenda. The UN has admitted the possible nexus
between illegal fishing and TOC by adopting several resolutions, and the current
development shows a more robust measure by aligning illegal fishing and TOC. FAO and
UNODC assume a key role in pushing this further. Albeit very slow in the progress, this
matter continues to get more attention from international society.
2.1.2.

Practices of Other Countries as Lessons Learned.

2.1.2.1. The United States.
The Government of the United States (U.S) is greatly concerned over IUU fishing and
regards it as a national priority since the management and conservation of fish stocks are
undermined and the sustainable level of fisheries is threatened by this activity. 318 Some
policies such as the formation of the Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and
Seafood Fraud, Ratification to Port State Measure Agreement as well as port entry and access
restrictions to port services have been endorsed by the U.S Government to tackle IUU
fishing. In addition, the U.S Government also has powerful tools through the stipulation of
the Magnuson-Steven Reauthorization Act and the Lacey Act in its domestic legislation
system.319
The establishment of Presidential Task Force on Combatting IUU fishing marks a further
serious step taken by the U.S Government to combat IUU fishing. This task force was formed
under a Presidential Memorandum on Establishing a Comprehensive Framework to Combat
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud on 17 June 2014. This team
is an inter-agency coordinating unit comprising 14 government institutions, co-chaired by the
Department of Commerce and the Department of State. It has the authority to reveal
recommendations through the National Ocean Council and circulated in the Federal Register.
It has come up with 15 recommendations for agencies ‘to take concrete and specific measures
to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud’ along the supply chain.320
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In shaping the formulation of those recommendations, it is important to note that the task
force took several steps. Most importantly, it has engaged public participation to obtain the
public's opinion and develop the recommendations. Interestingly, this process involved not
only domestic but also relevant countries having an interest in fisheries and marine coastline.
The following measure is finding potential loopholes by reviewing the coordination amongst
existing related institutions in combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud.321 The application
of recommendations principally falls into 4 (four) categories: Firstly, the fight against IUU
Fishing and seafood fraud at international level. Secondly, the strengthening of law
enforcement and the promotion of enforcement means. Thirdly, establishing and extending
cooperation with non-federal entities to investigate and eradicate seafood deception and the
transaction of IUU seafood products in the U.S. Fourthly, disseminating information
available on seafood products through a mechanism of traceability.322
In those 15 recommendations, the Task Force sets the reasons, implementing steps and
timeframes. The recommendations are as follows: 323
1) Following up Port State Measures Agreement by passing its implementing legislation
and promoting its implementation;
2) Best practices for catch documentation and data tracking as well as other measures such
as boarding and inspection on the high seas, MCS (Monitoring, Control and
Surveillance), port state control, promoting the adoption of monitoring in Regional
Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs);
3) Promoting maritime domain awareness including analysing and monitoring the threat of
IUU fishing;
4) Using Free Trade Agreements to address IUU fishing and seafood fraud;
5) Eliminating fishery subsidies contributing to excess fishing capacity. Overfishing and
IUU fishing;
6) Building capacity for the management of sustainable fisheries and the elimination of IUU
fishing;
7) Diplomatic priority when combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud;
Guard), the Interior (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), and Justice; Federal Trade Commission; Office of
Management and Budget; Office of Science and Technology Policy; U.S. Agency for International
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8) Sharing and analysing information and resources ‘to prevent IUU fishing or fraudulently
labelled seafood from entering U.S commerce’;
9) Promoting Custom Mutual Assistance Agreement by exchanging information and
encouraging ‘foreign customs administrations’;
10) Standardizing and clarifying regulations when identifying the species, common name
and origin of seafood;
11) Working with state and local enforcement institutions to disseminate sharing of
information and develop means of addressing IUU fishing and seafood fraud;
12) Broadening agency enforcement authorities;
13) Establishing a regular forum with related stakeholders;
14) and 15) Traceability program. The two recommendations encompass one program with
two stages. The first phase is identifying and developing, within six months, any
information and operational standards of traceability while the second phase is
establishing a risk-based traceability program as a continuation of the first phase.
In the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act
(MSRA) of 2006, there is an acknowledgment for international cooperation to combat IUU
fishing affecting sustainable fisheries around the globe. This Act amended the High Seas
Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (Moratorium Protection Act). This Moratorium
Act was amended by the Shark Conservation Act to upgrade conservation of sharks at
domestic and international levels. It is required by the Moratorium Act that NOAA report to
Congress biennially. This report should list countries that have incomparable regulatory
measures to those of the U.S.324
In the Report to Congress pursuant to Section 403(a) of the MSRA, during 2013 and/or 2014
there existed four countries identified as engaging in IUU fishing based on Conservation and
Management Measures (CMMs). The countries are Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and
Portugal. This is an improvement from the 2013 report identifying ten countries, namely:
Columbia, Ecuador, Ghana, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Panama, Spain, Tanzania and
Venezuela.325 In 2017 the report to Congress, three countries have been identified for having
vessels to be engaged in IUU fishing from 2014 to 2016 by the U.S Government, Ecuador,
324
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Mexico and Russia while three others, Costa Rica, Italy and Panama, held a status ‘Countries
“of interest” Not Identified’.326 Following up this listing, either positive or negative responses
will be obtained by those states after having consultation with the U.S. For countries
receiving a negative response, they will be denied entry to the U.S ports and navigation in the
U.S waters.327
It is important to highlight that the U.S Government has adopted a more rigorous definition of
IUU fishing than as stated in IPOA-IUU fishing. This definition is incorporated in Section
403 of MSRA as an amendment to the Moratorium Protection Act by adding, amongst others,
a new section 609 on IUU fishing. Through this definition, the U.S has extended
implementation of the MSRA of 2006 to areas beyond the US national jurisdiction and to
fisheries activities in which there are no international regulations in place. Section 609(e)(3)
defines IUU fishing, at the minimum, as:
a) Fishing activities that violate conservation and management measures required under an
international fishery management agreement to which the United States is a party, including
catch limits or quotas, capacity restrictions, and bycatch reduction requirements;
b) Overfishing of fish stocks shared by the United States, for which there are no applicable
international conservation or management measures or in areas with no applicable
international fishery management organization or agreement that has adverse impacts on
such stocks; and
c) Fishing activity that has an adverse impact on seamounts, hydrothermal vents, and coldwater corals located beyond national jurisdiction, for which there are no applicable
international conservation or management measures or in areas with no applicable
international fishery management organization or agreement.328

Another essential regulatory framework of the U.S is the Lacey Act. This Act was adopted in
1900 and amended in 1981. Through this Act, the U.S Government has jurisdiction to bring
before the court its nationals committing IUU fishing activities, even when operating on
board foreign fishing vessels.329 In this Act, ‘It is unlawful for any person to import, export,
transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in interstate or foreign commerce any fish or
wildlife taken, possessed, transported or sold in violation of any law or regulation of any
State or in violation of a foreign law’. 330 This Act is considered an effective tool in
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addressing IUU fishing by providing ‘long arm national jurisdiction’ as applied in the Bengis
case.331
Despite the fact that the U.S Government applies a rigorous policy and enforcement to
eliminate IUU fishing, the administration does not have a specific policy to respond the
concept of TOFC. The Presidential Task Force on Combatting IUU Fishing and the Seafood
Fraud in its regular report presented to Congress identifies countries whose fishing vessels
engage in IUU fishing. The presidential level of the IUU fishing task force shows a matter of
urgency for the country to address the problem. The gradual steps taken by the government
through consultation should be observed as a positive measure to be learned. Unfortunately,
the IUU fishing and seafood fraud task force in the report does not acknowledge crimes
associated to fisheries or TOFC as an important issue that should be settled down
appropriately.
2.1.2.2. South Africa.
In South Africa, fisheries are conceived as an important sector concerning employment for
both unqualified and semi-unqualified workers, particularly in the Western Cape. The
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of South Africa estimate that there are
around 27 000 labourers directly employed in, and 100 000 workers indirectly dependent on,
the industry of fishing. 332 The central government institution with the responsibility of
governing fishing activities nationally in South Africa is the Department of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF).333 In virtue of regulation framework, according to Vrancken,
‘fisheries legislation has a long history in South Africa Law’.334
South Africa has enacted the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) 18 of 1998 regulating
the utilization of marine resources as the main reference for fisheries law. The principles and
objectives of MLRA are, among others, related to optimum utilization, conservation,
precautionary approaches, ecological balance, protection of the ecosystem, preservation of
marine biodiversity, marine pollution, engagement in the process of decision-making,
331
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national obligation under international law, fishing industry restructuration, equal access
promotion, fisheries management, and fish allocation through a multi-species approach.335
This Act together with the more general National Environmental Management Act 107 of
1998 (the 1998 National Environmental Management Act) provide the main regulation for
the enforcement of administrative and/or criminal infringements as well as punishments for
the violations on fisheries.336
The preamble of the 1998 National Environmental Management Act states that the
environment should be protected through reasonable legislative and other measures that,
among others, promote conservation as well as secure ecologically sustainable development
and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.337
Under Part 3 of Judicial Matters, this Act provides legal standing to enforce environmental
laws338 and private prosecution339 and criminal proceedings.340
Countries in Africa including South Africa have problems with illegal foreign fishing vessels,
mainly from China. As revealed by Greenpeace, there was a dramatic increase in the number
of Chinese fishing vessels catching fish in Africa, from only 13 in 1985 to 462 in 2013. The
investigation discovered that 114 of these illegal fishing vessels operated in Gambia, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone waters over eight years.341 As disclosed
by Van As, South Africa faces illegal fishing and transnational organized crimes issues by
Chinese boats, as occurring on high seas.342 In a recent case, Chinese vessels were fined R1.3
million (around US$91 000) by South African authorities for undertaking unlawful fishing
such as the possession of fishing devices without licences. As the offenders are highly
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organized, financially capable and transnationally operated in committing the crimes, such
trials infrequently occur.343
South Africa also encounters IUU fishing like the other countries. This activity in South
Africa occurs not only in small-scale fisheries but also in the commercial fishing sphere.344
According to an assessment from DAFF, marine living resources are regarded as fully
exploited and high-value species are extensively overexploited in the commercial fisheries.
The decline of Abalone and Patagonian stocks is a good example of the result of IUU fishing
activities. The sustainability of other fish species such as Hake and Pilchards, known as an
important commodity in the South Africa fisheries industry, are also affected by IUU fishing
in the current cases. In addition, lobsters and sharks were also reported as targets of
poaching.345
For the execution of the provisions of MLRA, including combatting IUU fishing, fishery
control officers are the primary government officials having authority to enforce the law.346
South Africa is determined to fight against IUU fishing and fisheries crimes through some
initiatives such as cooperation between international police and PescaDOLUS (independent
research network) and enhanced collaboration between the Monitoring, Surveillance and
Control Unit of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) and the South
African Police.347
As championed by the Centre for Law in Action of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University (NMMU), the Department of Trade and Industry and Fisheries of Norway has
approved the establishment of a law enforcement academy through a project called
FishFORCE in the university. After initiating previous work between PescaDOLUS and the
Norwegian Government, the Centre for Law in Action proposed a further collaboration with
the Government through the project aiming to fight against fisheries crimes. This cooperation
was affirmed by the signing of the agreement on June 6th, 2016 during the conference on
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Operation Phakisa and the Ocean Economy in Port Elizabeth. The project is in the form of an
academy providing training for related government officials such as ‘Fisheries Control
Officers, police officers and prosecutors’ in South Africa, along the coastlines of East Africa
and Namibia. Further collaboration will be extended to countries around the Indian Ocean
Rim, including Indonesia.348
2.2. Domestic Background.
2.2.1. Recent Developments: Indonesia’s Measures to Combat IUUF and TOFC.
As an archipelagic country in Southeast Asia, Indonesia lies between the continents of Asia
and Australia surrounded by two oceans, the Indian Ocean in the southern part and the Pacific
Ocean in the northern part. Indonesia is also located in a strategic location, astride or along
major sea lanes from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Indonesia's coastline is
determined as the second longest in the world after Canada. In total, Indonesia is covered by
5.8 million square kilometres of marine water comprising 3.1 million kilometres of waters in
the territorial zone (<12 miles) and 2.7 million kilometres in the EEZ (12-200 miles).349 In
proportion, it is assessed that Indonesia’s territory encompasses more than 50% marine
waters. By occupying that total area, Indonesia is acclaimed as the largest archipelagic
country in the world and the world’s third largest EEZ. 350 Considering the comparison
between EEZ and territorial waters, the scope of sovereign rights to explore marine living
resources and non-marine living resources means EEZ offers enormous potential for
Indonesia.
In light of biodiversity, as disclosed by Sudirman, the former Director General of Marine,
Coasts and Small Islands, the MMAF of Indonesia, Indonesia is situated at the centre of the
Coral Triangle. This area is ‘home to the richest marine biodiversity on Earth.’ In terms of
coral ecosystems, Indonesia is prominent for the diversity encompassing 18 per cent of coral
reefs in the world, more than 70 genera and 500 coral species, 2500 fish species, 2500
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mollusc species, 1500 Crustacea species and various marine biota. 351 In retaining the
sustainability of the fisheries sector, the waters of Indonesia are managed in eleven Fisheries
Management Areas (FMAs) (Figure 4).352 This division can be discerned as an effort to make
management of fisheries more focussed and easier to control. It can be understood that each
FMA has its own characteristics and challenges so the solutions to address the problems
arising should also be specific. From a broader perspective, this method of division is aimed
at making ocean resources management in Indonesia's jurisdiction more integrated and
coordinated. MMAF reveals the estimated potential, allowable catch and the sustainable level
of fish resources on certain species in each FMA through the enactment of the Ministerial
Decree Number 47/KEPMEN-KP/2016 as amended by the Ministerial Decree Number
50/KEPMEN-KP/2017.

This

ministerial

decree

adoption

supports

the

Indonesia

Government’s policy to prevent and revive the fisheries resources from overexploitation and
depletion based on the reliable data.

Figure 4: Indonesia’s Fisheries Management Areas
Due to its strategic position at the juncture of two oceans, Indonesia has problems in maritime
affairs such as maritime security and marine ecosystem. Indonesia should also delineate its
maritime zone and delimitate its borders with neighbouring countries as opposing countries
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and adjacent states. All three aspects of maritime security, marine ecosystem and
neighbouring states are significantly interrelated in shaping proper ocean governance and the
maritime policy of the country.
From the point of view of the marine environment, the diversity of Indonesia’s ocean
resources and marine ecosystem offer not only opportunities but also challenges. From
fisheries activity, the potential of Indonesia's marine resources makes Indonesia one of the
leading nations in fisheries production particularly from marine fisheries. The latest report of
FAO, on the circumstance of global fisheries and aquaculture 2014, revealed that Indonesia
was in 2012, the second largest producer of capture fisheries with China first and the U.S in
third position.353 It is also acknowledged that according to a report submitted to RFMOs in
2014, Indonesia was the world’s largest tuna fishing nation contributing more than 620 000
metric tonnes.354 As a top tuna fishing nation, Indonesia contributed 15 per cent of global
tuna production in 2009, followed by the Philippines, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and
Spain. Nevertheless, in exporting tuna for global trade, Indonesia only contributed about four
per cent in 2010.355
As mandated by FAO IPOA-IUU Fishing, countries are encouraged to establish NPOA on
IUU Fishing for implementation at their national level. Indonesia has established NPOA IUU
Fishing based on Ministerial Decree Number KEP.50/MEN/2012 on NPOA to Prevent and
Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing of 2012-2016. This NPOA-IUU Fishing
aims to be a reference for related departments under the MMAF to prevent and eliminate IUU
fishing.356 Principally this document consists of Indonesia’s state of capture fisheries, IUU
fishing, plan of action and schedule to prevent and combat IUU fishing from 2012-2016. This
document covers IUU fishing practices as referred to as IPOA-IUU Fishing.
In the case of Indonesia, illegal fishing is most commonly conducted by foreign fishing
vessels, mainly from neighbouring states. Those vessels have entered not only into
Indonesia’s EEZ but also into its archipelagic waters. Concerning fishing gear, those illegal
vessels mostly use purse seine and trawl. Moreover, when fishing, the vessels are not
353
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equipped with either a Licence for Fishing (SIPI) or License for Fish Transporting Vessel
(SIKPI). Additionally, they are fishing in different areas determined by a fishing licence,
using prohibited fishing gears, counterfeit fishing licences, vessels’ document manipulation,
fishing without Sailing Approval Letter, deactivating Vessel Monitoring System (VMS)
transmitter and other monitoring devices, unloading fish without a licence, landing catch
without informing specific ports and fishing by Indonesia’s fishing vessels in another
country’s jurisdiction without securing approval from Indonesia’s government and the
government of the country concerned.357
Furthermore, unreported fishing numbers in Indonesia are generally related to data. Fishing
vessels ‘have not reported the actual catches or improperly / incorrectly reported’ generally to
evade tax. This activity encompasses conducting transhipment without reporting to the
relevant authorities, ‘fishing vessels and fishing carrier vessels do not report at the port base
in accordance with the licence granted’ and transports its catch to foreign countries358 while
unregulated fishing activity, that generally occurs in Indonesian waters, is in the form of
sports fishing.359
As part of the national commitment to combat IUU fishing, MMAF has also developed a
number of policies to fill loopholes such as a moratorium on fisheries licences for ex-foreign
fishing vessels. These licences encompass Licence for Fishing, Licence for Fish Transporting
Vessel and Fisheries Business Licence360 for vessels of more than 30 gross tonnes.361 This
policy is divided into two phases. Phase one is stipulated through Ministerial Regulation
Number 56/PERMEN-KP/2014 concerning Moratorium of Fisheries License for Ex-Foreign
Fishing Vessels in Indonesia’s Fisheries Management Area. The duration of this ministerial
regulation was six months, from November 3rd, 2014 until April 30th, 2015.362 After being
reviewed by MMAF, this first stage continued to the second stage through Ministerial
Regulation Number 10/PERMEN-KP/2015 as Amendment to Ministerial Regulation Number
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56/PERMEN-KP/2014. The only amendment to this regulation was to extend the moratorium
policy another 6 (six) months until October 3rd, 2015. 363 The primary objectives of the
ministerial regulations are to promote sustainable fisheries management and address IUU
Fishing in Indonesia’s Fisheries Management Area.364
Moratorium policy is not only addressing the problem of IUU Fishing as such but also
pertains to non-tax state revenue (Pendapatan Nasional Bukan Pajak/PNBP) from the
operation of foreign fishing vessels. The policy to temporarily halt fishing licences for
foreign fishing vessels was a response to low non-tax state revenue received which amounted
to only 8000 IDR (around US$0.61) per gross ton annually. At the same time, it was
identified that fishing vessels imported a thousand tons of fish to the US and European
countries. The Indonesian Government only obtained 300 billion IDR (US$22 million)
annually of non-tax revenue from 5329 large vessels. If this sum is compared to the state's
expenditure to subsidize the fisheries industry by means of diesel fuel, accounted for 1.2
trillion IDR (US$91 million), an enormous gap is found. 365 By temporarily ceasing the
licence, it is argued that fish stocks can revive, and non-tax state revenue can be increased.
As a part of moratorium policy, MMAF then reviewed fisheries licences of fishing vessels
borne by foreign countries. The investigation conducted by Task Force 115 found that 1132
fishing vessels owned by 187 foreign fishing companies operated in Indonesia. Most of them
were from China (374) followed by Thailand (216), Japan (104), the Philippines (98), and the
balance are from other countries.366 These vessels were found to be violating related laws and
regulations leading to the revocation of 291 fishing licences, the suspension of 61 fishing
permits and the issue of notices to 95 permitted fishing vessels. In an effort to promote
transparency and combat IUU Fishing in the broader context, MMAF will submit the data of
363
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those vessels to the Global Record of Fishing Vessels initiated by FAO and the International
Maritime Organization (IMO).367
In auditing ex-foreign fishing vessels, the illegal fishing task force investigated ‘the legal
compliance status of companies, the pattern of vessel ownership, their modus operandi (types
of violations, including fisheries crime), the roots of the problem and flaws in policy and
regulation’. After completing its analysis and evaluation in October 2015, MMAF decided to
revoke ‘15 out of 187 fishing business licences, 245 out of 1041 fishing licences, and 31 out
of 91 reefer licences’. Some licences were also suspended, and some companies have been
sent written notices.368 During the investigations, the task force highlighted those vessels that
had breached related regulations such as operational regulations or tax avoidance. 369
Following the announcement of this revocation, MMAF identified that 414 fishing vessels
have disappeared from Indonesia waters. It was suspected that the vessels had returned to
their country of origin370 wanting to avoid the liability of the violations. In that regard, Task
Force 115 has submitted the request to International Police to track down their
whereabouts.371
MMAF recognizes that transhipment and some fishing gears contribute to unsustainable
fishing practices including IUU fishing. Through the enactment of Ministerial Regulation
Number 57/PERMEN-KP/2014, transhipping in Indonesia waters is banned. This regulation
amended the legal basis for trans-shipment as stated in Article 37A of Ministerial Regulation
Number PER.30/MEN/2012.372 The policy sparked pros and cons from the fisheries industry
relating to the costs and freshness of fish. The Indonesian Longline Tuna Association argued
that this policy elevates the price of tuna as fishing vessels must land their catch at the nearest
port thus leading to higher fuel consumption. In addition, there would be more time taken
travelling to the ports influencing the freshness of the fish.373
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Nevertheless, the non-transhipment policy increases national ports utilization and prevents
fish from Indonesian waters being transported to foreign fishing ports illegally. By landing
them in Indonesian ports, increased supply of fish means that one part of food security to
Indonesia’s people is secured. With regard to fishing gears, MMAF has adopted Ministerial
Regulation number 2/PERMEN-KP/2015.374 This regulation prohibits the use of trawls and
seine nets since those fishing gears are considered unsustainable and environmentally
unfriendly to the marine ecosystem, particularly for coral reefs and seafloor. Previously
through this ministerial regulation, the Government regulates those type of gears to cease
operation from 9 January 2015. 375 Nevertheless, after taking into account the views of
traditional fishers, this ministerial regulation was suspended until September 2015, giving
fishers around eight months to prepare and adapt to new fishing gear.376
In the fisheries industry, another severe problem found in its strong relations to IUU fishing is
fisheries crimes. Indonesia is facing this problem as the fishery is a very vulnerable sector in
the country. Based on statistical data, Indonesia constitutes the second largest marine
producer in capture fisheries in the world amounting to 5 420 247 tonnes and is second only
to China.377 Indonesia’s contribution to global capture fisheries has increased from 3 per cent
in 1990 to 6 per cent in 2011.378 Transnational organized crimes such as human trafficking
and slavery occur in the fisheries industry in Indonesia. It is of international concern as
Indonesia is placed in Tier 2 according to the Report of the U.S Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
2015. In every province of Indonesia, cases of trafficking are found.379 The report revealed
that forced labour of foreign and Indonesian nationalities working in foreign and Indonesian
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fishing vessels occurred in Indonesia waters and primarily they worked in the fishing industry
of Thailand.380
One prominent case of modern slavery was practiced by PT. Pusaka Benjina Resources in
Benjina Island, Maluku, Indonesia. Associated Press reported that more than 300 workers
were evacuated to Tual, Maluku after being investigated on 4 April 2015.381 In 2015, a team
investigating this case found that over 1450 crew members, mostly from Myanmar and
Cambodia, were underpaid though they were employed more than the agreed regular hours
‘without clean water and proper food’. They were tortured and hindered from returning
home. In responding to this, MMAF adopted Ministerial Regulation Number 35/PERMENKP/2015 requiring business people in the fisheries industry to respect and implement human
rights values.382 Relevant institutions such as the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM)
and MMAF revoked the company’s business licence.383
2.2.2. Challenges.
The measures championed by the MMAF to combat IUU fishing have resulted in positive
outcomes. As claimed by the United Nations Environment Program, local fishers and
government have benefitted from the above-mentioned policies. They can now more easily
catch and sell fish in the local markets than in previous years. There was an increase of 62.53
per cent for fishes landed by local fishing vessels in local fishing ports. Fish consumption
also increased annually from 37.89 kg per person in 2014 to 41.11 kg in 2015. In addition,
according to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Indonesia, in 2015 the fisheries sector also
experienced an increase to 8.37 per cent of GDP compared to 7.35 per cent in the previous
year. 384 Nonetheless, some challenges persist when enforcing these policies.
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Firstly, the NPOA on IUU Fishing was due to expire in 2016. The only explanation that
refers explicitly to activities of IUU Fishing as set out in IPOA-IUU Fishing within the
national document can be found in NPOA-IUU Fishing.385 Most importantly, action plans
contained in existing NPOA-IUU Fishing possibly no longer meet up with the dynamics and
actual challenges that Indonesia and the world are currently facing.
Secondly, the foremost challenge also comes from fisheries stakeholders such as fisheries
industry both inside and outside the country as they are affected by trawl and purse seine
prohibition. A massive wave of demonstrations was held by fishermen in several regions to
stage protests against the prohibition of unsustainable fishing gears such as trawl and seine
nets as stipulated in Ministerial Regulation number 2/PERMEN-KP/2015. Traditional
fishermen argued that their livelihoods would be affected due to the ban if no alternative
solution was provided. They revealed 80 per cent of them were still accustomed to
traditionally using that type of fishing gear. Fishermen also opposed a regulation adopted by
MMAF to limit the size of lobster and crab they could catch and sell. This limitation
prompted controversy as fishermen in some areas exported their catch overseas.386 According
to Ministerial Regulation Number 1/2015, it is not allowable for anyone to catch lobster and
crab under certain dimensions and when producing eggs.387
By way of destructive fishing nets, the Indonesian Government has banned these devices
since 1980 through Presidential Decree Number 39 Year 1980 on the Elimination of Trawl
Net.388 However, law enforcement of this regulation has not been as effective as it should be
owing to several reasons such as the lack of patrol vessels and legal apparatus to oversee the
implementation.389 This circumstance allowed fishermen to violate the existing regulation for
years as though it was legitimate.
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Thirdly, the moratorium policy may create a shortage of fish in the market and
unemployment for people working in the fish processing factories. In sustaining fish stocks,
some areas, particularly in Management Protected Areas (MPAs), are commonly closed or
have limited fishing activity in some seasons. This method is enacted to allow a chance for
the revival of fish stocks. In determining MPA, along with rules authorities should take into
account the relevant stakeholders, mainly small-scale fishermen who depend heavily on
fishing for their livelihood. Their concerns should be heard to achieve the best decision.
Moratorium policy imposed on ex-foreign fishing vessels above 30 gross tones offered some
advantages and disadvantages. The former relates to fish stock availability and non-tax
revenue while the latter is related to unemployment in fisheries factories and fish availability
in the market. Benefits taken from this policy have been elaborated in the previous section.
Fourthly, from an institutional aspect, there is a clear separation of international organizations
in addressing IUU fishing and fisheries crimes. IUU fishing is developed under the regime of
IPOA-IUU, which is administered by FAO while fisheries crimes fall under UNODC as it is
related to mainly the issues of crime. There are three major aspects under the auspices of
UNODC, namely: crime, drugs and terrorism. For crime, matters covered are corruption,
human trafficking, justice and person reform, money-laundering and organized crime.390
Fifthly, the Deputy Head of Task Force 115 conceived that law enforcement agencies of
Indonesia which are responsible for fighting against IUU fishing experience inadequacies in
the area of coordination as well as capacity to spot, react and punish. The other shortcoming
comes from corruption in the government institutions. The challenges identified concerning
law enforcement in the marine and fisheries in Indonesia are as depicted in the following
figure 5:
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Figure 5: Challenges in Law Enforcement of Indonesia in Combating IUU Fishing391
Coordination is sometimes easy to mention but challenging to undergo. This problem also
occurs in government institutions. The success of goals in an organization can be determined
by having good coordination amongst stakeholders. In the case of fisheries, law enforcement
holds an important role in combatting IUU fishing, fisheries crimes and fisheries-related
crimes. In the above chart, insufficient coordinated measures amongst law enforcement
agencies are identified as one of the factors affecting deficiencies of law enforcement.
3. Existing Policy and Proposed Measures.
The prevailing policies mainly involve different institutions since good cooperation between
MMAF and the other institutions significantly determines the overall success of a policy’s
implementation. In general, Indonesia’s measure to fight against those practices is divided
into two phases. The first phase is prior to the establishment of special teams while the
second phase is post-foundation of those task forces. It can be asserted from both periods that
the former sees less foreign fishing vessels sunk compared to the latter.
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3.1.

Policy Issues.

3.1.1. Inter-Agency Collaboration.
Indonesia’s abundant marine resources attract other countries to catching fish in Indonesia’s
waters under its national jurisdiction. Fishermen using small boats and large fishing fleets
poach fisheries resources in EEZ, territorial waters and even in the internal waters of the
country. They come and catch fish illegally in the forms of IUU fishing. As revealed by Susi
Pudiastuti, ‘the finding discovered that at a certain time on a certain day, over 70 vessels of
50 to 70 gross tons entered Indonesian waters.’392
Indonesia has determined to fight against IUU fishing and TOFC at all costs as Indonesia has
a profound interest to secure those resources. After assuming the post of Minister of Marine
Affairs and Fisheries in 2014, Susi Pudjiastuti has been very active in combatting IUU
fishing and TOFC. During the second Bali Tuna Conference (BTC) and the fifth International
Coastal Tuna Business Forum (ICTBF), Minister Susi delivered Indonesia’s commitment to
eradicating IUU fishing in areas within and beyond national jurisdiction. She identified IUU
fishing as a major constraint as it is not only linked to 1.5 million tonnes of ‘illegal capture of
fishery products’ and economy impact but also connected to environmental considerations.393
When investigating IUU fishing, Indonesia acknowledged that the activity caused fisheries
crimes and other fisheries-related crimes to occur. Several fishing vessels engaged by
transnational organized criminals were also involved in illegal activities such as human
trafficking, tax fraud and other related crimes. 394 In overcoming this issue, Indonesia’s
Government has firmly committed to fight against IUU fishing and fisheries crimes by using
an integrated approach involving relevant institutions such as the Navy, Maritime Police,
Maritime Security Agency and the other relevant institutions. The law enforcement agencies
such as fisheries control officers/civil servant investigator of fishery and the officers from the
Navy and Maritime Security Agency hold a strategic role to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU
fishing and fisheries crimes to occur. Under the Indonesia Fisheries Law, the authority to
investigate crimes in fisheries shall be performed only by three authorities: civil servant
392
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investigator of fishery, Navy officer investigator and/or Police investigator.395 With regard to
the maritime jurisdiction, only two authorities that reserve the right to enforce law up to
Indonesia’s EEZ, those are, Navy Investigator and Civil Servant Investigator of Fishery.396
Nonetheless, if the crimes in fisheries occur in the fishery port, the investigation shall be
performed firstly by civil servant investigator of fishery.397 When enforcing the crimes on
fisheries, those three agencies as stated in Article 73(1) may coordinate398 and the Minister of
Marine Affairs and Fisheries shall establish a coordination forum.399 One example of the
coordination and cooperation undergone between MMAF and the Navy to arrest illegal
fishing vessels was when Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries took in charge the
operation to combat illegal fishing by using the Navy warship in North Natuna on 14-15
April 2019.400
In 2014, Indonesia adopted Law Number 32/2014 concerning Ocean Affairs in which there
are some provisions regarding the establishment of Badan Keamanan Laut (Maritime
Security Agency) along with its duties and authorities. Article 63 states that Maritime
Security Agency is authorized to (a) conducting hot pursuit, (b) ceasing, observing,
apprehending, escorting, and passing the vessels to the related authority for the interest of
legal process, (c) integrating security and surveillance information system in Indonesia’s
jurisdiction and waters. 401 Further details of Maritime Security Agency arrangement are
stipulated in the Presidential Regulation Number 178/2014 concerning Maritime Security
Agency. Article 28 of Presidential Regulation provides legal foundation to form Law
Enforcement Unit (Unit Penindakan Hukum) comprising of related maritime law
enforcement agencies.402 It is unclear if the Law Enforcement Unit is a coordination forum as
mandated under Article 73(5) of Fisheries Law. If it is intended as a coordination forum, the
Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries has the only authority to establish the forum.
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It can be observed from Article 63(c) of Law Number 32/2014 that Indonesia Maritime
Security Agency does not have the authority to investigate subject to legal proceedings, only
patrolling in the search of perpetrators. After being apprehended, personnel of Maritime
Security Agency shall pass the perpetrators to the related institution based on violations
committed for further investigation. For instance, if the vessels are caught for illegal fishing,
then they should be handed to Civil Servant Investigator of Fishery. This limited power of
Maritime Security Agency is in conformity with Article 73(1) of Fisheries Law stipulating
three agencies to enforce the law such as fishing vessels sinking/burning excluding Maritime
Security Agency.
Before Susi assumed the post, previous ministers of marine affairs and fisheries had sunk
fishing boats. According to the Director General of Marine Resources Surveillance of
MMAF, Indonesian authorities had seized 16 (sixteen) ships committing illegal fishing in
Indonesian waters from January to April 2014 and confiscated 130 Thai fishing vessels
between 2007 and April 2014.403 Between 2007 and 2012, MMAF had sunk 33 of 38 illegal
foreign vessels. Most of them were Vietnamese fishing vessels caught fishing in Natuna
Island waters.404
Although MMAF has undertaken the stringent measure of sinking vessels conducting illegal
fishing, it has not prevented illegal fishers completely breaching the sovereignty and
sovereign rights of Indonesia. They have continued poaching in Indonesia waters. During the
regime of former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the government did not widely
broadcast this policy. One possible reason was the foreign policy of Indonesia to have ‘a
million friends and zero enemies’.405 Literally, Indonesia’s concept of international policy is
to make as many friends and as few enemies as possible. Hence, the publicity of sinking
illegal fishing vessels may harm bilateral, regional and multilateral relations between
Indonesia and other countries. In addition, as a member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast
Asian Nations), Indonesia also preferred to foster good relations with neighbouring states
within the principle of the ASEAN Way as values shared by ASEAN member countries to
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emphasize the principles of consultation and dialogue as well as non-interference in domestic
issues.406
A different approach is being performed by Minister Susi. Seemingly, she prefers to publicize
the sinking through media and casts aside the traditional ASEAN Way in combatting IUU
Fishing. She is also inclined to sink those vessels during the commemoration of national
public holidays such as Indonesia Independence Day as a message to the other countries to
respect Indonesia’s territory. 407 After Susi took charge as Minister of Marine Affairs and
Fisheries, the number of vessels sunk increased significantly. According to the Jakarta Post,
there were 18 illegal fishing vessels sunk during the period October 2014 to March 2015408
and 38 illegal foreign fishing vessels were sunk by Indonesian authorities on 18 August
2015.409
From 2014 until April 2017, a total number of 317 illegal fishing vessels from other countries
have been sunk by Indonesia’s authorities including ‘FV VIKING, a notorious stateless vessel
sought worldwide by INTERPOL and 13 countries’. The most significant number of these
fishing vessels belongs to Vietnam which accounted for 142, followed by the Philippines
(76), Malaysia (49), Thailand and Indonesia (both 21), Papua New Guinea (2), one from
Belize, one a Chinese's fishing vessel and 4 stateless vessels (Figure 6).410 Most of the vessels
were detained in Natuna waters and the remainder were arrested in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and
Papua. When arresting those fishing vessels, Susi recognized that the most challenging task
was when dealing with China's fishing vessels as their coastguards escorted them. 411 The
rationale for most foreign fishing vessels arrested in Natuna is that the EEZ of Natuna Island
waters are adjacent to the South China Sea and Indonesia has maritime boundaries with
neighbouring countries. This issue becomes more complicated as EEZ of Natuna Island
overlaps the disputed area of the Nine Dash Line, claimed by China.
406
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Figure 6: Illegal Fishing Vessels Sunk by Indonesia Authorities as of April 2017.
Minister Susi also initiated an established task force under the ministerial decree to eliminate
IUU fishing. The duties of this Task Force are:
1. To conduct the analysis and evaluation of 1132 ex-foreign vessels (legal due diligence)
and develop legal consequence analysis (per company and vessel);
2. To develop, monitor and/or implement recommendations resulting from analysis and
evaluation;
3. To conduct fisheries licence governance reform (national and regional level);
4. To monitor enforcement practices on IUU Fishing and provide technical assistance for
enforcement officers on a cases basis;
5. To develop integrated and comprehensive enforcement guidelines on IUU Fishing;
6. To strengthen coordination among enforcement agencies by developing an online case
tracking system for IUU fishing. 412
Another task force was formed under Presidential Regulation, known as Task Force 115. This
team assumes the duties as follows: 413
1. To strengthen the enforcement capacity and effectiveness to combat IUU fishing by
establishing a joint enforcement task force which includes MMAF, Navy, Police, Coast
Guards and Public Prosecutors;
2. To utilize the existing forces including warships, airborne, and other appropriate
technology for surveillance and enforcement purposes;
3. To patrol regularly (including airborne surveillance) conducted by a joint task force to
detect IUU fishing activities.
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Nevertheless, as referred to in Regulation 115/2015, the task force carries duties of focussing
on developing and enforcing the law in its effort to combat illegal and unreported fishing.414
Principally, the task force under ministerial decree focuses its work on combatting IUU
fishing within the ambit of the ministry while Task Force 115 pays its attention to a broader
scope involving different institutions and under the direct supervision of the President of the
Republic of Indonesia.
As stated in the title, the task force, established by Presidential Regulation, focuses on
combatting illegal fishing. This means that this team does not bear the responsibility to fight
against unreported and unregulated fishing. Nevertheless, Article 2 states that the task force
also has the duty to address unreported fishing.415 To put it simply, inconsistency is found in
this Presidential Regulation. If this illegal fishing term is meant to be part of unreported
fishing, it is arguably not a correct term as the concepts of illegal and unreported are
distinguished under IPOA-IUU Fishing,416 though those terms overlap in their application to
some extent. Furthermore, this task force also does not have a specific task in addressing and
combatting fisheries related crimes as they focus only on illegal fishing. Therefore, it is
necessary for this Presidential Regulation to be amended by identifying transnational
organized fisheries crimes as part of this task force’s duties.
3.1.2. Inter-Country Cooperation
Sinking illegal foreign fishing vessels is deemed as being a deterrent effect. This is aimed at
frightening foreign poachers and preventing them further from illegally catching fish in
Indonesia waters. To some extent, approaches that Minister Susi has taken make regional
relations inconvenient as most of the fishing vessels sunk are from countries around
Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is crucial to garner support from regional and international
communities in addressing the matter as the problem is transboundary in character and it
cannot be solved by Indonesia alone. Bilateral, regional and international initiatives have
been taken by Indonesia in combatting IUU fishing. Meanwhile, transnational organized
fisheries crimes are a relatively new issue endorsed by the government in bilateral, regional
and international negotiations although these crimes have existed for a long time.
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MMAF has collaborated with other countries concerning issues of marine affairs and
aquaculture. Bilaterally, Indonesia has signed binding and non-binding legal instrument
documents with numerous states on areas of common concern. Probably the most relevant
and current joint initiative between Indonesia and its counterpart in addressing IUU fishing
and fisheries crimes is the cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway. On 24 November 2015, Indonesia and
Norway committed to combatting IUU fishing, fisheries crime and fisheries-related crimes as
well as to promote sustainable fisheries governance through the signing of a joint statement
between the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia and the Minister of Trade,
Industry and Fisheries of the Kingdom of Norway.417
Both ministers agreed to cooperate and coordinate at levels of operation and policy to
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, fisheries crimes and fisheries related crimes
pursuant to relevant ‘international best practice in line with LOSC and the principle of due
legal process’. They also intend to promote measures for responsible fisheries through
‘information sharing, capacity building activities, and sharing best practices on combatting
IUU fishing, fisheries crimes and fisheries related crimes with a particular focus on
multidisciplinary and inter-agency cooperation’. Lastly, they also agreed to explore joint
efforts in international institutions to fight against IUU fishing and fisheries crimes as well as
‘to promote sustainable fisheries governance’.418
Minister Susi has signed various memoranda of understanding including with Timor Leste
(East Timor). Having cooperation with this country is strategic for Indonesia as the countries
share maritime boundaries. Indonesia’s Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and Timor
Leste’s Minister of Fisheries and Agriculture signed a Memorandum of Understanding to
accelerate coordination on the activities of the elimination of fish poaching, fisheries
conservation management and technology information exchange.419
Russia is also deemed as a strategic partner in diminishing IUU Fishing. Minister Susi has
visited Russia and paid a visit to Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich. During the
417
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meeting, they discussed the issue of IUU fishing. Susi revealed Indonesia's plan to establish
15 incorporated fishery stations in different areas across the country and to operate sea radars
made by Russia. The radars are aimed to support small patrol ships in decreasing fish
poaching cases.420
In regional forums, Indonesia also actively seeks support from regional organizations,
ultimately ASEAN member states and their dialogue partners.421 Indonesia together with the
United States and Timor Leste organized and chaired the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)422
Workshop on IUU Fishing on 19-24 April 2016 in Bali, Indonesia. This event was a
continuation of the previous ARF Workshop on Improving Fisheries Management conducted
in Honolulu, Hawaii, on 22-23 March 2016 co-chaired by Indonesia and the U.S. The
objectives of the said workshops were to establish a foundation for promoting dialogue and
collaboration in eliminating illegal fishing in the region and endorsing Indonesia’s measure to
create a regional instrument on the prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU fishing.423
The participants of the Bali workshop highlighted measures to prevent, deter and eliminate
IUU fishing and its connection to transnationally organized crimes. Primarily, it was expected
that the participants of the workshop could pay more attention to the issue concerned and
eventually make genuine efforts in overcoming the problem.424
Regional initiative on IUU fishing is continued to be promoted further by the Regional
Conference on the Establishment of a Regional Convention against IUUF and its Related
420
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Crimes in Bali on 19 May 2016 hosted by the Indonesian Government. 425 During the
discussions, participants shared similar views that IUU fishing per se was not a TOC.
However, the linkage between IUU fishing and TOC was recognized. It was highlighted that
there were criminal activities leading to and connected with IUU fishing. This connection has
created persistent challenges in combating IUU fishing that need to be comprehensively
addressed.426
It was also the view that the existing definition of IUU fishing remains as it is. Such new
terminology as ‘fisheries crimes’ or ‘fisheries-related crimes’ should be discussed and studied
further by considering the existing international laws. The participants emphasized that this
initiative should not overlap with existing regional instruments and mechanisms. It should
complement and strengthen such existing regional and international instruments and
mechanisms. In this regard, a gap analysis was advised. This initiative should encompass
information sharing, capacity building, law enforcement cooperation and also use of internetbased technology for monitoring, controlling and surveillance. A further study on the matters
raised in this Conference was discussed at the Second Conference in October 2016 held in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia.427
By virtue of law enforcement, Indonesia and International Police (INTERPOL) span the
cooperation to combat illegal fishing and fisheries crimes through Project Scale. This project
was launched on the occasion of the First INTERPOL Conference on International Fisheries
Enforcement held on 26 February 2013 at the General Secretariat of INTERPOL in Lyon,
France. Three parties are committed to support this project: the Government of Norway, the
United States Department of State and the Pew Charitable Trusts. This Project aims to,
amongst other aims, increase awareness and make an assessment on the affective needs of
vulnerable countries concerning fisheries crimes as well as ‘facilitate regional and
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international operations to suppress crime, disrupt trafficking routes and ensure the
enforcement of national legislation’.428
The first meeting of the Fisheries Crime Working Group was founded after the conference.
This working group has the objectives to enhance the building of capacity, the exchange of
information and the support of operations to combat fisheries crimes.429 Through this project,
as of May 2016, INTERPOL has issued 17 Purple Notices and 17 Blue Notices as requested
by several countries including Indonesia.430
In a recent case, Indonesia has sent an inquiry to INTERPOL in tracing the vessel Hai Fa for
catching and exporting hammerhead sharks, deactivating AIS (Automatic Identification
System) and VMS as well as sailing back to China unseaworthy and without port clearance.
The District Court of Ambon Region and Appellate Court of Maluku Province ruled the
Captain of the Hai Fa guilty and imposed a fine amounting to US$ 15 000. In response to
this, INTERPOL issued a purple notice on 9 September 2015. 431
3.2. Proposed Measures
This section will focus on the proposed measures of how to address this transnational
problem. First, international cooperation is needed amongst like-minded states in the form of
bilateral and regional collaborations. Secondly, domestic efforts are necessary in addressing
the gaps identified in the internal system.
3.2.1. Stronger Bilateral and Regional Cooperation.
The South African and Norwegian Governments together are greatly concerned to combat
IUU fishing and fisheries crimes. Both countries and other organizations such as Stop Illegal
Fishing and PescaDOLUS agreed to have a joint initiative by convening the First
International Symposium on Fisheries Crime held on 12 and 13 October 2015 in Cape Town,
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South Africa. This event was co-funded by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries of South Africa and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries of Norway. This
symposium was attended by 198 participants, representing 31 countries.432
The initiative to establish the FishFORCE Academy in the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University taken by South Africa and Norway should be observed as an advanced measure
not only for South Africa, Norway and the African region but also for the international
community at large. This program can be a pilot project for law enforcement in clamping
down on fisheries crimes and fisheries-related crimes in the African continent in the years to
come as concern from the fishery industry grows as more than 50% fish stock has been
depleted due to overfishing in the waters from Nigeria to Senegal as well as profoundly
affecting the local economy in countries such as Senegal which has amounted to $300 million
dollars annually. 433 This program can offer an alternative for sharing and building the
capacity of how to address the said crimes in more effective means and ways. In the region,
one prominent inadequacy is the lack of law enforcement devices such as patrol boats, as
occurring in Sierra Leone.434 With this drawback, FishFORCE can be used to enhance the
quality of enforcement through what is called intelligence-led investigations.
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA)435 can be a proper forum to disseminate and enlarge
the work of FishFORCE through the mechanisms of bilateral and regional cooperation. It was
a perfect time for Indonesia and South Africa to cooperate in this forum as both countries
were chair and vice chair of this forum in 2017. IORA asserts fisheries management as one of
the priority areas and member countries of IORA are eager to develop ‘management and
conservation’ of fish resources in the region. This association also has serious concerns on
overfishing and climate change affecting fish stock and food security.
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In IORA, the Fisheries Support Unit (FSU) 436 can be used to discuss how to strengthen the
cooperation between FishFORCE and IORA coastal states and the measures that can be
rendered to them. Collaboration between both sides can also be generated through maritime
safety and security areas as this issue pinpoints a key priority in IORA. To this extent,
FishFORCE and IORA share the common ground in addressing traditional and nontraditional security issues in the ocean such as illegal fishing, human trafficking, people
smuggling, piracy and weapons smuggling. In the near future, the possibility to conduct joint
patrols amongst IORA members should be implemented in which FishFORCE can render its
support as such.
Indonesia is a potential country in which FishFORCE and South Africa can extend
cooperation, and vice versa. Indonesia’s strong commitment to clamp down on fisheries
poaching would be a good opportunity for FishFORCE and South Africa to also have mutual
collaboration. The cooperation between both parties should be formulated through a legally
binding document such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or other mutually agreed
agreement.
In its areas of cooperation, the parties should agree, amongst other things, in preventing,
deterring and eliminating IUU fishing, transnational organized crimes and fisheries-related
crimes. Additionally, other areas such as education and training within the scope of marine
and fisheries are worthy of inclusion. In order to ensure its effective implementation, a
regular meeting under a joint committee should be established. Members of the commission
can be government officials and academics as this combination is committed to producing
better decisions or policies as their basis relies upon proper scientific evidence.
A robust bilateral relationship between the two countries has been laid through the signing by
the two Presidents, of the Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership for a Peaceful and
Prosperous Future between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the
Government of the Republic of South Africa.437 To be more operational and technical on the
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cooperation, the parties signed MoU between the Government of the Republic of South
Africa and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the Establishment of a Joint
Commission for Bilateral Cooperation.438 On the sidelines of the Asian-African Ministerial
Meeting as part of the 60th Anniversary of the Asian-African Conference, both parties agreed
to renew this MoU on 20 April 2015 in Jakarta. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia
and the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa have come to an
agreement to explore cooperation in the maritime sector and the blue economy.439
From the above-mentioned commitment by those two ministers, the cooperation between the
MMAF of Indonesia and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of South
Africa is widely open. If the parties agree to conclude such a memorandum of understanding
or agreement on marine and fisheries, the work of a joint committee under the agreement
should be linked to a joint commission under the said memorandum of understanding. The
cooperation between Indonesia and South Africa may include other parties such as the
Government of Norway and UNODC.
More technically, within the framework of policy, both states may exchange views and share
best practices on how to develop and formulate sound policies in determining effective ways
of eliminating IUU fishing, fisheries crimes and fisheries-related crimes. In managing living
marine resources, Indonesia promulgates Law on Fisheries while South Africa adopts
MLRA. Both parties can raise the issue on how to impose stringent measures in combatting
IUU fishing through higher administrative penalties and punishments. Furthermore,
FishFORCE can provide higher education in university and training since the academy is
under the auspices of NMMU.440 This facility can be accessed by the personnel of MMAF as
part of capacity building. In addition, a joint program can also be developed between NMMU
and a university in Indonesia to bridge research activities for scholars from both countries.
various regional, inter-regional, and international forums with the principles stipulated in the UN Charter and
other universally recognized norms of international law.
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3.2.2. Policy Framework Measures.
Policy framework plays an essential role in fostering living marine resources at a sustainable
level. In attaining this goal, problems of IUU fishing and transnational organized fisheries
crimes should be addressed with comprehensive and integrated measures. Through the vision
of Indonesia as GMF, fisheries resources have become a national agenda. The determination
of the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia to clamp down on fish
plundering by sinking illegal foreign fishing vessels has been a fascinating subject of
discussion, particularly when posing the fact that fisheries resources have been depleted
globally together with the other severe economic, social and environmental impacts.441 In this
regard, the following proposed recommendations can be considered to fill the loopholes in
the policy development.
Firstly, in the NPOA-IUU fishing of 2017-2021, GMF should be envisioned in the document.
This vision is the basic footing on which to project measures taken in the future to combat
IUU fishing. It is important also to include fisheries transnationally organized crimes in this
NPOA-IUU Fishing. Not only has this issue been endorsed by Minister Susi on many
occasions but also in order to respond to the problems Indonesia currently faces. All policies
taken by Minister Susi in implementing sustainable fisheries practices should be elaborated
detailing actions along with timeframes to achieve specific targets.
This document supposedly has become the main guidelines and domestic commitment in
combatting IUU fishing and fisheries crimes. It is important to also include cases such as Hai
Fa442 Benjina as lessons learned for policymakers when dealing with similar cases. Before it
is extended for another 5 (five) year term, this document should be reviewed specifically
regarding the implementation of plans of action. The review’s result should be encompassed
in the subsequent five years document as additional background to determine more precise
policies and measures.
Secondly, it is vital to enforce relevant policies aiming to foster and preserve the environment
from unsustainable practices. However, the Government should also consider applying the
441
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rule by using a persuasive approach particularly to traditional fishers since it is related to their
daily livelihood and income. Some traditional fishermen were imprisoned due to breaching
trawl and purse seine regulations, but they argued that violating the regulation was the only
choice they had to feed the family.443 Learning from this case, and before applying certain
policies,

MMAF

should

invite

relevant

stakeholders

to

discuss

and

formulate

environmentally friendly policies on one side and accommodate small-scale fishermen
interests on the other. MMAF should be able to convince them that the regulation is for the
sake of their interest and there will be no more fish if the marine ecosystem is completely
destroyed. Public engagement in formulating policies can be drawn from the Presidential
Task Force of the U.S.
Thirdly, in some regions, moratorium and non-transhipment policy led to the closure of fish
processing companies because of lack of supply from the ocean.444 Minister Susi rebutted this
claim by saying that those fish processing companies were closed long before the moratorium
policy came into effect.

445

The Indonesian Chamber of Commerce asserted that

unemployment reached 600 000 to one million in the fisheries sector and export has declined
by almost 37% due to the policy.446 Taking into account those impacts and as this policy has
affected fisheries sectors, it is preferable that MMAF might undergo a comprehensive study
examining the advantages and disadvantages before applying the policy. During the
examination, public consultation should be considered as one good option to gather ideas
from the public. Although pros and cons cannot be avoided in responding to a particular
policy, this public meeting can be used to minimize adverse impacts arising from revealed
policy.
Fourthly, there is a need to distinguish the roles of FAO (IUU fishing) and UNODC (fisheries
crimes). This distinction is imperative for each organization to increase focus on how to
address the problem. In making those two international organizations more coordinated,
443
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regular collaboration and discussion between the two should be organized more frequently. It
is also important to bring to the fore the primary responsibilities of UNODC and FAO in
advocating member states develop their domestic policy reforms on mutually agreed upon
issues. UNODC and FAO may render technical assistance for member states.447
Fifthly, deficiencies of law enforcement encompass four aspects, namely; coordination,
single door, lack of three abilities and corruption. Commitment and awareness are of utmost
importance to overcome this coordination hurdle. However, a proper coordination mechanism
also plays an essential role. Through Presidential Regulation Number 115/2015 concerning
Task Force to Eliminate Illegal Fishing, related government institutions such as MMAF,
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transport, Indonesia Navy,
Indonesia Police, Attorney General Office, Agency of Maritime Security, Centre for
Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis and Agency for State Intelligence are
involved in countering illegal and unreported fishing activities. This task force has the
authority, amongst other things, to determine the target of law enforcement, gather data and
information through coordination as well as establish and order members of the task force to
conduct law enforcement operations.448
This Presidential Regulation constitutes a major leap towards a strengthened coordination and
to address issues not only including inadequate coordination among law enforcers, but also
other drawbacks of a single door policy, lack of those three capabilities and corruption.
Single door policy is asserted as an approach practiced by the previous regime. The
investigation conducted by Indonesian authorities found that the modus operandi of IUU
fishing broadly encompasses ‘overfishing, tax fraud, money laundering, human trafficking’
and so forth. As such, it is essential to have a different mechanism through a ‘multidisciplinary legal or multi-door approach’.449 Within this context, the former policy of singledoor is deemed to be less effective in combatting IUU fishing, therefore the latter is
introduced as an advanced robust and comprehensive measure to tackle the problem.
As elaborated by Husein, the rationale for taking the approach of multi-door is mainly based
on the assessment that crimes committed in fisheries sectors are cross-sectoral while the
447
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prevailing regulations on fisheries in Indonesia are asserted inadequately in bringing about
the perpetrators before the justice system and activities of IUU fishing generally involving
other crimes. He also explained that there are some advantages of having the approach,
namely of widening the overview, multi-legal approach, cross-sectoral enforcements from
different institutions, more coordinated measures and utilizing the principle of ‘follow the
suspect and follow the asset’.450 The principle can be a powerful tool to trace the mastermind
and not only the perpetrator in the field which could lead to it having a stronger effect on the
persons committing crimes and the company operating it might be liable.
The OECD perceives that the clue to solving the problem is by tracing where the money is
disbursed. This organization also holds a view that following the suspect and asset principles
needs to be promoted based on the following three reasons:451
1. By following the revenue from IUU fishing, the true perpetrators, along with their
networks, can be traced and brought before the courts;
2. The flow of profits resulting from IUU fishing should be halted since the more operators
of IUU fishing that make money, the more difficult it is for them to be stopped; and
3. Investigation of the financial transactions can be used as evidence that IUU fishing activity
occurs. The investigation should be integrated in the whole strategy of combatting crime
by having the cooperation of related fisheries institutions.
Multi-door approach presents a holistic view in discerning and combatting IUU fishing. This
approach should also be viewed as a robust measure to impartially eliminate illegal activities
in the fishing activities from capturing the fish, then processing, up to selling them to the
market. A publication from UNODC in 2011 is a good example in depicting transnational
organized crime and criminal activities occurring in the fishing operations. The study focuses
on the engagement of the fishing industry in the types of activities that are most related.
These include transnational organized crime such as trafficking in persons, people smuggling
and illegal drugs and psychotropic materials trafficking, including their connection to the
other types of crimes such as ‘marine living resource crime, corruption, piracy and other
security-related crimes’.452 From the research, it was evident that trafficking in persons was
450
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connected to those crimes and the ruthlessness of the trafficked persons to be forced labourers
on fishing vessels was probably the most upsetting fact. They became ‘prisoners of the sea’,
vulnerable to severe cases of abuse. Fishing vessels were discovered as a means of
transporting illegal drugs and weapons, terrorism and smuggling illicit migrants.453
Sixthly, the formulation of guidelines. It is not mere anecdotal evidence that criminals indeed
commit crimes in the fishing industry. Law enforcement apparatus would face this
circumstance when enforcing laws and regulations. By using a multi-door approach, they can
undertake systematic investigations and mutual cooperation amongst various governments
and law enforcement authorities. This measure offers full protection against environmental
damage as those institutions would have a coordinated position.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to formulate the work of the law enforcement agencies with more
details through a set of guidelines following up on Presidential Regulation 115/2015. The
guidelines aim to support the implementation of the regulation. It may involve a review of the
policy implementation to combat those three activities and it may provide answers as to how
the measures should be put into effect. It is also important to upgrade the capacity building of
law enforcement officers and to ensure that all enforcement authorities explicitly incorporate
the multi-door approach into their routine operations.
4. Conclusion.
In overcoming IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, numerous policies have been taken by the
Indonesian Government such as sinking fishing vessels undertaking IUU fishing and
establishing two task forces. As a political document mandated by IPOA-IUU fishing,
NPOA-IUU fishing can be considered as a political commitment in combatting IUU fishing.
During the leadership of Minister Susi, some policies have also been introduced, such as a
moratorium on fisheries licences for ex-foreign fishing vessels for vessels of more than 30
gross tonnes in order to promote sustainable fisheries management, addressing IUU Fishing
in Indonesia Fisheries Management Areas and increasing non-tax state revenue.
As follow up to the moratorium policy, MMAF then reviewed fisheries licences of fishing
vessels constructed by foreign countries. Indonesia also applied a non-transhipment policy
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through the enactment of Ministerial Regulation Number 57/PERMEN-KP/2014. In the
fisheries industry, transnational organized crimes such as trafficking in persons and slavery
occur in the fisheries industry of Indonesia. It has become the international community's
concern as Indonesia is placed in Tier 2 according to the 2015 Report of TIP. In an effort to
garner support from the international community, Indonesia has committed to having stronger
bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation, not only with states but also with
INTERPOL.
There are some loopholes in Indonesia’s policy regarding IUU fishing and its connection
with transnationally organized fisheries crimes:
1. NPOA on IUU fishing expired in 2016 and the transnational aspects of IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes were not covered in that document.
2. The moratorium policy and the prohibition on transhipment and destructive fishing gear
sparked resistance from related stakeholders such as the fisheries industry and small-scale
fishermen.
3. The moratorium policy may lead to creating unemployment and a lack of fish supply in
the market.
4. A gap also occurs in international organizations handling IUU fishing (FAO) and fisheries
crimes (UNODC) as those issues are separated based on the mandate of each organization.
5. Constraints in law enforcement efforts, namely; coordination, single door policy, lack of
the three abilities and corruption.
In the above explanation, lessons learned can be drawn from the state practices of the U.S and
South Africa. The U.S and South Africa have much interest in IUU fishing. The U.S
Government has established the Presidential Task Force on Combatting IUU fishing and the
Seafood Fraud ratified PSM Agreement as well as port entry and access restriction. The
Magnuson-Steven Reauthorization Act and the Lacey Act can be discerned as powerful tools
to combat IUU fishing. Two lessons can be learned from the U.S. It is essential to learn that
when formulating the recommendations, the Task Force involved public participation to
obtain their opinions. The Task force issues 15 (fifteen) recommendations.
In the case of South Africa, the strengthened cooperation has been initiated between DAFF
and the South Africa police. A project called FishFORCE in NMMU has also been
established after securing funding from the Norwegian Government. Through this project, a
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law enforcement academy is devoted to providing capacity building on the issues of fisheries
crimes and fisheries-related crimes at sea. Future collaboration is possible to be extended to
member countries of IORA including Indonesia.
Some efforts proposed to be undertaken to eliminate IUU fishing and TOFC within the scope
of the domestic national policy framework are:
1. Stronger cooperation in the region within the framework of relevant regional organizations
including ASEAN and IORA should be encouraged. However, bilateral cooperation also
plays an important role.
2. The NPOA-IUU fishing should be reviewed before it is extended another five years. It is a
good opportunity to include a vision of Indonesia as GMF and encompass in the
document, transnationally organized fisheries crimes.
3. It is also important to note that communication and consultation with the public may
curtail resistance from stakeholders on the publicized policies. It is much better if MMAF
conducts a comprehensive study examining advantages and disadvantages. As learned
from the U.S Task Force when formulating the policy, during examination, public
consultation could be considered as one good option to gather concerns from the public.
This public dialogue can diminish the adverse impacts arising from the policy.
4. Paying attention to the different roles of FAO and UNODC. The former has the mandate
to address IUU fishing while the latter has the duty to address crimes related to fisheries. It
is imperative also for the two organizations to meet more regularly.
5. The other effort should be that of addressing four deficiencies of law enforcement through
commitment and awareness enhancement as well as utilizing the multi-door approach.
6. Referring to the title of Presidential Regulation Number 115/2015, the task force
established by that regulation focuses on combatting illegal fishing meaning it does not
have a specific task in addressing and combatting fisheries related crimes. Therefore, it is
necessary for this Presidential Regulation to be amended by positioning transnational
fisheries crimes and unregulated fishing as part of this task force’s duties. The last
proposal is to formulate guidelines to implement Presidential Regulation Number
115/2015 in a more detailed fashion.
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PART V
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF IUU FISHING AND FISHERIES CRIMES
1. Introduction.
After examining the policy frameworks, this part examines the legal approach of the IUU
fishing and fisheries crimes. Legal and policy approaches contribute to being important
elements of ocean governance. Policy measures would be more effective if legal instruments
present to support the policy’s application. To begin with, this part introduces an overview of
international and domestic settings. International law instruments such as LOSC, UNFSA,
PSMA and UNTOC are presented to discuss the topics covered by this thesis.
This part then presents a brief overview of several cases concerning prompt release
adjudicated by ITLOS and the application of Article 72 of LOSC. A comprehensive review
of the submission of Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC) regarding Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing to ITLOS is delivered. This part also discusses an
overview of domestic legislation encompassing relevant laws and regulations and fishery
courts. This part uncovers some legal issues and proposes some efforts to solve the problems.
In the sense of domestic legislation, Indonesia has a number of legal instruments. Those
international legally binding mechanisms will be elaborated in this part along with domestic
legal instruments as primary tools in assessing the loopholes to be filled in.
This thesis identifies the conceptual challenges concerning the interplay between IUU fishing
and transnational organized crimes. It looks at different perceptions, practices, and
approaches and the domestic legal system to observe and address fisheries violations. When
taking a robust stance against IUU fishing, Indonesia does not adopt a particular definition or
explanation on IUU fishing and fisheries crimes in its domestic legal system. This thesis finds
in international law that Indonesia needs to express its consent to be bound by related
conventions. It is worth noting that the U.S has a strong law to punish its nationals who
conduct IUU fishing. Finally, this part proposes some recommendations.
2. International and Domestic Contexts.
In most societies, the existence of rules is necessary for members to perform their daily
routines in an orderly manner. Those rules are extended to the communities responsible for
the management and conservation of marine resources. As part of ocean governance, legal
framework plays an important role in ensuring that marine resources are sustainably utilized.
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The governance holds certain norms, values and regulations that people should respect and
abide by, on how to foster and prevent ocean resources from destruction and depletion.
Yoshifumi Tanaka asserts that increasing human exploration in the oceans has led
international rulers to manage their activities in the oceans. As one of the oldest branches of
public international law, the international law of the sea takes a strategic role in managing the
ocean through its legally binding strength.454
2.1. International Overview.
In order to make international instruments more comprehensible, the following Figure 7
depicts the general framework of the international instrument on fisheries. The instrument is
divided into two main clusters; hard law and soft law. Hard law encompasses the 1982
LOSC, the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the 1993 FAO Compliance
Agreement), the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (the 1995 UNFSA),

455

PSMA 456 and the Cape Town Agreement. Meanwhile, soft law examples include IPOAIUU457 and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (‘Code of Conduct’),
the 2001 Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem, and SDG
14.4.
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Hard Law

Soft Law

The 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention
(in force on 1994)

The 1993 FAO
Compliance
Agreement, adopted by
the FAO Conference,
forms an integral part
of the FAO Code of
Conduct, in force 2003

The 1992 UNCED;
Agenda 21; Rio
Declaration on
Environment and
Development
The 1995 Rome
Consensus on World
Fisheries (FAO)
The 1995 FAO Code of
Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries

The 1999 Rome
Declaration on
Implementation of the
Code of Conduct
(FAO)

The 1995 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement
(UNFSA), in force
2001
The 2009 Agreement
on Port State Measures
to Prevent, Deter, and
Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, in
force 2016
The 2012 Cape Town
Agreement, not yet in
force.

The 1995 FAO Code of
Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries

The 2001 Reykjavik
Declaration on
Responsible Fisheries
in the Marine
Ecosystem
Technical International
Guidelines Plans of
Action
- IPOASeabirds,
1999
- IPOASharks,
1999
- IPOACapacity,
1999
- IPOAIUU, 2001

The 2002 Johannesburg
Declaration on
Sustainable
Development
The 2002 WSSD Plan
of Implementation
Sustainable
Development Goals
(Goal 14.4)

Figure 7: International Fisheries Instruments458
458

High Seas Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas, (London, IUU Fishing
Coordination Unit: 2006) 42. The shown table has been updated by putting the Cape Town Agreement.
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2.1.1. Legally Binding Instruments.
As delivered in this thesis, Indonesia has expressed its consent to be bound by LOSC (Law
No. 17/1985), UNFSA (Law No. 21/2009), PSMA (Presidential Regulation 43/2016) and
UNTOC (Law Number 5/2009) as its commitment to combat IUU fishing and transnational
organized crimes. However, Indonesia is not a State Party to either the 1993 Compliance
Agreement or the 2012 Cape Town Agreement. Those legally binding instruments will be
discussed further in this section.
From historical overview, it can be learned that the Conference of Geneva on the Law of the
Sea of 1958 resulted in 4 (four) important conventions; namely, the Geneva Conventions on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 459 on the High Seas, 460 on the Continental
Shelf461 and on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas462 while
the Geneva Conference of 1960 did not produce any convention. Those conventions have
entered into force.463 Although the conventions were praised as a great achievement, some
issues remain unresolved such as the fundamental questions on the territorial sea width,
fishing rights beyond coastal states’ territories, fisheries resources conservation, continental
shelf due to the new technology of underwater exploration and coastal states’ responsibility
on pollution. More importantly, some post-colonial states, excluding Indonesia, had not been
involved in drafting the Geneva Conventions, leading to the request to convene the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (LOSC III).464
459
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The member states of the third conference agreed to adopt LOSC on 10 December 1982.465
The Convention, known as the Constitution of the Ocean, is an umbrella for all international
regulations governing ocean affairs. After completing negotiations for almost nine years,466
this Convention came into force on 16 November 1994 encompassing in general the
provisions of marine-related issues such as the management of marine resources and
spaces.467 In the preamble, the fisheries aspect is covered through member states’ recognition
of ‘the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living
marine resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment’.468
The principles are related to the conservation and management of marine living resources in
the regimes of EEZ, continental shelf and high seas while territorial seas, internal waters and
archipelagic waters fall under the sovereignty of coastal states.
As referred to in Articles 56(1) and 77(1) of the LOSC, as well as international custom, the
coastal states have sovereign rights in the EEZ and continental shelf.469 In Article 56 (1), it is
important to emphasize that the sovereign rights are limited only to the economic exploitation
and exploration of EEZ (limitation ratione materiae).470 The coastal state has exclusivity in
the sense that no state can conduct activity within the continental shelf without the express
consent of coastal states if those states do not explore the continental shelf or exploit its
natural resources.471 According to Tanaka, it can be argued that sovereign rights, along with
express consent principle, also apply to the activities in EEZ. 472 Coastal states have an
obligation to the promotion of the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in
EEZ and the determination of its capacity to harvest the total allowable catch.473
Nevertheless, other states such as developing states, land-locked states and geographically
disadvantaged states have rights to access the surplus of the allowable catch in the case where
the coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest total allowable catch through the
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conclusion of agreements or other arrangements.474 It is an obligation also for coastal states in
the EEZ to ensure proper conservation and management efforts to prevent the living
resources from over-exploitation based on the best scientific evidence. There shall be
cooperation between coastal states and related international organizations at subregional,
regional and global levels.475 When fishing in the EZZ, nationals of other states shall abide by
the conservation measures and other laws and regulations of the coastal states.
These laws and regulations shall not be in contravention to the LOSC and may relate to the
licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, the determination of the species that
may be caught, the regulation of the seasons and areas of fishing, the types, sizes and amount
of gear, and the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels that may be used, establishing the
age and size of fish, the specific information concerning fishing vessels, the conduct of
specific fisheries research programs, the assigning of observers or trainees on board, the
landing of all or any part of the catch, terms and conditions of joint ventures or other
cooperative arrangements, the requirements for training of personnel and technology transfer,
and procedures of enforcement.476
Because of the establishment of the EEZ regime, fishermen from distant fishing states catch
fish on the high seas and overexploit some fish resources. There is a serious concern about
the current fish stocks circumstance on the high seas. As stated in the United Nations
Secretary General’s Report submitted to the resumed Review Conference on the Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the overall status of highly migratory stocks has declined,
although some fish stocks have improved since the previous assessment in 2010. In detail,
there was a dormant fish stock level of 69 per cent, with deterioration of 20 per cent and
improvement of 11 per cent in fish stocks. 477
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On the high seas, one of the six principles applied is freedom of fishing. However, this
freedom is not limitless and is subject to conditions laid down in Section 2, Part VII.478
Furthermore, Article 116 stipulates that all states have the right for their nationals to engage
in fishing on the high seas subject to: a) treaty obligations; b) the rights and duties as well as
the interests of coastal states provided for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles
64 to 67; and c) the provisions of section 2, Part VII.479 The duty of all states is to take, or to
cooperate with other states in taking such measures for their respective nationals as may be
necessary for the conservation of living marine resources of the high seas as contained in
Article 117. 480 States also have an obligation to cooperate with other states in the
conservation and management of living resources on the high seas through the establishment
of subregional or regional fisheries organizations.481 In addition, there is a duty for states to
cooperate on the management of straddling stocks, 482 highly migratory species, 483 both
anadromous484 and catadromous.485 The provisions related to the duty to cooperate pave the
way for the formation of RFMOs.
The practice of reflagging, flags of convenience and the issue of genuine connections have all
contributed to IUU fishing activities. In evading the prevailing regulations applied by
RFMOs, vessels alter their flag from a state party to a non-state party member. Reflagging
remains a key problem since ‘the requirements for the flag state to exercise control over their
vessels are weak and subject to manipulation as well as being based on state consent’. Flag of
convenience refers to the states that do not demand their vessels conform to the RFMO's rules
when fishing in their agreed area or accommodate the regulations set in the relevant
international legally binding instruments. 486 The practice is a challenge to halt since it
depends more on each state’s domestic policy and awareness of preserving fisheries
resources.
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When fishing on the high seas, a flag state has ultimate responsibility in managing and
conserving marine living resources and combatting IUU fishing. At the global level, two
recognized legally binding instruments concerning flag states responsibilities are the 1993
FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 UNFSA. Nevertheless, LOSC also has the
provision of flag responsibility. 487 The FAO Compliance Agreement was adopted on 24
November 1993 and entered into force on 24 April 2003488 while UNFSA was adopted on 4
August 1995 and entered into force on 11 December 2001.489
In the FAO Compliance Agreement, it is imperative for a flag state ‘to exercise effectively its
jurisdiction and control over vessels flying its flag, including fishing vessels and vessels
engaged in the transhipment of fish’. 490 In the preamble, the practice of flagging and
reflagging is identified as one of the factors undermining the international conservation and
management measures for living marine resources.491 It covers state responsibility including
genuine linkage as stated in Article III 492 and the records of fishing vessels.493 Under the
Indonesia Fisheries Law, the genuine link has been regulated under Article 63. In this
provision, fishing vessels owned by Indonesian individuals are to be registered as Indonesian
fishing vessels when operating in the Fisheries Management Area of Indonesia and on the
high seas. 494 If the fishing vessels are purchased from overseas, a document of release
published by the original flag state shall be lodged for registration.495 Such registration also
serves as a record of the fishing vessels. As a non-party to the Agreement, Indonesia is
encouraged to adopt laws and regulations consistent with the provisions of the Agreement.496
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The Compliance Agreement provisions are intended to apply to all fishing vessels
undertaking their activities on the high seas with particular arrangement for fishing vessels of
less than 24 meters. 497 Ministerial Regulation 12/2012 only governs fishing vessels of a
minimum 30 gross tonnage and having at least 15 meters LOA (Length Overall).498 It is also
important to highlight that as a non-member state of the Compliance Agreement, 499 nonmandatory for Indonesia to exchange information 500 and to be part of international
cooperation501 with developing countries under the Agreement.502 As of October 2018, 42
states have become Parties to the Compliance Agreement.503 Despite the limited number of
acceptances to the Agreement, Indonesia suffers a potential loss in not cooperating with
Parties to the Agreement in terms of the exchange of information including evidentiary
materials regarding activities of fishing vessels which help flag states to recognize fishing
vessels reported to have been involved in activities undermining international conservation
and management efforts.504
The cooperation also occurs for port states in promptly notifying flag states and in launching
an investigation when their fishing vessels have been used for activities that “undermines the
effectiveness of international conservation and management measures” where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the fishing vessels have engaged in such measure. 505
Indonesia may use this provision when their fishing vessels are in contravention of Article III
concerning flag state responsibility if it consents to be bound by the Agreement. Furthermore,
as a developing state, Indonesia can also receive assistance including technical assistance to
fulfil the obligations under the Agreement if Indonesia becomes a State Party.506 It is evident
that the problem of fishing vessels flying the Indonesian flag committing illegal fishing on
the high seas arises from a variety of reasons. From an international legal framework point of
view, the Compliance Agreement can be used as a tool to diminish illegal fishing practices on
the high seas inasmuch as it provides mechanisms to curb activities that are inconsistent with
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international conservation and management measures. Indonesia’s consent to be bound by
this Agreement creates an image as a sustainable fisheries nation that Indonesia has been
attempting to establish globally.
The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) stipulates the principles of the
conservation and management of those straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
and lays the foundation that the management shall be based on the precautionary approach
and the best available evidence. 507 In achieving this objective, the UNFSA sets out the
mechanism for cooperation in the conservation and management of the resources through the
promotion of the optimum utilization of resources of fisheries 508 within areas under and
beyond national jurisdiction. 509 The approach to ensuring effective conservation and
management of such fish stocks are the cooperation, either directly or indirectly, through
appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements.510
The effective control of flag states and international cooperation are dual objectives as set out
in the UNFSA.511 Article 18(1) stipulates that flag states assumes the obligation to ensure
their fishing vessels conform to sub-regional and regional conservation and management
measures and prohibit the vessels engaging in any activity undermining the effectiveness of
such efforts. 512 During the Review Conference on the UNFSA, some signs of progress
developed by flag states in undertaking effective control over vessels flying their flags were
appraised. Nevertheless, there was also a concern expressed by delegations on the increasing
number of fishing vessels undertaking IUU fishing in several regions. 513 The following
provisions are, among others, related to compliance and enforcement including cooperation
mechanisms514 along with detailed arrangements such as necessary procedures for boarding
and inspection.515 The role of the port state is acknowledged to promote the effectiveness of
such measures.516
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Another robust tool to address IUU fishing is the FAO PSMA. This Agreement was approved
by the FAO Conference at its Thirty-Sixth Session in Rome on 18-23 November 2009 under
Paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the FAO Constitution, through Resolution 12/220 dated 22
November 2009. This Agreement entered into force on 5 June 2016 after reaching 25th
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession on 6 May 2016. As of 30 August
2016, 47 countries and the European Union have consented to be bound by this
Agreement. 517 Indonesia has ratified this PSMA though Presidential Regulation Number
43/2016.518 This is the only legally binding international instrument combatting IUU fishing
emphasizing port state responsibility. The role of flag states is also recognized ensuring the
successful implementation of the PSMA.519
Compared to that of law enforcement at sea, port state measure is acclaimed as the most
efficient and cost-effective way to fight IUU fishing, particularly for developing states.520 In
general, there are three major stages covered by this FAO PSM - before entering a port,
during docking at a port and after inspections. In the first stage, the port state can ban vessels
from entering its port if sufficient evidence of IUU fishing activities is found.521 However, in
the case of force majeure or distress, fishing vessels shall be permitted to enter port to receive
assistance.522
When anchored at the port, if the vessel is proven to have engaged in IUU fishing, port states
are obliged to prohibit landing and transhipping as well as processing and packing of fish in
addition to the other port services.523 After the refusal, notification is delivered to the flag
state, RFMOs and related international organizations. 524 This measure aims to widely
disseminate information as soon as possible, so that other states can be aware of the situation
and take concrete, real-time action. As for the last resort, if there is convincing evidence that
the vessel was engaged in IUU fishing, the vessel is banned from activities including
refuelling, logistics, maintenance and dry docking.525
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The other significant treaty in preventing illegal fishing and TOC particularly on the high
seas is the 2012 Cape Town Agreement. This agreement was adopted by the IMO, and it
brings the main mission to enhance:
The standard of design, construction and equipment, including safety protections, of fishing
vessels 24 metres or more in length. The agreement also outlines regulations for crew and
observer protections and calls for harmonized inspections, those that consider fisheries, labour,
and safety issues.526

The Cape Town Agreement of 2012 updates and amends the Torremolinos International
Convention (the Convention) for the Safety of Fishing Vessels of 1977 and the 1993
Torremolinos Protocol (the Torremolinos Protocol). The Convention has been twice amended
previously while the Protocol has updated and amended the Convention in view of
technological progress since 1977.527 The International Labour Office (ILO) notes that the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 as amended (the SOLAS
Convention) is the most important legal instrument to enhance the safety of life and vessels at
sea, but fishing vessels are generally exempted from SOLAS. The Torremolinos Protocol
deals with this gap by regulating the safety of fishers’ lives at sea but the status of the
Torremolinos Protocol has not come into force, except for European Union members through
the adoption of Directive 97/70/EC of 11 December 1997.528
The condition for the Cape Town Agreement to come into force is ‘12 months after the date
on which not less than 22 states the aggregate number of whose fishing vessels of 24 m in
length and over operating on the high seas is not less than 3600 have expressed to be bound
by it’. 529 This threshold is lower than the conditions set in the Convention and the
Torremolinos Protocol in order to achieve more consent by states. Technical arrangements of
the Agreement will apply to new fishing vessels of a length of at least 24, 45 and 75 metres.
However, some articles will apply only to existing fishing vessels of at least 24 and 45
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metres.530 The 24 meters or longer fishing vessels regulated under the Cape Town Agreement
comes for the rationale that the fishing vessels in this size usually operate on the high seas.
The vessels at the smaller than 24 meters generally carry out commercial fishing within EEZ
and are subject to national regulations.531 As of 20 March 2018, nine countries have ratified
the Cape Town Agreement (Congo, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Netherlands,
Norway, Saint Kitts and Nevis and South Africa) consisting of 1144 fishing vessels in total of
at least 24 meters.532 A minimum number of states expressing consent to be bound by this
agreement has not been reached to allow it to come into force. As was the case for its
successors, the Convention and the Protocol, the biggest challenge of this Agreement remains
its limited number of state parties.
The link between IUU fishing and the safety of fishers working on board and forced labour
has been acknowledged by the FAO Committee on Fisheries. There are three relevant
agreements encompassing the connection, those are: PSMA, the Cape Town Agreement and
the ILO Work in Fishing Convention Number 188.533 Fishing operators who engage in illegal
fishing are less likely to provide their crews with proper labour conditions, safety equipment
or training. They are inclined to have inadequate modifications and their vessels often lack
inspection or safety certifications in order to reduce operational costs.534 Fiercer competition
amongst vessel owners due to declining fish stocks may undermine fishers’ safety. 535 As
such, it is in Indonesia’s interest to consent to the Cape Town Agreement for the reasons that
Indonesia can play three following different roles:
1. Coastal state.
As a coastal state, Indonesia has a profound interest in conserving and managing the coastal
areas in its territorial sea and EEZ. Under international law, ‘States have the sovereign right
to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance
with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment.’ 536 The sovereign right
applies in the EEZ of the coastal state. Indonesia reserves the right to enforce full sovereignty
530

Ministry of Transport of New Zealand, above n 527, 3.
The PEW Charitable Trusts, The Cape Town Agreement Explained (October 2018)
<https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2018/10/ctaexplained_brief_final2.pdf> 4.
532
Committee on Fisheries of Food and Agriculture Organization, Safety at Sea in the Fisheries Sector, 33rd
Session, COFI/2018/Inf.8 (April 2018) <http://www.fao.org/3/MW946EN/mw946en.pdf> 3.
533
The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme, The Cape Town Agreement on the Safety of Fishing
Vessels at Centre of Pacific Islands Gathering (29 August 2017) <https://www.sprep.org/news/cape-townagreement-safety-fishing-vessels-centre-pacific-islands-gathering>.
534
The PEW Charitable Trusts, The Cape Town Agreement Explained, above n 531, 2.
535
ILO, Caught at Sea: Forced Labour and Trafficking in Fisheries, above n 528, 6.
536
Law of the Sea Convention art 193.
531

148

in its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea. The ratification and application
of the Cape Town Agreement would enable the marine environment to be safer and less
chance for the incidents to occur in Indonesia’s coastal waters since the safety standards of
fishing vessels operating in the waters is higher.
The incidents such as capsizing, fire or foundering may potentially lead to pollution spread
over the coastal waters. Another advantage is enhancing the transparency of the domestic and
foreign fishing vessels that navigate in Indonesia’s waters with regard to the operations,
standards of safety and working conditions. The principle of ‘no more favourable
treatment’537 regulated under the Cape Town Agreement authorizes a coastal state to inspect
foreign fishing vessels although the flag state is not a state party to the Agreement.
2. Flag State.
Indonesia plays a decisive role on fishing in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (ABNJ), and
the Cape Town Agreement can be used as a tool to have more control over Indonesian fishing
vessels when operating on the high seas. As of December 2018, Indonesia has become
member of three RFMOs, those are, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(WCPFC) in 2013,538 the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) in 2007539 and
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) in 2007. 540 Indonesia made a declaration on
Article 3 paragraph 1, Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks in the WCPFC upon ratification to the Convention in which ‘the application on
the Convention shall only cover the Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone adjacent to and
within the Pacific Ocean as defined in the Article 3 of the Convention, and shall not be
537
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extended to the archipelagic, territorial and internal waters’.541 As recorded by each RFMO
(as of 30 December 2018), Indonesia flagged-fishing vessels registered in WCPFC, CCSBT
and IOTC amounted to 20,542 101543 and 329,544 respectively. With the total number of 454
fishing vessels, the ratification of the Cape Town Agreement is of utmost importance for
Indonesia’s fishing fleet to apply and ensure certain safety standards.
Once the Agreement is ratified, the operators of commercial fishing vessels will be required
to spend the expenditures to manage the safety and the working conditions of the crews. It is
therefore to force fishing vessels to abide by the rules of the Agreement thus taking into
account a growing concern about ‘human trafficking, including severe violation of minimal
working and living conditions, on board fishing vessels’.545 Those fishing vessels should be
inspected in a more regular fashion to conform with the provisions of the Agreement. This
measure also makes illegal fishing harder to commit since the operators are watched closely
by Indonesia Government.
3. Port State.
The Committee on Fisheries of FAO had come into a conclusion that the Cape Town
Agreement was to become a significant instrument to eliminate IUU fishing inasmuch as the
fishing vessels of member countries, as part of the Agreement, would fall under the ambit of
Port State Control (PSC). 546 By agreeing to be bound by the Cape Town Agreement,
Indonesia can use the Agreement to complement the PSMA, to which Indonesia is a State
Party (Presidential Regulation Number 43/2016), being an instrument to curb illegal fishing
through having the authority to conduct inspection at ports owing to the no favourable
treatment to vessels of non-Parties.547
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As one of the safety at sea instruments, the Agreement also carries the potential to improve
the transparency of the identity of fishing vessels, ownership and movement since it could
serve as a means to extend the IMO identification number and automatic identification
system on merchant vessels to fishing vessels.548 One possible reason for the extension of
IMO identification number is because the Cape Town Agreement falls under the auspices of
IMO. This application of IMO number would assist Indonesia as port state in identifying the
foreign fishing vessels when docking in Indonesia’s ports.
It is worth mentioning that the Cape Town Agreement provides leniency in its application. In
the case a State Party to the Agreement has concluded not to implement all of the provisions
regulated under Chapters VII, VIII, IX and X on existing vessels, the State Party may,
according to a plan, progressively apply the measures provided for in Chapter IX over a
period of a maximum of 10 years and the Chapters VII, VIII and X over a period of no more
than five years.549 Furthermore, the exemption may be applied to vessels of a State Party if
the requirements are deemed to be unreasonable and impracticable in view of the vessel type,
the conditions of weather and the absence of navigational hazards in general, provided,
among others, the vessels only operate in its EEZ.550 The following table depicts the complete
guidance on the implementation of the Cape Town Agreement by state parties:551
Table 1: The Guidance on the Application of the 2012 Cape Town Agreement
The 2012 Cape Town Agreement
Chapter

Content

Implementation
New

II

Construction

Time to
Existing

Applied

Implement
Upon
ratification

III

Stability

Applied

Upon
ratification

IV

Machinery

Applied

Upon
ratification

V

Safety of Fire

Applied

Upon
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ratification
VI

Protection

of Applied

Upon

Crew
VII

Appliances

ratification
of Applied

Up to 5 years

Lifesaving
VIII

Emergency

after ratification
Applied

Applied

Procedures
IX

Radio

after ratification
Applied

Applied

Communications
X

Navigational

Up to 5 years
Up to 10 years
after ratification

Applied

Device

Applied

Up to 5 years
after ratification

Despite the fact that consent by countries to the Cape Town Agreement has so far failed to
reach the minimum 22 countries required for it to enter into force, Indonesia still needs to
strengthen its leadership role in combating IUU fishing and transnational organized crime in
the fisheries sector by ratifying the Agreement.
Furthermore, the role of the ILO Convention concerning Work in the Fishing Sector (Work in
Fishing Convention, 2007) (No. 188) to eliminate IUU fishing and fisheries crimes also
comes into the fore. As admitted by FAO, a number of international institutions have been
attempting to establish instruments that can be used to address crimes associated with the
fisheries sector including ILO that develops the Work in Fishing Convention Number 188 to
combat the crimes.552 This convention adopted on 14 June 2007 in Geneva553 has come into
force in 2017 after Lithuania expressed its consent on 16 November 2016 meeting the
minimum requirement of 10 ratifications to enter into force in November 2017. It is
acknowledged that this convention constitutes to be the first international treaty dealing with
fishers’ conditions on board in the effort to fight against the abuses of human rights,554 and it
is conceived also as a “toolkit” to combat IUU fishing. 555 The adoption of the Convention is
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supplemented by the Work in Fishing Recommendation 2007 (R199). 556 Like other ILO
recommendations, it is a voluntary mechanism as it does not have a legal character.
Nonetheless, it is indicative of those scopes that are regarded as the most necessitating
legislation: youngsters protection, medical examination, service condition, accommodation,
protection of health, training, payment, medical care and social security.557
The prompt response to protect its fishers working on board has been demonstrated by
Indonesia through inter-ministerial coordination to discuss the ratification and the stipulation
of several relevant national regulations. The related ministries such as MMAF, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Transport, Ministry
of Legal and Human Rights and the Ministry of Labour made the overview on the ratification
of the ILO Work in Fishing Convention. They have come into a decision on March 4th, 2019
that Indonesia is not prepared to provide its consent to the convention. Their particular
concerns are as follows:558
1. The application of Ministerial Regulation Number 42/PERMEN-KP/2016 concerning the
Work Agreement for Fishing Vessels Crew on Board as the adoption to some provisions
of the Work in Fishing Convention experiences some gaps to address;
2. Indonesia needs to pay more focus on the protection of domestic fishing vessel crews;
3. The lack of ratification from the other countries;
4. The strengthened coordination should come forward amongst government institutions,
fishing companies and fishing vessel crews in making the ILO Convention on the Work in
Fishing implemented;
5. The regular meetings will be conducted to oversee the government institutions
preparedness in ratifying the convention.
With regard to the legal aspect, MMAF takes the side of fishers’ human rights values in the
stipulated regulations. The prevailing Ministerial Regulation Number 35/PERMEN-KP/2015
concerning System and Certification of Human Rights on Fisheries Business sets out the
objective to ensure that fishing company pays a respect to all stakeholders of fisheries
commercials including fishing vessel crews and local community by preventing and
556
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overcoming activities that may constitute to human rights breach.559 In this regulation, every
business people in fisheries sector shall follow fisheries human rights system560 through the
statement to respect the rights to:561
1. Receive the remuneration and sufficient and adequate time to take a rest;
2. Obtain a good living standard including accommodation, food and drink;
3. Receive the medical treatment;
4. Get the social insurance;
5. Obtain the protection from the working risk;
6. Get special rights for women, children and disabled persons.
The work agreement for the labour and the crew of fishing vessels shall be concluded and
applied to ensure that a good standard of salary is fulfilled.562 In addition, the forced labour
practices are also banned. 563 The technical arrangement of the work agreement and the
certification of human rights is further governed in Ministerial Regulation Number
42/PERMEN-KP/2016 concerning the Work Agreement for Fishing Vessel Crew on Board564
and Ministerial Regulation Number 2/PERMEN-KP/2017 concerning the Conditions and
Mechanism of Fisheries Human Rights Certification.565
The intention of Indonesia Government to ratify the ILO Work in Fishing Convention and to
protect fisheries working on board has been shown by a series of inter-agency meeting and
the enactment of a set of legislation. However, it comes into some considerations that more
time is needed to ratify the convention. Therefore, the legal gaps still persist although System
and Certification of Human Rights on Fisheries Business Ministerial Regulation is in place.
Unlike the convention, the national regulation does not address the matters in detail and the
scope of the two is not always identical. For instance, the ministerial regulation requests
fisheries entrepreneur to respect the right of fishers, among others, to have an access on
559
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medical.566 Meanwhile, it is a compulsory for fishers to secure a lawful medical certificate
attesting the ability to do their duties. This provision can be exempted from the application
after having consultation with the competent authority. However, the exemption cannot be
rendered to ‘a fisher working on a fishing vessel of 24 metres in length and over or which
normally remains at sea for more than three days.’567 The domestic regulation governs a very
general provision on medical issue which is different with the convention regulating in a
more detailed arrangement. The loose the word “respect” in the regulation also brings a
distinguishable gravity in the convention that chooses the word “shall”. The most notable
distinction between the regulation and convention that can be discovered is the former applies
only to fishing business in Indonesia and fishing vessels flying Indonesia flag or foreign
fishing vessels that capture the fish in Indonesia568 while the latter covers ‘all fishing vessels
engaged in commercial fishing operations’ including ‘24 metres in length and over’569 which
are typical for fishing on the high seas operation.
The legal loopholes that exist for not ratifying the ILO Work in Fishing Convention brings
the potential for the fishers working in the fishing vessels flying Indonesia’s flag. However,
the ratification cannot be extended to protect Indonesia fishers working in the foreign fishing
vessels particularly when operating on the high seas as it applies the flag state jurisdiction.
Considering the total number of 454 Indonesia fishing vessels on the high seas (as presented
in the previous section on the Cape Town Agreement), Indonesia may lose the chance to
protect its fishers and most importantly, to prevent IUU fishing and fisheries crimes to take
place. As such, it is advisable Indonesia should attempt to its best effort ratifying the
convention. If the country perceives that related domestic issues overshadows its
preparedness to express its consent, some leniencies on the application of the convention
particularly for fishing vessels less than 24 metres can be opted as reference as provisioned in
Article 4(1).570
Furthermore, in order to provide more comprehensive information concerning Indonesia’s
commitment on the international legally binding instrument, the following is the list of
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international legally binding instruments related to living marine resources to which
Indonesia has provided its consent to be bound.571
Table 2: International Legally Binding Instruments related to Living Marine Resources
Ratified by Indonesia
No
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.

Convention

Year
of
Ratification
Convention on the High Seas
1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf
1958
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 1958
Resources of the High Seas
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
1985
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 2000
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10
December 1982
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 2007
(CCSBT)
Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna 2007
Commission (IOTC)
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 2009
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA)
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly 2013
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean (WCPFC)

10. Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 2016
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Port
State Measure/ PSM Agreement).

2.1.2. Case Law.
Law enforcement in combatting IUU fishing and fisheries crimes notably determines the
compliance of states in managing and conserving fisheries resources. Article 73 of LOSC
provides laws and regulations enforcement exerted by coastal states in EEZ:
571
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1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve
and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures,
including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to
ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this
Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable
bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive
economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary
by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels, the coastal State shall promptly notify the
flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties
subsequently imposed.572

Some essential principles are applied in Article 73 such as sovereign rights in EEZ, prompt
release and posting the reasonable bond or other security, the exclusion of imprisonment with
certain conditions when violating fisheries laws and regulations, as well as prompt
notification to the flag states after the arrest and detention of fishing vessels. Article 73(1) has
provided the coastal states the ability to exercise the right of hot pursuit as stated in Article
111(2)573 for foreign fishing vessels that attempt to escape from law enforcement efforts.
Further application concerning prompt release of vessels and crews is regulated under Article
292 of LOSC stating that:
Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel flying the flag of another State
Party and it is alleged that the detaining State has not complied with the provisions of this
Convention for the prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable
bond or other financial security, the question of release from detention may be submitted to any
court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, failing such agreement within 10 days from the
time of detention, to a court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under article 287 or to
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the parties otherwise agree. 574

In the case of a detained vessel and crew which is not promptly released upon the posting of
the reasonable bond, flag states may bring the case before any court or tribunal as mutually
agreed upon by the parties. Nevertheless, particular arrangement is paid in the case where the
parties cannot reach an agreement within ten days through application to the court or tribunal
under Article 287 or ITLOS. As such, the consent of the detaining state is compulsory. When
signing, ratifying or acceding LOSC, the state party shall be free to choose one or more 4
(four) means for dispute settlement on the interpretation and application of LOSC through a
572
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written declaration. The choices of procedure are: a) ITLOS, b) ICJ, c) arbitral tribunal in
accordance with Annex VII, and d) a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VIII
for one or more of the categories of disputes therein.575
Several submissions to ITLOS evoke Article 292. As of 2 January 2019, a total of 25 cases
have been submitted to the Tribunal and most cases related to prompt release (nine cases).576
One of the cases applying Article 73 is illustrated by the Case of the “Camouco” (Panama v.
France) on Prompt Release. The French government arrested the Panamanian-flagged
Camouco and the Seychelles-flagged Monte Confurco in August and September 1999. Those
vessels were proven to have been involved in illegal fishing in the EEZ of France. The case
then, was brought before ITLOS under Article 73 and 292 of the LOSC. Another instance of
prompt release is the “Volga” Case (Russian Federation v. Australia). Australian authorities
arrested a Russian fishing vessel for violating sovereign rights near the Heard and McDonald
Islands in Australia’s EEZ. The case was also brought before the Tribunal concerning the
applications of Article 73 and 292 of LOSC.577
Legal question on the amount of bond determined by the arresting state as stated in Articles
73 and 292 of LOSC was addressed in those two cases.578 In the “Camouco” Case, the judges
of the Tribunal identified the relevant aspects to assess ‘the reasonableness of bonds or other
financial security’ as follows:
The Tribunal considers that a number of factors are relevant in an assessment of the
reasonableness of bonds or other financial security. They include the gravity of the alleged
offences, the penalties imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining State, the value of
the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, the amount of the bond imposed by the detaining
State and its form.579

The list was not intended to include all factors, nor does the Tribunal aim to set inflexible
rules. Those factors are a complement to the adjudication of the M/V “Saiga” Case, in the
following:
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In the view of the Tribunal, the criterion of reasonableness encompasses the amount, the nature
and the form of the bond or financial security. The overall balance of the amount, form and
nature of the bond or financial security must be reasonable.580

In 2015, ITLOS received submission from the SRFC regarding Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing.581 The background for the submission was the consideration that the
principle of exclusive jurisdiction of flag states contained in LOSC was inadequate in making
sure of the compliance with, and enforcement of, rules.

582

This intergovernmental

organization after particular considerations from participants contending and in favouring
Articles 16 and 21 of the Statue of the ITLOS and Article 138 of the Tribunal, through its
judges, came to the decision that the Tribunal have jurisdiction to entertain the request
submitted to it by SRFC. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to the EEZ of the SRFC
Member States. 583 Article 16 reads ‘The Tribunal shall frame rules for carrying out its
functions. In particular, it shall lay down rules of procedure’584 while Article 21 of the Statute
reads ‘The jurisdiction of the Tribunal comprises all disputes and all applications submitted
to it in accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other
agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal’.585
Furthermore, Article 138 of the Rules states:
1. The Tribunal may give an advisory opinion on a legal question if an international agreement
related to the purposes of the Convention specifically provides for the submission to the
Tribunal of a request for such an opinion.
2. Request for an advisory opinion shall be transmitted to the Tribunal by whatever body is
authorized by or in accordance with the agreement to make the request to the Tribunal.
3. The Tribunal shall apply mutatis mutandis articles 130 to 137.

SRFC has submitted the 4 (four) following original questions to obtain the advisory opinion
of ITLOS:
1. What are the obligations of the flag State in cases where illegal, unreported and unregulated
(IUU) fishing activities are conducted within the Exclusive Economic Zone of third-party
States?
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2. To what extent shall the flag State be held liable for IUU fishing activities conducted by
vessels sailing under its flag?
3. Where a fishing licence is issued to a vessel within the framework of an international
agreement with the flag State or with an international agency, shall the State or international
agency be held liable for the violation of the fisheries legislation of the coastal State by the
vessel in question?
4. What are the rights and obligations of the coastal State in ensuring the sustainable
management of shared stocks and stocks of common interest, especially the small pelagic
species and tuna? 586

For the first question, the Tribunal referred to Articles 192 and 193 of LOSC in which the
flag state shall undertake necessary measures to ensure that its vessels abide by the protection
and preservation measures adopted by the member states of the SRFC.587 The flag state shall
also exercise its jurisdiction and control effectively in administrative matters over its vessels
particularly by correctly marking such vessels.588 Furthermore, the flag state has an obligation
to impose adequate sanctions over its fishing vessels flying its flag when committing IUU
fishing to prevent violations and to deprive offenders of the benefits acquired from their IUU
fishing activities.589 It is important to note that the sanction is not only for the purpose of a
prevention measure but also to remove the advantages taken by the perpetrators.
In the sense that the second question is related to the flag state’s liability, the Tribunal evoked
Draft Articles 1, 2 and 31 (paragraph 1) of the International Law Commission on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, as the rules of general
international law.590 The Tribunal made a reference to due diligence obligations from Articles
125 to 140 as well as distinguishing between due diligence obligations and result
obligations.591 A further important explanation is the definition of ‘due diligence obligations’
as provided by the ICJ in the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, as follows:
It is an obligation which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures but
also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control
applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by
such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party. The responsibility of a party to the
1975 Statute would, therefore, be engaged if it was shown that it had failed to act diligently and
thus take all appropriate measures to enforce its relevant regulations on a public or private
operator under its jurisdiction. 592
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In the case that a flag state has undergone all necessary and appropriate efforts to conform
with “due diligence obligations” to make sure that its fishing vessels do not undertake IUU
fishing, the flag state is not liable.593
The third question is more complicated and open to multi-interpretation in which the Tribunal
needed to further illuminate the term of international agency and the scope of the question. It
was reiterated that when the international organization has concluded a fisheries access
agreement with an SRFC member state, the international organization assumes the
responsibility of its member states. Hence, the international organization shall ensure that its
member states’ fishing vessels do not breach the fisheries laws and regulations of the SRFC
member states and do not undertake IUU fishing activities.594 This is also to confirm the
international organization’s liability if its member states constitute a breach of fisheries
access agreement in the SRFC Member States.
The fourth question pointed particularly to shared stocks in the EEZ of the SRFC member
states, particularly small pelagic species and tuna. The Tribunal was of the view that Articles
61, 62, 73 192 and 193 of the LOSC are relevant to the question.595 Those articles are primary
references for the conservation and management of marine living resources. The SRFC
member states have the right to reach agreement with the other members of SRFC to
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of their shared stocks. Nonetheless,
they also have an obligation to make sure of the sustainable management of shared stocks in
their EEZ by developing several measures.596
2.2. Domestic Overview.
2.2.1. Recent Developments: Indonesia’s Efforts to Address TOFC and IUU Fishing.
Along with a policy viewpoint, the legal instrument plays a key role in ensuring the
conservation and management of living marine resources from degradation, particularly the
depletion of fisheries resources. Within the ambit of the domestic legal instrument, marine
resource management in Indonesia has been governed through a complex regulatory
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system.597 As an umbrella of laws and regulation, Article 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution of
the Republic of Indonesia reads ‘Land and water and natural resources therein shall be
controlled by the State and shall be utilized for the greatest benefit of or welfare of the
people’.598 In this article, the government asserts the mandate to explore the natural supplies
including marine resources for the prosperity of the people. In other words, the state is
obliged to preserve the resources from deterioration in order to make it of benefit to the
people.
After Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, Indonesia’s legislative system was
deemed to be ‘one of the most formidable legislative frameworks in the world’.599 Pursuant to
Article 7 of Law Number 12/2011 concerning the Formulation of Laws and Regulations, the
1945 Constitution occupies the supreme law, followed by People’s Consultative Assembly
Decree. The third position is Laws or Government Regulations in Lieu of Law while the
fourth level is Government Regulation. The last three positions are Presidential Regulation,
Provincial Regulation and Regional/Municipal Regulation. In addition, the other regulations
such as regulation of the House of Representatives and ministerial regulation are recognized
in the legislative system. The following is the hierarchy of Indonesia's laws and regulations in
accordance with Article 7(1), as depicted in Figure 8:
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1945 Constitution
People Consultative Assembly Decree
Laws or Government Regulations in
Lieu of Law
Government Regulation
Presidential Regulation
Provincial Regulation
Regional/ Municipal Regulation

Figure 8: The Hierarchy of Indonesia’s Laws and Regulations 600
Indonesia pays particular concern to fisheries, embedded in its domestic legal system in the
form of laws and regulations. The primary legal instrument governing fisheries resources is
Law No. 45/2009 as an amendment to Law No. 31/2004 concerning Fisheries. The main
objective of Law No. 45/2009 is to better address the problem of illegal and unreported
fishing601. This law addresses challenges of new technology invention, better coordination
amongst related institutions involved in fisheries management and ‘matters of jurisdiction
and the competency of regency-level court’s traditional scope of authority’. Further, it also
aims to engage local administrations more.602 The amended Law 31/2004 was not conceived
to have increased sustainable income through fisheries management, surveillance and optimal
law enforcement.603 As a primary law, Fisheries Law does not govern technical aspect of
fisheries. The specific issues of fisheries such as fishing vessel registration and licensing,
licensing of fisheries business, fish monitoring system and the other aspects are regulated
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under ministerial regulations, ministerial decrees, governmental regulations604 and director
general decrees.
It is commonly observed that the perpetrators of criminal acts are inclined to conceal, or
camouflage money and assets acquired from these activities. This means authorities have
difficulty in tracing these assets thus criminals can spend it legally or illegally. In anti-money
laundering, the perpetrators and their illegal assets can be spotted through a tracing
mechanism. By confiscating the illegal assets and detaining the criminals, the crime rate can
be diminished. This principle can be applied to the assets from illegal fishing and as well as
fisheries crimes. Indonesia has enacted Law Number 8/2010 concerning Countermeasures
and Eradication of Money Laundering. Under this law, any assets shall be classified as being
the result of criminal acts if they are acquired from illegal activities such as, among others,
corruption, bribery, immigrant smuggling, human trafficking, labour smuggling, taxation
crimes, environmental crimes, crimes in marine and fishery or other crimes dealt with by
imprisonment for 4 (four) or more years.605
In terms of punishment, Article 3 of Law Number 8/2010 reads:
Anyone, who places, transfers, forwards, spends, pays, grants, deposits, takes abroad, changes
the form, changes to the currency or securities or other deeds towards the Assets of which are
recognized or of which are reasonably alleged to be as the result of criminal action, as set forth
in Article 2 section (1) with the purpose to hide or to disguise the origin of Assets, shall be
subject to be sentenced due to the criminal action of Money Laundering with imprisonment of
no longer than 20 (twenty) years and fined no more than Rp10,000,000,000.00 (ten billion
rupiah). 606

Different degrees of punishment apply depending on the gravity in committing such crime in
either a passive or active manner. Moreover, if it is committed by corporations, the sentence
shall be subject to the corporation and/or corporation control personnel.607 A fine of no more
than Rp 100 000 000 shall be imposed on the corporation as the primary sentence. An
additional sentence shall be enforced in the case of: ‘a) announcement of judge’s verdict; b)
suspension of the overall or partial business activity of the Corporation; c) revocation of the
business licence; d) dissolution or restriction of the Corporation; e) Confiscation of the
604
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Corporation's assets for the State; and/ or f) Corporation takeover by the State’. 608 An
independent institution, Financial Transaction Report and Analysis Centre (Pusat Pelaporan
Analisis dan Transaksi Keuangan/ PPATK), was established by the Indonesian Government
to prevent and eliminate money laundering.609
To protect labourers working in the fisheries sector from human rights violations, MMAF has
enacted Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Regulation Number 35/PERMEN-KP/2015
concerning System and Certification of Human Rights on Fisheries Business. This regulation
requires business people in the fisheries industry to respect and implement human rights
values.610 One prominent case of human rights abuse was found in the Benjina Case which
occurred on Benjina Island, Maluku, Indonesia. Associated Press reported that more than 300
workers were evacuated to Tual, Maluku after being investigated on 4 April 2015.611
2.2.2. Sinking and/or Burning Illegal Fishing Vessels: Standard Operating Procedures.
In the case of burning and/or sinking of illegal fishing vessels, the authority can undertake
this “distinctive measure” on the basis of sufficient preliminary evidence.612 Further technical
and detailed arrangements are regulated under the Director General of Marine and Fisheries
Resources Surveillance Regulation Number 11/PER-DJPSDKP/2014 concerning Technical
Guidelines on the Implementation of Distinctive Measure towards Foreign Fishing
Vessels.613 In this regulation, a Distinctive Measure is a measure undertaken by Fisheries
Civil Servants Investigators and/or Fisheries Supervisors when executing their duties on
board to protect themselves and enforce fisheries legislation.614
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Two conditions shall be met when burning and/or sinking foreign fishing vessels in
accordance with Article 6. These conditions are subjective and/or objective.615 The subjective
conditions include:616
1. Master and/or crews of foreign fishing vessels resist, and/or their maneuver endangers the
fisheries patrol vessel and its crews when halting, checking and/or taking the identified
vessel to the nearest port;
2. It is not possible to take or escort the identified vessel to the nearest port due to weather
condition;
3. Identified foreign fishing vessels are severely damaged and can endanger the safety of
perpetrators and fisheries patrol vessels.
Meanwhile, the objective conditions consist of cumulative and/or alternative conditions:617
1. Cumulative conditions comprise:
a. The fishing vessel is not equipped with valid licenses;
b. Obviously catching and/or transporting fish in the Fisheries Management Areas of
Indonesia; and
c. Foreign fishing vessels with all foreign crews.
2. Alternative conditions shall include:
a. Foreign fishing vessels captured which are not highly valued; and/or
b. The vessels cannot be taken into the closest port, with due considerations of:
1) The vessel is endangering navigational safety and/or quarantine concerns;
2) The vessel is carrying communicable diseases and/or poisonous and dangerous
materials;
3) It is impossible to be escorted to the nearest port due to the number of captured
vessels; and/or
4) High cost of taking or escorting the vessels.
Some procedures should be followed prior to imposing the Distinctive Measure, such as
warning crews to leave the vessel, evacuating them, attempting to detach the flag,
documenting and taking note of the vessels’ position, where it was burnt and/or sunk.618 The
Distinctive Measure can be carried out in EEZ in the event that subjective conditions are
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fulfilled.619 Unfortunately, the Director General’s regulation is silent on the steps following
the imposition of the Distinctive Measure with regard to notification to the flag state of the
fishing vessels.
Nevertheless, sending a notification is stipulated under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations of 1993, Article 36 (b) which reads ‘the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular
district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial
or is detained in any other manner’. 620 Therefore, flag states shall be informed through
diplomatic channels if the fishing master and crew are arrested or detained for fishing
illegally. If a foreign fishing vessel is arrested or detained in another State’s EEZ, the coastal
state has a duty to promptly notify the flag state through appropriate channels of the measures
taken and any penalties imposed.621
Nevertheless, the time extended to send notification remains unclear and therefore bilateral
agreement should be agreed to regulate a maximum time in which to send the notification.
One instance of a bilateral agreement is between Indonesia and Australia through the signing
of the Arrangement on Consular Notification and Assistance on 10 March 2010. Section 6 of
this arrangement reads ‘the competent authorities of the receiving State will without delay
and within three working days inform the consular post or diplomatic mission of the sending
State that a national of the sending State has been arrested, detained, or apprehended’.622
It can be conceived that burning and/or sinking illegal foreign fishing vessels is regulated
under Indonesia’s domestic law. Several steps and conditions must be followed before
imposing such a measure as sinking and/or burning a vessel. Moreover, international law
identifies that fishing masters and crews have rights, including the right to receive assistance,
if they are detained. Due to gaps in both Indonesian domestic and international law regarding
the duty to notify in a timely manner, the bilateral agreement should be negotiated between
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Indonesia and relevant states to provide prompt and proper legal assistance to foreign fishing
masters and crews of vessels caught fishing illegally in Indonesian waters.
2.2.3. The Establishment of Fishery Courts.
To enhance prosecutorial effectiveness, the Government of Indonesia has adopted fishery
tribunals under Article 71(1)(2), Law Number 31/2004 as amended by Law Number
45/2009.623 This establishment is an important decision to respond to fishery cases based on
Fisheries Law and other related laws and regulations. In the initial phase, five fishery
tribunals have been established under the district courts of North Jakarta, Medan (North
Sumatra), Pontianak (West Kalimantan), Bitung (North Sulawesi) and Tual (Southeast
Maluku).624 As of 21 October 2014, the total number of fishery courts had reached 10 (ten)
locations with additional courts at Tanjung Pinang (Riau), Ranai (Riau), Ambon (Maluku),
Sorong (Papua) and Merauke (Papua). The last three courts were established by Presidential
Decree Number 6/2014 and are in the eastern part of Indonesia.625 The composition of that
tribunal comprises 3 judges (one career judge and two ad hoc judges).626
The formation of a fishery tribunal can be attributed to the following rationales:627
1. The judicial process in ordinary court generally takes quite a long time to proceed. In the
meantime, as a matter of fact, cases in fisheries crimes requires a faster course because of
the type of crime and proof.
2. In light of the penalty, the prevailing non-fisheries laws and regulations do not cover all
violations and crimes undertaken in fisheries. To some extent, this circumstance leads to
fisheries law violations being punished inappropriately.
3. The competency and capability of ordinary courts are deemed to be a constraint in
presiding over the proceedings of fishery tribunals. It can be discerned from the fact that to
some degree, a large number of violations in fisheries crimes have received improper
punishment.
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It is worth mentioning that two ad hoc judges can be derived from experts without a law
background but they must have expertise and experiences in fisheries issues regardless of
whether they are from academia or university, non-government organizations or professional
organizations.

628

In creating effective and efficient judicial proceedings in fisheries

violations, the duration for handling the case from investigation until the final decision has
lessened to about 2.5 months. Those wrongdoers can also be brought before the court in
absentia to speed up the process.629 In accordance with the data provided, there were 138
cases in 2010 and 66 cases in 2011 handled by fishery courts.630
The perpetrators were sanctioned using both administrative law and penal code. One
interesting example is the verdict of Tanjung Pinang District Court Number 22/Pid.SusPRK/2015/PN Tpg of 2016. A Vietnamese, Le Duc Long, was found guilty of breaching
fishing in the EEZ of Indonesia with a fine amounting to Rp. 1 500 000 000. In the case the
defendant, unable to afford the fine, will be imprisoned for 6 (six) months.631 This ruling
prompted further discussion concerning the legality of the imprisonment. According to
Article 73(3) of LOSC, imprisonment or any other form of corporal punishment is prohibited
in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned. This provision
conforms with Article 102 of Fisheries Law.632 Nevertheless, in the case that the defendant
cannot pay, or decides not to pay the penalty, then it falls under civil law as to the
ramification of his/her illegal conduct.
In 2015, Deputy of Task Force 115 revealed that compared to other areas, the highest rate of
violations occurred in the Aru Island, Maluku (Eastern part of Indonesia) involving 350
vessels. 95% of those vessels employed masters and crews with incomplete documents, had
more than one flag, inactivated the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and transhipped
illegally. He referred to the case of Benjina in which several criminal acts such as forced
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labour, human trafficking, illegal migrant and illegal labour all occurred.633 It arises from the
fact that crime in fisheries cannot be addressed in isolation as it provokes other crimes.
Pursuant to Article 71 (1), the fishery court has authority to investigate, hear and adjudicate
criminal acts in fisheries, therefore, this court will have difficulty when handling fisheries
cases along with the other related cases in the chain from production to marketing. This
intricate problem can simply be resolved by amending fisheries law, particularly the related
articles on fishery court.
One possible option to resolving the problem is leaving the authority to adjudicate fishery
crimes to the ordinary court. However, bearing in mind past rationales when establishing
fishery courts, including limitations faced by the ordinary court as mentioned above, this
option should be further reconsidered. One advantage in returning fisheries cases to the
ordinary court is that it has the authority to adjudicate all aspects of crime. Another possible
solution is to strengthen the existing fishery courts with the right to process non-fisheries
crimes in their internal judicial system. Again, this solution prompts another question
concerning the scope of fisheries crimes in its position as lex specialis. The fisheries courts
are also governed under fisheries law, so it may create another problem if the courts have
jurisdiction to adjudicate crimes other than fisheries violations.
From the latest data revealed by the Supreme Court of Indonesia, 814 fisheries cases had
been submitted to the relevant courts to be adjudicated over the six years, from 2010 to
2016. 634 However, there exist the gaps between IUU fishing and fisheries crime cases
reported in the media and those that are brought before the justice system. As claimed by
Gilles Blanchi, Chief Technical Advisor of European Union-United Nations Development
Program SUSTAIN, hundreds or more cases of IUU fishing have been reported by the media,
but the numbers that reach the court fall drastically. He further reiterated that all related
institutions should cooperate and coordinate properly to ensure the cases appeared before the
court.635 In handling cases of fisheries crimes, it is also essential to take fast and strategic
633
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measures as the crimes are dissimilar to other crimes. For instance, once an illegal fishing
vessel is seized, according to Article 73B (6) the perpetrators shall be brought before the
court in less than 30 (thirty) days,636 which is significantly faster than handling other criminal
cases.
Recognizing that coordination amongst institutions responsible for law enforcement is one of
the main hurdles, a project has been funded by the European Union, called EU-UNDP
SUSTAIN, to build the capacity of courts in Indonesia including fishery courts and to
strengthen coordination amongst law enforcement personnel. The project’s term is five years
with the total amount of EUR 10 million in funds. Internally, the Supreme Court of Indonesia
has taken the initiative to convene training for fishery judges designated in the district courts
and appellate court in collaboration with UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)
and EU. 637 It is convinced that training plays a crucial role in upgrading the capacity of
fishery judges when adjudicating fisheries cases. Some crucial aspects such as international
law and practices should be part of the training materials to avoid misjudgements and multiinterpretation in their rulings.
3.

Legal Issues and Proposed Measures.

3.1. Legal Issues.
3.1.1. Legal Frameworks.
In general, Fisheries Law sets heavy fines and imprisonment in punishing individuals and
corporations committing IUU fishing. However, according to Gregory Rose, relevant
domestic laws and regulations under MMAF do not address transnational criminal activities
in fisheries. 638 The lack of transnational crimes provisions in the Fisheries Law, to some
extent, can be understood since the Fisheries Law governs primarily fisheries issues.
However, with the current challenges of transnational crimes in the fisheries sector, the
Fisheries Law needs to cope with those issues accordingly. The inclusion of the crimes shall
not be directed to regulate all aspects of the crimes transnationally committed, but it is
intended to connect the crimes with the prevailing regulations of fisheries instead. In
Indonesia legal system, human trafficking has been regulated under Law Number 21/2007
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concerning the Elimination of Human Trafficking.639 The connection with the Fisheries Law
can be done by acknowledging it as a crime occurring in the fisheries sector and adopting it
as the provision. The proper and coordinated response conducted by relevant authorities
when facing the problem on the ground can be addressed in this Law.
In Fisheries Law, the criminal act is divided into crime and offence.640 Those committing a
crime will be treated as criminals with a minimum of four years’ imprisonment and a heavy
fine. For example, a minimum five years imprisonment and a maximum IDR two billion
imposed for those practicing the use of unsustainable fishing gear.641 If it falls under the
category of offence, a maximum two years imprisonment will be imposed and/or a lesser
amount of fine than that under the category of crime. In respect of law enforcement in EEZ,
imprisonment will not be imposed, except when a bilateral agreement is concluded between
Indonesia and relevant states.642
Moreover, in Fisheries Law, the definition or explanation on IUU fishing does not exist. The
only reference to IUU fishing is NPOA-IUU Fishing which has terminated in 2016.643 The
explanation or definition on the term may serve as a proper guideline when it is needed as a
reference in the domestic level. In the IPOA-IUU fishing, the explanation on the term IUU
fishing is provided. However, it is not intended to be a legal definition as this instrument is
voluntary. Thus, it is meant to be a loose reference. It depends on the countries to modify or
adopt fully or partially as it does not have a legally binding character. Therefore, IUU fishing
should be defined to govern each activity in the terminology. For instance, in Section
609(e)(3) of MSRA of 2006, the U.S Government sets the definition of IUU fishing and even
extends its jurisdiction to seamounts, hydrothermal vents, and cold-water corals located
beyond national jurisdiction.644 This definition is not identical to IUU fishing as set out in
IPOA-IUU fishing.
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Despite no specific definition or explanation on IUU fishing, some provisions curbing IUU
fishing are found extensively in the Fisheries Law such as the prohibition of unsustainable
fishing gear.645 A licensing system comprising License for Fishing (Surat Izin Penangkapan
Ikan/SIPI) and License for Fish Transporting Vessel (Surat Izin Kapal Pengangkut
Ikan/SIKPI) is mandatory with an exception for small-scale fishermen.646 Individuals who
has committed a breach to Articles 27 and 28 shall be treated as a criminal and receive both
punishment of imprisonment and fine.647 It has provided “no flag of hopping” rule.648 As the
main focus of MMAF policy in addressing IUU fishing, more stringent measures apply
through the authority for the investigator and/or fisheries inspector to undertake distinctive
measures by burning and/or sinking foreign fishing vessels based on sufficient preliminary
evidence. 649 The authority to investigate is allocated to the Fisheries Civil Servant
Investigator, Navy Investigator and/or Police Investigator.650
While Fisheries Law covers mainly aspects of fisheries, Law Number 32/2014 governs any
issues related to Ocean Affairs. In this law, the issue of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes are
not addressed explicitly. As occurred in the Fisheries Law, the Marine Law does not cover
the definition or explanation of IUU fishing. Nevertheless, both central and local
governments, along with the respective authority, shall undertake marine management
measures to the best extent for the people’s prosperity through the utilization of marine
resources by adopting the blue economy principle. This utilization encompasses, among
others, coastal and small islands resources as well as the fisheries sector.651 Consideration of
the people’s prosperity in this regulation is in line with the principle stated in Article 33(3) of
the 1945 Constitution.
The authority of provincial government is further governed in Law Number 23/2014
concerning Local Government. The provincial government has the responsibility to combat
IUU fishing and fisheries crimes as it reserves the rights, among others, to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage ocean resources other than oil and gas from baseline to 12 m. In terms
of marine security and national sovereignty, the province, along with national administrations
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should share the responsibility.652 Meanwhile, with regard to the distribution of authority to
issue Fisheries Business Licence (SIUP), the rule is as follows:
1.

The province reserves the right to issue SIUP for fishing vessels between 5-30 gross
tonnes (GT);

2.

The central government or MMAF assumes responsibility for issuing SIUP for:
a. Fishing vessels of no more than 30 GT engaging in foreign investment and/or with
foreign fishermen working on board; and
b. Fishing vessels of over 30 GT.653

The link between both IUU fishing and transnational organized crime emerged firstly during
the ninth meeting of UNICPOLOS and at the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNTOC in
2008. 654 Those meetings did not reach agreement on the issue and further research was
necessary.655 Currently, there are some important contributions in analysing the correlation
between IUU fishing and transnational organized crime. As the Global Initiative against
Transnational Organized Crime puts it: “The majority of IUU fishing violates or contravenes
some law, regulation or agreement, or the spirit of these legal instruments, and therefore
could be categorized as (an environmental) crime, and as we shall see, due to its transnational
and highly organized nature, it constitutes a form of transnational organized crime.656
However, the said inclusion is challenged by Palma. She conceives that the categorization of
IUU fishing as environmental crime is neither collectively nor explicitly stated in
international law unlike illicit logging, illicit wildlife trafficking, and illegal trafficking of
poisonous waste. She further suggests conducting more in-depth research to address the
connection between ‘fisheries and environmental law and transnational organized crime’.657
Her subsequent perspective regarding the issue is relevant to this research to generate some
652
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ideas, such as the measures to fortify national laws and regulations in overcoming the matter.
It can encompass efforts such as defining the sorts of activity that are categorized as fisheries
crime, incorporating clauses pertaining to illegal acts as part of fisheries laws and regulations,
and/or revising relevant laws and regulations having connection with crime to connect with
fisheries legislation, and, therefore, link it ‘as predicate offence to money laundering’.658 This
sort of offence is defined as any offence whose proceeds may become the subject of money
laundering offences as defined under the UNTOC (art. 2(h)).
The connection between criminal acts in the marine and fisheries sector as the predicate
offence659 to money laundering is provided under the domestic legal framework of Indonesia
through the adoption of Law number 8/2010 concerning Countermeasure and Eradication of
Money Laundering. Before the adoption of this Money Laundering Law, Indonesia had
enacted Law Number 15/2002 concerning the Crime of Money Laundering which was then
amended by Law Number 25/2003. After Indonesia ratified the Palermo Convention on 15
December 2000, the Indonesian Government adopted Law Number 8/2010 as a replacement
of Law Number 15/2002 amended by Law Number 25/2003 incorporating related provisions
of the Palermo Convention.660
Article 2 of Law Number 8/2010 has connected money laundering with assets acquired from
various criminal acts including marine and fishery or other criminal acts which are treated
with imprisonment for four years or more.661 Criminal acts listed in Article 2 of Law Number
8/2009 are intended to conform to Article 6 (2)(b) of the Palermo Convention which reads:
Each State Party shall include as predicate offenses all serious crime as defined in article 2 of
this Convention and the offenses established in accordance with articles 5, 8 and 23 of this
Convention. In the case of States Parties whose legislation sets out a list of specific predicate
offences, they shall, at a minimum, include in such list a comprehensive range of offences
associated with organized criminal groups. 662

Even though the application of this provision, particularly money laundering in marine and
fisheries, needs to be tested further, the connection may pave the way as a landmark in
combatting fisheries crimes within the milieu of transnational crime.
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As asserted by Palma, organized crimes in most countries merely involve predicate offences
of drug trafficking, trafficking in people, weapons smuggling, goods smuggling, piracy,
armed robbery and terrorism and occasionally illegal logging. She claimed that the
Philippines is the only state that has adopted fisheries breach as predicate offences for
transnational crimes. In its anti-money laundering regulation of Republic Act 10365 which
amended Republic Act 9160, it is possible for the Philippines related authorities to freeze,
seize, recover money from the proceeds of crime, cooperate with other countries, create
financial intelligence units, require customer identification, keep the record and report
suspicious transactions. By possessing these authorities, it is possible to trace the proceeds of
crimes of fisheries in the Philippines.663 With the adoption of Law Number 8/2010, Indonesia
can apply the same measures as the Philippines in addressing fisheries crimes.
Supplementary to the domestic legal framework information, the following table is the list of
laws having a connection with marine resources management compiled from various
sources.664
Table 3: List of Legislations Affecting Marine Resources Management
No

Legislations

I. National Level
A. Ocean Jurisdictional Claims
1.
Law No. 6/1996
2.
Law No. 5/1983
3.

Subject

Indonesian Waters
Indonesian Exclusive Economic
Zone
Indonesian Continental Shelf

Law No. 1/1973 Indonesian
Continental
B. Ocean Resources and Activities on the Sea
4.
Law No. 4/2009
Minerals and Coal Mining
5.
Law No. 17/2008
Shipping
C. Terrestrial Spatial and General Planning Laws
6.
Law No. 26/2007
Spatial Use Management
7.
Law No. 10/2009
Tourism
D. Coastal and Marine Resources Management
8.
Law No. 45/2009 as the Fisheries
amendment of Law No
663
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31/2004
9.

Law No. 1/2014

The amendment of Law No. 27/2007
concerning Coastal and Small Islands
Management
10.
Law No. 18/2013
The Prevention and Elimination of Forestry
Destruction
11.
Law No. 16/1992
Quarantine of Animal, Fish,
and Plant
12.
Law No. 32/2014
Ocean Affairs
E. General Legislation of Environmental Management
13.
Law No. 32/2009
Environmental Protection and
Management
14.
Law No. 5/1990
Conservation of Biological
Resources and Their Ecosystems
F. Legislation of Decentralization
15.
Law No. 9/2015
The Second Amendment of Law No.
23/2014 concerning Regional Government
16.
Law No. 33/2004
Financial Balancing between Central
and Regional Government
II. International Level
17.
Law No. 5/1994
Ratification of United Nations
Convention on Biological
Diversity
18.
Law No. 17/1985
Ratification of United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea
3.1.2. Challenges.
The nexus between IUU fishing and TOC is an interesting subject since amongst countries
there exist conflicting views pertaining to this matter and it needs further clarification such as
the discussion about the complete terms of IUU fishing and transnational organized crime.665
A critical discussion on the issue is on the standardization of the punishment mechanism for
breaching fisheries regulations. Countries are different in perceiving and imposing fisheries
violation in terms of sanction. Some encompass them as criminals, while others charge them
with an administrative penalty or both.666 In the case of Indonesia, Fisheries Law provides
both administrative and criminal sanctions for IUU fishing perpetrators.667
It is important to note that when discussing the connection between the domestic legal
frameworks and the international legal instrument concerning IUU fishing and TOC, the
main reference is the Palermo Convention as the only legal definition of TOC is provided in
665
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Article 2 of the Convention which reads ‘Organized criminal group shall mean a structured
group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the
aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this
Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’.
Serious crime is further defined as ‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by a
maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty’. 668 As
conceived by Telesetsky, the term “maximum” in the definition of “serious crime” set out in
Article 2 creates a quandary. It can be translated into two ways. First, there must be at least a
maximum imprisonment of four years to qualify as “serious crime” and secondly, it is
possible to interpret it as longer imprisonment of four years if it is considered as a “more
serious penalty”. The word “penalty” also presents unclear if it refers to a monetary fine or
imprisonment.669 It is conceived as “transnational in nature” if:
(a) It is committed in more than one State;
(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction or
control takes place in another State;
(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in
criminal activities in more than one State; or
(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.670

The definition of ‘organized criminal group’ and ‘serious crime’, as well as conditions for
‘transnational in nature’, constitute the most important reference of TOC. In Article 2 of
UNTOC, Anastasia Telesetsky highlighted two sorts of crime. Initially, particular
transnational crimes encompassing “organized criminal group” and then “serious crime”
encompassing “organized criminal group”. She was of the view that IUU fishing activities
involving a minimum of three individuals would be regarded as “organized criminal group” if
it is referred to the Convention.671
With regard to the international perspective for a felony to be an organized crime, the
European Union sets out six characteristics, in which at least points 1, 3, 5 and 11 must be
present, namely:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Collaboration of more than 2 people;
Each with his/her own appointed tasks;
For a prolonged or indefinite period of time (refers to the stability and (potential)
durability);
Using some form of discipline and control;
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5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Suspected of committing serious criminal offences;
Operating at an international level;
Using violence or other means of intimidation;
Using commercial or businesslike structures;
Engaged in money laundering;
Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration, judicial authorities or the
economy;
11) Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power. 672

If IUU fishing and fisheries crimes need to conform to a minimum of four characteristics, it
can be asserted that those may fall under the category of organized crime.
In assessing Indonesia’s effort to include IUU fishing and fisheries crime as TOC, there are
several aspects to be examined. Following some categories under the Palermo Convention,
three main factors are involved; organized crime, serious crime and crime transnational in
nature. Obviously, IUU fishing and fisheries crime can be executed by more than three or
more persons as these activities may involve big business. IUU fishing activity is also
transnational in nature as persons committing this action will be border-crossing in achieving
their goals and causing destruction to the other countries. In Indonesia, IUU fishing is also
undertaken by vessels flying foreign flags. However, to conform to the category of organized
crime, there should be an aspect of ‘serious crime’ in that regard.
To some extent, the definition of ‘serious crime’ promotes different responses from different
countries. This distinction leads to hesitancy for several countries to include IUU fishing as
TOC under the Palermo Convention. This distinction occurs as those countries take the view
that IUU fishing shall be treated from a fisheries management perspective. One instance is
Norway’s policy. In the inaugural fisheries crime symposium in 2015, the view most
emphasized came from the representative of the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and
Fisheries. He reaffirmed Norway’s commitment to fight against fisheries crimes and treat
illegal fishing as a TOC. Norway promoted two approaches; fighting against IUU fishing
with administrative sanctions and combatting fisheries crimes with criminal sanctions. 673
From this perspective, there is a clear distinction between IUU fishing and fisheries crimes in
terms of prevailing legal and policy instruments leading to the imposition of sanctions. In this
sense, IUU fishing is not deemed a crime and therefore it should be addressed under civil
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law. However, when it comes to fisheries crimes, criminal law shall be applied to combat the
unlawful activities.
Another example is South Africa. In its regulations, breaching most of the provisions of
MLRA will be enforced as a criminal offence and incur a penalty of a maximum two years
imprisonment and a fine of not more than ZAR 2 million, respectively. Some offences in
fisheries such as ‘prohibited gear, interference with and storage of gear and the use of
driftnet’ are treated under administrative law and involve no imprisonment.674 Seemingly, the
South African Government has a different approach in terms of the legal framework in
addressing IUU fishing and almost certainly fisheries crimes.
In comparison, within the context of Indonesia’s legal instrument, as previously explained,
Fisheries Law has sanctions by penalty of fine and/or imprisonment depending on the
category, either offence or crime. Nonetheless, most unlawful acts are considered as crimes
with a minimum of four years imprisonment and a severe fine. This four-year imprisonment
complies with the definition of ‘serious crime’ of the Palermo Convention. Money
Laundering Law also provides the possibility to trace and seize and other relevant measures
to bring before the court any crimes and violations as a predicate offence from marine and
fisheries activities.
The other hurdle to overcome is ununiformed terms introduced in combatting IUU fishing
and transnational organized crimes. In international forums, prominent figure such as
Minister Susi refers to fisheries crimes and other fisheries-related crimes related to IUU
fishing. 675 Meanwhile, when delivering presentation in CCAMLR (Commission on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources), Eve de Coning prefers to use
transnational organized fisheries crime 676 whilst INTERPOL emphasizes the fight against
transnational fisheries crimes in its effort to launch INTERPOL’s Global Enforcement under
Project Scale program.677
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Figure 9: The Connection between IUU Fishing, Fisheries-related Crimes and Crimes
Associated with the Fisheries Sector678
For the purpose of explanation, as depicted in the figure 9, FAO maintains the view that IUU
fishing, fisheries-related crimes and crimes associated with the fisheries sector should have
different classification. Nonetheless, those three are all interlinked. Fisheries-related crimes
are not conceived as IUU fishing but closely linked with the fishing activity and they may not
be part of fishing operation. Some examples of the crimes are tax crimes, money laundering
and fake fishing licences. With regard to crimes associated with the fisheries sector, the
crimes do not have a direct correlation with fishing activity, but they are committed on the
fishing vessels, ‘or during a fishing operation, and using the fishing operation as a cover,
opportunity or means to commit such crimes’. Crimes such as drug trafficking, people
smuggling, and piracy are some instances falling under associated crimes with the fisheries
sector.679 The elucidation of FAO may enlighten the different perception in perceiving any
crimes that take place in the fishing activities or fisheries sector but cannot be classified as
IUU fishing by making simplification into two categories. Nonetheless, it does not limit the
introduction of different interpretation or term as they are not aimed as legal definitions.
678
679
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From the above elaboration, some future challenges can be drawn. Firstly, Indonesia has not
yet provided its consent to be bound by the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the 2012
Cape Town Agreement. Those agreements are of utmost importance in combatting IUU
fishing and its relations to transnational organized crime. This can be understood since
transnationally organized crime practices involving drugs, weapons, and other illicit goods
commonly take place on the high seas.680 Palma acknowledges that flag states can be used to
probe the possible linkage between transnational organized crime and fishing while the goods
resulting from those illegal activities can be traced and forbidden to be exported and
imported.681
Secondly, perceptions, practices, approaches and the domestic legal system vary amongst
states in observing and addressing IUU fishing and fisheries crimes. The division between
schools of thought of fisheries management and crimes in approaching those activities still
exists among countries. It is also worth noting that unregulated fishing for some countries is
not regarded as a crime since fishing in areas or fish stocks for which there are no applicable
conservation or management measures does not constitute a breach of law. Although this is a
fundamental concept, the distinction should not undermine current measures in reviving
depleted fish stocks, combatting crimes occurring along the value chain of fisheries and
addressing unsustainable practices in the global marine ecosystem. In its domestic system,
Norway is inclined to make a separation between IUU fishing and fisheries crimes in terms of
the sanction. On the other hand, Indonesia is in a position to combat both IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes by using administrative and imprisonment sanctions.
Thirdly, even though relevant domestic laws and regulations, particularly fisheries law and
anti-money laundering laws, have complied with the provisions of UNTOC for IUU fishing
to be TOC, there are some loopholes in the law that need to be to be essentially addressed. In
Law Number 45/2009 as the amendment of Law Number 31/2004 concerning Fisheries and
Law Number 32/2014 concerning Ocean Affairs, no definition of IUU fishing is found,
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particularly in Article 1 of said laws.682 Moreover, although elements of fisheries crimes are
also regulated in the Fisheries Law, the connection between fishing and transnational
organized crime is not provided.
Fourthly, a further loophole is the international community has various terms for
overcoming fisheries poaching even though the goal is the same. The most familiar terms
would not be IUU fishing per se, but could refer to transnational organized fisheries crimes,
fisheries related crimes, crimes associated with fisheries sector and fisheries crimes. This
dissimilarity emerges due to the lack of an agreed definition in international legally binding
agreements that could have been referred to as a common starting point. The terms of
transnational organized crime, fisheries-related crimes and fisheries crimes were introduced
as a breakthrough to overcome depleted fishery resources. Those three terms share the same
notion from the fact that fisheries poaching encompasses other transnational crimes.
However, those terms leave the unanswered question of which the most correct term to use.
3.2. Proposed Measures.
3.2.1. Domestic Strides.
From the legal perspective, Indonesia has enacted several laws to combat IUU fishing
including Law Number 31/2004 as amended by Law Number 45/2009 concerning Fisheries.
The Government of Indonesia ratified the Palermo Convention on 15 December 2000 and
adopted Law Number 5/2009 regarding the Ratification of the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime683 along with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children684 and the Protocol against
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air Supplementing the United Nations
682
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Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 685 Nevertheless, the Government of
Indonesia has not established its consent to be bound by the Protocol Against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.686
As elaborated in the above-mentioned challenges, there are several measures to propose.
Firstly, while states attempt to discover the best formula in accommodating the discrepancies
between fisheries management and crimes in view of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, it is
important to highlight that both IUU fishing and fisheries crimes are regarded as having a
connection with other criminal offences and are generally transnational, largely organized,
and can have severe adverse social, economic and environmental impacts both domestically
and internationally. Moreover, fisheries crime is part of IUU fishing. Therefore, IUU fishing
and fisheries crimes should be used altogether in international forums.
Secondly, in responding to the current dynamics, it is necessary for the Indonesian
Government to review and amend the existing legal frameworks on fisheries, particularly
Law Number 45/2009 as the amendment of Law Number 31/200 concerning Fisheries. The
said law should define IUU fishing in the article regulating the definition. It is also possible
to consider providing the definition of fisheries crimes. Another option that can be taken into
account is that MMAF can propose a specific law or regulation concerning IUU fishing as lex
specialis to the Law on Fisheries. In the proposed law or regulation, fisheries crimes that are
transnationally organized should be provisioned.
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Thirdly, in determining the most correct term to use, there is a silver lining to the resolution
of this issue. In February 2016, the UNODC and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) co-organized
an Expert Group Meeting on Fisheries Crime, in Vienna. In this forum, fisheries crime was
defined as a serious offence within the fisheries resource sector that takes place along the
entire food products supply chains and associated value chains, extending to the trade,
ownership structures and financial services sectors. Nevertheless, the ‘serious’ term is not
associated with the definition found in the UNTOC. It is instead meant to have an extensive
impact on the community.687 It seems that the panel of experts has agreed to offer a solution
be agreeing on the explanation of fisheries crimes. Although this is still a working document,
this consensus may pave the way for states as a reference when formulating the possible
legally binding agreement. Nevertheless, this fisheries crimes description needs further
testing from legal perspective as described in Part VII of this thesis.
Fourthly, it is important for the Government of Indonesia to consent to be bound by the 1993
FAO Compliance Agreement. In this Agreement, the control of flag states is imperative in
ensuring their fishing vessels ‘exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control over vessels
flying its flag, including fishing vessels and vessels engaged in the transhipment of fish’688
and avoid ‘the practice of flagging or reflagging fishing vessels as a means of avoiding
compliance with international conservation and management measures for living marine
resources’.689
It should come also to Indonesia’s concern to express its consent to the Cape Town
Agreement of 2012 on the Implementation of the Provisions of the 1993 Protocol relating to
the Torremolinos International Convention for the Safety of Fishing Vessels, 1977 by means
of accession.690 As recognized by Wetbooi, the 2012 Cape Town Agreement can be utilized
to press the fishing vessels to abide by the rules contained in the Agreement taking into
account the growing concern of ‘human trafficking, including severe violation of minimal
working and living conditions, on board fishing vessels’.691 The third international treaty that
is recommended for Indonesia to provide its consent is the ILO Work in Fishing Convention
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Number 188 as this convention can be an instrument to combat IUU fishing and crimes
associated with fisheries sector.
3.2.2. Enacting a Law Similar to, or Incorporating, the Elements of the Lacey Act.
Indonesia needs to consider enacting a regulation similar to the Lacey Act Amendments of
1981. This act was adopted by the US in 1900692 and has been amended several times.693 The
Lacey Act bans, among other things, imports, exports, transport, sale, receipt, acquisition, or
purchase of any fish, wildlife or plants that are taken, possessed, transported or sold in
violation of any law, treaty, regulation of the US or Indian tribal law.694 It is also illegal to
conduct the same measures when this happens in foreign trade and to breach any law or
regulation of any foreign law.695 The basic idea is exercising national jurisdiction on the basis
of the principle of active nationality, through the enactment of laws that will impose
punishment on its nationals if those persons conduct IUU fishing activities, even in the case
that they are on board foreign vessels.696
This Act is considered as a cornerstone of the U.S-based litigation. The objective is: ‘to
protect those species of fish and wildlife whose continued existence is presently threatened
by the gradual drying up of the international market for endangered species, thus reducing the
poaching of any such species in the country where it is found’. When Lacey introduced this
Act at the beginning of the twentieth century, he had a threefold objective in proposing this
Act; (1) to permit the introduction and protection of game, song and wild birds, (2) In the
prevention of ‘unwise introduction of foreign game and birds’, and (3) To complement state
laws for the fortification of game and birds.697
According to Elinor Colbourn, Assistant Chief Environmental Crimes Section of the US
Department of Justice, there are some advantages of the Lacey Act. First, it is considered to
encompass very flexible in terms in its application from administrative penalties to
transgressions to offences and it is automatically applied to new laws. Secondly, it can be
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used to combat illegal and unreported fishing (if there is any requirement for reporting)
undertaken in foreign states where the fisheries products are exported to the U.S. Thirdly, it
can support other countries in applying their laws and regulations by imposing punishment to
the perpetrators importing fish taken illegally from elsewhere, to the US.698 Some countries,
such as Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Solomon Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia have adopted and applied this Lacey Act authorizing them to
govern the importation of fisheries products.699
The U.S Government has employed the Lacey Act in several fisheries cases, such as the
United States v. Lee, et al in 1991, the United States v. Northern Victor Partnership in 1996,
the United State v. McNab, et al in 2003, the United States v. Neptune Fisheries, et al in
2004, the United States v. Pego, et al in 2005, and the most famous case, the United States v.
Bengis, et al in 2004. The Government of the US has paid considerable attention to prosecute
fisheries cases based on the following rationales: (1) Violations in fisheries sector are deemed
to have a massive impact posing a direct peril to marine ecosystems and (2) Violations may
lead to loss of significant benefits to the industry and persons particularly to legal
fisherman.700
On June 14, 2013, the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York
adjudicated the U.S v. Bengis, et al case. The defendants (Arnold Bengis, Jeffrey Noll and
David Bengis) were accused of engaging in the harvesting of illegal South Coast and West
Coast rock lobsters in South Africa to be exported out to the United States. This activity
breached both the U.S and South Africa domestic laws. Arnold Bengis was the Managing
Director and Chairman of Hout Bay Fishing Industries operating in Cape Town, South
Africa. Meanwhile, Jeffry Noll and David Bengis were the presidents of the two U.S-based
companies that imported and sold the fish within the U.S territory on behalf of Hout Bay. The
defendants had allegedly captured and exported the lobsters to the U.S. between 1987-2001.
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The capture and distribution of the lobsters was regulated under the MLRA of South Africa
Law and the Convention on the Conservation of Marine Living Resources. 701
After further investigation, the defendants were tried by both South African and the United
States courts. In 2002, Bengis entered a plea of guilty in violation of MLRA on over-fishing
of lobster off the South and West Coasts. Hout Bay Company paid a specified fine to the
South African Government. Two fishing vessels and contents of a container were also
confiscated. Further, South African authorities, in collaboration with the U.S Government,
investigated and prosecuted the defendant for violating the U.S law. Arnold Bengis and
Jeffrey Noll pleaded guilty to: (i) conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act and to commit
smuggling in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371; and (ii) violations of the Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §
3372 (a)(2)(A) while David Bengis pleaded guilty to conspiracy. It is interesting to note that
the term “fish of wildlife” as provisioned in the Lacey Act is defined to include crustaceans,
such as lobsters.702
The court concluded that the defendants pay US$29 495 800 for violating the U.S law. That
amount of restitution should be reduced by the US$7 049 080 the defendants had already paid
to South Africa. Therefore, in total, the defendants were to pay the amount of US$22 446
720. 703 What can be learned from the Lacey Act, along with those fisheries cases, is the
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction in combatting IUU fishing and the possible
enforcement of various laws such as fisheries and customs regulations can address crime on
fisheries.704
MMAF pays close attention to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing and fisheries crimes.
Under the administration of the 7th President Joko Widodo, and the leadership of Minister of
Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, the vision on maritime affairs will come to the
fore in the years to come. The spirit to preserve and conserve living marine resources should
be complemented with stringent measures in any aspects including legal frameworks. One
good option is either enacting a law like the Lacey Act or incorporating the elements of the
Act into the existing laws and regulations such as fisheries law and other environment-related
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laws. The Department of Justice of the U.S has participated in and coordinated speaking
engagements in some countries such as Indonesia, China, Belgium, Switzerland, Vietnam,
Malaysia, and the United Kingdom, to disseminate the Lacey Act.705 The engagement of the
U.S Government can be a good opportunity to learn more about the application of the Act
including the challenges that may occur during its implementation.
It is necessary to undertake further research concerning the possible application or adoption
of the elements of the Lacey Act in the domestic legal system particularly with regard to the
extraterritorial jurisdiction principle. Guidance with regard to such possible adoption is set
out in Article 2 of the Money Laundering Law. This provision stipulates that the proceeds of
crimes are the assets acquired from the criminal acts of, among others, trafficking in persons,
terrorism, embezzlement, fraud, environmental crimes, crimes in marine and fishery or the
other crimes with the punishment of four years or more in prison which are committed inside
or outside the territory of the Republic of Indonesia and such criminal acts are considered as
crimes according to the Indonesian Law.706Article 2 is further strengthened by Article 10
stating that anyone who is in or outside the territory of Indonesia participating to commit
attempts, assistances, or conspiracy to conduct the criminal act of Money Laundering shall be
subject to be sentenced with equal sentence as set forth in Articles 3, 4, and 5.707
In those two articles, a further step is taken in addressing money laundering by punishing
Indonesian nationals when the crime is committed inside or outside the country. The only
deficiency is the jurisdiction to impose sanctions on Indonesian nationals in violations of the
laws and regulations of foreign countries as well as international treaties. The same measure,
taken by Money Laundering Law, can be applied to address IUU fishing and fisheries crimes
with a possible extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction. If Indonesia has this type of Act, it
would not only secure its natural resources but also assume its role in keeping environmental
exploitation at a sustainable level.
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4. Conclusion.
Indonesia has included provisions on natural resources in the constitution. The 1945
Constitution has provided for the role of the state and the benefit to the Indonesian people
with regard to natural resources arrangements. Under the Constitution, there are several main
laws concerning IUU fishing and Fisheries Crimes such as Law No. 45/2009 on Fisheries,
Law No. 32/2014 on Ocean Affairs and Law No. 8/2010 on Countermeasures and
Eradication of Money Laundering. More technical aspects such as fishing vessel registration
and licensing and other aspects are regulated under ministerial regulations, ministerial
decrees, governmental regulations and director general decrees.
One of the ultimate objectives of Fisheries Law is to overcome the problems of IUU fishing.
In this Law, criminal acts consist of crime and offence. The punishment for persons
committing crimes is higher than that under the category of offence. The minimum
punishment for criminal acts is four years while for offence the maximum is two years. Some
provisions to curb IUU fishing are found in this law. Meanwhile, Law Number 32/2014 does
not explicitly cover issues of IUU fishing and TOFC. After ratifying the Palermo Convention,
Indonesian authorities agreed to adopt Money Laundering Law Number 8/2010. The
connection between criminal acts in marine and fisheries and predicate offences is provided
in this law. An independent institution, PPATK, was established by the Indonesian
Government to prevent and eliminate the crime of money laundering
In the Fisheries Law, there is a mandate to establish fishery courts under Article 71(1)(2) of
Fisheries Law in an effort to have an effective prosecution. There were 10 (ten) fishery courts
across the country as of 21 October 2014. The composition of those tribunals comprises three
judges. The courts face difficulty when handling fisheries cases along with other related cases
in its sphere. This complex problem can simply be resolved by amending fisheries law. The
possible option to resolving the problem is either in rendering the authority to adjudicate
fisheries crimes to the ordinary court or in strengthening the existing fishery courts with the
right to process non-fisheries crimes in their internal judicial system.
From the legal aspect, there persist some loopholes regarding IUU fishing and its connection
with transnationally organized fisheries crime:
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1. The relevant domestic laws and regulations under MMAF do not clearly address
transnational criminal activities in fisheries. Fisheries law also does not define IUU fishing
nor fisheries crimes.
2. With regard to fishery courts’ duties, including related-crime aspects of fisheries crime
will make it difficult for the courts in adjudicating the crimes.
3. Furthermore, within the international community, the opinion of perceiving and imposing
violations on fisheries regulation differs. Some countries view them as criminals while
others treat them under civil law.
4. Moreover, various terms in addressing fisheries poaching such as TOFC, fisheries-related
crime and fisheries crime as the legal definition of fisheries crime are not provided in the
international legally binding instruments.
5. Indonesia is not a state party to the FAO Compliance Agreement and the Cape Town
Agreement.
Indonesia can draw some lessons from legal instruments of the U.S and South Africa. The
U.S Government has evoked the Lacey Act in several cases including the notable Bengis
Case. The defendants could be prosecuted because of collaboration between the U.S and
South African Governments. Authorities in South Africa have a strong commitment not only
to prosecute the defendants based on its domestic regulations but also to cooperate with the
U.S Government to bring the perpetrators before the U.S court. This Act makes the
implementation of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the application of the customs regulation in
combatting fisheries crimes possible. As inspired by the Lacey Act, some countries have
adopted this kind sort of Act into their domestic legal system.
Several proposals can be considered to combat IUU fishing and transnationally organized
fisheries crimes within the scope of the domestic legal framework, as follows:
1. IUU fishing and fisheries crimes should be discussed together in international forums;
2. It is necessary to review and amend the existing legal frameworks on fisheries, particularly
Law Number 45/2009 concerning Fisheries. The said law should define IUU fishing. It is
also possible to consider providing its connection with TOC.
3. Indonesia should provide its consent to be bound by the 1993 FAO Compliance
Agreement, the 2012 Cape Town Agreement and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention
Number 188.
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4. Indonesia should consider enacting a regulation similar to or incorporating the elements of
the Lacey Act. The objective is to protect those species of fish and wildlife whose
continued existence is presently threatened by gradual drying up of the international
market for endangered species, thus reducing the poaching of any such species in the
country from which it emanates. Lessons learned from the Lacey Act, are extraterritorial
jurisdiction and the possible enforcement of other laws such as customs regulations to
address crime in fisheries.
Further research is necessary on the possible application or adoption of the elements of the
Lacey Act in the domestic legal system, particularly regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction
principle. There is evidence that can be produced for that possible adoption as set out in the
Money Laundering Law. In the relevant articles, Indonesia’s authorities punish its nationals
when money laundering is committed inside or outside the country. The only deficiency is
the jurisdiction to impose sanctions when violating domestic laws and regulations of foreign
countries and international treaties.
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PART VI
THE EXAMINATION OF IUU FISHING AND FISHERIES CRIMES THROUGH THE
LENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
1. Introduction
From the last two parts, it can be drawn that legal and policy loopholes exist at the domestic
plane. This part continues to deliver a deeper understanding on the identified problems of
IUU fishing and fisheries crimes from the view of environmental law approach. At the outset,
in order to secure a comprehensive overview of the issue, this part elaborates on the larger
picture of environmental law by encompassing the discussion from the historical perspective
and the profile of environmental law followed by the transnational nature of crimes
committed on the environment. The next section examines IUU fishing and fisheries crimes
from the view of environmental law. In the subsection of this topic, it presents a marine
environment overview to provide a general understanding that this thesis focuses on marinerelated affairs, not on a broad scope of the environment.
It is worth noting that the basic understanding on the nexus between IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes should be delivered in this part to shed some light regarding the distinction
and the interplay between the two concepts. After taking into consideration the previous
discussion, the subsequent discussion of this part is devoted to the relationship between the
law of the marine environment, fisheries crimes and UNTOC.
2.

Environmental Law.

2.1. The History of Environmental Law.
It is widely acknowledged that the environmental challenges our planet is currently facing
need integrated and comprehensive solutions. 708 To materialize these solutions, countries
must play a critical role in preserving the Earth from environmental degradation. In this
sense, countries should go hand-in-hand in addressing the environmental problems due to
their transnational character. Climate change, pollution of marine ecosystems, biodiversity
loss and depletion of fish stocks are actual examples of environmental problems that various
countries across the globe have been experiencing transnationally.
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The conclusion of treaties and other international agreements along with the establishment of
regional and international institutions over the next few decades mark the adoption of new
standards on the protection and promotion of human rights principles and environmental
conservation. Non-Government Organizations and corporations have been identified as the
most active proponents709 in endorsing both subjects. This development then influences the
emergence of legally binding instruments on domestic and international stages. Even though
globalization gives rise to some adverse effects such as pollution, it can also be asserted that
it is a significant factor in raising awareness concerning environmental issues710 inasmuch as
information dissemination on climate change and other environmental problems would
become easier to access.
From the historical outlook, environmental law has been envisaged as an important subject
worldwide since the last decade of the 20th century. 711 Nonetheless, in the book titled
Principles of International Environmental Law, the authors introduce that international
communities began to recognize the transboundary ramifications of environmental activities
affecting areas beyond national jurisdiction in the late nineteenth century. Furthermore, in the
1930s, the Trail Smelter case concerning air pollution was adjudicated in the arbitral tribunal
as an acknowledgment to border-crossing consequences.712 The International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution by the Sea by Oil was initiated in the 1950s and came into force
on 26 July 1958.713 A further step was taken concerning pollution when like-minded states
discussed and consented to be bound by the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage in 1969.714 The adoption of this Convention validates that sufficient
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financial reparation should be granted to persons suffering from oil pollution damage as a
result of a maritime accident encompassing ships carrying oil.715
Despite the fact that some signs of progress had been made prior to 1970 on the development
of international environmental law, the concept of sovereignty in terms of political and legal
control over the natural resources by states was still considered dominant, the same control
applies over their people, trades and other activities within their jurisdiction.716 It was in 1996
that ICJ on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons admitted that ‘the
environment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a
catastrophe for the environment.’ 717 This recognition is imperative with regard to the
presence of environmental concern over the dangerous risk of nuclear weapons. The advisory
opinion also constitutes the acknowledgment of general international environmental law as
stated in the following report:
The existence of general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
and control respect the environment of other states or areas beyond national control is now part
of the corpus of international law relating to the environment. 718

This statement contributes to the legal development of environmental law particularly in its
complexity and technical aspect. It also leads to the integration into other areas such as
intellectual property, human rights, investment, trade and armed conflict laws. 719 In
intellectual property rights, one instance that can be discerned is the nexus between the
technology of environment and patent law, trademarks, property rights in biodiversity and
international protection of intellectual property.720
Further essential reference by virtue of international environmental law evolution is the
Stockholm Declaration agreed by delegations attending the UN Conference on the Human
Environment held 05-16 June 1972 in Stockholm, Sweden. This declaration consists of 26
to all seagoing vessels carrying oil in bulk as cargo, but only ships carrying more than 2,000 tons of oil are
required to maintain insurance in respect of oil pollution damage. This convention does not apply to warships or
other vessels owned or operated by a State and used for the time being for Government non-commercial service.
715
International Maritime Organization, International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(19 July 2017) <http://www.imo.org/en/About/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-conventionon-civil-liability-for-oil-pollution-damage-(clc).aspx>.
716
Ved P. Nanda and George (Rock) Pring, International Environmental Law and Policy for the 21st Century,
(Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) 7.
717
Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, para 29.
718
Ibid.
719
Sands et al, Principles of International Environmental Law, above n 712, 4.
720
Michael A. Gollin, ‘Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection’ (1991) 4 Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology 210-217.

195

principles chiefly dealing with natural resources conservation, pollution, economic and social
development, environmental degradation, demographic policies, application of scientific
technology in controlling environmental problems, education on environmental issues,
limited sovereignty, international cooperation and elimination and destruction of nuclear
weapons and all other means of mass destruction. Another commitment resulting from the
Conference was Action Plans comprising 109 recommendations. 721 Although it is a nonlegally binding instrument, the Declaration has contributed to the progress of international
environmental law. Particular attention is paid to Principle 21 which is based on the Charter
of the United Nations and the principles of international law concerning states’ responsibility.
In this principle, it is ‘to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.722 The responsibilities that states should bear in Principle 21 are based on the
Trail Smelter arbitration conceived as ‘a milestone for further development of transboundary
environmental protection.’723 Principle 21 offers the balance between a state’s sovereignty
and commitment to preserving and protecting the environment.
In the development of international environmental law, its grouping is interesting in the sense
that scholars may have divergent points of view in classifying its evolution. As introduced by
Phillipe Sands, the commencement of the Stockholm Declaration until the conclusion of the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) is categorised as
the third period of modern international law. The role of the UN in this period was critical in
endorsing and coordinating the cooperation on environmental endeavours internationally.
Globally, particular products were prohibited for the first time in this period. Furthermore, the
first period was identified when fisheries agreements were agreed bilaterally in the nineteenth
century and concluded with the establishment of new international organizations in 1945.
Meanwhile, the second period commenced when the United Nations was created and
continued until the conclusion of the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.724
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Moreover, the inauguration of the international agenda for sustainable development was
marked by the conclusion of UNCED held at Rio in 1992. This conference also led to the
adoption of several prominent international agreements and plans of action.725 The 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development constitutes a significant leap in achieving a
more sustainable world order. As complementary to other measures in strengthening the
notion of sustainable development, the Rio Declaration offers an ‘ideal perspective’ as it
encompasses, among other things, ‘definitions, paradigmatic descriptions, guidelines, action
frameworks and ethical interpretations of the concept.’726
The 1992 Rio Declaration is conceived as the fourth era established through the integration of
environmental issues from the perspectives of international law and policy into all aspects of
human activities.727 The states worked together to formulate a more specific TEC from the
perspective of a legally binding approach. The period between the Rio Conference and the
ensuing years is determined as a crucial transformative development from the modern era
into the post-modern period.728 The compliance with international obligations has resulted in
the escalation of international jurisprudence.729
The indicators set for determining the range of time can be challenging as Phillipe Sands
explains further the 4 (four) ways to trace the progress of the issue through observing the
trends in general and the topics. These are firstly, international environmental law is inclined
to develop as a response to incidents and has scientific evidence basis, rather than as
‘anticipatory legal frameworks’ to environmental degradation. Secondly is the imperative
role of science and technology development as a catalyst to the establishment of new norms
of law. Thirdly, the interplay amongst governments, non-state actors and international
institutions have contributed to the development of international environmental law rules and
principles. Fourthly, it is more common lately – during the period 1990s to 2000s – for
international tribunals to adjudicate environmental cases contributing to the ‘definition and
application of the subject’. 730 Since Sands’ overview on clustering the time period was
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written in 2003, the possible subsequent period is open to discussion particularly with the
current progress in international environmental law.
Another approach taken by Peter Sand is placing the historical evolution of international
environmental law into three major phases, those are, the traditional, the formative modern
and the post-modern. The traditional period is divided into prior to and post 1945, while the
second modern period started from the 1972 Stockholm Declaration to the 1992 UNCED in
Rio de Janeiro. The development after the Rio Conference is part of the post-modern era.731
Meanwhile, Edith Brown Weiss is of the view that the evolution of international
environmental law should be divided into three different periods: (1900 – 1972), (1972 –
1992) and (1992 – 2012). The first period is called ‘early glimmers’. The second is referred to
as ‘development of basic framework’, and the third is categorized as ‘maturation and
linkage’. Most notable progress is evident during the second phase in which the 1972
Stockholm Conference was conceived as the initial multilateral conference focusing on
environmental issues.732 Therefore, this second phase lays down a fundamental framework
for developing environmental law. Despite some discrepancies, both evolutions introduced by
Sand and Weiss share the same notion that the 1972 United Nations Stockholm Conference
and its Principle 21 play a critical role in promoting further environmental concerns in
international society through multilateral agreements.
International environmental law has developed further since the Rio Declaration.
International adjudications on the subject constitute further important steps in determining the
legal aspects of the issue. Some principles of environmental law have been formalized
internationally in the UN system such as through the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) having its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya. This first international
intergovernmental organization had the mandate to focus on the issues of environmental
protection and was created as ‘a subsidiary body by the General Assembly in 1972’, after the
conclusion of the Stockholm Declaration.733 This organization was not intended to be another
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UN specialized body, and therefore cannot enjoy the UN organization status such as FAO or
UNODC.734
Nevertheless, in the UNEP, the Division of Environmental Law and Conventions (DELC) has
been established to contribute to the development and application of environmental law
through exercising its daily duties or by facilitating multilateral meetings aimed at developing
‘multilateral environmental agreements, principles and guidelines’ to address the global
environmental crisis.735 This UN body has been regarded as the most active organization in
developing multilateral agreements and endorsing the implementation as well as undertaking
coordination amongst related treaty secretariats and on the meetings of state parties. It is
expected that UNEP should not act on itself, rather it should develop and coordinate
environmental aspects of the programs executed by the other UN bodies.736 Nevertheless, the
work of UNEP also encourages new cooperation and ‘mind-sets within civil society and the
private sector’.737
2.2. International Environmental Law Profile: Legally Binding or Non-Compliance?
In general acceptance, the laws that govern international society are international laws.
International law which is also called public international law, by definition, is ‘the body of
rules legally binding on states and other subjects of international law in their relations with
each other’.738 In accordance with the traditional school of thought, the consent to be bound
rendered by sovereign states constitutes the legitimacy for international law to prevail.739
Without their consent, in principle countries are not bound by any international treaties. The
discussion on the character of international law can be drawn once it is compared to laws at
the domestic level. Although international law does not introduce international police or army
as a law enforcer and has the challenging tasks of imposing the sanctions against any breach,
the binding nature is not derived from the presence of jail, police and the court but the basis is
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the consent of states either expressly or implied and the interest of the states.740 Domestic and
international laws are not an ‘apples-with-apples’ comparison in the sense of their
enforcement inasmuch as domestic society and the international community have dissimilar
members. The former comprises individuals while the latter consists of sovereign states.
In reality, the treaties agreed upon by the state parties on environmental issues are not always
legally binding. The discussion on the legal nature of international environmental law comes
to the fore as on the one hand, the legal instrument should be legally binding but on the other
hand environmental issues do not receive a fitting legal acknowledgment from the
international community. This intersection creates an interesting development in international
law. It is commonly understood that the general practice of environmental agreements is still
on a voluntary basis to comply with the obligations. In its development, it has tended to
‘develop non-compliance mechanism designed to secure compliance by the parties with the
terms of a treaty or decisions of the Conference of the Parties (COP)’.741 This tendency shows
that the international community acknowledges the fact that countries continue to be reluctant
to consent to be bound by international treaties on environmental issues. For those countries
that are inclined to be part of voluntary decisions or agreements, environmental issues
seemingly are less important than ‘high profiles issues’ such as politics or security matters.
It can also be observed that some countries are averse to receiving serious consequences
when breaching environmental decisions or agreements bilaterally or multilaterally. In that
sense, the objective of treaties accommodating a non-compliance approach is to assist state
parties in conforming to their obligations rather than to find their disobedience and render
punishment. As explained in the UNEP Training manual on International Environmental
Law:
Non-compliance procedures are best understood as a form of dispute avoidance or alternative
dispute resolution, in the sense that a resort to binding third-party procedures is avoided. The
treaty parties will instead seek to obtain compliance through voluntary means and in the process
reinforce the stability of the regime as a whole. 742

In this regard, the highest priority for encompassing the non-compliance approach is to seek
member countries’ best measures to follow and apply the decisions that have been agreed
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together with the other countries, particularly in their domestic system including in both legal
and policy frameworks.
It is interesting to assert that in environmental law, breaching of environmental agreements or
decisions is not legally sanctioned. International institutions which are mandated as
supervisory bodies to environmental treaties function to oversee the compliance through
consultation and practical support to replace punishment measures which are usually avoided
by states. The sufficient available information holds a pivotal role in determining the success
of the supervision of the application and operation of the agreements. 743 One important
instance that can be referred to in terms of non-compliance mechanism is the 1987 Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (the Montreal Protocol). This protocol
is regarded as one of the most successful treaties to address global environmental
problems.744 As stated in the preamble, it is determined to:
…protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary measures to control equitably total global
emissions of substances that deplete it, with the ultimate objective of their elimination on the
basis of developments in scientific knowledge, taking into account technical and economic
considerations and bearing in mind the developmental needs of developing countries. 745

This Montreal Protocol was adopted on 16 September 1987 and entered into force on 1
January 1989. The state parties have amended the protocol six times, among other aims, to
control new chemicals and the establishment of a financial instrument paving the way for the
developing countries to conform.746 Non-compliance provision is regulated under Article 8
which reads ‘The Parties, at their first meeting, shall consider and approve procedures and
institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol
and for treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance’.747
The non-compliance instrument adopted in the Montreal Protocol can be comprehended as
one of the key points in having a successful environmental treaty in its negotiation and
743
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implementation as it offers a more flexible way for countries to accommodate their national
interest. The main idea of the approach is to render assistance for non-compliant member
countries to return to compliance and to jointly reach the main objectives. This “soft law”
mechanism relies heavily on strong awareness from countries to eventually address common
problems. Raising awareness itself is an important and challenging task as it would influence
and “provoke” the states to be part of negotiations and then to ratify the agreement with the
final goal of devoting their full cooperation and commitment in applying the provisions of the
agreement.
2.3. Transnational Environmental Crimes.
In this subparagraph, the discussion focuses mostly on environmental crimes that are
transnationally organized. Two interesting issues that can be elaborated on further in this
respect are environmental crimes and transnational environmental crimes. This separation
arises as environmental crimes are not necessarily transnational, crossing national boundaries
in their operation. This sort of crime employs a wide range of particular offences in which the
crimes or misdemeanours committed encompass trade in environmental goods or harming the
environment in general within the domestic scope. For instance, deforestation can take place
continuously in some provinces of Indonesia such as Central Kalimantan, Jambi, West
Kalimantan and Riau 748 without involving the non-Indonesian perpetrators. The timbers
chopped down from illegal activity may be perpetrated and distributed for the domestic
market only because of restrictions on export and import regulations imposed on illegal
logging by several countries.
Another example in which environmental crimes are not always transnational is the
distinction between human smuggling and human trafficking. As shown in the following
comparison, there exist three major differences in terms of transnationality, purpose, consent
and victimization between the two.749
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Table 4: Human Smuggling vs. Human Trafficking
Criteria
Transnationality
Purpose
Consent
Victimization

Human Smuggling
Required
Transportation
Voluntary
Country/Border

Human Trafficking
Not Required
Exploitation
Involuntary
Person

For the first comparison, while people smuggling cases require the presence of
transnationality, the transnational prerequisite is not compulsory for human trafficking cases.
Trafficking may take place in different places within a country and the victims may not be
removed to another country. Likewise, it is called smuggling, if the actions are transnational.
Further, the purposes are also distinct between human trafficking and people smuggling. For
the former, the aim is to transport from one to another place while for the latter the humans,
as victims, are subject to exploitation. Additionally, people movement is made possible with
their consent whilst the traffickers do not need the consent of the victims to be given.
Nevertheless, apart from the transnational character discrepancy of the two crimes, crossborder crimes present a significant economic loss in the world.
Financial losses resulting from environmental crime under various sectors committed
transnationally are estimated to be US$ 91-259 billion. This amount is twice that of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) given globally. The total of this amount comes from societal
loss suffered since ‘the commercial activity takes place in a parallel criminal illegitimate
economy’.750 It is recorded that during the past decade, environmental crimes have risen by
about 5 – 7 %, or a twofold increase compared to the rate of world GDP growth.751 Based on
the 2017 report of Transnational Crime in the Developing World revealed by Global
Financial Integrity, the revenues resulted from the 11 following environmental crimes
reaching the total of US$1.6 trillion to US$2.2 trillion per annum generated from corruption,
finance violence and other crimes. The following table also proves that some environmental
crimes such as IUU fishing, illegal logging and illegal wildlife trade are regarded as
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transnational crimes in operation. The estimated retail value of transnational crimes is
enormous as illustrated as follows:752
Table 5: The Retail Value of Transnational Crime
No

Transnational Crime Estimated

Annual Value (US$)

1

Counterfeiting

$923 billion to $1.13 trillion

2

Drug Trafficking

$426 billion to $652 billion

3

Human Trafficking

$150.2 billion

4

Illegal Logging

$52 billion to $157 billion

5

IUU Fishing

$15.5 billion to $36.4 billion

6

Illegal Mining

$12 billion to $48 billion

7

Crude Oil Theft

$5.2 billion to $11.9 billion

8

Illegal Wildlife Trade

$5 billion to $23 billion

9

Small Arms and Light Weapons Trafficking

$1.7 billion to $3.5 billion

10

Trafficking in Cultural Property

$1.2 billion to $1.6 billion

11

Organ Trafficking

$840 million to $1.7 billion

Total

$1.6 trillion to $2.2 trillion

It can be observed from the table that counterfeiting and organ trafficking assume the highest
and lowest positions accounting for $923 billion to $1.13 trillion and $840 million to $1.7
billion, respectively. A significant gap is shown between drug trafficking and human
trafficking. IUU fishing takes the fifth position amounting to $15.5 billion to $36.4 billion,
one level down from illegal logging. This report notes that this estimate does not cover
unregulated fishing nor any IUU fishing in inland fishing. The estimated percentage of illegal
and unreported fishing represents approximately 14 to 33 per cent of the global marine
capture value. Corporations operating IUU fishing are exposed as being intertwined with
other transnational crimes. 753 The exclusion of unregulated fishing as an estimated value
should be questioned as this table presents three elements of IUU fishing. This table also
poses a challenge regarding the value of fisheries crimes. If it is referred to as a working
document of the UNODC/WWF Fisheries Crime Expert Group Meeting,754 fisheries crimes
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losses would be enormous as the crimes would encompass other crimes such as human
trafficking, people smuggling and other relevant transgressions.
In the light of the definition of environmental crimes, there is a lack of agreed legal reference
adopted by the international community. The Environmental Investigation Agency has
generally defined environmental crimes as ‘illegal acts which directly harm the environment.'
These sort of crimes encompass IUU fishing, illegal trade in harmful waste, illicit logging
and its related trade in stolen timber, illicit trade in wildlife and smuggling of ozone-depleting
substances (ODS). 755 The inclusion of IUU fishing as environmental crimes can be
challenging as unreported and unregulated will not fall under crime activities if there is no
obligation to report and no regulation in place. 756 Meanwhile, according to the joint
assessment between UNEP and INTERPOL, the crime activities in the environment are
commonly understood as ‘a collective term to describe illegal activities harming the
environment and aimed at benefitting individuals or groups or companies from the
exploitation of, damage to, trade or theft of natural resources, including serious crimes and
transnational organized crimes’.757 From the definition stressed in the joint assessment, it can
be learned that the general view is presented at the outset and then narrowed into a more
specific explanation at the end. As such, non-transnational environmental crimes which occur
at the domestic level can fall under this definition of the general term. With regard to the
transnationally organized crimes, the definition has definitely encompassed this transnational
issue as part of environmental delinquencies along with the serious crimes.
The core notion of transnational crimes is the activities violating the criminal law that are
transboundary in character encompassing different states. This breach is not the problem of a
single country as it embraces numerous countries where the crimes occur involving a broad
range of various sectors. One of the critical factors is international coordination and
cooperation in addressing the problem. As awareness arises amongst countries on the need to
overcome environmental degradation, the international mechanisms for legal collaboration
amongst countries have increased significantly in the first ten years of the 21st century. This
decade is considered as an important development for multilateral legal collaboration to fight
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against Transnational Environmental Crime (TEC). Prior to this century, the last decade of
the 20th century is regarded as a landmark in globalizing environmental law through the UN
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio in 1992 which set the agenda for
sustainable development, 758 the adoption of the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 759 and the Convention on Biological
Diversity.760 International institutions playing a pivotal role in transforming environmental
crime into global concerns through their work and decisions, are amongst others, the
UNODC, the United Nations Commissions on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
(CCPCJ), the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UN Security Council, the
UN General Assembly, the World Customs Organization,761 INTERPOL and UNEP.
With regard to the application of TEC, an interesting notion is introduced by Prof. Greg Rose.
He points out that TEC is a crime in violation of law in the domestic sense, rather than at an
international level. TEC is a different concept with sole non-compliance. The breaches of any
law are not constituted to be criminal and punishable when they are not imposed by criminal
laws, 762 and vice versa. Hence, it depends on the state whether its domestic law system
includes the violations of environmental regulations as crimes. Nevertheless, this area of
interest is a growing concern over legality and criminality rather than a mere aspect of noncompliance and environment preservation.763
In respect to transnational concern, it is evident that environmental crime crossing borders
will not come into the sense of criminality without the intention and accomplishment of the
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persons committing the crime. The perpetrator may consist of a single poacher to ‘complex
multi-layered transactions across multiple jurisdictions by organized criminal syndicates’.764
In this context, the number of persons involved is in general terms distinguished from the
definition as prescribed in Annex I of UNTOC concerning organized criminal groups.765 In
practice, the classification made by Gregory Rose may ensue since it is not necessary for the
involvement of three or more persons in a structured group to undertake transnational
environmental crimes. However, criminals would need a network and therefore shall be more
than one individual in committing an organized crime as they cannot design the plan and
execute it without any assistance from or intervention with the others.
The question regarding the minimum number of persons as three or more to be classified as a
criminally organized group, as set in the Palermo Convention, can be an interesting subject
for further discussion. According to the travaux préparatoires of the Palermo Convention, the
number of persons necessary to be involved and identified as ‘transnational organized crime’
differed amongst delegations during the negotiations. Some delegations supported the
minimum of three persons, however other delegations such as from Azerbaijan was of the
view to have a minimum two persons. The other countries also proposed omitting the
minimum number of persons and made a general classification to only a ‘group’.766 Finally, it
was a political decision reached by delegations attending the conference through consensus to
determine the appropriate number of persons required to fall under the definition of an
organized criminal group. Andreas Schloenhardt holds the view that the definition in Article
2(a) pays particular attention to ‘sophisticated and large-scale criminal organizations’,767 so
the minimum number of three is agreed to be an extensive criminal group under the Palermo
Convention.
Furthermore, the following figure 10 illustrates the causes and impacts of major
environmental crimes including the losses suffered.
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Figure 10: Major Environmental Crimes, Drives and Impacts768
It can be observed from the above figure that the most significant losses occur in illegal
logging and trade accounting for a maximum US$152 billion and minimum US$50.7 billion
while trade and dumping of hazardous waste assumes the lowest position of US$10-12 billion
per annum. IUU fishing and wildlife poaching and trafficking share the same losses as the
maximum loss, but they differ in their minimum loss. The illegal extraction and trade in
minerals suffer the second significant annual loss accounting for US$12-48 billion. It is
interesting to note that the above intersection shows that illegal exploitation and trade in oil
768
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would potentially become more prevalent in the years to come. It has been identified that
there exist seven causes of environmental crime, namely; corruption, lack of legislation, lack
of enforcement, mafias, corporate crime, conflict and increasing demands. The occurrence of
those drivers may take place in a local, national, regional and international combination but
for the lack of legislation which occurs only nationally. Amongst these chief impacts, IUU
fishing assumes third position for the minimum and maximum economic loss. Three
identified problems at stake are fish stocks, revenue loss for fishermen and state, as well as
the threatened lives of targeted species such as sharks, tuna and toothfish.
In figure 10, it is apparent that fisheries crimes are not counted as main environmental
crimes. There can be some rationales for the absence of fisheries crimes such as possibly the
inclusion of fisheries crimes in IUU fishing under the term illegal fishing769 and the difficulty
in calculating the financial loss for this type of crime. In this respect, in order to discern the
apparent position of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes in environmental crimes, the following
section discusses IUU fishing and fisheries crimes from the perspective of environmental
law. This section also covers the interplay between IUU fishing and fisheries crimes in a
more detailed fashion.
3.

Environmental Law Perspective on IUU Fishing and Fisheries Crimes.

3.1. Marine Environment.
The protection of the marine environment has been an essential issue amongst scholars
having concern over the general topic of environment. The marine environment in common
place meaning encompasses the whole ocean. 770 The concern can be understood as humans
depend heavily on the ocean. In accordance with the first global integrated assessment,
seven-tenths of the planet are covered by the ocean. On average, the ocean is 4,000 meters
deep comprising 1.3 billion cubic kilometres of water. In total, with approximately 7 billion
people living on the earth, this means that one-fifth of a cubic kilometre of the ocean is
occupied by each one of us. This portion also then produces 50% of the oxygen production
annually for human beings to breathe and the total amount of fish and seafood that humans
consume. This allocated portion of one fifth also suffers from marine litter, oil pollution, and
waste from industry. It is projected by the year 2050, the population will increase to 10
769
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billion people occupying the Earth leading to the shrinking of each human’s portion to oneeighth of a cubic kilometre. 771 This prediction sends a strong and clear warning that the
ocean will face a difficult task accommodating the needs of humans, animals and other living
creatures while at the same time experiencing environmental degradation. In that sense, it is
the duty of humankind to conserve and manage the ocean in a sustainable manner for the
generations to come through any ways possible including legal frameworks.
The main international legal framework regulating the marine environment should be referred
to LOSC. As the Constitution for the Ocean, it encompasses constitutional nature perceived
as the primary reference to the entire laws related to the sea and is superior to any other
relevant conventions on marine affairs.772 More specifically, LOSC provides a broad range of
mechanisms for marine environmental protection. The related provisions can be discovered in
Part XII dealing with the protection and preservation of the marine environment.
Furthermore, the articles concerning the conservation of marine living resources are regulated
in the other parts of the Convention, particularly in Part V regarding the Exclusive Economic
Zone and Part VII governing High Seas.773
Within the general ambit of the marine environment, LOSC has governed the issue into two
different legal aspects being marine environment protection and marine living resources
conservation.774 In Part XII, it is the obligation of states to protect and preserve the marine
environment.775 This obligation has been viewed as part of international custom taking into
account the significant number of state parties of LOSC and the acknowledgment of marine
environment protection in the numerous agreements. 776 In the subsequent article, LOSC
provides states with the sovereign rights over their natural resources to be exploited with due
consideration of their environmental policies and duty in protecting and preserving the
marine environment.777
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The sovereign right of states in this article can be referred to the sovereign right as stated in
the Preamble to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter: ‘in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
Principles of international law’.778 Furthermore, from this Part XII, it can be observed that
obligation is the highest priority, prior to the right to explore. As such, states are required to
comply with the obligation before securing their rights. The nexus between the obligation in
Article 192 and the sovereign right provisioned in Article 193 was integrated into Principle
21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.779
With regard to the conservation of marine living resources, two fundamental approaches as
the basis of identified legal aspect are the approach to zonal management and the approach to
specific species. Tanaka discloses further that each jurisdictional regime follows the
distinctive rules of the marine living resources conservation governed under the former
approach while in accordance with the latter approach, the conservation efforts are based on
the category of each marine species.780 Therefore, in the LOSC, some specific articles can be
seen to conserve and develop the fish stocks shared within the EEZ of two or more coastal
states, 781 straddling fish stocks in the EEZ, area beyond and adjacent to it,782 species that
migrate widely,783 marine mammals,784 anadromous stocks785 and catadromous species786 as
well as sedentary species.787
Nevertheless, those two approaches are conceived to be inadequate in responding and
addressing marine living issues 788 due to lesser concern on the environment once the
delegations drafted and negotiated the LOSC.789 In actual fact, it can be understood, as at the
time of negotiations state parties of LOSC negotiated draft texts based on the best scientific
evidence and the most updated circumstance at the time of negotiations. With the
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advancement of methodology and technology, the degradation of the marine environment has
become more apparent and threatening. As such, it is the duty of state parties of LOSC to
work conjointly in developing the most suitable mechanism in addressing marine
environmental challenges in particular marine living resources.
3.2. IUU Fishing and Fisheries Crimes under Domestic Environmental Law.
In the domestic legal platform, the Government of Indonesia stipulates Law number 32/2009
concerning the Protection and Management of Environment.790 This law sets the objectives,
among others: to ensure the continuity of humankind life and the preservation of ecosystem
as well as to realize the sustainable goals.791 Unfortunately, this law does not cover specific
provisions on fishery and far from addressing its surrounding problems such as illegal fishing
and its related crimes. It can be understood from two perspectives:
1. This law focuses on the environmental aspect as the environment is defined as “the
surroundings or conditions in which a person, animal, plant lives or operates;792
2. Fishery has its own legal mechanism under the Law number 45/2009 on Fisheries.
Nevertheless, albeit now much, this environmental law regulates marine ecosystem as the
environment of fish such as marine pollution,793 conservation on coastal and ocean794 and
wastewater discharge to the ocean. 795 A more specific regulation on marine ecosystem
protection is provisioned in Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Law Number 32/2014 on Ocean
Affairs. Another related legal instrument is Government Regulation Number 21/2010
concerning the Protection of Maritime Environment.796 This regulation focuses only on the
prevention and mitigation of maritime pollution from shipping activities,797 leaving pollution
from fishing vessel unregulated. Hence, it is recommended to provide a legal mechanism to
regulate the pollution discharged from fishing vessels. The strategic policy that MMAF can
play is by establishing the rule for fishing vessels and other activities related to fisheries
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including fish processing unit to ensure that their activities such as oil discharge, toxic liquid,
sewage, garbage and gas omission to water and air do not harm marine environment as
prerequisite to apply SIPI (license for fishing), SIUP (Fisheries Business License) and SIKPI
(License for Fish Transporting Vessel). In addition, it can be concluded that illegal fishing
and fisheries crimes are deemed as not having a direct connection with domestic
environmental law.
3.3. The Interplay between IUU Fishing and Fisheries Crimes
The discussions concerning IUU fishing, fisheries crimes and their nexus with transnational
organized crimes have been introduced by scholars, 798 government institutions, research
centres, non-governmental organizations and international organizations799 having concerns
on the issues. In its evolution, the term IUU fishing was initially mentioned at a CCAMLR
meeting in 1997 under Agenda Item 1 (IUU Fishing in the Convention Area), at the Standing
Committee on Observation and Inspection (SCOI), 28-31 October 1997. 800 It should be
understood that IUU fishing is designed to address non-compliance issues on fisheries
management regulations, particularly by vessels practicing flags of hoping.801
In seeking a more profound understanding of transnational crimes and fisheries connection,
the following presentation by Eve de Coning depicts an obvious interplay between IUU
fishing, fisheries crimes and transnational crimes: 802
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The Nexus between IUU fishing and
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Figure 11: The Interplay between IUU Fishing, Fisheries Crimes and Transnational
Crimes
From the figure 11, it can be observed that fisheries crime is part of IUU fishing. Within
fisheries crime itself, other crimes involved include money laundering, human trafficking,
corruption and document fraud. Those transnational crimes are separated from IUU fishing
activities if they refer to the explanation of IUU fishing in the IPOA-IUU fishing.803

It can be observed further from the above interaction that not all aspects of fisheries crime are
part of IUU fishing. In brief, paragraph 3.3 of IPOA-IUU embodies the following activities as
IUU fishing:
fishing in areas under national jurisdiction conducted by State or foreign fishing vessels
contrary to domestic regulations; fishing in waters managed by regional fisheries management
organizations (RFMOs) in contravention of conservation and management adopted by that
RFMO by vessels flying the flag of members and cooperating non-members, non-members,
vessels without nationality, and fishing entities; misreporting, underreporting and non-reporting
of catch in national waters and RFMO areas; and fishing in areas where and for fisheries in
which there are no applicable regulations.804
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Furthermore, Palma argues that the above characterization of IUU fishing employs mainly
management of fisheries and compliance issues and as such those undertakings presumably
do not include criminal activities.805 It is also worth noting that paragraph 3.4 IPOA-IUU
fishing reads:
Notwithstanding paragraph 3.3, certain unregulated fishing may take place in a manner which
is not in violation of applicable international law, and may not require the application of
measures envisaged under the International Plan of Action (IPOA). 806

It can be inferred from paragraph 3.4 of IPOA-IUU that unregulated fishing activities are
ostensibly not always in contravention of any international laws or in other words, some
unregulated fishing undertakings are legal. This case also applies to unreported fishing. As
asserted by Eve de Coning, unregulated and unreported fishing could turn into illegal fishing
in the sense that those activities have been provisioned as crime activities807 in the relevant
regulations. Nevertheless, Palma’s claim that IUU fishing is not regarded as a crime cannot
be generalized to all those terms since illegal fishing is clear-cut outlaw behaviour. This is if
breaching national and international laws and regulations, including without permission of
the coastal states, national and foreign fishing vessels constitute committing illegal
activities.808 The same rules apply when fishing in RFMOs management areas.809
In addition, the term illegal fishing can be disputed on its broad ‘literal interpretation’
suggesting ‘any activity carried out by any vessel (whether fishing or not)’ in the waters of a
country and without securing its approval or being in breach of its laws and regulations.810
This term also creates inconsistency and confusion between the term ‘fishing’ and its
explanation as ‘any activity’. This concern may lead to a challenge when evoking this
description as a reference in the domestic and international sense, particularly when
attempting to prosecute the perpetrators of illegal fishing although IPOA-IUU Fishing is not a
legal instrument and it is merely a voluntary instrument.
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In its conference edition report, UNODC made an analysis, available to the public, of the
crimes committed along the value chain of the fisheries sector by illustrating the past and
present cases. It highlighted that fisheries crime is chiefly motivated by economic factors
and/or organized in nature. 811 Common economically motivated crimes committed by the
perpetrators of fisheries crimes include fraud, forgery and corruption to evade taxes, customs
and duties.812 To make their goals achieve, they usually construct and involve networks when
committing those crimes.
Transnational organized crime in the fisheries sector is real. The European Maritime Analysis
and Operation Centre (Narcotics) (MAOC(N)) has received reports undertaken by countries
under the coordination of this institution. As seen from the following figure the total amount
of cocaine seized had reached 52.3 kilotons through maritime operations conducted between
2007 – 2010. 813

Figure 12: Cocaine Seizures 2007-2010 – Per cent of total Cocaine Seizure according
to the Type of Vessel (total = 52,300 tonnes)
It can be seen from the above pie chart that most of the cocaine seized was taken from fishing
vessels (44.5%). The second and third proportions were confiscated from sailing boats and
merchant’s vessels accounting for 27.2% and 18.3%, respectively. The smallest amount
accounted for 10% was taken from ‘go-fast boats’. This data suggests that fishing vessels
have the potential to carry far copious amounts of cocaine (on average 1,150 kg) than other
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boats or vessels. This case shows that it is not about fishing per se, but it is related to
transnationally organized crimes.
From the above discussion on the explanation of IUU fishing and its relations with fisheries
crimes, it can be learned that illegal fishing can be classified as fisheries crimes, thus as
unreported and unregulated fishing. The classification of ‘illegal fishing’ as fisheries crimes
would not be as problematic as that of ‘unreported’ and ‘unregulated’ fishing. For the latter
two concepts, if there is no obligation to report and no regulation in place, then the penalty or
punishment cannot be imposed under civil and/or criminal codes. In practice, it is recognized
that the fishing vessels are conducting IUU fishing by breaching conservation and
management rules; however, those vessels do not automatically contravene the rules in their
operation. In short, it can be asserted that IUU fishing involves activities that are not
necessarily illegal.814
3.4. The Correspondence of Marine Environmental Law, Fisheries Crimes and the
Organized Crime Convention.
This section is devoted to responding to a challenge expressed by Palma to undertake deeper
research concerning the correlation between ‘fisheries and environmental law and
transnational organized crime’. This suggestion comes from her view that IUU fishing should
not be related to environmental crime as it is not clearly narrated in any relevant provisions of
international law, unlike illegal logging and illegal wildlife trafficking. 815 However, this
section is intended nor to cover all related aspects of the connection between those three
topics nor to present a comprehensive overview of it. This section is part of a mosaic of this
thesis which also discusses the relations between marine environmental law, fisheries crimes
and the Organized Crime Convention.
As deliberated on in the previous sections, the environmental issue also covers the general
topic of the marine environment. The primary legal reference for the marine environment,
among others, should be LOSC. In its preamble, it reads:
Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the
sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international
communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and
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efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study,
protection and preservation of the marine environment.816

Further, the coverage of the marine environment has been extended to a number of articles
including in particular Part XII dealing with ‘Protection and Preservation of Marine
Environment’.817 However, this part governs a few articles pertaining to the conservation of
species. It can be found that Article 192 is devoted to the obligation of a state to ‘protect and
preserve the marine environment’.818 Further regulation positions Parties to LOSC to assume
‘the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to their environmental policies
and in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment’.819 In his
assertion, Robin Churchill conceives that natural resources in Article 193 include marine
living resources. 820 It is worth mentioning that crimes may take place in marine living
resources. To some extent, the crimes are also organized transnationally.821 The admittance of
the international community on the possible link between illegal fishing and transnational
organized crimes through the UN General Assembly Resolution 67/79822 shows that more indepth research and measures are necessary to prevent this crime going further. The
publication of the issue paper on ‘Combatting against Transnational Organised Crime at Sea’
by UNODC casts some light on the problems of interlinked emerging crimes at sea with the
reference to UNODC materials and LOSC. The crimes include amongst others, piracy and
armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, illegal drug
trafficking as well as organized crime conducted in the fishing industry.823
Before further elaboration on the interplay between marine living resources and transnational
organized crimes, it is essential to discuss the clear concept of marine living resources crime.
Although it lacks the accepted legal definition, marine living resources crime is attempted to
be defined as ‘criminal conduct that may impact negatively on the marine living
environment’.824 It is asserted that the term marine living resources crime was ‘modelled on
the definition of ‘environmental crime’ proposed at the time by UNODC’. It is claimed
816
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further to be an early effort to introduce the concept of fisheries crimes. Marine living
resources crime was conceived to be used in distinguishing the offences of criminal fisheries
from the administrative law usually applied to combat IUU fishing. This concept has then
evolved and been encapsulated fully in the term fisheries crimes, which involves all crimes
related to the value chain in the fisheries sector, including ‘those that may impact negatively
on the marine living environment’.825
The encapsulation of marine living resources crimes into fisheries crimes, as claimed above,
would face a challenge when referring to the overview accessible in a report by WWF
International in 2013. As principal authors behind that comprehensive report, Gregory Rose
and Martin Tsamenyi cover a wide range of research on marine living resources crimes. In
order to have a deeper understanding, the geographical and biological ambits of marine living
resources have been presented in that regard. The former encompasses:
Resources present in the marine environment, which extends across all oceans, seas, semienclosed seas that form part of the Earth's saltwater bodies. It excludes rivers, lakes, glaciers,
ice flows or other freshwater bodies. Simply put, this means the range of jurisdictions for which
jurisdictional powers and norms are prescribed under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. These include the high seas and all zones of national jurisdiction (the exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf) or national sovereignty (internal waters, territorial sea and
archipelagic waters) up to the low-water mark or the freshwater boundary.826

In respect of the latter, ‘the biological scope of living resources includes ecosystems,
organisms, specimens of organisms and the genetic material of organisms’.827
Looking deeper into the geographical account presented above, it can be inferred that the
fisheries aspect is part of marine living resources. It has a broader spectrum than merely
fisheries crimes. To a greater extent, marine living resources encompass a range of marine
environments to cover, with some exclusion on the water flow on land or any freshwater
bodies, those areas put simply as mentioned in the above explanation. In addition, the
possible negative impact on the marine living environment as the result of all crimes related
within the value chain of the fisheries sector828 shows that fisheries and the marine living
environment are not identical despite some areas of intersections between them. Therefore,
fisheries are not always identical to marine living resources. In that sense, it seems unlikely to
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occur that marine living resources crime will make its transformation into fisheries crimes.
Moreover, it is important to highlight that both marine living resources and fisheries crimes
have the same transnational dimension when performing their illegal operations. In 2011,
UNODC identified that there exist in the fishing industry, marine living resources crimes
along with the presence of transnational organized crimes.829 Nonetheless, Bricknell asserts
that marine living resources crimes should not all be conceived as transnational organized
crimes. This notion comes from the fact that it is not necessary to commit the crimes in a
transnational and organized manner. Bricknell classifies offenders of illegal fishing in
Australia into three groups; the repeated offenders, the opportunist and the ignorant. The last
group, the ignorant, is found to be the most significant contributor to illegal fishing or marine
living resources crimes. Mainly, they ignore fisheries laws and regulations and have a lack of
awareness on the amended legislation.830
In making the link between marine living resources and transnational crimes, UNODC
provides a clear discussion on, amongst other issues, (1) the trafficking of fishermen with the
objective of forced labour; (2) the trafficking of children in the fishing industry; (3) groups of
transnational organized crimes involved in marine living resources crimes pertaining to
limited volume and costly species such as abalone; (4) the high calibre of ‘logistical
coordination and legal sophistication’ practiced by several operators of transnational fishing
involved in marine living resources. 831 These four issues are clear examples of how the
fishing industry is vulnerable to the illegal activities being transnational in character. The
transitional and organized features of marine living resources crimes are also extended to
fisheries crimes. This characteristic is embedded in other environmental crimes such as
wildlife and forest crimes.832
It can be elicited from the UNODC report that the engagement of syndicates of
transnationally organized crimes within marine living resources seems to be increasing.833
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This circumstance should be a matter of utmost concern to all countries. Legal overview and
international institutions in the years ahead should also give this matter the upmost
prominence. Even though it is evident that marine living resource crimes have a transnational
character, the current legal instrument of the Organized Crime Convention does not include
the crimes as one of its protocols.834 The way to get marine living resources and criminal
aspects transnationally organized is by upholding marine living resource crimes as a possible
additional protocol to the Organized Crime Convention.835
In the Organized Crime Convention, Article 3 limits the scope of application of the
Convention to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of four categories of crimes as
listed in Articles 5 (criminalization of participation in an organized criminal group), 6
(criminalization of the laundering of proceeds of crime), 7 (measures to combat moneylaundering) and 23 (criminalization of obstruction of justice)836 as well as serious crime837 in
the sense that the transgression is transnational in operation and involves a group of
organized criminals. 838 Based on Article 3, the application of this Convention could be
extended to address the marine living resources crime along with transnationally organized
crime syndicates.
Qualifying those two categories of transnational and organized crime groups would possibly
not be an issue for marine living resources crime. Nonetheless, for the serious crime
classification, it would be challenging for fisheries offences, as part of marine living resource
crime, to conform to a minimum four years gaol sentence. For instance, as ‘home to the
largest fishing fleet in the world, China has one of the most explicit codes regarding illegal
fishing’.839 In Chinese Criminal Law, Article 340 articulates that a breach of laws of marine
resources constitutes a crime qualifying for a maximum sentence of three years in prison.840
Referring to this article, it is clear that marine living resources under Chinese regulation will
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not fall under the category of “serious crime” as provisioned in the Organized Crime
Convention.
Nevertheless, as regarded by Anastasia Telesetsky, in Chinese Law, ‘there are a number of
crimes that seem equally relevant to IUU fishing by organized groups, including smuggling
or tax evasion, which might qualify as “serious crimes” if they include a transnational
component’. For instance, a smuggler of fish resulting from IUU practices can be sentenced
to less than three years or more than 10 years gaol depending on the gravity of the violations.
However, the individual is charged based on the dues owed, 841 not by virtue of the IUU
fishing activity. Article 340 of Chinese Criminal Law shows the complexity when marine
living resources crime is seen to be part of the Palermo Convention as it does not comply
with the term “serious crime”. It can be argued that fisheries management approach
dominates countries, with no more than four years of imprisonment on a fisheries offence. If
new international norms can be shaped in viewing marine living resources violation as
crimes, the subsequent step to secure the position of an additional protocol to the Palermo
Convention would be smoother.
The other limitation in criminalizing the marine living resources crimes derives from
different maritime jurisdictions. Article 3(2) of the Palermo Convention defines an offence
which is transnational in character. 842 As referred to in Article 3(2)(a), a marine living
resource crime is transnational in nature if its operation crosses the border of one state to the
other state/s in territorial waters. It occurs because ‘the marine living resource crime would
not be committed of another state if it was committed in exclusive economic zone or the high
seas’ in accordance with international law. Likewise, it applies to paragraph (b) in which
transnational crime would occur only if it was committed in the territorial waters of the other
state/s.843
From the legal overview, the management of marine living resources standards have been
regulated in the LOSC, 844 the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement, 845 the 2009 Port State
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Measure Agreement 846 and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. 847 Nonetheless, in
accordance with in-depth research on the criminal aspect of marine living resources,
countries have yet to adopt a legal regime particularly regarding the punishment of marine
living resources crimes at the global level. International institutions dealing with marine,
environmental and other general issues pay particular attention to standard settings instead of
the enforcement of criminal law.848 This shortage leaves the question hanging regarding the
seriousness of countries in addressing this urgent marine environmental problem.
Relevant international institutions such as FAO, IMO, UNODC, OECD, ILO, INTERPOL
and other related institutions have been advised to intensify their efforts in managing and
addressing this problem as a matter of urgency.849 An integrated approach should be taken to
law and policy by combining marine living resources and criminal aspects. The presence of
transnational crimes such as human trafficking or people smuggling in the fishing industry
cannot be neglected by those relevant international institutions. In that sense, those
institutions should establish a regular coordination forum to work out the best possible ways
of supporting marine environmental problems and bringing this attention before the states in
their regular forums. The institutions should also keep informed to present research on marine
environmental degradation to increase the awareness of, as well as to convince, the countries
on this crucial issue. In doing this, they are expected to receive more acknowledgment from
countries that marine living resources should be revived and prevented from further
degradation by criminalizing those breaching marine living resources laws and regulations.
4. Conclusion.
In looking for more in-depth research on IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, legal and policy
perspectives both national and international have been presented in the previous parts. This
part goes further in the examination of environmental law. It is discovered that environmental
law has evolved into a relevant subject from the last decade of the 20th century. The Trail
Smelter case has been referred to in various researches concerning environmental history to
illustrate the ramifications of transboundary as a result of environmental activities. Some
international conventions on the environment indicate the importance of the cooperation of
states in addressing this problem. The Stockholm Declaration along with its Principle 21
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brings an important development to international environmental law. This principle suggests
the balance between the state’s sovereignty and commitment to preserving and protecting the
environment in this regard.
Scholars’ overviews on the evolution of environmental law are not similar. For instance,
Phillip Sands classifies the development into four phases with the Stockholm Declaration
until the conclusion of UNCED as the third period marked as the beginning of modern
international law. This period laid the foundation of cooperation on the environment amongst
states. It is important to highlight that fisheries’ role at the initial period of evolution, through
the conclusion of the bilateral agreements, constitutes the first commitment of states in
having concern over environmental problems. Different stages offered by Peter Sand
comprise three periods. He includes the 1972 Stockholm Declaration until the 1992 UNCED
as the second phase. The subsequent period is post-modern. In addition, Edith Brown Weiss
introduces a different approach emphasizing a three-year grouping consisting of ‘early
glimmers’, development of basic framework and maturation and linkage. She includes the
Stockholm Conference in the second phase and acknowledges it as the initial multilateral
conference on the environment. The establishment of UNEP in 1972, through its Division of
Environmental Law and Conventions, contributes to the further development of international
environmental law.
The discussion continues on the character of international environmental law, whether legally
binding or non-compliance. This topic is critical for examining IUU fishing and fisheries
crimes at the end of Part VI. The basic understanding of the legal nature of international
environmental law should be comprehended as such as it is commonly understood that public
international law encompasses legal strength. It is different from domestic law due to the
non-existence of a law enforcer in international society. Treaties on the environment are not
always legally binding. This non-compliance mechanism is intended to receive compliance
from countries in the form of treaties or decisions of COP. This non-compliance approach
carries an advantage to secure states best effort to comply with the decisions made. The 1987
Montreal Protocol can be regarded as one of the most successful agreements on the
environment.
The financial loss generated from 11 identified environmental crimes was estimated to be in
the range of US$1.6 trillion to US$2.2 trillion annually. The loss of IUU fishing reached
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US$15.5 billion to US$36.4 billion. Although this data was disclosed in 2017, unfortunately,
it does not cover fisheries crimes. In light of its definition, the international community has
not reached any agreement. Nonetheless, academics or relevant organizations make their
interpretation. The Environmental Investigation Agency defines environmental crimes simply
as illegal acts which directly harm the environment. This Agency includes IUU fishing as
environmental crime although this inclusion poses a challenge since unreported and
unregulated fishing can be legal if there is no obligation to report and no regulation in place.
In its application, TEC is a crime in violation at domestic level, and it depends on the
domestic legal system of relevant countries.
More in-depth research pertaining to the primary driver and financial loss from
environmental crimes shows that there persist seven chief causes of TEC. While lack of
legislation occurs at national level only, the other major drivers take place at the combined
local, national, regional and international levels. Fisheries crimes, unfortunately, are not
regarded as environmental crime. Two possible reasons could be firstly, the complication to
measure the impact of fisheries crimes and secondly, illegal fishing is regarded as being
covered in fisheries crimes.
It also examines the apparent position of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes from an
environmental law overview including their relationship with TOC. As background, the
marine environment and relevant provisions of LOSC are provided. It is projected that by the
year 2050, the global population will increase to 10 billion people leading to the shrinking of
mankind’s liveable portion to one-eighth of a cubic kilometre per person. This circumstance
would escalate the burden the ocean has to bear in the future.
With regard to the legal provisions of environmental marine law, LOSC encompasses marine
environment regulations in its Parts V, VII and XII. In respect to the connection between IUU
fishing and fisheries crimes, it can be seen that fisheries crime is part of IUU fishing. Within
fisheries crime itself, other crimes are involved. These transnational crimes are separated
from IUU fishing activities if they refer to the definition of IUU fishing in IPOA-IUU fishing.
From the explanation of the IUU fishing term in the IPOA-IUU fishing, IUU fishing mainly
concerns the management of fisheries and compliance issues and as such, those undertakings
presumably do not include criminal activities. It is important to note that illegal fishing is
clear-cut outlaw behaviour. However, unregulated and unreported fishing could be classified
225

as illegal in the sense that those activities have been provisioned as criminal activities in
certain regulations.
Another challenge comes from a broad explanation of illegal fishing that may lead to
inconsistency and confusion between the term “fishing” and its explanation as “any activity”.
In addition, this creates a challenge when suggesting this description as a reference in both
the domestic and international sense, specifically when attempting to criminalize the
perpetrators of illegal fishing. In the meantime, research shows that the existence of
transnational organized crimes in the fisheries industry is a reality in which most of the
cocaine seized from maritime operations was taken from fishing vessels.
To make the discussion more specific, this part analyses the connection between marine
environmental law, fisheries crimes and the Palermo Convention. It can be shown that
fisheries aspects are part of marine living resources. Both marine living resources crimes and
fisheries crimes have the same transnational dimension when performing their illegal
operations. Even though it is evident that marine living resource crimes are transnational in
nature, the current legal instrument of the Palermo Convention does not include the crimes as
one of its protocols. The analysis that has been made shows the difficulty in conforming to
“serious crime” classification under Article 2 of the Convention. Another obstacle comes
from the jurisdictional issue in which marine living resources crimes would fall under
transnational classification if they are only committed in the territorial sea of the other state/s.
Though some international legal instruments have been adopted to address marine living
resources crimes, countries have yet to adopt a legal regime particularly regarding the
punishment of marine living resources crimes at the global level. Relevant international
institutions pay particular concern with standard setting instead of enforcement of the
criminal law on the perpetrators of environmental crimes.
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PART VII
ADDRESSING IUU FISHING BY USING THE METHOD OF TRANSNATIONAL
ORGANIZED FISHERIES CRIMES
1. Introduction.
The previous part delivers, among other things, the discussion on the nature of environmental
law, the analysis of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes and how marine environmental law
relates to fisheries crimes and the Organized Crime Convention. In brief, the concept of
environmental law suggests that the compliance approach is more to the fore than a legallybinding character. It is evident also that the interplay between IUU fishing and fisheries
crimes needs to be comprehended clearly by the public and decision makers so that the two
activities are not regarded as the same concept. In addition, for some reason fisheries crimes
do not fall under the Palermo Convention provisions. The discussion in Part VI provides a
further foundation on which to make an assessment of the policy to combat IUU fishing from
a transnational crimes perspective.
This analysis now goes on further by discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
perceiving and overcoming IUU fishing through fisheries crimes methods covered in this Part
VII. The primary objective of this part is to deliver a balanced understanding for interested
parties who pay a great deal of attention to the matter, such as government institutions,
international organizations or individuals. Prior to the conclusion, this part presents an
analysis if the policy is doable, to be applied by taking into consideration the previous
discussions.
2. Transnational Organized Fisheries Crime Method to Address IUU Fishing:
Advantages and Disadvantages.
The attempts to combat IUU fishing have been exercised through many methods. One
approach that has been taken is linking IUU fishing with environmental law and transnational
environmental crime. This makes sense as IUU fishing operations are chiefly transnational
and have significant impacts on the marine environment. Nonetheless, the measures to
address the problem face a number of challenges. As stated in the Australian Institute of
Criminology report, acknowledgment of environmental issues raises obstacles in regard to its
original link to criminal activities unlike the other sorts of crime which affect properties or
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persons.850 Apparently, this perspective comes from people’s unawareness and to some extent
their lack of knowledge on the long-term and potential threat of environmental degradation.
Different state practices within each domestic legal system also contribute to this
circumstance. The nature of high returns and low risk in environmental crime differs from the
other types of transnational crimes, such as human trafficking or drugs smuggling.
In this sub-section, the discussion focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of fighting
IUU fishing particularly in the efforts to revive the level of fish stocks through a fisheries
crimes approach and the transnational issue. The main objective of having this discussion is
to propose a balanced and comprehensive overview when devising the policy to take part in
endorsing such a measure. For the Indonesian Government, this discussion is imperative as
the Government, in its policy, has laid down the highest priority on IUU fishing and fisheries
crimes. By offering the advantages and the disadvantages, the Government is expected to
take a more comprehensive view. If the policy is revealed based on a mere assumption or
one-sided perspective by counting, let’s say, the advantages, the implementation of policy on
the ground may end up a failure.
2.1. Advantages.
In the general process of decision making within an organization, several steps should be
taken by decision makers. This occurs at many levels, from small institutions or enterprises
up to the large multinational corporations, both in the private and public services.
Nevertheless, there should be distinctions made between private corporations and
government institutions in the sense of their final goals and the stakeholders of both, as well
as to some extent their working culture. It is evident that some private companies pursue the
highest possible profits as their top priority851 while government institutions are non-profit
making in their orientation apart from state-owned companies. Stakeholders of a corporate
organization encompass an individual or group that may ‘affect or be affected by the actions
of a business as a whole’. They can be both internal (the entities within the corporation such
as managers, investors and employers) and external (the entities that are not part of the
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corporation’s structure, but they pay attention to or are implicated by the corporations). The
external stakeholder can be consumers, government, suppliers and/or creditors.852
When formulating a strategic policy to accomplish the objectives of an institution, all levels
of management are supposed to take into account the advantages and the disadvantages. As
conceived by James A. Anderson, ‘public policies in a modern, complex society are indeed
ubiquitous. They confer advantages and disadvantages; cause pleasure, irritation, and pain;
and collectively have important consequences for our well-being and happiness’. 853
Therefore, the advantages and disadvantages dimensions are embedded when a decision is
made in particular in public policy. In a government institution such as the MMAF, the
decision-making process concerning public policy is inevitable. The decisions disclosed by
the MMAF affects society in both its social and daily life.
The policy to combat IUU fishing has been a cornerstone for the MMAF particularly after
Minister Susi Pudjiastuti assumed the chief position in the ministry.854 When addressing this
problem, some transnational crimes such as corruption, human trafficking, document, tax and
customs fraud, money laundering and other illicit activities were also discovered along the
value chain of fisheries. 855 There are some benefits when eliminating IUU fishing from
fisheries crimes and TOC, as follows:
2.1.1. Eradicating Transnational Organized Crimes in Fishery Activities.
TOC are a global phenomenon. Its nature to involve different jurisdictions and groups needs
different countries to strengthen cooperation in addressing the problem. Nonetheless,
transnational crimes should not be seen as identical with international crimes although both
crimes cross borders and have an international dimension. The latter may or may not involve
852
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more than one state and encompass crimes committed against humanity. 856 Genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression are instances of international
crimes.857 Both the former and the latter have their references. With regard to the latter, in
paragraph 6 of the preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, every
country has the duty to apply its criminal jurisdiction for which it shall bear the responsibility
for committing international crimes. 858 Meanwhile, transnational organized crimes are
regulated under UNTOC or the Palermo Convention.
Under the Palermo Convention, three separate protocols have been drafted and established as
annexes to the said convention. First of all, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, are supplementing the UNTOC or
the Organized Crime Convention. Secondly, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea and Air, are supplementing the UNTOC. Thirdly, Protocol against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition,
supplements the UNTOC.859 Nonetheless, in its first report on the Transnational Organized
Crime Assessment, UNODC has assessed some transnational organized crimes including
trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, cocaine, heroin, firearms, environmental
resources, counterfeit products, maritime piracy and cybercrime in order to have a better
understanding of the networks as well as their related operations.860
Hence, what can be implied from those two documents is that TOC are not only supplements
to the UNTOC and its protocols but also to the other crimes that are classified as
transnational and organized in the field. The possible rationales for the inclusion of three
different transnationally organized crimes as annexes to UNTOC are firstly that a more
robust mechanism can be rendered to address the problem through a legally binding
agreement in the form of protocols. Next, the convention along with the protocols specifies
some procedures to follow in coping with the transnational crimes in a more effective
manner. State parties to the convention shall agree to the application of the provisions such as
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criminalizing corruption and money laundering, extradition, mutual legal assistance, joint
investigation, enhancing cooperation and witness protection. 861 Lastly, it is an agreement
amongst state parties to place priority on the three crimes as urgent matters since most state
parties of the convention are likely to experience the same problems and the issue has
become one of international concern.
As the world economies grow, globalization is spreading. This globalization is a doubleedged sword offering advantages and disadvantages. In some respects, it makes international
trade freer resulting in lower prices on goods, but on the other hand, the transformations also
exacerbate negative behaviour. Some instances such as corruption and exploitation are now
more globalized. In the larger picture, globalization also leads to the spread of transnational
organized crime.862 The financial transactions from transnational organized crimes including
drug trafficking reached 1.5% of world GDP or US$870 billion in 2009. The most significant
contribution of revenue for transnational organized crimes is generated from illegal drugs
accounting for some 20% (17%-25%) of total crime earnings, approximately 50% of
transnationally organized crime proceeds and 0.6% to 0.9% of the world’s GDP.863
The cross-border crimes committed are not only on land but also at sea. The United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 65/37 was adopted on 7 December 2010 concerning
transnational organized crime committed at sea. In this resolution, it has been noted with
concern that transnational organized crimes undertaken at sea are identified as persistent
problems. Those crimes include migrant smuggling and persons trafficking, illicit drugs,
maritime security and safety such as armed robbery and terrorism at sea.864
More concern has been expressed with regard to the possible nexus between organized crime
and illegal fishing. Through the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 64/72 adopted
on 4 December 2009 on sustainable fisheries, member states noted the possible correlation
between illegal fishing and internationally organized crime in some parts of the world. It
encourages member states, including through relevant international forums and organizations,
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to conduct a further study on illegal fishing, the possible connection and to make it widely
available taking into consideration the different legal systems under international law applied
to international organized crime and illegal fishing.865 This resolution is an important stride in
attempting to link a specific issue on illegal fishing with transnational organized crime. The
resolution also suggests that when developing the research, different legal regimes are
emphasized. This is understood as illegal fishing is under the guidance of FAO while
transnational organized crimes shall be ruled under the authority of UNODC.
In bridging the connection between transnational organized crime and the fishery sector,
UNODC disclosed the 2011 report on transnational organized crime in the fishing industry
focusing on trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and trafficking of illicit drugs. It is
evident that fishers have misused fishing vessels when carrying out illegal activities such as
smuggling people, trafficking illegal drugs (chiefly cocaine), trafficking illegal weapons and
terrorism. The fishers are recruited by criminals due to their knowledge and skills and their
role is mostly to support the mastermind in committing transnationally organized crimes in
the fishery sector including fishing vessels.866 It is typical for fishing vessels in West Africa
to practice transhipment as a means of trafficking illegal drugs.867 This illicit practice has
significant impacts on the society, the economy and the environment leading to West Africa
losing approximately US$1.3 billion a year.868
A different approach to overviewing transnational crime activities in the sector of fisheries is
introduced through fisheries crime. Through this concept, the involvement of perpetrators of
transnationally organized crimes in the fisheries sector is strengthened. Although legal
reference of fisheries crimes remains undefined, criminal activities in this model share the
same conception of criminal acts in transnational organized crimes. Fisheries crimes can be
deemed as a multi-layered phenomenon engaging cross-sectoral crimes, including economic
crimes, committed across the entire value chain, from capturing fish up to the end process
presented to the consumers. Transnational crimes involved in fisheries crimes include
865

Sustainable Fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, GA Res
64/72, UN GA, 64th sess, Agenda Item 76(b), UN Doc A/RES/64/72 (19 March 2010).
866
UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry, above n 37, 4.
867
UNODC, Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat, above n 71, 11.
868
Africa Progress Panel, ‘Africa Progress Report 2014: Grain, Fish, Money-Financing Africa’s Green and Blue
Revolutions’, (African Progress Report, 2014) 16, <http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/publications/policypapers/2014-africa-progress-report/>.

232

amongst other things, marine resources transhipment, fishing illegally, corruption, money
laundering, and relevant documentation fraud, tax and customs. 869 In the field, the
engagement of transnational organized crime in the fishing industry has two dimensions.
Firstly, the direct involvement of major transnational organized criminal groups 870 and
secondly, it is likely that the transnational fishing companies operate legal and illegal
businesses concurrently. The illegal catches are laundered by selling them with legally caught
fish products.871
From the discussion in this section, it can be concluded that transnational organized crimes
are present in the fisheries sector. The data and information in research papers and
publications published by the international organization such as UNODC are sufficient to
clarify that the fisheries sector is vulnerable to be utilized as a means to perpetrate
transnational organized crimes. In combatting this sort of crime, studies have been taken
including how to link such crimes with illegal fishing, but the measure faces some challenges.
Firstly, IUU fishing arises from a voluntary or soft law instrument, that is, IPOA-IUU Fishing
with the objective to address non-compliance by using fisheries management regulations.
Secondly, not all activities in IUU fishing are necessarily illegal. Thirdly, the explanation of
IUU fishing in the IPOA-IUU does not include criminal activities such as corruption, money
laundering, people smuggling, drug trafficking or any other similar crimes. 872 As such,
fisheries crimes can be conceived as a breakthrough to fill the loopholes that exist when
connecting the problem of border crossing organized crimes occurring along the value chain
of the fisheries sector with the end goal of combatting and eliminating the said crimes in a
more integrated and effective manner.
Furthermore, the fisheries crimes method also offers a double impact in attempting to revive
the depletion of fish stocks and at the same time fighting against TOC. It comes from the
notion that despite being ill-defined, fisheries crimes cover various illegal activities in the
fisheries sector. Aldo Lale-Demoz introduces an interesting perspective that in addressing
fisheries crimes, criminal law enforcement measures should be imposed to complement the
traditional approach of fisheries management. He suggests that a national framework of
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sustainable development plays a leading role in enforcing the law against fisheries crimes.873
This advice is understood as an effort to expedite the current issue of crimes on fisheries as
international legal framework is silent on the legal definition of fisheries crimes.
2.1.2. Facilitating International Collaboration.
In his remarks to the Security Council Debate on Organized Crime as a Threat to
International Peace and Security on February 24th, 2010, the former UN Secretary-General,
Ban Ki-moon praised states for having respectable collaboration in fighting against organized
crimes including the General Assembly’s measures to combat drugs, on the Process of
Kimberly against Blood Diamonds and the UN Global Initiative on Human Trafficking.
Nonetheless, he invited countries to pay more attention and actions to overcoming emergent
threats such as cybercrime, money laundering, illegal dumping of poisonous waste and
environmental crime. 874 Further, ‘With transnational threats, States have no choice but to
work together. We are all affected – whether as countries of supply, trafficking or demand.
Therefore, we have a shared responsibility to act’, he said.875
The mechanism for cooperation has been governed under the UNTOC. The need to
strengthen cooperation in bilateral, regional and multilateral stages is affirmed throughout the
Convention. The UNTOC establishes an effective instrument and the essential legal
framework for international collaboration in fighting against transnationally organized
criminal activities and the connection with terrorism.876 This Palermo Convention is designed
to fight against particular criminal activities as well as to address the problems that the states
are facing on international cooperation.877 Moreover, the Convention aims to have promoted
cooperation in more effectively preventing and combatting transnational organized crimes.878
In most cases, the statement of purpose or similar is structured in the early stage of a
convention. In any convention, it brings the gravity to provide the main rationales for why the
said convention should be negotiated and agreed upon by the states. Hence, within the main
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body of the UNTOC, cooperation amongst state parties is deemed important in making the
prevention and fight against transnational organized crimes successful.
The research that has been taken illustrates that cross-border organized crimes and other sorts
of criminal activity in the fishing industry are multidimensional and complicated. It involves
different international legal frameworks and institutional mandates to tackle, amongst other
things, human trafficking at sea, crimes by using fishing vessels, crimes by fishers and the
interplay between marine living resources crimes and corruption. 879 The relevant legal
frameworks involved include the LOSC, the Palermo Convention, the United Nations Fish
Stocks Agreement and the Compliance Agreement. In regard to the institutional overview, it
encompasses international organizations such as FAO, UNODC, IMO and INTERPOL. As
such, if IUU fishing is viewed as merely a fisheries management problem which is under
FAO’s mandate, then the cooperation on law enforcement would encounter difficulties when
addressing the crimes occurring along the value chain of fisheries activities. In that sense, a
transnational crimes approach can facilitate international cooperation in addressing the
problems through the engagement of different institutions particularly UNODC as guardian
of the Palermo Convention.
2.1.3. Tightening Cooperation on Money Laundering and Confiscation of Assets.
Money laundering is commonly related to transnational crimes. It is largely connected to the
earnings from traditional and more modern crimes. With regard to the latter, such as illicit
drugs and weapons smuggling and marketing, the perpetrators make a great deal of money.
Their illegal profits need to be laundered in the activities that do not draw the attention of
related government authorities from the other countries.880 Apart from cleansing their dirty
money and making it ‘legal money’, it is most likely that they also intend to camouflage their
‘illegal investment’ in the legitimate sectors aiming to generate more revenue and security.
Both the legal and illegal fishing industries are found to be connected to money laundering
practices. The illegal funds can be invested in operations or infrastructure. It is known that
fish sales are in cash which is difficult to trace, and crews are also paid in cash. 881 Moreover,
in accordance with the 2008 Solomon Islands Report, environmental crimes (including
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marine living resource crimes such as IUU fishing) assumed the 3rd most common predicate
offence of money laundering in the Pacific.882
The method of laundering the money to other countries shows that the transnational nature of
this crime cannot be overlooked, and countries need to establish proper mechanisms or
instruments at every stage, bilateral, regional and multilateral. It is evident that if countries
work together enhancing coordination, it will limit the distribution of money which in turn
will restrict expansion of the operation. The Palermo Convention pays particular attention for
countries to eliminate money laundering through joint collaboration amongst member states.
Three aspects are brought to the fore for related authorities to cooperate, those are, on the
legal frameworks, enforcement of the law and regulation of financial matters.883
When money has been laundered through investment schemes, the criminals will obtain
benefits in many forms such as property, equipment or other instrumentalities. These
proceeds of crime should be subject to confiscation and seizure. In the sense that the money
laundering takes place in other countries, international cooperation should be an apt measure
to curb the expansion of the crime. It is essential to note that international cooperation
determines the successful recovery of assets that have been transmitted to, and concealed in,
different overseas jurisdictions. The process to take place includes evidence gathering,
provisional measures implementation and confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities
of organized crimes. 884 It is highly recommended that the conclusion of bilateral or
multilateral agreements to promote the effectiveness of international cooperation on the
subject of confiscation be considered.885
In bolstering international cooperation on the confiscation of crime proceeds, Article 13(1) of
UNTOC provides two conditions when a state party requests another state party assuming
jurisdiction over a crime under the Convention for confiscation. A state party, when referring
to Article 12(1), shall, to the best extent within its domestic legal instrument: a) submit to the
relevant authorities in order to secure an order of confiscation or b) submit to related
authorities to obtain, to the best extent, an order of confiscation issued by a court of the
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territory of the requesting party. 886 The said article adequately accommodates the initial
procedure when a state party has adjudicated a particular transnational crime and its court
makes a verdict to confiscate proceeds of crimes and other instrumentalities. However, the
challenge comes from Article 13(7) when a state party may decline the request from another
party to cooperate if the crime is not provisioned by the Palermo Convention.887
In point of fact, it is the true character of any international treaty when the state parties to the
convention only consent to regulate issues agreed upon by them as covered in that agreement.
Although illegal fishing is transnational in nature and money laundering occurs in the fishing
industry, this issue is not part of the Palermo Convention. Therefore, there is no obligation to
abide by the rules stated in Articles 12 and 13 with regard to illegal fishing. However, it is
still possible to refer to the same clauses through bilateral or multilateral agreement between
like-minded states without referring to the Palermo Convention. In practice, perceiving IUU
fishing from a crime overview may face hurdles in different domestic legal systems of
countries. Another possible way around this is to relate fishing industry with criminal conduct
or fisheries crimes method. If countries have the same views that fisheries crimes exist, then
it would be easier to include in the Palermo Convention.
2.1.4. Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance.
2.1.4.1 Extradition
The mechanism for international cooperation, is amongst others, extradition and mutual legal
assistance which have been regulated in Article 16 and Article 18 of UNTOC, respectively.888
When the perpetrators face trial as responsible for the crimes committed, they can be
extradited to their country of origin. If this cooperation does not exist, then it would be
difficult to execute this policy. It is most likely for that reason, that state parties of the
UNTOC should strengthen cooperation on extradition through either evoking the Convention
or concluding the bilateral or multilateral treaties as the legal basis.889 As matter of course,
state parties should inform the Secretary-General of the UN whether or not they take the
Convention as a legal reference when depositing the instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval of, or accession.890 If they do not refer to the Convention, then they should seek to
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conclude the said treaties, where appropriate. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that state parties
are compelled to admit the offences under the Palermo Convention as being extraditable
crimes between themselves if those state parties prefer not to conclude a treaty. Furthermore,
to name but a few, other issues which are stipulated in the Palermo Convention for bridging
cooperation include the investigation of the offences891 and law enforcement.892
Indonesia has adopted legal framework on extradition through Law Number 1/1979 on
Extradition. This extradition law revokes the Royal Decree of May 8, 1883, no.2 (State
Gazette 1883-188) on ‘Extradition of Aliens’ (Koninklijk Besluit van 8 Mei 1883 No. 26
(Staatsblad 1883-188) on ‘Uitlevering van Vreemdelingen’).893 The latter decree is a legacy
from the colonial government of the Netherlands. This decree has been perceived to be no
longer in accordance with recent development of relevant laws and regulations on extradition.
Moreover, the existence of legal framework for extradition, adopted in 1883, indicates that
the extradition has been long admitted in the legal system and practiced in the field. In the
bilateral sphere, Indonesia has concluded 8 (eight) treaties on extradition with other states, as
follows:894
Table 6: Extradition Treaty between Indonesia and Other Countries
No.

Treaty

1 Treaty between the
Government of the
Republic of Indonesia
and the Government of
Malaysia relating to
Extradition
2 Extradition Treaty
between the Republic of
Indonesia and the
Republic of the
Philippines and the
Protocol

Date and
Venue of
Signature
Jakarta, 0706-1974

Jakarta, 1002-1976

Ratification
Status

Entry into Force

Ratified through
Law No.9/1974

11-08-1975

Ratified through
Law No.10/1976
(26 July 1976)

25-10-1976
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No.

Treaty

3 Treaty between the
Government of the
Republic of Indonesia
and the Government of
the Kingdom of
Thailand relating to
Extradition
4 Extradition Treaty
between the Republic of
Indonesia and Australia

Date and
Venue of
Signature
Bangkok, 2906-1976

Ratification
Status

Entry into Force

Ratified through
Law No.2/1978
(18 March 1978)

18-06-1980

Ratified through
Law No. 8 /1994
(2 November
1994).
Ratified through
Law No.42/ 2007
(23 October 2007)

21-01-1995

New Delhi,
25-01-2011

Ratified through
Law No. 13/ 2014
(21 July 2014)

15-12-2014

It shall enter into
force 30 (thirty) days
after the last
notification on I
which the Parties
have notified each
other in writing that
their respective
requirements for
entry into force of
this Treaty have been
complied with.
26-04-2015

Jakarta, 2204-1992

5 Treaty on Extradition
between the Republic of
Indonesia and the
Republic of Korea
6 Extradition Treaty
between the Republic of
Indonesia and the
Republic of India
7 Extradition Treaty
between the Republic of
Indonesia and the
Independent State of
Papua New Guinea

Jakarta, 2811-2000

Jakarta, 1706-2013

Ratified through
Law No.6/2015

8 Extradition Treaty
between the Republic of
Indonesia and the
Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam

Jakarta, 2706-2013

Ratified through
Law No.5/ 2015

16-11-2007

In the above list of extradition treaties, Indonesia has laid the foundation to conclude the
treaty not only to the state parties but also to the non-state parties to the Palermo Convention.
It can be observed that Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, the Republic of Korea,
India and Viet Nam are parties to the Convention while the Independent State of Papua New
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Guinea is not on the list as a state party to the Palermo Convention.895 The provisions agreed
upon are the translation of common grounds between the state parties. Although Papua New
Guinea and the member states of the Convention assume a different level of responsibility
under the Palermo Convention, they are bound by the same level of legally binding
agreements. The provisions to some level, are also the same, such as Article 2 (1) concerning
Extraditable Offences on the Extradition Treaties between Indonesia and Papua New
Guinea896 and India897. The article reads: ‘An offence shall be an extraditable offence, if it is
punishable under the laws in both States, by imprisonment for a period of at least one year or
by a more severe penalty’.898
Extradition is regarded as one of the oldest categories of international cooperation. Its history
can be traced back to ancient times.899 However, it has been conceived by Cherif Bassiouni
that its original objective was not designed as a tool for cooperation to preserve common
interest in the society, but instead to surrender the fugitives. 900 Although it has been
practiced for a long time, it has not come to the point in which it receives a positive
commitment from any country in the world. It is subject to the presence of a legally binding
instrument accompanied by certain restrictions on some offences and classes of persons that
may not be extraditable due to jurisdiction matters. The courts would evoke some reasons in
making a decision to extradite such as identity, dual criminality, supporting evidence
sufficiency and extradition treaty existence.901
The nexus between extradition and ocean issues is proved to carry an old tradition. In 1624,
the pioneer of freedom of navigation and the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius introduced his view
postulating the principle of aut dederre aut punire (either extradite or punish) or aut dedere
aut judicare (either extradite or prosecute) in more modern practice.902 The latter has replaced
punire with judicare as the option to extradition in order to open the possibility that a
895
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criminal suspect may be found not guilty. 903 It is required by this formula, which was in
particular aimed at pirates at the time, that states dedere or judicare when the crimes are
against hostis humani generi (enemies of humanity).904
Hugo Grotius, or Huigh de Groot in Dutch, asserted that ‘when appealed to, a State should
either punish the guilty person as he deserves, or it should entrust him to the discretion of the
party making the appeal’.905 This maxim obtained momentum when international society was
taking efforts to fight against piracy between the 17th and 18th centuries.906 This principle not
only laid down individual responsibility for international crimes but also it obliged the state
to be responsible when sponsoring piracy and when its vessel was apprehended. It is
important to note that Hugo Grotius also introduced the universal jurisdiction theory for
piracy.907 It is further clarified that the universal jurisdiction application is not objected for
any and all states that could exercise their jurisdiction over any and all pirates. It is more
properly said that the admittance of universal application of the jurisdiction of flag state is
within its rights to defend against piracy and then to hunt them down to launch prevention
and prosecution measures, consecutively.908
Within the regime of transnational environmental crime, some scholars such as Debbie
Banks909 and Stephen F. Pires,910 believe that IUU fishing is classified as an environmental
crime or wildlife crime. If this activity is regarded as a crime by some academics, the
subsequent questions would be whether or not the perpetrators of IUU fishing can be
extradited? What about fisheries crimes? If fisheries crimes can enjoy extradition treatment?
In making a response to the subject matters, it is worth noting that the classification of IUU
fishing as a crime, no matter whether environmental or wildlife, would pose some issues in
903
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respect of unreported and unregulated fishing. Both terms would be complicated to be
included as criminal activities if there is no duty to also report when the regulation is not
adopted. The problem of extradition arises as since the outset, that is, in the terminology
itself.
With regard to fisheries crimes, the lack of legal definition in international law potentially
also brings a challenge. Although legal reference it not a prerequisite, however, without a
legal reference, countries may perceive or construe the issue differently. Perhaps, the
character not to have legal definition follows its larger umbrella of environmental crimes. To
some extent, different state practices when addressing environmental issues form legal
framework contributing to this ill-defined concept of fisheries crimes. 911 Hence, the
perpetrators of fisheries crimes can be extradited if two conditions are met, those are, first of
all, if member states do not disagree for fisheries crimes to be additional protocol of the
Palermo Convention and secondly, like-minded states agree to be bound by the extradition
treaty, notwithstanding challenging with limited success, at the bilateral, regional or
multilateral levels of making the fisheries crimes extraditable crimes.
In the absence of a legally binding agreement, Ahmad Farooq delivers an overview that the
reciprocity principle can be applied. The extraditable crimes:
Offences that are punishable under the laws of both parties and either enumerated among the
extraditable offenses or found according to the formula for ascertaining extraditability in the
applicable treaty. In the absence of a treaty, if extradition is based on reciprocity, the offense
must be mutually recognized as extraditable. Where extradition is based on comity, it will
depend exclusively on the applicable national law. In addition to designating extraditable
offenses, the criminality of the relator's alleged conduct must satisfy the requirement of double
criminality, i.e., the offense charged must constitute a crime in the two legal systems. 912

It can be drawn from the previous explanation in this extradition section that Indonesia has
concluded an extradition treaty with Papua New Guinea, a non-state party to the Palermo
Convention. Although fisheries crimes are not covered by the Palermo Convention it is likely
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however, for Indonesia to include the crimes in the fisheries sector as extraditable offences
under a bilateral legally binding agreement.
2.1.4.2 Mutual Legal Assistance
Extradition is intertwined with mutual legal assistance as it is the continuation of extradition
which can be observed from the purposes of extradition and mutual legal assistance. The
former is purposed for a requested state to send a fugitive to the requesting state with the aim
of being tried and therefore punishment can be executed. Meanwhile, in regard to the latter,
its purpose is to get the requesting state to render assistance to the requested state in terms of
the judicial process such as obtaining the witness’, victim’s or expert’s testimonials by taking
other kinds of proof or by confirming judicial or other official records. 913 Mutual legal
assistance is provisioned in bilateral treaties concerning extradition between Indonesia and
India. It reads ‘Each Contracting State shall, to the extent permitted by its laws, afford the
other the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters in connection with the
offence for which extradition has been requested’.914 It can be observed that the two parties
are bound to provide mutual legal assistance for the extraditable offences covered by the said
treaty.
The Palermo Convention governs a specific provision concerning mutual legal assistance.
Article 18 stipulates that state parties shall afford one another to their best extent mutual legal
assistance in terms of investigation, prosecutions and judicial proceedings pertaining to all
offences covered by the Palermo Convention.915 In particular, the measure shall be extended
to; 1) the crimes established under articles 5, 6, 8, and 23 that are transnational and
organized; 2) the offences stipulated under any of the Protocols of the Palermo Convention in
which the states have provided their consent to be bound and 3) transnational serious crimes
encompassing an organized criminal group as referred to in Article 2(b) as well as in a larger
picture and 4) the offences under articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 involving ‘organized criminal group,
where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that victims, witnesses, proceeds,
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instrumentalities or evidence of such offences are located in the requested State party’.916
Nonetheless, the measures will come into effect in the case that the request is communicated
in an effective manner and the communication continues to be taken during the
implementations.917 As such, the way of communication plays a pivotal role in determining
the mutual legal assistance to be successfully executed. The requesting and requested states
should understand each other’s needs.
As guidance to have effective mutual legal assistance, the general principles have been
tabled, namely; 1) sufficiency of proof; 2) dual criminality; 3) double criminality and the
Palermo Convention in mutual legal assistance issues and 4) limits on transmission or use of
information acquired by mutual legal assistance. 918 Particular attention is paid to number
three to make it distinguishable from number two. The latter solely explains dual criminality
(the conduct is conceived as crimes in both requested and requesting states) while the former
refers to Article 18 (9) as a further scenario concerning the non-existence of dual criminality
allowing a state to refuse the request. In that case, the requested state may, when it perceives
appropriate, afford assistance in any circumstance possible, regardless of whether or not the
conduct in question would establish an offence in the requested state under its domestic
legislation.919 Moreover, Revised Manual Treaty on Extradition and on the Model Treaty on
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters outlines the sort of assistance that can be included in
the Mutual Assistance Treaty as follows:920
a. Taking evidence or statements from persons;
b. Assisting in the availability of detained persons or others to give evidence or assist
in investigations;
c. Effecting service of judicial documents;
d. Executing searches and seizures;
e. Examining objects and sites;
f. Providing information and evidentiary items;
g. Providing originals or certified copies of relevant documents and records, including
bank, financial, corporate or business records.
There are some exceptions in applying for mutual legal assistance. First of all is the matter of
political offence. Chiefly, the requested party can refuse the request for legal assistance on
political grounds. Secondly and thirdly are fiscal offence and military law, respectively.
916
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However, it is important to note that mutual assistance shall not be refused on the grounds of
secrecy of bank and similar financial institutions. 921 The different rule concerning fiscal
offence applies to extradition. It may not be refused for the sole reason that the offence is
conceived to involve fiscal matters. 922 Fourthly is if the request would prejudice the
sovereignty, security and public order 923 or other essential public interest. 924 Fifthly, it is
prohibited to undertake the requested action in national law. Sixthly is the application of de
minimis, while seventh is nemo bis in idem debet vexari (double jeopardy). The respective
eighth and ninth are incorrect procedure and human rights.925 The 10th is if the request has
been made on the grounds of ‘person’s race, sex, religion, nationality, ethnic origin or
political opinions or that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of those reasons’.926
Indonesia has adopted Law 1/2006 concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.
In addition to the refusal of mutual legal assistance by requested state parties, Indonesia has
made an exception for killing, or its attempt, towards the head of state/head of government
and terrorism as an exception to political offence. 927 Therefore, Indonesia will render the
relevant legal assistance to the other countries in the case of terrorism or if their head of
state/government is killed or attempted to be killed. This provision may face a hurdle in its
execution in the sense that the other countries govern them as political offences when making
a bilateral agreement or applying the reciprocity principle.
In bilateral and regional stages, Indonesia has made a serious effort in making mutual legal
assistance come into effect. There exist six bilateral treaties between Indonesia and other
countries and Indonesia is in the process of discussion or negotiation with four other
countries. The latter includes the United Arab Emirates, France, Brazil and Iran (as of 5
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December 2017). 928 With regard to the former, the countries with which Indonesia has
concluded legal assistance treaties are as follows:929
Table 7: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty on Criminal Matters between Indonesia
and Other Countries
No.

Treaty

1 Treaty on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal
Matters between the
Republic of Indonesia and
the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam
2 Treaty between the
Republic of Indonesia and
the Republic of India on
Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters
3 Agreement between the
Government of the
Republic of Indonesia and
the Government of the
Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of
China concerning Mutual
Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters
4 Treaty on Mutual Legal
Assistance in Criminal
Matters

Date and
Venue of
Signature
Jakarta, 2706-2013

Ratification
Status

Entry into Force

Ratified through
Law No.13/2015
on 18 November
2015

Entered into Force

New Delhi,
25-01-2011

Ratified through
Law No.9 /2014
on 11 March 2014

Entered into Force

Hong Kong,
03-04-2008

Ratified through
Law No.3/2012 on
28 March 2012

Entered into force

Kuala
Lumpur,
Malaysia, 2911-2004
Seoul, 30-032002

Ratified through
Law No.15/2008
on 30 April 2008

Entered into Force

Ratified through
Law No.8/2014 on
11 March 2014

Entered into Force

Ratified through
Law No.8/2006 on
18 April 2006

Entered into Force

5 Treaty between the
Republic of Indonesia and
the Republic of Korea on
Mutual Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters
6 Treaty between the
Jakarta, 24Republic of Indonesia and 07-2000
the People’s Republic of
China on Mutual Legal
928
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<http://www.interpol.go.id/id/berita/749-mengenal-bantuan-hukum-timbal-balik-mutual-legal-assistance-incriminal>.
929
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Data Collection of International Treaties, above n
894.

246

No.

Treaty

Date and
Venue of
Signature

Ratification
Status

Entry into Force

Assistance in Criminal
Matters
In the Southeast Asian region, 10-member countries of ASEAN signed the Treaty on Mutual
Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters on 29 November 2004.930 Nevertheless, these countries
have provided their consent to be bound by the treaty through different ratifications ranging
from 2005 to 2013.931 State parties to the treaty agree to render the following assistance:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)

Taking of evidence or obtaining voluntary statements from persons;
Making arrangements for persons to give evidence or to assist in criminal matters;
Effective service of judicial documents;
Executing searches and seizures;
Examining objects and sites;
Providing original or certified copies of relevant documents, records and items of evidence;
Identifying or tracing property derived from the committing of an offence and
instrumentalities of crime;
The restraining of dealings in property or the freezing of property derived from the
committing of an offence that may be recovered, forfeited or confiscated;
The recovery, forfeiture or confiscation of property derived from the committing of an
offence;
Locating and identifying witnesses and suspects; and
The provision of such other assistance as may be agreed, and which is consistent with the
objects of this Treaty and the laws of the Requested Party. 932

The scope of assistance or areas of cooperation contained in a treaty is not always identical to
the UNTOC. The comparison between Article 2(1) of the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance
in Criminal Matters and Article 18(3) of the Palermo Convention shows that some issues in
the Convention are not covered by the Treaty such as ‘making arrangements for persons to
give evidence or to assist in criminal matters’. This distinction can be justified as Article
18(3)(i) provides ‘Any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the
requested State Party’. 933 This article opens the possibilities for the state parties to the
relevant treaties to conclude the ambit of mutual assistance other than those stated in the
Palermo Convention.
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From above explanations on mutual legal assistance, it can be observed that the status of the
conduct as a crime holds an essential role in assuming mutual assistance. As applied in the
extradition treaty, the lack of criminal aspect on unreported and unregulated fishing makes it
challenging to secure mutual legal assistance. It would be a different story when a fisheries
crimes approach is taken. Although mutual assistance is regulated under the Palermo
Convention, it is unnecessary to include fisheries crimes as protocol to the Palermo
Convention for giving mutual legal assistance. Mutual legal assistance can be extended to
countries by using bilateral, regional or multilateral treaties or the reciprocity principle
provided that the countries so agree.
2.1.5. The Enhancement of Cooperation on Joint Law Enforcement Investigation.
One important aspect to address and combat illegal activities should be through law
enforcement. At the domestic level, the cooperation amongst law enforcement agencies such
as police, attorney, armed forces and other relevant agencies contributes through their duties,
to the success in enforcing the law. On the international stage, law enforcement would need
international cooperation since the crimes are undertaken by crossing into national
jurisdiction of the other countries. A coordinated transnational response is required to fight
against transnational organized crimes. As its networks span the world, transnational
measures to combat the criminals should also be extended to make sure that organized crime
networks are unable to easily relocate their operation to states or regions where loose criminal
justice comes from vulnerable collaboration.934
When facing IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, it would be challenging for countries to
enforce domestic and international law alone without the cooperation of other countries
because of their transnational character. For countries having the same concerns on the
prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, bilateral or
multilateral cooperation can be strengthened through legally or non-legally binding
agreements. Indonesia and Australia are committed to laying a strong bilateral foundation in
addressing marine problems. 2017 saw an important step for both countries when the two top
leaders, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo and Australia’s Prime Minister Malcolm
Turnbull signed a Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation. Among other things, the
collaborations agreed upon are:
934
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1) Enhanced Economic Partnership.
2) People-to-People Links.
3) Maritime Cooperation
Australia and Indonesia further recognized that IUU fishing is a complex and growing
problem and reaffirmed their commitment to support efforts to combat it. The leaders agreed
the two leaders would develop an Action Plan to implement the Joint Declaration. 935
The joint statement then was followed by the Joint Declaration on Maritime Cooperation
signed by Retno Marsudi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, and Julie Bishop,
Minister for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia on 26 February 2016.
Both leaders ‘will seek to deepen and broaden maritime cooperation’ with, amongst others,
the following objectives:
1) To improve the management and sustainability of living marine resources.
2) To strengthen cooperation to combat IUU fishing and crimes in the fisheries sector.
3) To promote the development of improved maritime infrastructure and greater regional
connectivity to help facilitate maritime trade, investment, services, and tourism.
4) To build closer cooperation between our maritime civil law enforcement agencies through
information sharing, capacity building and the conduct of bilateral cooperative activities.
5) To combat transnational organized crime committed at sea, through closer cooperation and
information sharing between law enforcement and justice agencies. 936

Dating back to previous years, Indonesia and Australia agreed to sign the Agreement between
the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation
(Lombok Treaty) on November 13th, 2006. It came to the concern of both countries that there
was the need to cooperate between relevant institutions and agencies, including prosecuting
authorities, in preventing and combating transnational crimes, in particular crimes related to
people smuggling and trafficking in person, money laundering, financing of terrorism,
corruption, illegal fishing, cybercrimes, illicit trafficking in narcotics drugs and psychotropic
substances and its precursors, illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition, explosives and other
dangerous materials and the illegal production thereof; and other types of crime if deemed
necessary by both Parties.937
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The initiatives taken by both leaders of Indonesia and Australia should be praised. It has laid
a strong foundation for the years to come on the issues of common interest. Nevertheless, it
should be highlighted that the joint statement and the joint declaration are not intended as
binding instruments between the two countries. The choice of words also determines less
importance of the statements such as using ‘will’ instead of ‘shall’.938 Therefore, to some
degree, these instruments will not be as effective as any legally binding mechanisms because
neither country is bound by the provisions including the cooperation on maritime civil law
enforcement agencies through information sharing and Combating Transnational Organized
Crime Committed at Sea between law enforcement and justice agencies.939
Considering that the cooperation between law enforcement and justice offices holds a vital
role in the investigation and prosecution process, the cooperation should be formulated in the
instrument with a legally binding character. This formulation can be achieved through an
instrument such as the Organized Crime Convention. Again, the hurdle comes from the
absence of IUU fishing or fisheries crimes in the Convention. If both IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes are treated as crimes, these issues reserve the right to refer to legally binding
provisions including concerning law enforcement cooperation as stated in Article 27 of the
Convention. This article reads ‘States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another,
consistent with their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the
effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offenses covered by this
Convention’.940 In this provision, it is a must for state parties to strengthen cooperation in
order to make law enforcement effective. UNODC explains this further through methods of
law enforcement cooperation. Travaux Préparatoires of this Convention suggest some
flexibility in its application concerning ‘the extent and manner of cooperation’. For instance,

Treaty was signed on 13 November 2006 in Lombok, Indonesia and entered into force on February 7th, 2008.
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provisions on defence, law enforcement, counter-terrorism, intelligence, maritime security, aviation safety and
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organizations on security-related issues and community understanding and people-to-people contact. The
implementation of this treaty is strengthened further by Joint Understanding on a Code of Conduct between the
Republic of Indonesia and Australia in Implementation of the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and
Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation signed on 28 August 2014 in Bali, Indonesia.
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the cooperation can be denied if it violates domestic laws and policies.941
On the practical level, it is frequently discovered that the investigators need to detect and
gather the proof from victims living in the other countries or to collect information aiming to
verify and support the testimonials from witnesses.942 This condition can be met when states,
parties to the Organized Crime Convention, cooperate in establishing a joint law enforcement
investigation. This measure can also be extended when curbing fisheries crimes. Although
fisheries crimes operate as transnationally organized, the international society has tended to
pay it insufficient attention since it is not adequately comprehended as a crime. As a result,
there is a shortage of ‘a coordinated criminal law enforcement response’.943 By treating this
issue as a transnationally organized crime, countries would obtain the advantage to strengthen
and enhance their law enforcement investigation.
2.1.6. Pathway to the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.
It is common nowadays that the flow of people crossing national boundaries increases the
possibility to imprison or impose other forms of liberty deprivation to nationals of foreign
countries when they commit a crime. This circumstance then promotes further concern
pertaining to the proper approach to cope with such sentenced persons.944 Some scenarios
remain such as deporting the crime-committed individuals to their original country or sending
them to the local correctional institutions to serve their sentences and then be expelled to their
home country following the completion of the punishment. The former may face drawback
such as the avoidance of the sentence by the convicted persons because of the internal rule or
policy of the receiving state, or they can be rehabilitated particularly in the case of local
regulations of the sending state allowing the latter.945
The violation of fisheries laws and regulations along its value chain, when undertaken in a
transnational and organized fashion, makes it possible to receive transnational treatment
including the transfer of sentenced persons. Nevertheless, it is not possible without the crime
941
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attached to it, the adequacy of the domestic legal framework of the relevant states and
international cooperation. The transfer of convicted persons is discerned to be an important
tool of cooperation to thwart and combat crime being the purpose of the 1998 United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the United
Nations Convention against Corruption and the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime.946
Under the Organized Crime Convention, the arrangement on the transfer of a sentenced
person has been regulated under Article 17:
States Parties may consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements
on the transfer to their territory of persons sentenced to imprisonment or other forms of
deprivation of liberty for offenses covered by this Convention, in order that they may complete
their sentences there. 947

In comparison with the other provisions in the Convention, such as mutual legal assistance948
and extradition,949 the arrangement on the transfer of sentenced persons is relatively shorter
and does not go into much detail. The choice of language such as the word ‘may’ rather than
‘shall’ in most subparagraphs is ‘softer’ than is used in mutual legal assistance and
extradition. It is arguably for the reason that the Convention provides not only mandatory but
also non-mandatory instruments to facilitate international cooperation.950 The use of a softer
term is the result of the negotiation process amongst negotiating states which is likely to
receive more acceptance from the states in order to provide its consent to be bound by the
Convention. Another limitation is it only contains the suggestion for state parties to conclude
bilateral and multilateral treaties if they wish to transfer the sentenced persons from the
sending states to the receiving states.
As of January 2018, Indonesia has neither established bilateral nor multilateral agreement
with other states nor adopted laws regulating the transfer of sentenced persons although many
offers have been received from several countries to conclude such agreement, 951 such as
Malaysia, Thailand, China/Hong Kong, the Philippines, France, Nigeria, Iran, Bulgaria,
946
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Rumania, Brazil, Australia, Syria, India and England.952 This is a true challenge in particular
when considering the data provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia that 4
227 883 Indonesia nationals live overseas. Indonesian workers working overseas (Tenaga
Kerja Indonesia/TKI) provide 60% of that total number. The rest belongs to students,
professionals, crews of ships and others.953
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia reveals further that the number of Indonesian
workers involved in the judicial process has increased. There exist 4415 Indonesian workers
imprisoned in other countries with the majority serving their sentences in Malaysia for cases
of immigration and fighting. Of these, around 283 of them are serving their sentences in
Australia due to people smuggling, drugs and immigration breaches. The other countries
where Indonesia nationals have been imprisoned are Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines and
Thailand with 40 convicts, respectively. Likewise, foreign nationals imprisoned in Indonesia
also confirm quite a significant number accounting for 682 foreigners as of March 1st, 2013.
Most of them are of Malaysian nationality with as many as 144 persons in total.954 As a
response, Indonesia has initiated making a law on the transfer of convicted persons. A draft
academic paper was concluded in 2013 and a bill circulated to the experts and public to
garner their input.955 However, for the time being, it seems that the adoption process from bill
into law has shown slow progress and needs to be pushed forward. If Indonesia has it enacted
into law, the bilateral or multilateral treaties will find legal basis for conclusion with the other
countries.
The stipulation of law on transfer of sentenced persons as well as its bilateral and multilateral
agreements would bring more gravitas to Indonesia's priority to endorse fisheries crimes and
IUU fishing before international forums. Several concerns should be taken into account.
Firstly, it bestows more protection to Indonesians working in the sector of fisheries as fishing
vessel’s crews or other employment related to fisheries. They can be subject to legal
proceedings and their transfer is necessary for the sake of rehabilitation, resocialization and
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reintegration. The last three aspects interplay when sentences are applied, with the offenders’
rehabilitation important ensuring they receive resocialization and reintegration into the
society.956
Secondly, it would complement Indonesia’s strong commitment to endorse fisheries crimes in
relation to the Organized Crime Convention. By putting the domestic regulation and
concluding bilateral agreement of transfer of convicted person in place, Indonesia would
conform not only with Article 17 as its main reference to the transfer of sentenced persons
but also Article 31(3) concerning the Prevention which reads ‘States Parties shall endeavour
to promote the reintegration into society of persons convicted of offences covered by this
Convention’.957
Thirdly, by concluding the transfer of sentenced persons agreement, Indonesia has
demonstrated its desire to protect the human rights of not only its nationals committing
crimes overseas but also citizens of foreign countries. In international law, the transfer of
convicted persons has a robust legal basis under the law of international human rights. In the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 10(3) specifies that ‘The
penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be
their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated from adults
and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status’.958 It can be inferred that
reformation and social rehabilitation as human right values are highlighted as the primary
objective of prisoner treatment. In a case where Indonesian nationals are imprisoned in other
countries, their family members would find it more difficult in paying them a visit due to
financial and time constraints. Likewise, it applies also to foreign nationals committing a
crime in Indonesia. The perpetrators of illegal fishing and fisheries crimes can be Indonesian
or foreign nationals committing crimes outside their home country.
Fourthly, on a more technical matter, the transfer of sentenced persons program can provide
the sending and receiving states with the means to cooperate on how to formulate and find
agreement on some technical matters such as the scheduling of arrival and means of
956
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transportation, information on the crimes committed and their daily activities which may be
necessary information for the sending state to prevent them from possible return to the
sending states.959 This is important in particular in the case of sex predators and perpetrators
of child pornography whose operation is transnational and their movement is usually
undetected.
However, some conditions can be discussed when negotiating the agreement of transfer of
sentenced persons before transferring the convicted individuals to the home country. These
are namely; final judgement, minimum sentence remaining to be served, dual criminality, ties
to the administering state, states’ consent, sentenced persons’ consent, human rights, mental
health, discretion consideration and cumulative effect.960 With regard to the application of
dual criminality, the European Union through Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA sets some
exceptions for offences without verification of the dual criminality of the act such as
terrorism, trafficking in persons, corruption, fraud and so forth provided that ‘they are
punishable in the issuing State by a custodial sentence or a measure involving deprivation of
liberty for a maximum period of at least three years, and as they are defined by the law of the
issuing State’.961
2.2. Disadvantages.
In perceiving IUU fishing and fisheries crimes from the perspective of criminality, it offers
not only advantages but also disadvantages. As the advantages have been presented and
discussed in the previous section, this part focuses on the downsides of the efforts in the
interplay of crimes with fisheries offences. Chiefly, it would be broken into two studies, those
being, having elaborative discussion with the Organized Crime Convention as a primary
reference and without the reference to the Organized Crime Convention.
2.2.1. Dual Criminality as Precondition Required for Extradition and Mutual Legal
Assistance.
Extradition, by signing bilateral agreements on extradition in order to remove safe hides of
severe criminals, has long been practiced by states since as far back as the late 19th century. It
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is formal, and in most cases involves a treaty-based process with the main objective to send
or return the offenders to the state where they are sought in relation to unlawful activities. It
can be on a voluntary basis without legally binding agreement except that this would rarely
happen.962 Extradition cannot be performed on the convicted person without the presence of
dual criminality since it is deeply embedded in the principle of extradition law.963 Dual or
double criminality is based on mutual obligations964 and the reciprocal account of the crimes
committed which is between the states. The principle of nulla poena sine lege, which literally
means ‘no punishment without law’, applies in this context.965
Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance have been stipulated in Articles 16 and 18 of the
Organized Crime Convention respectively. Article 16 (1) of the Organized Crime Convention
outlines dual criminality as prerequisite to extradition of the sentenced persons for the
offences under the Convention or an offence governed in the Article 3 (1)(a) or (b) ‘provided
that the offence for which extradition is sought is punishable under the domestic law of both
the requesting State Party and the requested State Party’. It is identified in Article 16(1) that
there are two main divisions of crimes in which double criminality is required, those are, in
general, offences stipulated in the Convention and particular offences regulated in Article 3
(1)(a) or (b).966 In conforming with Article 16(1), it is not necessary for double criminality to
apply to all crimes listed in the article but it should apply to one of the crimes as prescribed
because the choice of word is ‘or’ which means ‘alternative’ or it can be applied to one of the
crimes instead of ‘and’ which is ‘cumulative’ or it should apply and take effect to all crimes.
It is admitted that different states may employ different definitions with regard to dual
criminality. In this sense, the United Nations Convention against Corruption emphasizes the
conduct-based approach instead of technical terms as follows:
In matters of international cooperation, whenever dual criminality is considered a requirement,
it shall be deemed fulfilled irrespective of whether the laws of the requested State Party place
the offence within the same category of offence or denominate the offence by the same
terminology as the requesting State Party, if the conduct underlying the offence for which
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assistance is sought is a criminal offence under the laws of both States Parties.967

Therefore, if one state has a broader scope in its definition then the requested state, as far as
the offence can be included in the laws of both countries, this signifies that the offence that
can be extradited.968
It is interesting to note that dual criminality requirement will be no longer necessary when the
offences merely involve organized criminal groups and the extraditable individuals are
identified in the requested state without considering the presence of the transnational element
of the crimes committed.969 It is likely that the legitimacy to extradite the offenders in the
absence of transnational requirement without taking into account the transnational nature of
the crime comes from the notion that the locus of the offence is in the territory of the
administrating state, but the offender has absconded to the requested state. Thus, the
consideration is that the offender has committed the crime in the requesting state before
leaving the country. The transnational concern is not present in this case because its operation
is not transnational, but in crossing national borders.
The same case applied to extradition concerning double criminality is also pertinent to mutual
legal assistance practices. It is provided in Article 18(9) in which state parties to the
Organized Crime Convention may refuse to render mutual assistance in the case that double
criminality does not exist. Nevertheless, the state party may render assistance when
possible.970 In practice, double criminality is not always the case as a requirement for legal
assistance. Some states do not demand dual criminality, but the other state party may request
the condition of double criminality in their mutual assistance treaty. 971 This different
perception and practice may occur as the principle of double criminality has not been
conceived as an international custom and a binding rule for the states, except when it is
concluded through statutes and treaties between countries.972
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In the region of Southeast Asia, ASEAN published the ASEAN Handbook on International
Legal Cooperation in Trafficking in Persons Cases with the assistance of UNODC and the
Australia Government. Within the regional context of mutual legal assistance to address the
trafficking of persons, ASEAN adopts the dual criminality approach as a prerequisite for
mutual legal assistance.973 Although double criminality can be perceived as a legal barrier to
mutual legal assistance practice, this principle can also be conceived as a compelling
rationale for countries to criminalize the trafficking in persons as defined in international
law.974
It can be observed from the above elaboration that under the Organized Crime Convention,
Articles 16(1) and 18(9) govern dual criminality as a requirement for extradition and mutual
legal assistance. Hence, one of the hurdles in treating IUU fishing and fisheries crimes under
the Organized Crime Convention would be the double criminality issue. The long-standing
distinction of schools of thought around fisheries management and crime in perceiving IUU
fishing and fisheries offences exists in the discussion. For those countries who are the
followers of the former school of thought, their legal system does not allow the perpetration
to be a serious crime. Conversely, for the latter school of thought, the legal system would
admit the offenders to be criminals for whom extradition is legitimate. This fundamental
problem would be difficult to resolve.
A possible breakthrough comes from bilateral cooperation by concluding a legally-binding
agreement or between like-minded states to negotiate and adopt multilateral treaties
regulating extradition and mutual legal assistance. Through this arrangement and legal
instrument, state parties or member states can formulate and adopt extradition and mutual
legal assistance with the exception of illegal fishing and fisheries crimes. Nevertheless, the
basic principle of double criminality is that the committed offence should be treated under the
criminal law of the administering state and the requested country should not be absent. In
order to promote international cooperation, it is recommended for states to construe or
formulate dual criminality in a more flexible fashion. It is further explained that the requested
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state should put more focus on the total gravity of the alleged crimes albeit with some
differences of its component establishing extradition or mutual legal assistance.975
2.2.2. Challenges for International Convention as the Basis for International
Cooperation.
In fighting against IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, the international community holds a key
role in contributing to the success of legal process application such as extradition and mutual
legal assistance. States should cooperate in finding the best possible way to negotiate and
conclude any instruments including “soft and hard laws” as a means to establish, secure and
strengthen commitment amongst themselves. Some international conventions relevant to
crimes in the fisheries sector include but are not limited to Law of the Sea Convention, the
foremost the Organized Crime Convention, 976 the United Nations Convention against
Corruption,977 the 1993 Compliance Agreement, the 2012 Cape Town Agreement and the
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Work in the Fishing Sector
of 2007.978
As a main tool to combat transnational crimes, the Organized Convention has been pointed
out for its lack or its weakness to address transnational organized crimes. Some examples are
its limited strategy in fighting against corruption and the increasing nexus of transnational
organized crimes and political power.979 It shows that there are many challenges to overcome
in the implementation of legally binding instruments such as the Organized Crime
Convention. Apart from its shortfall, there are a number of considerations Indonesia should
pay attention to once endorsing the Organized Crime Convention as the legal basis for
international collaboration as the nature of treaty application.
2.2.2.1. The Scope of the Convention.
It is usual for a treaty to define its scope of activities in a particular article or paragraph. This
also applies to the Organized Crime Convention. The scope of this Convention has been
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provided through its three protocols and in Article 3(a)(b). The crimes that have been
regulated in the Convention include the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Sea and Air and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Component and Ammunition. 980 Each protocol has its own
arrangement and state parties to the Organized Crime Convention have their own decisions
consenting to be bound by the protocol. One instance that can be drawn is Indonesia.
As a state party to Transnational Organized Crime,981 Indonesia has ratified the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children982 and
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. 983 Nonetheless,
Indonesia has not provided its consent to be bound by the last protocol of the Organized
Crime Convention, the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Component and Ammunition.
From the scope of the Convention, it can be observed that IUU fishing or offences in the
fisheries sector are not listed in the Convention. If fisheries offences are approved by state
parties as to be transnational organized crimes under the Convention, two approaches can be
followed, which are, by amending Article 3(1)(a) or making a new protocol supplementing
the Organized Crime Convention. From the two processes, it would be more accessible to be
regulated under a protocol for the reason that the member countries may have to ratify or may
not have provided their consent. However, the process to be included would pose a number of
challenges to conform to several classifications as transnational organized crime under the
Convention.
2.2.2.2. Monist and Dualist Schools of Thought.
A further challenge that can be observed is the application of monism/dualism. This
application relates to national practices in perceiving international legal order in its

980

Transnational Organized Crime Convention and its three protocols.
UNTOC Ratification Law of Indonesia.
982
Law Number 14/2009 concerning Ratification of Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime.
983
Law Number 15/2009 concerning Ratification of Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
981

260

relationship with the domestic legal framework. 984 Both schools of thought approach
international treaties from a different perspective. The traditional scholarship on the
implementation of convention or the other legally binding agreements are attentive to the
discussion of monism and dualism legal frameworks. 985 This promotes general debate
amongst scholars because the definition is not agreed.
In international law, the burning question to examine the profound concern on the
relationship between national law and international law has been translated into the concepts
of monism and dualism. These two dominating concepts remain in the sphere of the law of
treaties when a country determines to make a national commitment to express its consent to
be bound by international treaty through any means of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, or by other means if so decided.986 It is evident that on the one hand, the dualist
approach would play a role in this sense since the constitution of the relevant country does
not accord a special status to international treaties. The legal effect of international treaties
would take place only if domestic legislation has been promulgated to incorporate the
provisions of the treaty into a country’s national legal system. On the other hand, the monist
doctrine proposes that international treaties can be part of national law when they have been
concluded pursuant to the constitution and have come into force for the related countries.
Nonetheless, a set of legislation is still needed in many cases except for ‘self-executing'
treaties.987
Despite being recognized as distinct legal systems with different focuses and purposes,988 the
intersection of both schools of thought suggests that their existence appears to give rise to no
substantial distinction in force. As regarded by Prof. Sompong Sucharitkul;
The intimate relationship between international law and national or domestic law is therefore
boundless and infinite. Their inter-connection is complex and intense to such an extent that
there seems to be very little difference in practice between “monism” and “dualism”, nor
indeed between the different theories of “monism” or “dualism”.989
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The small distinction between monist and dualist doctrines can be further explained in
Anthony Aust’s suggestion that dualism is not the opposite of monism since many domestic
constitutions encompass both, or something in between, along with their variations of the
components of dualism and monism.990
The proponents of monism discern the national legal order and international legal framework
as being of the same legal system.991 In relation to this, one of the prominent scholars asserts
that international law has a vital position in the system of unitary law, and in that sense, the
domestic legal system should always be in conformity with international law. In order to
make this monism takes effect, it is the active role of domestic legal actors to transform
international law provisions into domestic legal norms in conformity with national laws and
regulations.992 The essential of the monism tenet comes from the notion that a treaty may,
without legislation, become part of national law when the treaty has been adopted in
conformity with the constitution of the relevant state and the treaty has a binding force for the
state.993 In practice, ‘the key distinguishing feature of monist legal systems, as defined herein,
is that at least some treaties are incorporated into the domestic legal order without the need
for any legislative act, other than the act authorizing the executive to conclude the treaty’.
Some countries practicing the monist system are, to name a few, Austria, Chile, China,
Columbia, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South
Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United States.994
Conversely, the dualists are of the view that the international legal regime may merge into the
domestic legal order when the relevant state expresses its consent to be bound by a particular
treaty. In other words, the most important feature of dualism, distinguishing it from monism,
is that the formal status of a treaty can be granted in the domestic legal system in the case
where the legislature enacts a regulation to integrate the treaty into the national law.995 In the
case where both systems have a problem in their application, the municipal court would refer
to basing its decision on municipal legislation. This dualism tenet holds an important position
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in the era of positivism observing a nation-state as the only political authority unit and legal
obligation source. As such, international law needs to be embedded into the domestic system
in order to have legal effect.996 The executive in many dualist states has the constitutional
power to employ a legally-binding international commitment on behalf of the state without
securing legislative approval in advance. However, their executives will consult with the
legislative branch prior to concluding ‘important’ agreements. 997 Some states that have
adopted the dualist system include Australia, Canada, India and the United Kingdom.998
Apart from both legal systems, there are many states in which their national constitutions
employ both dualist and monist components.999 More complications arise from the debate by
international law academics that differ in perceiving the classification of states over their
domestic legal system in responding to the legal effect of the international treaty on its
municipal law. One instance corresponding to this matter is South Africa. In David Sloss’
assertion, South Africa applies the monist principle in its domestic legal system. 1000
Nevertheless, other scholars are of the view that South Africa combines both monist and
dualist schools of thought. Professor G. Ferreira and Professor A. Ferreira-Snyman make
their view clear that South Africa does not follow a particular monist or dualist school but
instead, a mixture of the two. They base their argument on the provisions of Sections 231 and
232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996.1001 Another example is
Indonesia. As observed by Simon Butt, Indonesia does not seem to make a particular
preference in entering international law into domestic law. The Constitution of Indonesia
(Undang-Undang Dasar 1945) does not offer any direction on the status of international law
within Indonesia’s domestic legal system.1002 The only legal reference in the Constitution is
Article 11 which reads:
(1) The President, with the approval of the National Parliament, declares war and peace and
creates agreements with other nations.
(2) When creating international agreements that give rise to consequences that are broad and
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fundamental to the life of the people, create financial burdens for the State and/or require
amendments to legislation or the enactment of new legislation, the President must obtain
the agreement of the National Parliament.
(3) Further provisions on international agreements are to be regulated by statute.1003

Indonesian law through Law on International Agreement adopted in 2000 focuses on the
procedural matter of international agreement within the context of domestic and international
practices.1004 A high-ranking officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs holds a
view that the mixed policy in between the two concepts of the dualist model of the Germans
and the Netherlands’ monist model, has been the approach of Indonesia as its recent practice.
This approach is demonstrated through the dual sense extending to the law accepting a treaty
by the Indonesian Government.1005
The discussion on monist and dualist legal systems would always be interesting since
countries have their preference in deciding their legal system. The complication continues
when some countries such as Indonesia and South Africa are seen to not follow a particular
tenet but take the middle road of both schools instead. In this sense, it also applies to the state
parties to the Organized Crime Convention. State parties of the Convention are heterogonous
in employing tenets of monist, dualist or both. Furthermore, it is stated in Article 27 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning Internal Law and Observance of
Treaties that ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its
failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to Article 46’.1006 This article is
based on the contractual onus legally binding the state parties. It is not allowable for parties
to avoid responsibilities for the performance of the treaty particularly to justify their failure to
apply a treaty by invoking their domestic laws and regulations.1007 This article is understood
as an extension of its previous Article 26 regulating pacta sunt servanda.1008 Pursuant to the
Manual on Legal Assistance and Extradition published by UNODC, monist and dualist
approaches are related to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
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asserting that ‘non-incorporation of the provisions of the Convention into domestic laws does
not mean that a state is not bound by the provisions of the Convention once it is ratified’.1009
However, linking monism and dualism under the interpretation of Article 27 is incorrect in
this context. It comes from the argument that regardless of monism or dualism that state
parties follow, both schools of thought apply different means of being bound by treaties.
Monism would be a state party when expressing its consent while a treaty would bind dualist
countries after ratifying it through relevant domestic regulations. For dualism, legally binding
rules extend their legal effect after internal laws have enacted them. As such, within the
framework of the Organized Crime Convention, dualism can be a challenge in the sense that
the time needed for it to be an integral part of domestic law system will vary amongst states.
2.2.2.3. Reservation to a Treaty.
The performance of state parties in implementing a treaty including the Organized Crime
Convention is related to the provisions of reservation and declaration. Article 2 of the UN
Convention on the Law of Treaties defines reservation as ‘a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions
of the treaty in their application to that State’.1010 Reservation can be observed as a limitation
to the obligation of a treaty the state party should render because it is purported to exclude or
modify the legal effect of the treaty. Further arrangement on reservation is regulated under
Articles 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23. Article 19 concerning Formulation of Reservations reads:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, make a
reservation unless:
(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation
in question, may be made; or
(c) The reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. 1011

Some international conventions encompassing reservation in the provision include the
Organized Crime Convention and International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
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All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. 1012 Meanwhile, some international
agreements are prohibiting reservations such as:
1. Statute of the International Criminal Court;1013
2. Law of the Sea Convention;1014
3. Disarmament treaty such as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction;1015
4. Environmental treaty such as the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants.1016
In the Organized Crime Convention and its protocols, the regulation on reservation has been
stipulated in some articles such as Article 35 of the Organized Crime Convention,1017 Article
20 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,1018 Article 15 of the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime1019 and Article 16 of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking
in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.1020 These articles regulate the
same arrangement on dispute settlements. Therefore, state parties may make a reservation
merely on how to resolve a dispute that may occur during the application of the Convention
and its Protocols. They are not allowed to make a reservation on the other articles but solely
on the settlement of disputes. Some parties have made reservations in particular on Article
35(2) including, amongst others, Algeria, Azerbaijan, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
1012
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Belize, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, China, Colombia, El Salvador and Fiji.1021
It seems that the Organized Crime Convention does not admit state parties to modify or
exclude the legal effect of the substance of the Convention along with the protocols. State
parties may make reservation only on the choice of forum when state parties’ consent to
address the problems arising from the interpretation and application of the Convention. If
fisheries crimes or offences in fisheries are adopted to be additional protocols to the
Organized Crime Convention, a reservation would likely be allowed on the matter concerning
dispute settlements since the state parties to the Convention did not govern the reservation in
a particular and independent clause but instead, specifically in disputes settlement provisions.
The reference to this particular reservation on disputes settlement in Organized Crime can be
invoked in Article 19(b) laying down the foundation ruling that a state may formulate a
reservation unless the treaty ‘provides that only specified reservations, which do not include
the reservation in question, may be made’.1022
It is typical that a reservation can be made with regard to one or more particular articles such
as on dispute settlement.1023 A closer look at Article 19(b) discloses that this article deals with
prohibited reservation despite it being implicitly revealed. The prohibition is taken e
contrario from the article allowing for particular reservations. If the treaty in question
governs specified reservations, it can be assumed that the other reservations are intended to
be omitted. This comprehension can be asserted by the word “only” emphasizing the
argument.1024 Hence, the Organized Crime Convention follows the specified reservation rule
and it is not allowable to make a reservation to provisions other than the particular
permissible clauses.
2.2.3. Different Legal Approach of States in Discerning Environmental Crimes.
The efforts by countries to observe and relate fisheries offences with criminal aspects
illustrates that environmental issues have become a crucial matter in the global sphere.
Environmental protection is not simply nature related but also related to the universal
preservation of nature which marks a significant contribution to the life of human beings in
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both short and long terms. United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
(UNICRI) conceives that environmental crime and its connection with other sorts of crime
contributes to a grave and increasing danger for the development and stability of the world
and to international security.1025 Environmental crimes along with the other organized crimes
are an emerging threat that has also been conceived by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.1026
Despite the environmental problems faced by countries, environmental crimes often receive
improper response from some of the countries. Several countries have perceived this type of
crime as being a less important issue than the other crimes. 1027 This approach creates a
minimum deterrence effect and the probability of the crime being repeated remains high. The
main grounds given as reason for environmental crimes are that they chiefly carry low risks
and high profits resulting from ‘poor governance and widespread corruption, minimal
budgets to police, prosecution and courts, inadequate institutional support, political
interference and low employee morale, minimal benefits to local communities and rising
demand, in particular in Asia’.1028
The increase in environmental crimes in recent years has been contributed to by, among other
things, the engagement of organized criminal groups operating across national
jurisdictions.1029 In the fisheries sector, the involvement of transnational organized crime has
been discovered in many cases. Organized crime such as human trafficking takes place
widely in the fisheries industry for the purpose of forced labour. Given the fact that fishing
vessels have not been recognized as any part of the international regime in previous years in
neither international safety standards such as the International Convention on the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) nor in particular agreements on the working and living conditions of the
fishermen under the auspices of ILO, the fishing vessels are not subject to inspection at ports
in order to comply with relevant international agreements.1030
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However, in accordance with current developments, the safety of crews of fishing vessels is
appropriately protected after the Convention concerning Work in the Fishing Sector of 2007
entered into force on 16 November 2017. This convention opens up the opportunity to ensure
the safety of fishers on board and the safe operation of fishing vessels. 1031 With the
conclusion of this Convention, fishing vessels flying the flag of state parties to the
Convention shall comply with its provisions including the inspection by relevant officers. If
this Convention can be effectively implemented, the operation of organized crime networks
in the fisheries sector can be limited.
2.2.3.1. Malum rohibitum.
The legal construction invoked by states in defining, interpreting and responding to
environmental crimes falls under specific institutional and cultural frameworks. The nexus
between ‘harm’ and the criminalization including the sanction process is sometimes referred
to as the relationship between economy and ecology. Rob White explores further that there
exist two different schools of thought that can be considered in observing the connectivity
between environment and crimes. Firstly, Illegality or malum prohibitum, the principle of
which underlines behaviour that is unlawful according to the law, but in general, this
behaviour is perceived as less serious than other sorts of social harms. The proponents of this
tenet believe that damages to the environment are regarded as normal since it is the
consequence of industrial development which also offers some benefits. This circumstance
promotes a middle position between acceptable or problematic.1032 As a result, the regulation
holds a key role suggesting how to ‘control the problem’.1033 One instance of this middle
position is the regulation on maximum allowable pollution.
2.2.3.2. Malum in se.
The second principle is severe harm or malum in se. This school of thought upholds the view
that the behaviour is wrong by nature, and it is therefore conceived as serious. In practice,
this principle prohibits particular substances and/or actions. There exist two types of
prosecution to this crime. First is the recognition of ‘ecocide as a bona fide crime’ and second
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is the existence of institutional constructions in which the crimes could be prosecuted with
the proper available sanctions.1034
The two principles of malum prohibitum and malum in se can be observed as the basic
reference for countries to formulate their legal system in responding to environmental crimes.
A further specific explanation is presented with regard to the prosecution of the latter
principle, malum in se. The acceptance of ecocide as bona fide crime seems to be followed by
countries imposing strict criminal laws against environmental offences. Conversely, the latter
prosecution relies on the available sanctions without referring rigidly to criminal laws. Within
the perspective of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, those two principles explain the
complication that may emerge when endorsing fisheries offences as part of the environmental
aspect with a crime’s perspective.
2.2.4. Fisheries Crime on the High Seas.
The other challenge when combatting fisheries crime is the jurisdictional issue of law
enforcement on the high seas. This jurisdictional problem carries more complexity in
addressing this transnational crime. Before delving deeper into this problem, it is necessary to
touch upon the discussion about the term fisheries crimes that can be referred to as it relates
to the jurisdiction that states may have when their related officers undertake law enforcement.
The lack of legal definition of fisheries crime creates difficulty in making a precise analysis
on which activities may fall into the category of crimes in the fisheries sector. In its
publication on Combating Transnational Organized Crime Committed at Sea, UNODC
perceives that fisheries crime refers to illegal fishing only. This term is not intended to
represent the collective terms of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing with which it is
frequently associated, but the independent term of illegal fishing is considered in this
context.1035
As fisheries crime has developed further and gained more attention from countries, UNODC
and WWF jointly convened the Fisheries Crime Expert Group Meeting in Vienna on 24-26
February 2016 in the twenty-fifth session of CCPCJ. This session was aimed at facilitating
the comprehension of fisheries crimes and to identify proper criminal law enforcement tools
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to combat crime. The panel of experts had a shared understanding that fisheries crime is not
only related to fishing activity, but also covers its planning including concerning financial,
insurance, ownership and vessels’ registration. The other related crimes listed in this
document comprise 25 unlawful activities as examples of fisheries crimes throughout the
entire fisheries supply and value chains. Those crimes include (as listed in its Annex 2):1036
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Bribery and corruption;
Customs offences;
Arms trafficking;
Document forgeries, including falsification of permits, licences, catch documentation, etc;
Drugs trafficking
Fraud;
Human rights violations, especially crew conditions tantamount to slavery, kidnapping or
human trafficking;
Illegal fishing/ violation of flag state and/or coastal state fisheries laws and regulations;
Insurance fraud and related offences;
Migrant smuggling;
Misrepresentation;
Mislabelling;
Money laundering;
Murder and grievous bodily harm;
Obstruction of justice;
Offences under international marine/environmental law (eg the 1973 International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and its annexes);
Organised crime and racketeering;
Tax violations;
Theft;
Violation of corporation law;
Violation of hygiene and food safety standards;
Violation of international labour law standards;
Violation of vessel safety laws and regulations (crew and vessel);
Violation of navigation laws;
Violations of merchant shipping laws.

It can be observed from the outcome document of this meeting of experts that fisheries
crimes elements can be divided into two major parts; fisheries offences and related crimes
including transnational organized crimes. The crimes committed in the fisheries activities
together with those 25 crimes as listed constitute cross-sectoral illicit activities.
There exist two highly relevant legal references in the form of treaties that can be invoked
when discussing the interplay between transnational organized crime at sea and maritime
jurisdiction, these are, the LOSC and the Organized Crime Convention including its three
protocols. Jurisdictional aspect in this context is so relevant in the sense of the response that
states should have and the need to cooperate in enforcing the relevant laws when illicit
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activities take place at sea. In the LOSC, the ocean space has been divided into three
maritime zones, which are, 1) sovereignty (territorial sea, archipelagic waters and internal
waters),1037 2) sovereign rights (EEZ and continental shelf)1038 and 3) high seas (maritime
zone outside of sovereignty and sovereign rights).1039 Of particular importance is the attention
paid to fisheries and criminal activities on the high seas for the specific purpose of this
section. Criminals are attracted to undergo their operations in this area since they do not fall
under the typical enforcement jurisdiction of states. On the high seas, freedom of high seas
principle (mare liberum) is applied and exercised under the conditions set by LOSC and the
other international law rules. This freedom comprises:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Freedom of navigation;
Freedom of overflight;
Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international
law, subject to Part VI;
5. Freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in Section 2;
6. Freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 1040

In this circumstance, the focus is paid to freedom of navigation and freedom of fishing. The
freedom of navigation has been a customary rule. 1041 With regard to the jurisdiction of
vessels and their crews, Article 92(1) states that:
Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly
provided for in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port
of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.1042

This Article 92(1) should be translated as that the flag state (the state of registry) assumes the
sole jurisdiction over their vessels and their crew when sailing on the high seas.1043
It is worthwhile to invoke relevant rules concerning fishing on the high seas when observing
law enforcement on fisheries crimes in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. Under the
LOSC, freedom of fishing is granted to all countries. However, states shall co-operate in
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managing the fisheries resources 1044 and are obliged to impose measures to control their
nationals when fishing on the high seas.1045 The right to fish on the high seas is limited to
three conditions encompassing: 1) their treaty obligations; 2) rights and duties, as well as
interest of coastal states, stipulated in Articles 63(2) and 64 to 67; and 3) the provisions of
the section.1046 Some fisheries arrangements on the high seas are not stand alone rules as
these are also regulated in the EEZ in their relation to conservation of shared stocks such as
straddling fish and highly migratory species in both maritime zones through cooperation in
appropriate sub-regional, regional or international organizations.1047 In order to put in place
those duties and obligations on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species, likeminded countries have established RFMOs.1048
As asserted by Stefán Ásmundsson, RFMOs are divided into three different categories,
namely, general RFMOs, tuna RFMOs and specialized RFMOs. As of July 2016, there
existed eight general RFMOs, five tuna RFMOs and at least three specialized RFMOs.1049 A
book published in 2010 reveals that more than forty RFMOs had been founded in which ten
were created under FAO auspices and the remaining RFMOs were created through the
conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements between states.1050 More importantly, flag
states that are not members or participants to RFMOs are not discharged from the obligation
to cooperate, in accordance with the Convention and this Agreement, in the conservation and
management of the relevant straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.1051 In
combatting IUU fishing, RFMOs hold pivotal roles such as:1052
1. Establishing the list of vessels conducting IUU fishing;
2. Boarding and inspection;
3. Trade documentation and catch certification;
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4. Trade restrictive measures of the fish derived from IUU fishing;
5. Port state measures. Some elements in the measures involved are ports designation, early
entry notice, prior authorisation to land of tranship, fishing vessels inspection and the
enforcement of port state;
6. Fishing capacity control.
The enforcement for violations undertaken by fishing vessels by RFMOs lies heavily on flag
states responsibility with the combination of management measures adopted by RFMOs. For
WCPFC, once the fishing vessels allegedly conduct any violation, RFMO members should
investigate thoroughly and report the progress to the relevant RFMO as well as the actions
imposed or planned to be taken to respond to the suspected violation.1053 The cooperation
amongst members of RFMOs is required when a violation is taken in particular by the flag
states against their fishing vessels.1054 If it is discovered that a serious violation is based on
sufficient proof, the flag state would need to institute proceedings against the fishing vessel
without delay and impose sanctions of adequate severity. 1055 With regard to applying
sanctions against fishing vessels conducting IUU fishing, it is required that members of
ICCAT apply sufficient sanctions on their nationals and their fishing vessels conducting IUU
fishing.1056 ICCAT is also concerned over those non-members recorded on the IUU vessels
list to take all necessary efforts to combat IUU fishing, including, if necessary, the revocation
of registration and licences of the relevant fishing vessels.1057
Assessing fisheries crimes, in particular the listed 25 examples of unlawful activities as
outcomes of the panel of experts1058 would pose challenges concerning law enforcement to be
taken on the high seas. The complexity emerges from jurisdictional issues and random listing
of crimes. However, the listings in the document are presented as examples only and are not
regarded as a legal reference. As such, this section is not intended to cover nor assess all
those instances of listed crimes. By virtue of jurisdictional matter, some references can be
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cited from previous discussions. These are, freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, duty
to co-operate and flag state responsibility. These four principles lay down the basic references
in dealing with fisheries crimes conducted on the high seas.
The operation of transnational crimes such as illicit trafficking in drugs, human trafficking
and people smuggling can be extended to the high seas. Constitution of the ocean explicitly
regulates illicit drugs trafficking but neither human trafficking nor people smuggling appear
in the provisions. Article 108 of LOSC governs ‘all states to co-operate in the suppression of
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances engaged in by ships on the high
seas contrary to international conventions’.1059 As such, any state may request other states to
cooperate to combat the illicit traffic conducted by a ship flying its flag once the state has
reasonable grounds to believe that the ship is engaged in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances.1060 Apart from the LOSC, there exist some related treaties in force
regarding drugs trafficking such as the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 United Nations Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the 1988 Drug Convention).
The last convention is aimed at addressing trafficking problems.1061 It is important to note
that in the 1988 Drug Convention, a state party to the Convention can take appropriate
measures on the vessel of another party if the vessel engages in illicit trafficking on the high
seas, with the authorization of the related flag state.1062
Furthermore, in the case of human trafficking and people smuggling, the ship can be boarded
if the ship is stateless under Article 110 of the LOSC. This article governs warships or any
other duly authorized government ships or aircraft to assume justification to board a ship if
there is reasonable reason for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy, the slave trade,
unauthorized broadcasting, without nationality and in reality, has the same nationality as the
warship despite flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag.1063 The right of visit can also
be extended to human trafficking cases because trafficking in persons is frequently associated
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with slavery in modern practice. Unfortunately, the reference to slavery should be tested
further as this connection has not been invoked to exercise a right of visit for suspecting a
vessel is conducting trafficking in persons.1064
The other justification that can shed light on addressing human trafficking and people
smuggling in Article 110 (1) is the exclusion ‘where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty’.1065 It can be inferred from this article that states can secure the power to
intervene in any case, including these two crimes, provided that they consent to be bound by
bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between those like-minded countries. In
practice, states have signed various agreements concerning the right of visit governing
migration on the high seas. It needs to be achieved through a reciprocal basis and joint
patrol.1066
For state parties of UNTOC and Protocol of Migrants Smuggling, right of visit has been
stipulated in Article 8(2) which reads:
A State Party that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel exercising freedom of
navigation in accordance with international law and flying the flag or displaying the marks of
registry of another State Party is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea may so notify the
flag State, request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from the
flag State to take appropriate measures with regard to that vessel. The flag State may authorize
the requesting State, inter alia:
(a) to board the vessel;
(b) to search the vessel; and
(c) if evidence is found that the vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea, to take
appropriate measures with respect to the vessel and persons and cargo on board, as authorized
by the flag State. 1067

From this article, it can be observed that the authority to board, search and take proper
measures against such foreign-flagged vessels by the requesting state shall come under the
permission of the flag state. The problem to address people smuggling on the high seas
emerges when the vessels are from states that are neither party to the protocol of Migrants
Smuggling nor party to any bilateral or multilateral agreements. The provision regarding the
authority of right of visit in people smuggling protocol is not regulated in the protocol of
human trafficking. The lack of this provision shows a further loophole in the law enforcement
when trafficking of persons takes place on the high seas.
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It can be concluded that various hurdles would be faced when observing fisheries crimes on
the high seas. First of all, it is worth mentioning that the rules that apply on the high seas are
freedom of high seas comprising six freedoms including freedom of navigation and freedom
of fishing and flag state responsibility. The establishment of RFMOs is purposed to conserve
and manage fisheries resources particularly straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
species but it is not intended to limit the freedom of high seas including the freedom of
fishing. It was the International Law Commission that put it precisely in its commentary to
the draft articles for the 1958 High Seas Convention:
Any freedom that is to be exercised in the interests of all entitled to enjoy it must be regulated.
Hence, the law of the high seas contains certain rules, most of them already recognized in
positive international law, which are designed, not to limit or restrict the freedom of the high
seas, but to safeguard its exercise in the interests of the entire international community. 1068

When fishing vessels are flying the flag of a member of the RFMOs, the flag state should be
responsible for the violations committed by its fishing vessels. Therefore, it is principally
subject to the regulations of the flag state for the sanctions. The problem then becomes what
is called a flag of convenience or flag of non-compliance. In practice, it refers to some flag
states ‘that are unable or unwilling to prescribe and enforce laws necessary to, for instance,
ensure that the owners and operators of their fleet uphold minimum labour and safety
standards, or refrain from engaging in criminal activities’. 1069 If the fishing vessels are
registered under a flag of non-compliance, they may face insufficient sanctions to have a
deterrent effect or even fail to have any punishment imposed.
Secondly, the limitation to enforcing the law concerning non-fisheries violations such as
human trafficking, people smuggling, and illicit drugs that has taken place on the high seas
would relate to flag state responsibility. Again, this falls under the flag of convenience
circumstance and the punishment may be inadequate. Thirdly, if trafficking in persons can be
considered as a practice of modern slavery, then Article 110(1)(b) would apply1070 and the
right of visit can be justified. Nonetheless, according to Natalie Klein, a warship or
designated government vessel on service cannot seize the suspected vessel and prosecute on
board, unlike ships and their crews in the piracy case. In relation to this, it is the
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responsibility of flag states to make effective efforts to prevent and punish ‘the transport of
slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that
purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall ipso facto be
free’.1071
Therefore, it can be inferred that even if trafficking in persons can be regarded as modern
slavery, the authority to prosecute shall be the responsibility of the flag state. If the flag state
is committed to prosecuting, the perpetrators will be put behind bars, and vice versa.
Furthermore, while human trafficking may occur on the high seas, the only protocol to the
UNTOC that regulates the right to visit the suspected ship is the protocol of Migrants
Smuggling. Otherwise, like-minded states may conclude bilateral or regional agreements to
govern the common concerns amongst them on matters such as people smuggling and human
trafficking with respect to flag state jurisdiction.
3. Conclusion.
Part VII delivers discussion of the advantages and disadvantages in using the method of
fisheries crimes and serves as suggestions or reference for policymakers, scholars,
practitioners, and related institutions having concerns on the matter. This section also
attempts to respond to the research question on the benefits and drawbacks of the criminal
approach to combat IUU fishing.
1. Advantages
a. Eradicating Transnational Organized Crimes in Fishery Activities.
It is evident that fishing vessels have been misused by fishers to carrying out illegal activities.
The fishers are recruited by criminals due to their knowledge and skills and their role is
mostly to support the mastermind in committing transnationally organized crimes in the
fishery sector including fishing vessels.
A different approach to overviewing transnational crime activities in the sector of fisheries is
introduced through fisheries crime. Through this concept, the involvement of perpetrators of
transnationally organized crimes in the fisheries sector is reinforced. Although the legal
reference of fisheries crimes remains undefined, criminal activities within this concept share
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the same concept of criminal acts in transnational organized crimes. Fisheries crimes can be
deemed as a multi-layered phenomenon engaging cross-sectoral crimes, including economic
crimes committed across the entire value chain, from the capture of fish until the end process
presented to the consumers.
In the field, the engagement of transnational organized crime in the fishing industry has two
dimensions. Firstly, the direct involvement of major transnational organized criminal groups
and secondly, it is likely that the transnational fishing companies conduct both legal and
illegal business at the same time. The illegal catches are laundered by selling them with
legally caught fish products.
The fisheries sector is vulnerable to being utilized as a means to perpetrate transnational
organized crimes. In combatting this type of crime, studies have been taken including how to
link such crimes with illegal fishing. The method faces some challenges: first, IUU fishing
emerges from a voluntary or soft law instrument, that is, IPOA-IUU Fishing with the
objective to address non-compliance by using fisheries management regulations. Second, not
all activities in IUU fishing are necessarily illegal. Thirdly, the explanation of IUU fishing in
the IPOA-IUU does not cover criminal activities. As such, fisheries crimes can be conceived
as a breakthrough filling the loopholes that exist when connecting the problem of border
crossing organized crimes occurring along the value chain of the fisheries sector.
Furthermore, methods of fisheries crimes also offer double impacts in attempting to revive
the depletion of fish stocks and at the same time fighting against transnational organized
crimes. This comes from the idea that fisheries crimes cover various illegal activities in the
fisheries sector. In addressing fisheries crimes, criminal law enforcement measures should be
imposed to complement the traditional approach of fisheries management. Domestic
framework of sustainable development plays the main role in enforcing the law against
fisheries crimes. This advice is understood to be an effort to expedite the current issue of
crimes in fisheries.
b. Facilitate International Collaboration.
The Organized Crime Convention has stipulated the mechanism for cooperation. The need to
strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral stages has been affirmed
throughout the Convention. The Palermo Convention was designed to fight against particular
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criminal activities as well as to address the problems that the states are facing on international
cooperation.
The relevant legal frameworks involved in tackling cross-border organized crimes and other
sorts of criminal activity in the industry of fishing are, amongst others, the LOSC, the
Palermo Convention, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and the Compliance
Agreement. In regard to institutional overview, it encompasses international organizations
such as FAO, UNODC, IMO and INTERPOL. If IUU fishing is viewed merely as a fisheries
management problem which is under FAO’s mandate, then the cooperation on law
enforcement would find difficulties when addressing the crimes occurring along the value
chain of fisheries activities. In that sense, a transnational crimes approach can facilitate
international cooperation in addressing the problems through the engagement of different
institutions particularly the UNODC as guardian of the Palermo Convention.
c. Tightening Cooperation on Money Laundering and Confiscation of Assets.
Money laundering is commonly related to transnational crimes and it is largely connected to
the earnings of both traditional and more modern crimes. In accordance a report,
environmental crimes (including marine living resource crimes such as IUU fishing) assumed
the 3rd most common predicate offence of money laundering in the Pacific.
The method of laundering the money to other countries shows that the transnational nature of
this crime cannot be overlooked, and countries need to establish proper mechanisms or
instruments at every bilateral, regional and multilateral stage. It is evident that if countries
work together enhancing coordination, it will limit the distribution of money which in turn
restricts expansion of their operations. The Palermo Convention encourages countries to
eliminate money laundering through joint collaboration amongst member states. Three
aspects are brought to the fore to allow related authorities to cooperate; the legal frameworks,
enforcement of the law and regulation on financial matters.
d. Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance.
1) Extradition.
Amongst other mechanisms, the mechanism for international cooperation, extradition and
mutual legal assistance has been regulated in Article 16 and Article 18 of UNTOC. When the
perpetrators face trial as responsible for the crimes committed, they can be extradited to their
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country of origin. If cooperation does not exist, then it would be difficult to execute this
policy. It is most likely for that reason, that state parties of the UNTOC should strengthen
cooperation on extradition through either evoking the Convention or concluding bilateral or
multilateral treaties on the legal basis.
Indonesia has adopted a legal framework on extradition through Law Number 1/1979 on
Extradition. In the bilateral sphere, Indonesia has concluded eight treaties on extradition with
other states. In the list of the extradition treaty, Indonesia has laid the foundation to conclude
the treaty not only to the state parties but also to the non-state parties to the Palermo
Convention. It can be observed that Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, the
Republic of Korea, India and Viet Nam are parties to the Convention while the Independent
State of Papua New Guinea is not on the list as a state party to the Palermo Convention.
The classification of IUU fishing as a crime, regardless of environmental or wildlife, would
pose some issues in respect of unreported and unregulated fishing. It would be complicated to
include both terms as criminal activities if there is no duty to report and no regulation is
adopted. The problem of extradition imposition for unreported and unregulated fishing would
be problematic as such.
The perpetrators of fisheries crimes can be extradited if two conditions are met. The two
conditions are, firstly, if member states do not disagree for fisheries crimes to be additional
protocol of the Palermo Convention and secondly, if like-minded states agree to be bound by
extradition treaty, notwithstanding being challenged with limited success, at bilateral,
regional or multilateral levels, provisioning the fisheries crimes as extraditable crimes. In the
absence of a legally binding agreement, the reciprocity principle can be applied.
2) Mutual Legal Assistance.
The Palermo Convention governs a specific provision concerning mutual legal assistance. As
guidance, to have effective mutual legal assistance, the general principles have been tabled,
among others, on dual criminality. There are some exceptions in applying for mutual legal
assistance such as on a political offence and fiscal offence and military law. However, mutual
assistance shall not be refused on the ground of banks’ or similar financial institutions’
secrecy.
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Indonesia has adopted Law 1/2006 concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.
There exist six bilateral treaties between Indonesia and other countries and it is in the process
of discussion or negotiation with four other countries. The status of the conduct as a crime
plays an important role in assuming mutual assistance. As applied in the extradition treaty,
the lack of a criminal aspect on unreported and unregulated fishing makes it difficult to
secure mutual legal assistance. It would be a different story if a fisheries crimes approach is
taken. Although mutual assistance is regulated under the Palermo Convention, it is
unnecessary to include fisheries crimes as the protocol to the Palermo Convention for mutual
legal assistance. The mutual legal assistance can be extended to the countries by using
bilateral, regional or multilateral treaties or the reciprocity principle, provided that the
countries so agree.
e. The Enhancement of Cooperation on Joint Law Enforcement Investigation.
On the international stage, a coordinated transnational response is required to fight against
transnational organized crimes. When presenting IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, it would
be difficult for countries to enforce the domestic and international law alone without
cooperation from other countries because of the transnational character. For countries having
the same concerns on the prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU fishing and fisheries
crimes, they can strengthen bilateral or multilateral cooperation through legally or non-legally
binding agreements.
Considering that the cooperation between law enforcement and justice offices plays an
important role in the investigation and prosecution process, cooperation should be formulated
in the instrument with a legally binding character. This formulation can be achieved through
an instrument such as the Organized Crime Convention. At a practical level, it frequently
occurs that the investigators need to detect and gather proof from victims living in other
countries or to collect information aiming to verify and support the testimonials from
witnesses. This condition can be met when states parties to the Organized Crime Convention
cooperate in establishing a joint law enforcement investigation. This measure can also be
extended when curbing fisheries crimes. By treating this issue as a transnationally organized
crime, countries would obtain an advantage to strengthen and enhance their law enforcement
investigation.
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f. Pathway to the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.
The violation of fisheries laws and regulations when committed in a transnational and
organized fashion makes it possible to receive transnational treatment including the transfer
of sentenced persons. Nevertheless, it is not possible without ‘the crime label’ attached to it,
to obtain international cooperation as well as the adequacy of the domestic legal framework
of the relevant states.
Under the Organized Crime Convention, the arrangement on the transfer of sentenced
persons has been regulated under Article 17. Compared to the other provisions in the
Convention such as mutual legal assistance and extradition, the arrangement on the transfer
of sentenced persons is relatively shorter and does not go into much detail. The choice of
language is ‘softer’ than that used in mutual legal assistance and extradition.
Indonesia has neither established agreements with the other states nor adopted laws
regulating the transfer of sentenced persons aside from offers from several countries. This
hurdle is a real challenge. There exist 4415 Indonesia workers imprisoned in other countries.
Indonesia has initiated the making of a law on the transfer of convicted persons. A draft
academic paper has been concluded in 2013 and a bill circulated to the experts and the public
to garner input from them.
The stipulation of law as well as its bilateral and multilateral agreements on the transfer of a
sentenced person would bring more gravitas to Indonesia’s priority to endorse fisheries
crimes and IUU fishing before international forums. Several concerns should be taken into
account. Firstly, it gives more protection to Indonesians working in the sector of fisheries as
fishing vessel's crews or other employment related to fisheries. Secondly, it would
complement Indonesia’s strong commitment to endorse fisheries crimes in relation to the
Organized Crime Convention. Thirdly, by concluding the transfer of a sentenced person
agreement, Indonesia has expressed its will to protect the human rights of not only its
nationals committing crimes overseas but also citizens of foreign countries. Fourthly, in a
more technical matter, the transfer of sentenced persons program can arrange for the sending
and receiving states to cooperate and how to formulate and find the agreement on some
technical matters.

283

2. Disadvantages.
a. Dual Criminality as Preconditions Required for Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance.
Extradition cannot be performed on the convicted person without the presence of double
criminality since it is deeply embedded in the principle of extradition law. Dual or double
criminality is based on mutual obligations and the reciprocal account of the crimes committed
between the states. This criminality requirement will no longer be necessary when the
offences merely involve an organized criminal group and the extraditable individuals are
identified in the requested state without considering the presence of the transnational element
on the crimes committed.
The same circumstances applying to extradition in terms of double criminality are also
pertinent to mutual legal assistance practices. It is provided in Article 18(9) in which state
parties to the Organized Crime Convention may refuse to render mutual assistance in a case
where double criminality does not exist. Nevertheless, the state party may render assistance
when possible. In practice, double criminality is not always the case as the requirement for
legal assistance.
Articles 16(1) and 18(9) of the Palermo Convention govern dual criminality as the
requirement for extradition and mutual legal assistance. Hence, one of the hurdles of treating
IUU fishing and fisheries crimes under the Organized Crime Convention would be the double
criminality issue. A possible breakthrough comes from bilateral cooperation by concluding a
legally-binding agreement or between like-minded states to negotiate and adopt multilateral
treaties regulating extradition and mutual legal assistance. Through this arrangement and
legal instrument, state parties or member states can formulate and adopt extradition and
mutual legal assistance with the exception of illegal fishing and fisheries crimes. In order to
promote international cooperation, states construe or formulate dual criminality in a more
flexible fashion. The requested state should pay more focus on the total gravity of the alleged
crimes albeit with some differences of the component establishing extradition or mutual legal
assistance.
b. Challenges for International Convention as the Basis for International Cooperation.
1) The Scope of the Convention.
From the scope of the Convention, it can be observed that IUU fishing or offences in the
fisheries sector is not listed in the Convention. If fisheries offences are agreed by state parties
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to be transnational organized crimes under the Convention, two ways can be followed, these
are, by amending Article 3(1)(a) or making a new protocol supplementing the Organized
Crime Convention. Looking at the two processes, it would be more straightforward adopting
a new protocol for the reason that the member countries may have to ratify or not provide
their consent. However, the process to be part of it would pose a number of challenges to
conform with several classifications as transnational organized crime under the Convention.
2) Monist and Dualist Schools of Thought.
A further challenge that can be observed is the application of monism/dualism. This
implementation relates to national practices in perceiving international legal order in its
relationship with the domestic legal framework as both schools of thought approach
international treaties in a different manner. The essence of the monism tenet comes from the
notion that a treaty may, without legislation, become part of the national law when the treaty
has been adopted in accord with the constitution of the relevant state and the treaty has a
binding force for that state.
Meanwhile, the dualists are of the view that the international legal regime may have merged
into domestic legal order when the relevant state expresses its consent to be bound by a
certain treaty. In other words, the most important feature of dualism, distinguishing it from
monism, is that the formal status of a treaty can be granted in the domestic legal system in the
case where legislature enacts a regulation to integrate the treaty into the national law. Within
the framework of the Organized Crime Convention, dualism can be a challenge in the sense
that the time needed to become an integral part of domestic law system will vary amongst
states.
3) Reservation to a Treaty.
The performance of state parties in implementing a treaty, including the Organized Crime
Convention, is related to the provisions of reservation. Reservation can be observed as
limitation to the obligation of a treaty the state party should render because it is purported to
exclude or modify the legal effect of the treaty. In the Organized Crime Convention and its
protocols, the regulation on the reservation has been stipulated in some articles such as
Article 35 of the Organized Crime Convention, Article 20 of the Smuggling of Migrants
Protocol, Article 15 of Trafficking in Persons Protocol and Article 16 of Trafficking in
Firearms Protocol. These articles regulate the same arrangement on dispute settlements.
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Therefore, state parties may make reservation merely on how to resolve a dispute that may
occur during the application of the Convention and its Protocols. They are not allowed to
make reservation on the other articles apart from the settlement of disputes.
State parties may make the reservation only on the choice of forum when state parties’
consent to address the problems arising from the interpretation and application of the
Convention. If fisheries crimes or offences in fisheries are adopted to be additional protocol
to the Organized Crime Convention, the reservation would likely be allowed on the matter
concerning disputes settlement since the state parties to the Convention did not govern
reservation in a particular and independent clause but specifically in disputes settlement
provisions instead. The Organized Crime Convention follows the specified reservation rule
and it is not allowable to make reservation to provisions other than the particular permissible
clauses.
c. Different Legal Approach of States in Discerning Environmental Crimes.
Despite environmental problems faced by countries, environmental crimes often receive
improper response from some countries. This type of crime has been perceived by certain
countries as a less important issue than the other crimes and is usually sanctioned with an
administrative penalty. This approach has a minimum deterrence effect and the probability of
repeating the crime remains high.
The two principles of malum prohibitum and malum in se can be perceived as the basic
reference for countries to formulate their legal system in responding to environmental crimes.
A further specific explanation as presented pertains to the prosecution of the latter principle,
malum in se. The acceptance of ecocide as bona fide crime seems to be followed by countries
imposing strict criminal laws against environmental offences. Conversely, the latter
prosecution relies on the available sanctions without referring rigidly to criminal laws. Within
the perspective of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, the two principles explain the
complications that may emerge when endorsing fisheries offences as part of the
environmental scope within the crime’s perspective.
d. Fisheries Crime on the High Seas.
The other challenge when combatting fisheries crime is jurisdictional issue of law
enforcement on the high seas. This jurisdictional problem carries more complexity in
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addressing this transnational crime. The jurisdictional aspect in this context is highly relevant
in the sense of the response that states should have and the need to cooperate in enforcing the
relevant laws when the illicit activities take place at sea.
Under the LOSC, the freedom of fishing is granted to all countries. However, states shall cooperate in managing the fisheries resources and be obliged to impose the measures to control
their nationals when fishing on the high seas. The right to fish on the high seas is limited to
three conditions encompassing: 1) their treaty obligations; 2) rights and duties, as well as
interest of coastal states, as stipulated in Articles 63(2) and 64 to 67; and 3) the provisions of
the section. Assessing fisheries crimes, in particular, the listed 24 examples of unlawful
activities arising from the Fisheries Crime Expert Group Meeting, would pose challenges in
terms of law enforcement to be taken on the high seas. The complexity emerges from the
jurisdictional issue and random listing of crimes.
The operation of transnational crimes such as illicit trafficking in drugs, human trafficking
and people smuggling can be committed on the high seas. LOSC explicitly regulates illicit
drugs trafficking but neither human trafficking nor people smuggling are in the provisions.
Any state may request other states to combat the illicit traffic conducted by a ship flying its
flag once the state has reasonable grounds to believe that the ship is engaged in illicit drugs or
psychotropic drug trafficking. Apart from the LOSC, there exist some related treaties in force
regarding drugs trafficking such as the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, the 1971
Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Drug Convention.
It can be concluded that multiple hurdles would occur when observing fisheries crimes on the
high seas. First of all, the rules applied on the high seas entail freedom of high seas and flag
state responsibility. Secondly, the limitation to enforce the law concerning non-fisheries
violations such as human trafficking, people smuggling, and illicit drugs taking place on the
high seas would relate to flag state responsibility. It falls under the flag of convenience
circumstance and the punishment may not be effective. Thirdly, if trafficking in persons can
be considered as a practice of modern slavery, then Article 110(1)(b) would apply and the
right of visit can be justified.
Even if trafficking in persons can be regarded as modern slavery, the authority to prosecute
shall be the responsibility of the flag state. If the flag state is committed to prosecuting, the
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perpetrators will be put behind bars, and/or vice versa. Furthermore, while human trafficking
may occur on the high seas, the only protocol to the UNTOC that regulates right to visit the
suspected ship is the Protocol of Migrants Smuggling. Otherwise, like-minded states may
conclude bilateral or regional agreements to govern the common concerns amongst them on
matters such as people smuggling and human trafficking with respect to flag state
jurisdiction.
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PART VIII
CONCLUSION
1. Introduction.
IUU fishing and transnationally organized fisheries crimes are both global and national
problems. This practice also results in severe impacts on food security, sustainable
development and the economy. The general trend of the level of fish stocks shows a decline
based on the FAO assessment. This trend is not only occurring at a global level but also at the
domestic stage. Africa and the Asian Pacific Regions are actual examples of how developing
countries are severely affected by IUU fishing activities. Indonesia also faces the intricate
problem of IUU fishing, and it is severely affected by this practice including the loss of state
revenue, destroying the marine ecosystem and the plummeting level of fish stocks. As the
largest archipelagic state in the world blessed with abundant marine resources and with a
strategic location in the region, Indonesia is vulnerable to fish poaching. As the Minister of
Marine Affairs and Fisheries of Indonesia, Susi Pudjiastuti has been very active and forceful
in combatting IUU fishing. The efforts have come after President Joko Widodo envisioned
Indonesia as GMF and adopted the National Ocean Policy. The vision and document provide
strong support to put ocean affairs including IUU fishing at the top of the fishing agenda.
It is evident that IUU fishing is not a stand-alone problem in the fisheries sector. Along with
this activity, some other crimes are also committed such as people smuggling, trafficking in
persons, forced labour and drugs trafficking. The Indonesian government is greatly concerned
to eliminate IUU fishing and fisheries crimes and echoes this matter before international
forums. In the domestic sense, Indonesia has made some breakthroughs such as sinking
and/or burning illegal fishing vessels and establishing Task Force 115. MMAF under the
command of Minister Susi seems to be the frontrunner to combat IUU fishing and plays a
prominent role as a proponent of the concept of transnational organized fisheries crimes on
the global stage along with like-minded countries. In the influential conferences, Indonesia
holds a persistent view and acts as a traditional supporter of IUU fishing as TOC.
This thesis has the objectives of primarily identifying and analysing domestic legal and
policy frameworks in addressing IUU fishing and transnational organized fisheries crimes.
This thesis attempts to discover loopholes and then offer the solutions to fill those gaps.
Although focusing on the national level, it is appropriate to consider the international context
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of relevant laws and policies. In this respect, this thesis outlines domestic laws such as
Fisheries Law, Money Laundering Law and Ocean Affairs Law by taking into consideration
international “hard law” and “soft law” and relevant international cases on fisheries. In the
light of policy, this thesis provides a review of the measures taken by the MMAF to keep the
marine resources under Indonesia’s waters sustainable from IUU fishing and fisheries crimes
practices. After a thorough review, this thesis discovers some loopholes and offers the
measures to fill the gaps based on conceptual discussions on, amongst others, the terms IUU
fishing and TOFC.
In this thesis, environmental law is taken as the primary approach to depict the complexity of
the issues since this area of law has the character to emphasize the non-compliance approach
instead of a legally binding agreement to overcome an environmental problem. This thesis
also delivers the advantages and disadvantages of combatting IUU fishing from the
perspective of transnational organized fisheries crimes and holds the view that this policy
should be promoted further with due regard to the challenges. In this sense, Indonesia and
other like-minded states should be ready to negotiate with other countries that have differing
views on the subject matter. Some lessons from the struggle of Indonesia and other states to
secure archipelagic status can be applied to fisheries crimes policy.
2. The Reasons for the Research.
The number of researches around the globe focusing on the connection between the fisheries
sector, including IUU fishing and transnational organized crimes, has risen in the recent
years. UNODC as an international organization under the auspices of the United Nations
dealing with transnational crime has been very active in raising public awareness of, or
conducting research on, crimes that have a transnational dimension in the fisheries activity.
The development of this issue shows signs of progress since it was initially raised in 2008 by
delegates of the ninth UNICPOLOS meeting.
Indonesia was already a traditional supporter of IUU fishing as TOC before Susi Pudjiastuti
assumed the post as the minister in 2014. During her tenure, Minister Susi has persistently
advocated this policy and does not tolerate any activity that harms the sustainability of marine
living resources in Indonesia. Nonetheless, this policy seems to receive less response from
other countries than is expected. Countries are still reluctant to include IUU fishing as TOC
under the UNTOC. The concept of transnational organized fisheries crimes or fisheries
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crimes has been introduced by some countries including Indonesia to bridge the relationship
between illegal fishing and crimes transnationally organized. To the best of this thesis’
overview, this effort is still attempting to garner the support from countries through a series
of symposia in South Africa (2015), Indonesia (2016), Austria (2017) and Denmark (2018).
Although this policy has been set as a national agenda, limited research has been undertaken
to identify the main challenges. Taking into consideration these circumstances, this research
attempts to understand the shortcomings of the existing legal and policy response. Through a
deeper understanding, a solution can be offered to overcome the problems. This thesis also
contributes to the development of domestic law such as the amendment of the Fisheries Law.
3. The Results of the Research.
Part One
This part ultimately provides a background to the thesis. It starts with the considerable
contribution fisheries grant to humankind in terms of revenue, food, employment, protein and
other related aspects. Unfortunately, the level of fish stocks shows a general declining trend
and IUU fishing continues to be a major problem contributing to this trend. However, it is
common to discover criminal activities such as people smuggling, human trafficking, forced
labour and other crimes in this illicit practice. Indonesia is persistent in proposing IUU
fishing as TOC and fisheries crimes before the international community. This part finds some
challenges of this proposal such as the criteria of TOC that need to conform under UNTOC.
Another challenge comes from the three different terms of Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated fishing. None of these terms can be simplified as a crime. Illegal fishing has a
criminal dimension, but unreported and unregulated fishing would be difficult to classify as
crimes in that there is the absence of the obligation to report and regulation is not in place.
This part provides a brief overview on the gaps in policy and law and sets nine research
questions.
Part Two
Part two is devoted to examining the struggle of Indonesia to acquire archipelagic status. In
this part, the journey of Indonesia maritime history is chiefly divided into three phases; 1)
During the old kingdoms; 2) the Juanda Declaration; and 3) The adoption of the LOSC 1982.
The strategic location of Indonesia and its geographical features serve as the consideration in
assessing the geographical architecture of the country. In history, Indonesia assumes an
essential role as a maritime nation in the region. The maritime spirit is deeply rooted in
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Indonesia’s history. Chiefly, the two kingdoms shaped Nusantara during the 13th and the 14th
centuries, these being, Majapahit and Srivijaya. The Kingdom of Demak reached Malaka in
the 16th century and regarded it as a respected Islamic kingdom in Southeast Asia. The role of
the Bajau People was also imperative in spreading the maritime culture in the region.
Its history as a maritime nation lay down a strong foundation for Indonesia to claim
archipelagic status. Through the Juanda Declaration, Indonesia was declared an archipelagic
state and promoted its interests including unity and integrity. This declaration omitted the
pocket of high seas in between islands by extending territorial sea from 3 to 12 nautical miles
and claiming the waters inside ‘the blanket’ as internal waters. The rationales for the colonial
to apply the three nautical miles rule were: 1) The Netherland Indies needed Indonesia to be
fragmented; 2) It followed the same rule applied by the Dutch; and 3) The colonial had less
sense of belonging to Indonesia. This part offers discussion on the concept of an archipelagic
state and TZMKO and presents the case study of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries as the legal
basis of straight baselines connecting the outermost points. Indonesia conducted the search
for archipelagic state during the negotiations of UNCLOS I, II and III. Finally, the last
conference of the law of the sea adopted, amongst others, Articles 46, 47 and 48 governing
archipelagic states. In domestic law, the status was legally confirmed under Article 25A of
Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia 1945.
Two main lessons can be drawn from this part. Firstly, this part strengthens the notion that
Indonesia deserves to be a maritime nation. Secondly, the struggle delivers the message that
major marine countries refused the archipelagic concept when the Juanda Declaration was
initially launched. However, this concept was finally adopted in the LOSC 1982. The long
and painstaking process of obtaining the status can be beneficial as lessons learned for
Indonesia when proposing fisheries crimes at international level. Thirdly, the Juanda
Declaration enables Indonesia to protect its marine resources such as from the practice of fish
poaching in a more integrated way due to the omission of the pocket of the high seas.
Part Three
This part mainly scrutinizes the GMF doctrine introduced by the 7th President of Indonesia,
Joko Widodo. The previous part lays a foundation for the maritime vision that in fact has
existed in the past. Part Three finds that the vision is revisited through both the declaration of
Indonesia as a maritime nation and also as GMF. As a link, it touches upon a brief historical
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outlook to illustrate that maritime culture experienced a decline in the 16th century due to
three reasons; 1) The expansion of European countries; 2) The decline of old kingdoms; and
3) The dependency of the sea as the major route networks in Nusantara. This part also
examines the belief that Indonesia deserves to be a maritime nation based on history, its
status as an archipelagic state and the concept of maritime power.
The GMF declaration in 2014 initially was comprised five main pillars, but it has expanded to
seven pillars. In 2017, Indonesia adopted a national ocean policy to accelerate the
implementation of the doctrine. The document defines GMF as the vision of Indonesia to be a
maritime country internally sound and externally playing a role as a contributor to peace and
security in the region. Hence, it is not intended to be a dominant global maritime power
although the name global is itself a paradox. Nonetheless, this long-awaited document sheds
some light on the clear concept of Jokowi's Doctrine. The National Ocean Policy suggests
that the preservation of marine resources is one of the pillars and it falls under the fourth
cluster of maritime defence and security. Later, this group comprises maritime defence,
maritime security and IUU fishing in which the elimination of fisheries crimes is one of the
proposed programs. This thesis argues that the government employs this policy on the basis
of three main rationales: 1) IUU fishing has the same dimension as maritime defence and
security, and therefore; 2) IUU fishing should be addressed from the perspective of defence
and security; and 3) The measures to combat IUU fishing need to be integrated with defence
and security.
The policy to include IUU fishing promotes the following challenges:
1) IUU fishing consists of three different terms and it is improper to make the generalization
that the entire term, including unreported and unregulated fishing, poses a threat to
defence and security;
2) Some cases prove that transnational organized crimes may take place in the fisheries
sector and in this regard, a defence and security approach can play a role to combat this
practice including illegal fishing. Nonetheless, this approach should be reconsidered to
eliminate unreported and unregulated fishing;
3) The inclusion of fisheries crimes under IUU fishing should be reviewed since IUU fishing
and fisheries crimes are not always identical.
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This thesis further argues that illegal fishing and transnational organized crimes can be
categorized under the fourth cluster but unreported and unregulated should fall under the
cluster dealing with non-defence and security matters.
Part Four
This part focuses on policy overview of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes. The primary
reference to international policy concerning IUU fishing includes IPOA-IUU Fishing in this
respect. In this chosen document, the term IUU fishing is more of an explanation and it is not
intended as a legal definition. States have developed several policy instruments to overcome
IUU fishing such as Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Declaration and its Plan of Implementation
and the 2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 17 goals and 169 targets were agreed for
sustainable development demonstrating the determination of a new universal agenda. The
goals and targets commenced on 1 January 2016 and are projected to be applied until 2030.
The most related agenda to ocean affairs lies in Goal 14, that is, Conserve and Sustainably
Use the Oceans, Seas and Marine Resources for Sustainable Development encompassing
seven targets to achieve. Agenda 14.4 calls upon countries to have concern over sustainable
fisheries including the elimination of overfishing, IUU fishing and destructive fishing
activities. In regard to the possible connection between illegal fishing and transnational
organised crimes, UNGA has adopted Resolution 67/79 and 68/71.
UNODC has been very active in promoting fisheries crimes such as publishing research and
reports on the existence of TOC in the fisheries industry. In 2016, the Expert Group Meeting
on Fisheries Crime was held by UNODC and WWF to identify effective ways of addressing
TOFC and to promote the cooperation in prosecuting fisheries crimes, amongst others. The
experts attending this forum gave an explanation on fisheries crimes and included activities
regarded as the crimes in the annexe. In the explanation, the panel regarded fisheries crimes
as “serious crimes”. However, it is not intended to have the same scope as “serious crime”
provisioned in UNTOC but instead, extends to having an extensive impact on the community.
This part delivers the lessons that can be learned from the practices of the U.S and South
Africa in overcoming IUU fishing. The U.S Government conceives IUU fishing as its
national agenda through the establishment of the Presidential Task Force in Combatting IUU
Fishing and Seafood Fraud. The degree of presidential-level demonstrates that the President
supervises the matter directly. The Government has two powerful tools to combat IUU
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fishing, namely; the Magnuson-Steven Reauthorization Act and the Lacey Act. It is important
to highlight that the U.S publishes a set of recommendations for related domestic institutions
to take concrete and specific policies in combatting IUU fishing and seafood fraud. This task
force engages public participation inside and outside the country to formulate the
recommendations. Meanwhile, South Africa has a set of legislation including the Marine
Living Resources Act of 1998 and the National Environmental Management Act of 1998 as
its main reference to combat IUU fishing. Recent measures have been taken to eliminate IUU
fishing and fisheries crimes through international cooperation.
Indonesia makes a great effort to cope with IUU fishing and fisheries crimes through, to
name a few, moratorium policy, NPOA-IUU Fishing, the sinking of illegal fishing vessels,
the prohibition of transhipment, audit and evaluation of ex-foreign fishing vessels and the
like. Nonetheless, this thesis identifies some challenges such as the expiration of NPOA-IUU
fishing in 2016, protests from stakeholders, the potential lack of fish supply and
unemployment due to moratorium policy, the clear separation of the mandates of FAO and
UNODC and deficiencies of law enforcement. Having said that, this thesis suggests some
measures. 1) The formulation of NPOA-IUU Fishing of 2017-2021. This document should,
amongst others, encompass fisheries crimes and the GMF vision and set the target and the
timeframe to achieve that target. It is worth emphasizing that the only explanation on IUU
fishing in the domestic framework is found in this document; 2) MMAF should engage public
participation inside and outside the country; 3) A comprehensive study needs to be taken
before making a strategic policy; 4) It is necessary to make a distinction between the roles of
FAO and UNODC; 5) It is vital to overcome the deficiencies of law enforcement; and 6) The
formulation of SOP and guidelines to implement Task Force 115 duties and mandates.
Part Five
In the legal part, international legal frameworks along with challenges and the proposed
measures are provided. The LOSC is the main umbrella for all international regulations
governing ocean affairs. When fishing on the high seas, the flag state has ultimate
responsibility in managing and conserving marine living resources and combatting IUU
fishing. At the global level, two recognized legally binding instruments concerning flag states
responsibilities are the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 United Nations Fish
Stock Agreement. Another robust tool to address IUU fishing, based on the coastal state's
responsibility, is the PSM Agreement.
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As a supplement to international legal frameworks, cases on prompt release and advisor
opinion are presented. Some crucial principles applied are Articles 73 and 292 of LOSC. In
the case of detained vessel and crews which are not promptly released upon the posting of a
reasonable bond, flag states may bring the case before any court or tribunal as mutually
agreed upon by the parties. As of 26 October 2016, a total of 25 cases had been submitted to
the Tribunal. Most cases are related to prompt release (nine cases). Two cases applying those
two articles are the Case of the “Camouco” (Panama v. France) and the “Volga” Case
(Russian Federation v. Australia). Legal question on the amount of bond determined by the
arresting state as stated in Articles 73 and 292 of LOSC was addressed in those two cases.
The aspects to assess the reasonableness of bond or other financial security as inferred in the
“Camouco” Case match the adjudication of the M/V “SAIGA” Case.
With regard to the advisory opinion of ITLOS, there are 4 (four) questions submitted by
SRFC. For the first question, the Tribunal stated that the flag state shall undertake necessary
measures, exercise its jurisdiction and effectively control administrative matters over its
vessel and the flag state has an obligation to impose adequate sanctions over its fishing
vessels flying its flag when committing IUU fishing. In responding to the second question,
the Tribunal clearly made a reference to due diligence obligations from Articles 125 to 140 as
well as distinguishing between due diligence obligations and result obligations. For the third
question, it was reiterated that when the international organization has concluded a fisheries
access agreement with an SRFC member state, the international organization bears the
responsibility upon its member states. The tribunal responded to the last question by stating
that member states of SRFC have the right to conclude agreement with the other members of
SRFC to ensure the conservation and development of their shared stocks.
In the domestic sense, the foremost legal basis to preserve marine environment lies in Article
33(3) of the 1945 Constitution. Main legal reference on fisheries and its related crimes goes
to Fisheries Law No. 45/2009, Money Laundering Law No. 8/2010 and the regulations at
ministerial level. The assets are treated as the result of crimes if acquired from illegal
activities including crimes in marine and fishery or for other crimes involving imprisonment
for four years or more. This part also delivers the standard operating procedures to sink
or/and burn illegal fishing vessels as a legal basis to justify this distinctive measure and to
avoid the abuse or illegal action when imposing such policy. Indonesia also initiates fishery
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courts to promote prosecutorial effectiveness. The establishment of the courts are based on
three factors: 1) Fishery courts offer faster proceeding; 2) The lack of penalties on nonfisheries laws and regulations; and, 3) The lack of competence and capability of ordinary
courts.
This part identifies the shortcomings in the legal aspects; 1) Perceptions, practices,
approaches and domestic legal systems vary amongst states in observing and addressing IUU
fishing and fisheries crimes; 2) Domestic law does not provide the explanation or the
definition of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes; 3) Various terms of fisheries poaching such as
IUU fishing, transnational organized fisheries crimes, fisheries-associated crimes and
fisheries crimes; 4) Indonesia is not a state party to the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement the
2012 Cape Town Agreement and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention Number 188. In this
respect, this thesis suggests some points; 1) IUU fishing and fisheries crimes should be used
concurrently in international forums; 2) The amendment of Fisheries Law should include
IUU Fishing explanation or definition. Another way is to govern IUU fishing in a specific
law as lex specialis to Fisheries Law; 3) Invoke the explanation of fisheries crimes adopted in
the UNODC panel of experts as a starting point to promote a further discussion on fisheries
crimes; 4) Indonesia should express its consent to be bound by the 1993 FAO Compliance
Agreement, the 2012 Cape Town Agreement and the ILO Work in Fishing Convention
Number 188; and 5) Indonesia needs to consider adopting the elements of, or enacting a
regulation, similar to the Lacey Act.
Part Six
This part focuses primarily on environmental law in respect of curbing IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes. From its history, the transboundary ramification from the environmental
problem can be drawn from the Trail Smelter case and the Stockholm Declaration. Principle
21 of the Declaration offers the balance between the state's sovereignty and commitment in
preserving and protecting the environment. Moreover, the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development constitutes a major leap forward in achieving a more
sustainable order.
The discussion on the legal nature of international environmental law comes to the fore as on
one hand, legal instrument should be legally binding but on the other hand environmental
issues do not receive appropriate legal acknowledgment from the international community. It
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is commonly understood that the general practice of environmental agreements is still on a
voluntary basis to comply with the obligations. The agreements tend to develop noncompliance mechanism designed to secure compliance by the parties with the terms of a
treaty or decisions of the COP. It shows that countries continue to be reluctant to consent to
be bound by legally binding treaties on environmental issues. Some countries do not want
serious consequences when breaching environmental decisions or bilateral or multilateral
agreements. In this sense, the objective of treaties accommodating the non-compliance
approach is to assist state parties in conforming to their obligations rather than to observe
their disobedience and then render punishment. The non-compliance instrument adopted in
the Montreal Protocol can be comprehended as one of the key points in having a successful
environmental treaty in its negotiation and implementation as it offers a more flexible way for
countries to meet their obligation.
Research has reported that the losses of transnational value from environmental crime under
various sectors is estimated to be between of US$91-259 billion. IUU fishing takes fifth
position amounting to between US$15.5 billion and US$36.4 billion excluding the losses
from unregulated fishing and any IUU fishing in inland fishing. The report also poses a
challenge regarding the value of fisheries crimes. Its losses would be enormous as the crimes
would encompass other crimes such as human trafficking, people smuggling and other
relevant transgressions. It is worth mentioning that transnational environmental crime is a
crime in violation of law in the domestic sense, rather than at international level. The
breaches of any law do not constitute criminality nor punishment when criminal laws do not
impose them. Hence, it depends on the state whether or not its domestic law system includes
the violations of environmental regulations as crimes.
More in-depth research pertaining to the major driver and financial loss of environmental
crimes shows that there persist seven chief causes of TEC; corruption, lack of legislation,
lack of enforcement, mafias, corporate crime, conflict and increasing demands. While lack of
legislation occurs only at national level, the other significant drivers take place at combined
local, national, regional and international levels. Fisheries crimes, unfortunately, are not
regarded as an environmental crime. Two possible reasons could be: 1) The complication in
measuring the impact of fisheries crimes and 2) Illegal fishing is regarded as being coverd by
fisheries crimes.
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In respect of the connection between IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, it can be seen that
fisheries crime is part of IUU fishing. Within fisheries crime itself, other crimes such as
money laundering, human trafficking, corruption, document fraud are involved. These
transnational crimes are separated from IUU fishing activities if the definition of IUU fishing
in IPOA-IUU fishing is referred to. From the explanation of IUU fishing term in the IPOAIUU fishing, IUU fishing mainly uses management of fisheries and compliance issues and as
such, those undertakings presumably do not occupy criminal activities. It is important to note
that illegal fishing is clear-cut outlaw behaviour. However, unregulated fishing activities are
not always in contravention of any international laws. This is also the case of unreported
fishing. Another challenge comes from the broad explanation of illegal fishing that may lead
to inconsistency and confusion between the term “fishing” and its explanation as “any
activity” as well as creating a challenge when suggesting this description as a reference in
both the domestic and international sense, specifically when attempting to criminalize the
perpetrators of illegal fishing.
It can be interpreted that fisheries aspects are part of marine living resources. Even though it
is evident that marine living resource crimes are transnational in nature, the current legal
instrument of the Palermo Convention does not include the crimes as one of its protocols. The
difficulty falls when agreeing to “serious crime” under Article 2 of the Convention. Another
hurdle is drawn from a jurisdictional issue in which marine living resources crime will fall
under transnational classification if it is only committed in the territorial sea of other state/s.
Though some international legal instruments have been adopted to address marine living
resources crimes, countries have yet to adopt a legal regime particularly regarding the
punishment of marine living resources crimes at the global level. Relevant international
institutions pay meticulous concern to standard setting instead of to the enforcement of
criminal law for the perpetrators of environmental crimes.
Part Seven
This section responds to the research question on the benefits and drawbacks of a crime
approach to combat IUU fishing.
1. Advantages.
a. Eradicating Transnational Organized Crimes in Fishery Activities.
A different approach to the overview of transnational crime activities in the sector of fisheries
is introduced through fisheries crime. Through this concept, the involvement of perpetrators
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of transnationally organized crimes in the fisheries sector is reinforced. Although legal
reference of fisheries crimes remains undefined, criminal activities in this area share the same
concept of criminal acts as in transnational organized crimes. The engagement of
transnational organized crime in the fishing industry has two dimensions: 1) The direct
involvement of major transnational organized criminal groups; and 2) It is likely that the
transnational fishing companies operate legal and illegal business concurrently. The illegal
catches are laundered by selling them with legally caught fish products.
In combatting this sort of crime, studies have been taken including how to link such crimes
with illegal fishing. The measure faces some challenges. Firstly, IUU fishing emerges from a
voluntary instrument of IPOA-IUU Fishing with the objective to address non-compliance by
using fisheries management regulations. Secondly, not all activities in IUU fishing are
necessarily illegal. Thirdly, the explanation of IUU fishing in the IPOA-IUU does not cover
criminal activities. As such, fisheries crimes can be conceived as a breakthrough to fill the
loopholes that exist when connecting the problem of border crossing organized crimes
occurring along the value chain of the fisheries sector with the end goal of combatting and
eliminating the said crimes in a more integrated and effective manner. Furthermore, fisheries
crimes method also offers double impacts in attempting to revive the depletion of fish stock
and at the same time fighting against transnational organized crimes.
b. Facilitate International Collaboration.
The Organized Crime Convention has stipulated the mechanism for cooperation. The need to
strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral stages has been affirmed
throughout the Convention.
c. Tightening Cooperation on Money Laundering and Confiscation of Assets.
Money laundering is commonly related to transnational crimes and is largely connected to the
earnings of traditional and more modern crimes. It is evident that if countries work together
enhancing coordination, it will limit the distribution of money which in turn will restrict the
expansion of their operations. The Palermo Convention pays particular attention on countries
eliminating money laundering through joint collaboration amongst member states. Three
aspects are brought to the fore for related authorities to cooperate; 1) The legal frameworks;
2) Enforcement of the law; and 3) Regulation on financial matters.
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d. Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance.
Amongst others, the mechanism for international cooperation includes extradition and mutual
legal assistance which has been regulated in Article 16 and Article 18 of the UNTOC,
respectively. When the perpetrators face trial as responsible for the crimes committed, they
can be extradited to their country of origin. Indonesia has adopted a legal framework on
extradition through Law Number 1/1979 on Extradition. In the bilateral sphere, Indonesia has
concluded 8 (eight) treaties on extradition with other states. The perpetrators of fisheries
crimes can be extradited if two conditions are met: 1) If member states do not disagree for
fisheries crimes to be an additional protocol of the Palermo Convention and 2) If like-minded
states agree to be bound by the extradition treaty regulating the fisheries crimes as
extraditable crimes. In the absence of a legally binding agreement, the reciprocity principle
can be applied.
With regard to mutual legal assistance, the Palermo Convention governs a specific provision
concerning mutual legal assistance. As guidance, to receive effective mutual legal assistance,
the general principles have been tabled: 1) sufficiency of proof; 2) dual criminality; 3) double
criminality and the Palermo Convention in mutual legal assistance issues; and 4) limits on
transmission or use of information acquired by mutual legal assistance. However, legal
assistance can be refused for different reasons such as 1) The requested party can refuse the
request for legal assistance on political grounds; 2) Fiscal offence; and 3) Military law.
Mutual assistance shall not be refused on the grounds of banks, or similar financial intuitions,
secrecy. Indonesia has adopted Law 1/2006 concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters and has concluded six bilateral treaties.
As applied in the extradition treaty, the lack of criminal aspect in unreported and unregulated
fishing makes it challenging to secure mutual legal assistance. It would be a different story if
a fisheries crimes approach was taken. Although mutual assistance is regulated under the
Palermo Convention, it is unnecessary to include fisheries crimes as receiving mutual legal
assistance as protocol to the Palermo Convention. The mutual legal assistance can be
extended to countries by using bilateral, regional or multilateral treaties or reciprocity
principle provided that the countries so agree.
e. The Enhancement of Cooperation on Joint Law Enforcement Investigation.
On a practical level, it frequently occurs that the investigators need to detect and gather the
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proof from victims living in other countries or to collect information aiming to verify and
support the testimonials from witnesses. The condition can be met when states parties to the
Organized Crime Convention cooperate in establishing a joint law enforcement investigation.
This measure can also be extended when curbing fisheries crimes. By treating this issue as a
transnationally organized crime, countries would obtain the advantage to strengthen and
enhance their law enforcement investigation.
f. Pathway to the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.
The violation of fisheries laws and regulations when committed in a transnational and
organized fashion makes it possible for it to receive transnational treatment including the
transfer of sentenced persons. Nevertheless, it is not possible without ‘the crime label'
attached to it, and it needs international cooperation as well as adequacy of domestic legal
framework of the relevant states. Under the Organized Crime Convention, the arrangement
on the transfer of sentenced persons has been regulated under Article 17. The stipulation of
law on transfer of sentenced person as well as its bilateral and multilateral agreements would
bring more gravitas to Indonesia’s priority to endorse fisheries crimes and IUU fishing before
international forums. Several concerns should be taken into account including: 1) It bestows
more protection to Indonesians working in the sector of fisheries as fishing vessel’s crews or
other employment related to fisheries; 2) It would complement Indonesia’s strong
commitment to endorse fisheries crimes in its relations to the Organized Crime Convention;
3) Protecting the human rights of its nationals committing crimes overseas and citizens of
foreign countries alike; and 4) The transfer of sentenced persons program can provide
agreement on technical matters.
2. Disadvantages.
a. Dual Criminality as Preconditions Required for Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance.
Extradition cannot be performed on the convicted person without the presence of double
criminality since it is deeply embedded in the principle of extradition law. The same case
applying to extradition in terms of double criminality is also pertinent to mutual legal
assistance practices. It is provided in Article 18(9) in which state parties to the Organized
Crime Convention may refuse to render mutual assistance in the case that double criminality
does not exist. Nevertheless, the state party may render assistance when possible. In practice,
double criminality is not always the case as the requirement for legal assistance.
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It can be observed from the above explanation that under the Organized Crime Convention,
Articles 16(1) and 18(9) govern dual criminality as the requirement for extradition and
mutual legal assistance. Hence, one of the hurdles in treating IUU fishing and fisheries crimes
under the Organized Crime Convention would be the double criminality issue. A possible
breakthrough comes from bilateral cooperation by concluding a legally-binding agreement or
between like-minded states to negotiate and adopt multilateral treaties regulating extradition
and mutual legal assistance. In order to promote international cooperation, it is recommended
that states construe or formulate dual criminality in a more flexible fashion.
b. Challenges for International Convention as the Basis for International Cooperation.
1) The Scope of the Convention.
From the scope of the Convention, it can be observed that IUU fishing or offences in the
fisheries sector are not listed in the Convention. If fisheries offences are approved by state
parties to be transnational organized crimes under the Convention, two approaches can be
followed. The two approaches are by either amending Article 3(1)(a) or making a new
protocol supplementing the Organized Crime Convention.
2) Monist and Dualist Schools of Thought.
A further challenge that can be observed is the application of monism/dualism. This issue
relates to national practices in perceiving international legal order in its relationship with the
domestic legal framework as both schools of thought approach international treaties
differently. The most important feature of dualism as distinct from monism is that the formal
status of a treaty can be granted in the domestic legal system in the case where the legislature
enacts a regulation to integrate the treaty into the national law. Within the framework of the
Organized Crime Convention, dualism can be a challenge in the sense that the time needed
for legislature to become an integral part of the domestic law system will vary amongst states.
3) Reservation to a Treaty.
The performance of state parties in implementing a treaty including the Organized Crime
Convention is related to the provisions of reservation. Reservation can be observed as a
limitation to the obligation of a treaty the state party should render because it is purported to
exclude or modify the legal effect of the treaty. In the Organized Crime Convention and its
protocols, state parties may make reservation merely on how to resolve a dispute that may
occur during the application of the Convention and its Protocols. They are not allowed to
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make the reservation on the other articles but solely on the settlement of disputes. State
parties may make the reservation only on the choice of forum when state parties’ consent to
address the problems arising from the interpretation and application of the Convention. If
fisheries crimes or offences in the fisheries are adopted to be additional protocol to the
Organized Crime Convention, the reservation would likely be allowed on the matter
concerning disputes settlement since the state parties to the Convention did not administer
reservation in a particular and independent clause but instead specifically in disputes
settlement provisions.
c. Different Legal Approach of States in Discerning Environmental Crimes.
Environmental crimes have been perceived by some countries as being a less important issue
than the other crimes, and as such are usually sanctioned with an administrative penalty. This
approach creates minimum deterrence effect and high probability of repeating the crime. The
two principles of malum prohibitum and malum in se can be observed as the basic reference
for countries on which to formulate their legal system in responding to environmental crimes.
A further specific explanation is presented regarding the prosecution of the latter principle,
malum in se. The acceptance of ecocide as a bona fide crime seems to be followed by
countries imposing strict criminal laws against the environmental offence. Conversely, the
latter prosecution relies on the available sanctions without referring rigidly to criminal laws.
Within the perspective of IUU fishing and fisheries crimes, those two principles explain the
complication that may emerge when endorsing fisheries offences as part of the environmental
aspect from the crime’s perspective.
d. Fisheries Crime on the High Seas.
The other challenge when combatting fisheries crime is the jurisdictional issue of law
enforcement on the high seas. This jurisdictional problem carries additional complexity in
addressing this transnational crime. Jurisdictional aspect in this context is highly relevant in
the sense of the response that states should have and the need to cooperate in enforcing the
relevant laws when the illicit activities take place at sea.
Under the LOSC, the freedom of fishing is granted to all countries. The right to fish on the
high seas is limited to three conditions encompassing: 1) Their treaty obligations; 2) Rights
and duties; and 3) Interest of coastal states as stipulated in Articles 63(2) and 64 to 67 and 3)
the provisions of the section. Assessing fisheries crimes as listed, 24 examples of unlawful
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activities annexed to the Fisheries Crime Expert Group Meeting document would pose
challenges in terms of law enforcement to be taken on the high seas. The complexity emerges
from the jurisdictional issue and random listing of crimes.
The operation of transnational crimes such as illicit trafficking in drugs, human trafficking
and people smuggling can be extended to the high seas. The LOSC explicitly regulates in the
provisions, illicit drugs trafficking but neither human trafficking nor people smuggling. Any
state may request another state to combat the illicit traffic conducted by a ship flying its flag
once the state has reasonable grounds to believe that the ship is engaged in illicit drug or
psychotropic drug trafficking. Apart from the LOSC, there exist treaties governing drugs
trafficking such as the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Drug Convention.
It can be concluded that multiple hurdles would occur when observing fisheries crimes on the
high seas such as; 1) The freedom of high seas and flag state responsibility; 2) The limitation
to enforce the law concerning non-fisheries violations such as human trafficking, people
smuggling, and illicit drugs taking place on the high seas which would relate to flag state
responsibility. Therefore, it falls under the flag of convenience circumstance and the
punishment may not be effective; 3) If trafficking in persons can be considered as a practice
of modern slavery, then Article 110(1)(b) would apply and the right of visit can be justified.
Furthermore, while human trafficking may occur on the high seas, the only protocol to the
UNTOC that regulates right to visit the suspected ship is the Protocol of Migrants Smuggling.
Otherwise, like-minded states may conclude bilateral or regional agreements to govern the
common concerns amongst them on matters such as people smuggling and human trafficking
with respect to flag state jurisdiction.
4. Do Fisheries Crimes Offer a Better Approach to Combat IUU Fishing?
This section undertakes examination of the question whether or not transnational organized
fisheries crimes constitutes a better policy to curb IUU fishing. In responding to this question,
it is worth taking a look at the overviews provided in Parts VI and VII. As discussed in the
said two parts, a comprehensive background concerning environmental law and the benefits
and drawbacks of the transnational organized crime method have been presented.
Environmental law analysis of its relevant topics sheds some light on the positions of
countries when coping with marine environmental degradation. It can be learned that the
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practices of countries in discerning environmental problems are rooted in their fundamental
perceptions on environmental issues. Having said that, understanding this matter contributes
to making their views clear and lessons can be learned from such points of view.
The transnational character of IUU fishing encourages Indonesia to argue that IUU fishing
deserves to receive transnational treatment and to be part of UNTOC. Countries are still
reluctant to take the same position as Indonesia in this proposal for several reasons:
1. The different perceptions and practices of countries in perceiving illegal fishing in their
domestic regulations;
2. The criteria set out in the Organized Crime Convention concerning “serious crimes”.
Nonetheless, it is not necessary to obtain transnational activity status if it is not regarded as a
transnational organized crime as provisioned in the convention.
It seems Indonesia would join in any initiatives and would become a frontrunner in
addressing the problems of fisheries poaching. In its development, some countries such as
Indonesia, Norway and South Africa have promoted the concept of fisheries crimes. The lack
of an agreed definition of fisheries crimes gives rise to the difficulty of including the practice
under the convention. The explanation of fisheries crimes, including the related activities as
annex to the document concluded in the panel of expert meeting, leaves some questions
unanswered.
Although fisheries crimes pose some challenges, this thesis argues that the concept should be
promoted further based on the following reasons:
1. Providing a breakthrough to address marine living resources problems including the
degradation of marine stocks level;
2. Bridging the link between a mere fisheries management problem and transnational
organized crimes as commonly discovered in the fisheries sector;
3. Eradicating Transnational Organized Crimes in Fishery Activities;
4. Facilitating International Collaboration;
5. Tightening Cooperation on Money Laundering and Confiscation of Assets;
6. Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance;
7. The Enhancement of Cooperation on Joint Law Enforcement Investigation;
8. Pathway to the Transfer of Sentenced Persons.
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The reluctance of countries in joining the efforts to use this concept should not be perceived
as a major obstacle to making this idea an international norm. The Indonesian Government
needs to consider the struggle Indonesia faced when obtaining the status of an archipelagic
state. It was a painstaking process that had to pass through several stages from UNCLOS I to
III and took 47 years from the Declaration made by Prime Minister Juanda in 1947 until the
1982 UNCLOS entered into force on 16 November 1994. In Part II, it is thoroughly
demonstrated that the Indonesian delegations took some initiatives, as listed below, to garner
supports from countries:
1. Fostering the relationship with like-minded states such as Fiji, the Philippines and
Mauritius. Those countries including Indonesia had the same interests in having
archipelagic status.
2. Securing the support of developing countries and international organizations such as the
Organization of African Union;
3. Establishing ‘an alliance’ with those African countries that had different interests with the
aim of lending support to the agenda of each side;
4. Concluding bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries.
5. Maintaining good and non-confrontational approaches with opposing countries.
6. Fostering intensive communication with maritime powers.
The approaches taken by the Government of Indonesia when struggling to obtain
acknowledgment as an archipelagic country can be beneficial as lessons learned for Indonesia
when proposing transnational organized fisheries crimes before the international forums.
The concept of archipelagic states to some degree brought about a higher level of complexity
and was a more challenging case than the proposal to adopt fisheries crimes. Nonetheless,
both cases have similarity in their process in terms of the initial resistance from some
countries. The concepts also have evolved to a point where the resisting countries altered
their policy to be less restrictive than their previous positions. The distinction occurred when
the archipelagic concept was adopted under international convention, but the fisheries crimes
are still in the process of garnering more support from countries. The point that should be
kept in mind is that the link between IUU fishing and transnational organized crimes has
received better acknowledgment and acceptance than the initial measure when it was first
introduced in the ninth meeting of UNICPOLOS held in 2008. In the same year, the UN
Secretary-General regarded IUU fishing as a major challenge to peace and security in respect
to the food insecurity.
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The evolution process that has been illustrated in Part I suggests that the UNODC played a
strategic role in pushing this matter further by convening an expert group meeting to discuss
the presence of TOC in the fishing industry. This organization also published some papers on
the subject such as ‘Organized Crime Involvement in Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling
of Migrants’, ‘Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing Industry’ and ‘Estimating Illicit
Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and other Transnational Organized Crimes:
Research Report’ which raised public awareness.
In comparison with the archipelagic concept, the measure to combat IUU fishing by using the
transnational organized crime method bears more conceptual challenges such as:
1. Unclear definition of Fisheries Crimes;
2. Dual Criminality as Preconditions Required for Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance;
3. Challenges for International Convention as the Basis for International Cooperation;
4. Different Legal Approach of States in Discerning Environmental Crimes (Malum
rohibitum and Malum in se);
5. Fisheries Crime on the High Seas.
Addressing the list of drawbacks would be more difficult to overcome if in the sense they
involve the fundamental principles that a country follows. For example, countries with malum
rohibitum principle would be reluctant to amend their set of legislation to be a follower of the
malum in se school of thought. As such, the key to solving the problem is how to identify the
major and minor problems and then to find ways to reconcile those different principles based
on common ground. The archipelagic state provision in the LOSC is a result of compromise
between parties.
5. Next Steps.
There are some recommendations to follow:
1.

Revise the National Ocean Policy, in particular, the fourth cluster.

2.

Extend the expired NPOA-IUU Fishing.

3.

Try to find and introduce a more appropriate term to replace ‘fisheries crimes’ with a
more acceptable term such as ‘fisheries-related crimes’ as an attempt to accommodate
the discrepancies between states. The term ‘fisheries-related crimes’ will also be able to
be more easily defined. Another option is to make fisheries crime go further without
having a precise definition.
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4.

Another option to promote fisheries crimes is through the conclusion of a voluntary
instrument such as IPOA-IUU Fishing.

5.

Focus on domestic regulation to strengthen environmental regulation on the protection of
marine living resources.

6.

Try to identify the policy and legislation of major maritime powers with the largest
fishing fleets such as the U.S, China and Russia in responding to IUU fishing and
fisheries crimes. This identification aims to map their position and the appropriate
approach that should be taken.

7.

Diplomacy, through intensive approaches, should start to play a role in gathering more
support from relevant stakeholders.

8.

Set fisheries crimes or a more acceptable term as a national agenda item with a broader
ambit of attention from top decision makers such as the President and lawmakers.

9.

Make a timeline and also take steps to set a target.

10. Make a clear understanding between IUU fishing, fisheries crimes, transnational
organized fisheries crimes, crimes related to fisheries, crimes associated with the
fisheries sector.
11. Propose a preparatory meeting consisting of small-focused states.
12. Prepare to have an agreement with a compliance approach. The Stockholm Declaration
and other environmental agreements can be good references.
13. Propose to adopt a middle ground to reconcile the divergent views and practices of
countries in perceiving fisheries crimes.
6. Further Study.
1. How to be a major maritime nation. This thesis argues that Indonesia can be classified as a
maritime nation. However, the doctrine of GMF envisages Indonesia to be a major
maritime player in the global arena. By undertaking a further study, it can examine the
elements that Indonesia should adhere to in envisaging a major maritime nation by taking
into account domestic and regional strengths and weaknesses. Indonesia needs to
understand and cope with the major maritime players in the region such as China and
Japan before becoming a global maritime nation as envisioned in GMF.
2. The institutional framework. The reason to promote further research is to undertake more
in-depth research on ocean governance as this thesis limits its subjects merely to policy
and legislation. If the institutional aspect can be overviewed, three elements of ocean
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governance (policy, legal and institution) can produce interesting discussions and
comprehensive recommendations.
3. Legal overview in adopting the Lacey Act. It is necessary to have further study on
adopting elements of the Lacey Act into the domestic legal system. The most important
aspect of this study is to test whether or not long-arm jurisdiction as the main principle of
this Act can be applied to Indonesia legal practice.
7. Conclusion.
This thesis concludes that current policy and legal measures reflect the inadequacy in
combatting IUUF through the Fisheries Crimes approach and encompassing IUU fishing as
TOC under UNTOC. Nonetheless, this thesis argues that the fisheries crimes approach should
be considered as a breakthrough to overcome the depletion of fish stocks and the existence of
transnational organized crimes in the fisheries sector. This research has uncovered the
fundamental challenges that persist in the fisheries crimes. Having considered those
drawbacks, it is worth mentioning taking the lessons that can be learnt from Indonesia’s
struggle to obtain archipelagic status. The measures should also consider the character of
environmental law that have been discussed thoroughly in this thesis.
With regard to IUU fishing as TOC, it should be understood that IUU fishing consists of
three different activities and encompassing those three elements of illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing in the Organized Crime Convention would be exhaustive. Instead of
promoting this matter, this thesis argues imposing the hardest possible measures to combat
IUU fishing in the domestic sense by considering international law. This thesis proposes
some steps that can be treated as recommendations complementary to the proposed measure
to fill the loopholes discovered in the domestic policy and legal aspects. Finally, this thesis
recognizes that further study can be undertaken on these three issues.
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